

Frederik Boven

Cultural Citizenship. An Integrative Agenda for a Transdisciplinary Debate

Master's Thesis

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Cultural Citizenship: An Integrative Agenda for a Transdisciplinary Debate

Frederik Boven

Master's Thesis
Research Master Philosophy

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen

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“[T]he one outstanding virtue of the statesman”
is “understanding the greatest possible number of realities”
as they “open themselves up to the various opinions of citizens;
and, at the same time ... being able to communicate between
the citizens and their opinions so that the commonness
of this world becomes apparent”.¹

¹ Hannah Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics” (1990).

English ABSTRACT

The starting point for this thesis is a problem situation in the Netherlands: doubts have been raised as to whether ‘culture’ in the Netherlands contributes in the right way and degree to the functioning of citizens. This situation is described as a problem of ‘cultural citizenship’: an ‘essentially contested’ concept that points to some interaction between culture and citizenship, but leaves it open to interpretation what this interaction is. This flexibility allows the concept to open up a transdisciplinary debate that involves various fields and paradigms. The thesis aims to offer a research agenda for such a debate.

An integrative research agenda on cultural citizenship is formulated in two steps. First, seven authors from various fields and paradigms are discussed: the Dutch Council for Culture, Renato Rosaldo, Nick Stevenson, Paul Scheffer, Will Kymlicka, Jeffrey Alexander and Paul Ricoeur. For each of these authors research questions are formulated that reflect their work, 78 in total. Second, the research questions are reworked in a more structured and shorter list of 12 questions with sub questions.

The final result is a single normative question that integrates insights from all authors and that identifies three normative principles that should guide interventions in the Dutch problem situation: (1) make culture equally accessible to all citizens; (2) protect the richness and viability of culture; (3) balance unity and diversity.

Nederlandse SAMENVATTING (Dutch abstract)

Het startpunt voor deze scriptie is een probleemsituatie in Nederland: er zijn twijfels gerezen over de mate en wijze waarop ‘cultuur’ bijdraagt aan het functioneren van burgers. Deze situatie wordt beschreven als een probleem van ‘cultureel burgerschap’: een ‘fundamenteel omstreden’ concept dat verwijst naar een bepaalde interactie tussen cultuur en burgerschap, maar dat de aard van deze interactie open laat voor nadere interpretatie. Deze flexibiliteit stelt het concept in staat om een transdisciplinair debat te ontsluiten dat diverse velden en paradigma’s omvat. Doel van de scriptie is om een onderzoeksagenda te formuleren voor een dergelijk debat.

Een integratieve onderzoeksagenda voor cultureel burgerschap wordt opgesteld in twee stappen. Ten eerste worden zeven auteurs besproken uit uiteenlopende velden en paradigma’s: de Raad voor Cultuur, Renato Rosaldo, Nick Stevenson, Paul Schefer, Will Kymlicka, Jeffrey Alexander en Paul Ricoeur. Voor elke auteur worden vervolgens onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd die hun werk weerspiegelen, in totaal 78. Ten tweede worden deze onderzoeksvragen omgewerkt tot een beter gestructureerde en kortere lijst van 12 vragen met subvragen.

Het eindresultaat is een enkelvoudige normatieve vraag die inzichten van alle auteurs integreert en die drie normatieve principes identificeert die leidend zouden moeten zijn voor interventies in de Nederlandse probleem situatie: (1) maak cultuur gelijkkelijk toegankelijk voor alle burgers; (2) bescherm de rijkheid en vitaliteit van cultuur; (3) zoek een balans tussen eenheid en diversiteit.

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

This thesis is about ‘cultural citizenship’. This relatively new concept is used by policy makers and researchers to think about the relationship between culture and politics, the domain to which citizenship² traditionally belongs. New interactions between these two domains are at the forefront of Dutch public debate. When politicians dispute over the integration of immigrants, the representation of women in the media, or the effects that cutting art budget may have on citizens, they are debating cultural citizenship.

The concept of cultural citizenship is also of academic interest. In my home field of political philosophy it promises a fresh perspective on issues such as multiculturalism, citizenship, and political aesthetics. But the cultural citizenship debate involves other disciplines as well, notably anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies. My aim is to integrate ideas from all these disciplines, and formulate a shared research agenda.

Before we join this debate, in section 1.2, I should address the (unusual) style of this thesis, in the next section.

SECTION 1.1: The conversation frame and the debate frame

This master’s thesis is framed as a **face-to-face conversation**. That is, I want you to think of it as a conversation, in which I present my research project to an (unspecified) interlocutor. In light of this, most of the thesis is in **question-answer format**.³

Framing the thesis as a conversation is not just a rhetorical device. More fundamentally, it reflects how I conceptualize the communication in the thesis: as an interaction between reader and writer, each with their own structuring of the interaction.⁴ Framing academic discourse as a real-time simultaneous dialogue may be unusual.⁵ But in my

² Traditionally, ‘citizenship’ referred to legal membership of a political community. But be aware that in combination with ‘cultural’ it has often little to do with legal membership or state politics. Instead, it may refer to membership in cultural organizations, or being active and visible in the media.

³ From §1.2 onwards, and with the exception of chapters 4 and 5.

⁴ I use as a representational strategy a conceptual process that has been described in cognitive linguistics, called *fictive interaction*. The process involves using the schematic structure of face-to-face communication to organize thinking about more abstract domains. It was first described by Pascual, *Imaginary Trialogues: Conceptual Blending and Fictive Interaction in Criminal Courts* (2002). She defines ‘fictive interaction’ as follows: “the use of the schematic interactional structure of ordinary communication as an organizing pattern which can serve to conceptualize, reason, and talk about communicative as well as non-communicative entities, processes and relationships in conversational terms” (p. 1). Her view is that, as a matter of fact, key elements of the structure of the language we use derive from our experience with human interaction. I use this phenomenon as a strategy to render the text more accessible to a wide audience.

⁵ As Line Brandt points out, it is common in philosophy to think and talk about differences between thinkers from different times and places as an ongoing debate. In some cases this philosophical ‘debate’ is construed

defence, other ways of making the reader's perspective explicit are established in academic discourse.⁶ For example, scholars often use phrases such as "let us...", or "we now report on". The 'us' and 'we' in these phrases also explicitly include the reader. They reflect a similar representational strategy.

More importantly, the conversation frame furthers the communication process in two ways. First, it helps me, as the writer to structure my thoughts. It prevents my thought from becoming monological, forcing it to take an interactive form. Second, my use of the conversation frame should offer the reader clear entry points into my trains of thought. My hope and belief is that this format will render the text more accessible to a wide audience.

The 'conversation' will unfold in **four steps**, each of which will occupy a separate chapter. In this chapter, we will talk about the problem that my research addresses. In chapter 2, I will explain to my interlocutor the key concepts that I use. In chapter 3, I will identify a large number of research questions, which will be integrated into a more manageable number in chapter 4. In the concluding chapter, we will step back from the conversation and round up the results.

Before we dive into the subject matter of cultural citizenship, in the next section, I should clarify that I use another, related, frame, to make sense not just of my thesis but of my project as a whole. This is the debate frame. I will say that I am **preparing an agenda for a debate**. This is not a debate that you could physically attend to, but, as I will explain below, a 'fictive' debate.

Just as with the conversation frame, discussed above, I have a deliberate strategy behind this. The basic idea is to use our experience with actual debates, which you could attend, to help us think about more abstract interactions, which you can't. My aim, then, is to facilitate such a 'fictive' debate.⁷ In chapter 3 and 4, where the actual work will be done, the debate frame will prove particularly helpful.

It is now time to begin the conversation, in the next section, and make clear what this 'debate' is all about.

as a real-time simultaneous conversation. Cf. Brandt, "A semiotic approach to *fictive interaction* as a representational strategy in communicative meaning construction" (2008), and idem, *The Communicative Mind: A Linguistic Exploration of Conceptual Integration and Meaning Construction* (2013), p. 122-124. Brandt cites an example in which a modern philosopher engages in a real-time 'dialogue' with Kant. On this example, see Fauconnier & Turner, *The way we think: conceptual blending and the mind's hidden complexities* (2002) p. 59-62. On the use of the dialogue form in philosophy, see also Hyland, "Why Plato wrote dialogues" (1968).

⁶ See Fløttum et. al. " 'We now report on...' Versus 'Let us now see how...': Author Roles and Interaction with Readers in Research Articles" (2005); Hyland, "Bringing in the Reader: Addressee Features in Academic Articles" (2001).

⁷ 'Fictive' here does not mean fictitious, but refers to a mental construct that is half-way between 'real' and 'imaginary'. The intended referent (the discourse on cultural citizenship) is real, but it is mentally accessed via the different (and in that sense non-genuine) experience of a real-life dialogue. Cf. Pascual, *Imaginary Trialogues*, p. 4-5. On this notion of 'fictivity', see Talmy, "Fictive motion in language and 'ception'" (1996).

SECTION 1.2: 'The Dutch windmill': a problem situation in the Netherlands

Can you first tell me where your project is coming from? What drives your research?

My research has wider relevance, but it starts from a problem situation in Dutch society. The problem is this: from different perspectives, doubts have been raised as to *whether cultural institutions, processes and sources in the Netherlands contribute in the right way or degree to the formation and functioning of citizens*.

In the Netherlands, the relationship between culture and citizenship is now highly contested. The problem may not be new, but it has risen to new prominence since the turn of the century. More precisely, the relationship between culture and citizenship is contested in three ways, corresponding to three meanings of 'culture'. These different meanings all touch on citizenship, like three windmill wings that share an axis. I will therefore refer to the problem situation as 'the Dutch windmill' (see figure 1).




Figure 1: The Dutch problem situation represented as a wind mill

On the red mill wing, ‘culture’ refers to what sets **immigrants** apart from people who originate from the Netherlands, i.e. nationality, ethnicity, and religion. Since 1990, immigrants from non-western countries, who are (perceived to be) Muslim, have been represented as ‘different’ from and a threat to ‘being Dutch’, especially in the media.⁸ So-called ‘populist’ politicians and opinion makers have called into question the civic loyalty of (Muslim) immigrants.⁹ On the other hand, many immigrants, even from the second-generation, self-identify as ‘Turkish’ or ‘Moroccan’, not Dutch.¹⁰ This is not a matter of legal rights. Immigrants certainly have (after a few years of residence) the same rights as other citizens. But in terms of public debate¹¹ and public policy¹², the Netherlands indeed have witnessed a ‘decline of multiculturalism’, and a ‘return to assimilation’¹³.

On the white mill wing, culture refers to **the symbolic representation of other minorities**, regardless whether they are immigrant or not. The Netherlands are known

⁸ Roggeband & Vliegthart, "Divergent framing: The public debate on migration in the Dutch parliament and media, 1995–2004" (2007). Their research shows that framings in the Dutch parliament have been more diverse than framings in the media, which have been dominated by the Islam-as-threat frame.

See also Shadid, "Public debates over Islam and the awareness of Muslim identity in the Netherlands" (2006). Shadid shows that although Muslims have been present in the Netherlands since the 1960's, they were initially neglected, and only became stigmatized until the 1990's. For a recent analysis of the interplay between culture and power in the Dutch integration debate, see Uitermark, *Dynamics of Power in Dutch Integration Politics: From Accommodation to Confrontation* (2012).

⁹ See Dronkers, "The Netherlands: One Nation Under God? Christendom, Citizenship and the Re-Sacralization of National Loyalty" (2011); Schinkel, "The Moralisation of Citizenship in Dutch Integration Discourse" (2009).

Debates over dual citizenship are a case in point. The Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders in particular has raised questions about the civic loyalty of politicians with two passports. See De Hart, "The End of Multiculturalism: The End of Dual Citizenship? Political and Public Debates on Dual Citizenship in The Netherlands (1980-2004).

¹⁰ Verkuyten & Martinovic, "Immigrants' National Identification: Meanings, Determinants, and Consequences" (2011); Verkuyten & Yidiz, "National (Dis)identification and Ethnic and Religious Identity: A Study Among Turkish-Dutch Muslims" (2007). National self-identification by the majority is also not a given, but is mediated by salient representations of the nation. See Smeekes et al. "Mobilizing opposition towards Muslim immigrants: National identification and the representation of national history" (2011)

¹¹ Psychological research shows that ordinary citizens have a much more stable and positive attitude towards multiculturalism than public debates in the media and Parliament and may suggest. Cf. Breugelmans et. al., "Stability of Majority Attitudes toward Multiculturalism in the Netherlands between 1999 and 2007" (2009) Schalk-Soekar et. al., "The concept of multiculturalism: A study among Dutch majority members" (2008)

¹² Penninx, "Dutch immigrant policies before and after the Van Gogh murder" (2006).

¹³ There is wide agreement that some backlash against multiculturalism has taken place in the Netherlands. See e.g. Prins, "The nerve to break taboos: new realism in the Dutch discourse on multiculturalism" (2002); Vasta, "From ethnic minorities to ethnic majority policy: Multiculturalism and the shift to assimilationism in the Netherlands" (2007); Entzinger, "Changing the rules while the game is on; From multiculturalism to assimilation in the Netherlands" (2006); Prins & Saharso, "From toleration to repression: the Dutch backlash against multiculturalism" (2010); Alexander, "Struggling over the mode of incorporation: backlash against multiculturalism in Europe" (2013)

There is some disagreement, however, about the magnitude of this shift. Some Dutch scholars argue that the Netherlands never were very multicultural to begin with. Cf. Duyvendak et. al. (2012), "Deconstructing the Dutch multicultural model: A frame perspective on Dutch immigrant integration policymaking"; Duyvendak et. al., "Questioning the Dutch multicultural model of immigrant integration" (2009); See also, Vink, "Dutch Multiculturalism: Beyond the Pillarisation Myth" (2007).

Will Kymlicka claims that the backlash against multiculturalism, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, is not as severe as is often suggested. Kymlicka, "The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accommodation in diverse societies" (2010); idem, "Review of Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn's *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and its Discontents* (2008)

for their progressive legislation, for example on abortion, same-sex marriage, and drugs. However, there are three caveats to this progressiveness.

The first is that the cultural recognition of minorities such as gays and women lags behind their legal equality. There is no doubt that in the Netherlands gays and women are equal for the law, but there is still reason for concern about their representation in the media¹⁴, and their equal treatment in the streets.¹⁵ A second caveat is that majority views remain contested by (mostly religious) minorities. Some people in the Netherlands are afraid that the influx of large groups of Muslims will jeopardize the cultural progress that has been made since the 1960's, and which has come to be seen as the hallmark of 'Dutchness'.¹⁶ Third, there are many other minorities the citizenship of whom may not be fully realized, such as the handicapped and chronically ill,¹⁷ and psychiatric patients.¹⁸

For these three reasons, the symbolic recognition of minorities is still at the forefront of public debates in the Netherlands.

On the blue mill wing, 'culture' points to **the cultural sector**, i.e. the arts, cultural heritage, creative industries and the media. In 2007, the Dutch *Council for Culture* had come to realize that processes and institutions in these areas had become of increasing importance for the proper functioning of democracy.¹⁹ The Council therefore called for a more active role for the government. Particularly, the government should safeguard the accessibility of cultural institutions and information, and aid citizens in navigating a changing public sphere. Since the 1990's, the public sphere and public deliberation in the Netherlands had changed significantly.²⁰ Commercial television and radio stations were introduced in the Netherlands, as well as new media, such as the internet. There have

¹⁴ E.g. Bergman & Van Zoonen, "Fishing with false teeth: women, gender and the Internet" (1999); Peter & Valkenburg, "Adolescents' Exposure to a Sexualized Media Environment and Their Notions of Women as Sex Objects" (2005); Ter Bogt et. al. "Shake It Baby, Shake It": Media preferences, sexual attitudes and gender stereotypes among adolescents" (2010)

¹⁵ Buijs & Hekma, "As long as they keep away from me': The paradox of antigay violence in a gay-friendly country" (2011)

¹⁶ Bohemen et. al. "Seculiere intolerantie: Morele progressiviteit en afwijzing van de islam in Nederland" (2012); Hekma, "Queers and Muslims: The Dutch Case" (2011); Mepschen et. al., "Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands" (2010); Duyvendak. et. al., "Culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands" (2009); Roggeband & Verloo, "Dutch women are liberated, migrant women are a problem: the evolution of policy frames on gender and migration in the Netherlands, 1995–2005" (2007); Spruyt, "Can't We Discuss This? Liberalism and the Challenge of Islam in the Netherlands" (2007); Duyvendak et. al., "A multicultural paradise? The cultural factor in Dutch integration policy" (2005); Hekma, "Imams and homosexuality: A post-gay debate in the Netherlands" (2002)

¹⁷ Ootes, "Being in place: Citizenship in long-term mental healthcare" (2012); Duyvendak, "New frontiers for identity politics? The potential and pitfalls of patient and civic identity in the Dutch patients' health movement" (2007); Houten & Bellemakers, "Equal citizenship for all. Disability policies in the Netherlands: Empowerment of marginals" (2002)

¹⁸ Oosterhuis "Self-Development and Civic Virtue: Mental Health and Citizenship in the Netherlands (1945–2005)" (2007); Pols, "Washing the citizen: washing, cleanliness and citizenship in mental health care" (2006); Kal, "Kwartiermaken, creating space for otherness" (2012)

¹⁹ Cf. Raad voor Cultuur, "Innoveren, Participeren!" (2007)

²⁰ Cf. Boomkens, "Cultural citizenship and real politics: the Dutch case" (2010)

been worries in the Netherlands that politics have become too closely intertwined with the media, and as a result has become personalized and popularized.²¹

In addition, several Dutch scholars have asked for attention to be paid to a changing relationship between citizenship and education in the humanities.²² These concerns may also be considered to belong to the ‘cultural’ sector, if it is understood as the sector that deals with the creation, interpretation and renewal of meaning.

Corresponding to these three senses of ‘culture’ are three sense of ‘citizenship – just as each wing of a real mill is attached to the same axis, but to a different part of it. In relation to immigrants, citizenship refers to nationality, but for other minorities, such as gays, citizenship is rather about equality and visibility in the civil sphere. In the cultural sector, citizenship is about access to cultural information and institutions.

We now have before us three sets of meanings, each consisting of the pair ‘culture’ and citizenship’. This structural similarity allows me to fold the issues that they bring to the fore into a single, but multifaceted, description: it is a problem of **cultural citizenship**. As I see it, the question at the heart of all these issues is: *how are culture and citizenship related, and how should they be?*

To answer your question, the aim to develop a better understanding of and response to ‘the Dutch windmill’ is what ultimately drives my research.

Without going into details, can you give me an overview of what it is that you are trying to achieve with regard to this problem?

My aim, in this thesis, is to integrate, in a methodical way, divergent perspectives on the ‘the Dutch windmill’, from a number of scientific fields and paradigms as well as from stakeholders in Dutch society. It is principally **integrative research**, which seeks to generate knowledge by bringing together existing perspectives on culture and citizenship in the context of this problem situation in Dutch society.

There are now several bodies of knowledge about interactions between culture and citizenship. A wide range of scholars and stakeholders in Dutch society are addressing

²¹ See van Santen, *Popularization and personalization: a historical and cultural analysis of 50 years of Dutch political television journalism* (2012). Her conclusion is that there concerns about the popularization of political journalism and personalization of politics are unjustified. See further Van Santen & Vliegthart, "From political information to political entertainment? Political TV-program genres in Dutch election periods, 1956-2006" (2010); Van Zoonen & Holtz-Bacha, "Personalization in Dutch and German Politics: the case of the talkshow" (2000)

²² See Waaldijk, "Talen naar cultuur: burgerschap en de letterenstudies" (2005); Veugelers, "A humanist perspective on moral development and citizenship education"(2011) ; Miedema & Bertram-Troost, "Democratic citizenship and religious education: challenges and perspectives for schools in the Netherlands" (2008); Ter Avest & Miedema, "Religious citizenship education. Towards a new post-pillarized approach for all schools in the Netherlands" (2011)

aspects of the problem. However, their knowledge is specialized along one or several dimensions: it targets a specific group (Muslims but not women, or gays) or a specific domain (new media but not traditional communication), and does so from a specific field (sociology, not philosophy) and a specific paradigm (psychoanalysis, not structuralism). This specialized research has its own merits, but I believe that to increase the societal significance and impact of such knowledge a more **holistic approach** is required. If the societal problem I target is multifaceted and indeterminate, so should be my research.

I am intervening in **the cultural citizenship debate**, as I call it. I use the phrase in two ways, which I will refer to as debate¹ and debate². Debate¹ refers to an existing debate, which revolves around the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’. This debate is quite inclusive on some dimensions. For instance, it spans an array of academic fields, such as anthropology, cultural studies and philosophy. Beyond academics, policy makers, opinion makers and politicians have also contributed to the debate. But if we look at paradigms (which operate across several fields) debate¹ is not as inclusive as it could be. Influential paradigms such as structuralism and phenomenology are not part of the debate. From a societal perspective this is unfortunate, as it means that not all problem definitions and solutions paths that are possible are considered.

Debate² refers to my ideal of having a debate that is also paradigm-transcending.²³ This debate will still revolve around ‘cultural citizenship’, but the concept will have been emancipated from its current use and taken on a wider meaning.²⁴ The wider concept will have swallowed up related phrases, such as ‘multicultural citizenship’, and ‘culture and citizenship’. Scholars and stakeholders who were not talking with each other will now be drawn into the same debate. My intervention then, takes debate¹ as its starting point, and moves it beyond its current limitations, in the direction of debate². To have maximal significance for Dutch society, the debate on cultural citizenship must become more like that society in its diversity of perspectives.

²³ In cognitive linguistic terms, both debates are ‘fictive realities’ in the sense that they project schematic structure from genuinely situated debates unto the different reality of written discourse. Only debate² is in addition ‘counterfactual’: it is an unrealized scenario I use to evaluate the actual development of this discourse. In the counterfactual scenario the range of participants in the ‘debate’ is much wider than in the actual discourse. On the use of counterfactuals to frame research, see Turner, “Counterfactual Blends as Instruments of Research in the Social and Behavioral Sciences” (1996). On ‘fictive realities’, see Langacker, “Virtual reality” (1999).

²⁴ I am not the first to call for a broadening of the cultural citizenship debate. Indeed, a recent volume on does exactly that, see *Cultural Citizenship in Political Theory* (2010), eds. Vega & Boele van Hensbroek. The authors of this volume aim to “stretch the political-theoretical discussion of cultural citizenship beyond the narrow agenda of contemporary liberal discourse” (p.5). Their concern is that the writings of political philosophers such as Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, are one-sidedly liberal. There is, however, another way to frame the debate. Philosophers such as Kymlicka and Taylor articulate a link between culture and citizenship, but do not use the precise word combination ‘cultural citizenship’. I focus instead on people who do use this phrase, i.e. scholars in the social sciences and humanities, and policy makers. Framed thus, the debate is not one-sidedly liberal but one-sidedly postmodern, and the challenge is to make room for other, so-called ‘modernist’, perspectives. Moreover, this debate is not at all limited to political theory, but rather spans a wide range of disciplines within the human and social sciences, and in addition includes proposals made by societal actors.

I aim to **develop an integrative agenda** for debate²⁵. In so doing, I will apply two families of methods. For the integration itself I will use **transdisciplinary methods**.²⁵ These methods were designed to distinguish and render connectible several *disciplinary* perspectives, but I believe that they can also be used for other types of integration, such as the bringing together of diverging cross-disciplinary paradigms.

Before I can integrate these perspectives I must first describe them separately. For this description I will draw methods and theoretical tools from **cognitive linguistics**, a framework that has emerged in the last three decades and is now fairly established in linguistics. Novel is that cognitive linguistics regards language as emerging from and reflecting human cognition.²⁶ Cognitive linguists regard language as structured by the same patterns and forces as other cognitive capacities. Cognition is seen as (partly) structured by experience, i.e. so-called ‘embodied’ experiences (e.g. handling things or moving through space), and situated interactivity, (e.g. face-to-face conversations).²⁷

My research question sums up my intention: *can an integrative agenda be developed for a transdisciplinary debate on cultural citizenship, if so, in what way?*

It sounds to me as a lot to take on. How do you delimit your research? In other words, what are you not doing?

²⁵ Methodically, I draw on Bergmann et. al, *Methods for transdisciplinary research: a primer for practice* (2012). Originally published in German as idem, *Methoden transdisziplinärer Forschung: Ein Überblick mit Anwendungsbeispielen* (2010).

²⁶ This is a break with linguistic approaches that dominated the 20th century, which regarded language as symbolic signs or processes unique to the so-called ‘language faculty’ and thus unrelated to the rest of what happens in the mind.

²⁷ In cognitive linguistics, the idea that everyday physical experience constrains cognition and language was first developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. See Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason* (1987); Lakoff & Johnson, *Philosophy In The Flesh: the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (1999); idem, "Why cognitive linguistics requires embodied realism" (2002).

On situated intersubjectivity as a constraint on cognition and language, see Verhagen, *Constructions of Intersubjectivity: Discourse, Syntax, and Cognition* (2005); Zlatev. et al., *The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity* (2008); Dancygier, & Sweetser (eds.), *Viewpoint in Language: A Multimodal Perspective* (2012); Pascual, *Fictive Interaction: The Conversation Frame in Thought and Language* (forthcoming);

On the relationship between embodiment and intersubjectivity, see Zlatev, "What is in a schema? Bodily mimesis and the grounding of language" (2005); idem, "Embodiment, language and mimesis" (2007); idem, "Phenomenology and cognitive linguistics" (2010). See further Kimmel, *Metaphor, Imagery, and Culture. Spatialized Ontologies, Mental Tools, and Multimedia in the Making* (2002); idem, "Culture regained: situated and compound image schemas" (2005); idem, "Properties of Cultural Embodiment: Lessons from the Anthropology of the Body" (2008);

Regarding the philosophical tradition, Cognitive Linguistics has affinities with pragmatism (William James), perceptual phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty) and authorial hermeneutics (Dilthey). On James, see Tim Rohrer "Pragmatism, Ideology and Embodiment: William James and the philosophical foundations of cognitive linguistics" (1996). On Merleau-Ponty, see Johnson, "Merleau-Ponty's Embodied Semantics: From Immanent Meaning, to Gesture, to Language" (2006), and Sambre, "Fleshing out embodied language and intersubjectivity: An exploration of Merleau-Ponty's legacy to cognitive linguistics" (2012). On Dilthey, see Geeraerts, "The return of hermeneutics to lexical semantics" (1992).

First of all, **the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ mutually delimit each other**. The problem situation in the Netherlands is actually far more extensive than ‘the Dutch windmill’ on which I focus. None of these further issues will be addressed here. I am not concerned, for example, with the formal nationalisation of immigrants, with legal issues surrounding same-sex marriage, or the intrinsic value or economic benefits of a strong cultural sector. I deal with culture *only insofar it relates to citizenship*, and with citizenship *only insofar it involves a cultural dimension*. That is, research on ‘cultural citizenship’ is not the sum of culture research and citizenship research, but homes in on the particular problem of their interaction.

My research is further restricted to **reflections** on cultural citizenship, which are relatively detached from everyday experience. Specifically, this thesis targets writings by scholars or by opinion and policy makers with an academic background. This reflective level is only one of three levels on which the cultural citizenship debate actually operates. I will not be dealing with the other two levels²⁸, at least not directly.²⁹

Finally, I am concerned with the **integration** of perspectives rather than trying to advance or fully understand any one in particular. You should know that concentrating your efforts on a single discipline is only one way to focus research. Examining what connects or separates various perspectives is not necessarily less focussed. Rather, it is another way of achieving focus, which is just as legitimate.

²⁸ The second level is that of activism. It involves citizens, politicians, and interest groups, who are actually negotiating issues of cultural citizenship. They may not explicitly be using the word citizenship, but they are claiming cultural citizenship for themselves, or denying it to others.

The third level is that of experience, specifically pre-reflective and pre-discursive experience. Before we start talking and arguing about it we may already be caught up in issues of cultural citizenship: we are appearing to others, and participating in a shared and public world (or we fail to). Think of looks of disgust at two gay men who are kissing in the street, or the inaccessibility of a museum to someone in a wheelchair.

²⁹ Scientists and policy makers are never so detached that they cease to be citizens, and human beings, which makes it impossible to separate these levels entirely. When they are writing on cultural citizenship, they may also be claiming cultural citizenship for certain groups. For example, I will discuss the work of Renato Rosaldo, whose reflections on cultural citizenship at the same time claims a fuller citizenship for Latinos in the USA. In addition, most of the authors I discuss use basic experiences to think about culture and citizenship. A case in point is Paul Scheffer, a Dutch author, who uses fragile objects that are in danger of falling apart as a metaphor for Dutch society. But that is still different from focusing on activism or experience directly.

CHAPTER 2: Key concepts

We now have an overview of your project, and a sense of the context out of which it arises. Next, let us home in on your key concepts. What are they?

My key concepts are the three concepts in the title of this thesis: (1) ‘cultural citizenship’, (2) ‘transdisciplinary debate’, and (3) ‘integrative agenda’ (see table 1).

TABLE 1: three key concepts	
cultural citizenship	foregrounds interactions between culture and citizenship
transdisciplinary debate	debate between people from various academic disciplines and action contexts, or figuratively, between diverging bodies of knowledge
integrative agenda	research agenda that is framed by a societal problem as a whole and relevant to diverging fields, paradigms, groups and societal sectors

SECTION 2.1: Cultural citizenship

You offered some examples, but I still find it difficult to see what cultural citizenship is. Can you define cultural citizenship?

That is a good question, but one that has no easy answer. The short rejoinder is that it is a relatively new concept to articulate **interactions between culture and citizenship**. The concept emerged in the last 25 years to clarify that being a full citizen is not only a matter of social or political rights, but also a matter of culture. Citizenship has cultural dimensions as well, for example being respected in the street, being equally represented in the media, or having cultural knowledge and resources. Without these dimensions, citizenship is not all it can, and should be.

Unlike citizenship rights, which you either do or do not have, cultural citizenship is a matter of degree.³⁰ You cannot, legally, be half a citizen, but in a cultural sense people are. A case in point is the immigrant who has been naturalized but who is still treated as

³⁰ Unlike legal citizenship, cultural citizenship is a graded concept. It involves the degree to which group members are represented by themselves and others as a citizen. Group members may be represented as a ‘full’ citizen (that is, without qualification), as a ‘lesser’ citizen, or as not a citizen at all.

an outsider. In addition, cultural citizenship is context dependent. For instance, two gay men who kiss in public may be respected in some neighbourhoods, but be called names, or molested, in others. All this makes cultural citizenship a fragile achievement.

That cultural citizenship is a cultural achievement is most apparent in the case of minorities who are perceived as ‘other’, as their claims to being ‘fully’ or ‘really’ a citizen are contested. But the ease with which majority members may achieve recognition as a full citizen should not blind us to the fact that cultural citizenship may be a difficult feat for them as well. Biased media, for example, may make it difficult for any citizen to have access to role models, or to knowledge about the wider cultural context. In the same vein, cultural activities do not stand on their own, but are carried by a chain of organisations (e.g. schools, distributors) and individuals (e.g. technicians, performers). No citizen can secure a rich cultural sector on his or her own; this is no different for majority members than it is for minorities. If culture matters for citizenship, it does so for all citizens.

The long answer to your question is that cultural citizenship, like many political concepts, is an **essentially contested concept** (see figure 2). This idea was introduced by Scottish philosopher W.B. Gallie to account for the fact that concepts in politics³¹ do not have a single meaning that will ever be agreed upon by all its users.³²

For example, the concept of democracy has no agreed upon meaning, but may be used variously in the sense of (1) ‘citizens’ right to choose their government’, (2) ‘the participation of citizens in politics’, or (3) ‘the equality of all citizens’. Now, Gallie suggests that all three senses of the word are diverging interpretations of a *shared exemplar* or prototype. I will refer to it as the **uncontested core** of the concept.³³




Figure 2: democracy as an essentially contested concept

³¹ To be precise, Gallie’s theory was not restricted to political concepts but also applied to concepts in the humanities and social sciences more generally.

³² William B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts” (1956). To be clear, I do not subscribe to Gallie’s view of concepts as rationally constructed categories with fixed boundaries. Nor do I concur that only a special subset of concepts are contested. Research in categorization has shown that most if not all concepts have fuzzy boundaries and are prone to different interpretations. Even so, the idea of essentially contested concepts remains valuable if it is taken to mean that ambiguous concepts have a prototypical core, and that political concepts are especially prone to contestation. Cf. Paul Chilton, “Political terminology” (2006).

The notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’ has been integrated within a cognitive linguistic framework by George Lakoff, in *Thinking Points* (2006) and *Whose Freedom* (2007). On earlier suggestions by George Lakoff, see Alan Schwartz, *Contested Concepts in Cognitive Social Science* (1992), and Jason Patent, “A Unified Account of Essentially Contested Concepts” (2001).

³³ Following Lakoff, *Whose Freedom* (2007), p. 23-34. I seek to liberate the term ‘uncontested core’ from his cognitive linguistic assumptions about how that core is represented (i.e. as a so-called ‘image schema’).

In the case of democracy, this core is formed by an age-old tradition of aspirations and revolts, such as the ideals of the French Revolution. Because they all derive from the same prototype, various uses of the word ‘democracy’ can be said to belong to a single *concept*. However, as they offer rivalling interpretations of a shared exemplar, we must distinguish them as different *conceptions*. If the uncontested core is complex enough so that something can be said for each conception, each conception is at the same legitimate and essentially contested.³⁴

The adjective *contested* is chosen precisely because it may activate the cultural frame of a sport or game contest. W.B. Gallie compared conflicts over the boundaries and the meaning of concepts to a competition between rivalling teams during a gaming or sport tournament. In this framing, what Gallie calls ‘concept’ corresponds to the championship that all teams compete for, whereas a particular ‘conception’ corresponds to the playing styles of one of the teams. The uncontested core, finally, corresponds to a team from the past that all present teams recognize as exemplary, and which embodied the championship they all compete for.

That is all very well, but I do not see how this helps us to understand what cultural citizenship means. Why do you need this whole theory to answer what I thought was a simple enough question?

Well, if I am right that cultural citizenship is an essentially contested concept, your question (‘what is cultural citizenship?’) is not as simple as it may seem. In fact, it falls into **three sub questions** (see table 2).

TABLE 2: three sub questions			
1	Do conceptions of cultural citizenship share an <i>uncontested core</i> ?	a weakly structured prototype	descriptive put to an observer
2	What are the different <i>interpretations</i> of this uncontested core?	many competing conceptions	descriptive put to an observer
3	What interpretation do you <i>advocate</i> ?	one particular conception	prescriptive put to a contributor

First sub question: is there an uncontested core shared by diverging conceptions of cultural citizenship? We should not expect to find highly structured features that are common to all conceptions. Instead, we should look for a weakly structured prototype, to which each conception has a family resemblance. For cultural citizenship, this weakly structured core consists of the directive to **find a meaningful interaction between culture and citizenship**.

³⁴ In analytical political philosophy, Gallie’s distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ has been made famous by John Rawls, who employs it in *A Theory of Justice* [1971], p. 5., and Ronald Dworkin, who applies

Second sub question: what are the different *interpretations* of this uncontested core? The focus shifts from what different conceptions may have in common to what sets them apart. These interpretations correspond to Gallie's *competing conceptions*. We can look at some example later.

Taken together, these two questions demand a linguistic description of the concept of cultural citizenship. This description is not neutral, as it starts from certain linguistic assumptions about how concepts in general are structured, but it does not presuppose any strong opinions about cultural citizenship in particular. For this reason, the first two questions are for a relative observer, such as the moderator of the debate, rather than for anyone who is involved in the debate in the role of debater.

By contrast, **the third sub question** demands the involved perspective of a debater who participates in the debate. It asks for an involved opinion rather than for a detached description. The third sub question is: which interpretation do you *advocate*, and why? This is a prescriptive question, which asks for one conception of cultural citizenship in particular. As we will see, it is this question that authors on cultural citizenship usually try to answer in their writings on the subject.

Your last sub question is the one I would like to ask. Why bother with all these other interpretations if they are not your own?

I can see where you are coming from. However, I would like to remind you that I practice a special kind of research, which is best described as integrative. The whole purpose of my research is to integrate these interpretations that you would like me to disregard. In order to do so, I must first understand what they have in common. That is why my first sub question zooms out to the uncontested core that all these conceptions may have in common, rather than zooming in on one conception in particular.

There is no ready-made answer to my first sub question in the literature on cultural citizenship, although some of the more reflective literature comes close. To take a case in point, an early chapter on the development of the concept attributed its “explanatory power” to a “paradoxical juxtaposition of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ ”.³⁵ The authors emphasized that instead of explaining practices in terms of culture or citizenship separately, the concept of cultural citizenship draws attention towards “how they act upon each other”.³⁶ This is a good starting point for understanding the core meaning of cultural citizenship: it has to do with **interactions between culture and citizenship**. In the same vein, a recent article points out that “to talk about cultural citizenship means to

it in *Taking Rights Seriously* (1977), p. 132-137.

³⁵William V. Flores & Rina Benmayor, “Constructing Cultural Citizenship” (1997), p. 6

³⁶ Ibid.

articulate some link between culture and citizenship”.³⁷ To rephrase your question: it is possible to describe this interaction and this link with more precision?

I will do so with the help of W.B. Gallie’s theory of ‘contested concepts’. You should know that this theory is always applied to *single* concepts, e.g. ‘democracy’ or ‘freedom’. Our problem is somewhat different, as ‘cultural citizenship’ is a *complex* concept, which combines two existing concepts into a new one. The problem can thus be re-described as follows: how can the idea of a shared *exemplar* be transposed to the somewhat different case of a complex concept?

The transposition will involve two steps. The first step is to re-interpret what Gallie called shared *exemplar* in terms of schema theory. I maintain that the shared *exemplar* is a schema.³⁸ Such a schema combines two functions. On the one hand, it provides some common structure that constrains, regardless of context, how the concept may be used. On the other hand, the schema leaves blanks that are filled in differently depending on the context in which the concept is used. This allows me to re-describe the question with more precision: what schematic structure do different conceptions of cultural citizenship share, taking into account the internal complexity of the concept?

The next step of the transposition is to move from a schema that structures a simple concept to a schema that structures a complex concept.³⁹ You can imagine this operation as follows. We start at a plane where we see only single concepts, one in each view. First we see only ‘culture’ before us, then only citizenship’. In both cases, the concept takes up

³⁷Vega & Boele Van Hensbroek, “The agendas of cultural citizenship” (2010), p. 245. The authors caution that, so understood, the concept “broaches a very general problematic”, after all, “it is not too difficult to bring several such links to mind”. For this reason, they readily move on to a much thicker conception of cultural citizenship. I agree that such a general understanding of the concept does not offer enough guidance for developing a theory of cultural citizenship. But the minimal guidance it does offer may still be suited for a transdisciplinary debate, which has different objectives.

³⁸ Following Lakoff, *Whose Freedom* (2007), p. 23-34. Lakoff claims that essentially contested concepts have an uncontested core which consists of an ‘image schema’: a non-propositional pattern that provides meaningful organization on the level of perception and motor activity. This claim follows from his assumption that meaning is constrained and enabled by embodied experience. For a philosophical defense of image schema theory, see Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (1987), and more recently his “The philosophical significance of image schemas” (2005). In linguistics, see George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind* (1987). What is important for my current analysis is the basic idea of a schema, not so much the specific (embodied) nature of the constraints it involves according to Johnson and Lakoff.

³⁹ My explanation will draw on Michael Kimmel. He is an anthropologist who (like me) comes to cognitive linguistics from the outside, and who has a way of explaining technical concepts in cognitive linguistics in a way that is more accessible to non-linguists. I will rely on his dissertation: Kimmel, *Metaphor, Imagery, and Culture. Spatialized Ontologies, Mental Tools, and Multimedia in the Making* (2002).

Kimmel explains that a complex concept (such as cultural citizenship) can be represented as a network of ‘mental spaces’ (see p.358-360). It should be pointed out that mental spaces have nothing to do with spatial cognition or physical space. Rather, these ‘spaces’ refer to conceptual domains within which linguistic and other sorts of information can be conceptualized (reality, fiction, dream, desire). ‘Culture’ and ‘citizenship’ constitute, in and of themselves, two different mental spaces. These spaces have their own features, but may be mapped with each other and fused in a conceptual integration network. Depending on context, different aspects of both domains may be recruited in the integration, which explains why ‘cultural citizenship’ means different things in different disciplines. The idea of ‘mental spaces’ originates with Gilles Fauconnier, *Mental Spaces* (1985).

our entire visual field. Next, we zoom out, broadening the scope of our vision until we have both concepts in view, simultaneously. We can now see that the two concepts are apart but related. Finally, we direct our attention towards the relationships between the concepts, and we perceive that they form a network. The uncontested core that we are after, then, is **the schematic structure of this network**.

My assumption is that schematic structure is not confined to the semantic level, i.e. the meaning of concepts, but also operates at the level of syntax structures, such as the structure of concepts.⁴⁰ This means that to understand what ‘cultural citizenship’ means we must understand **how ‘content’ and ‘form’ work together** to create new meaning. When we try to comprehend ‘cultural citizenship’, for the first time, we must juggle three schemas: a content-schema internal to the culture concept, a content-schema internal to the citizenship concept, and a form-schema that structures their relationship.⁴¹

How are the content-schemas of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ related to the form-schema that structures their relationship? The proposal I support is that the content-schemas fit into the form-schema, like objects in a container.⁴² The concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ emerges when ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’, however they are defined, are placed into a structural relationship. Without further context, all we can say about the nature of this relationship is that is one of interaction: some sense of culture interacts somehow with some sense of citizenship.

In conclusion, my answer to your question is this: the core that different conceptions of cultural citizenship share is not so much a certain meaning as a certain form, which without further context can only be characterized in very abstract terms as a structural relationship of interaction. The uncontested core of the concept of cultural citizenship consists of the instruction to **combine culture and citizenship in a relevant and meaningful way**, without yet filling in what is relevant or meaningful.

I will take your word for it that this is how it works, but knowing that does not help me a bit. All I want to know is what the concept of cultural citizenship can do for me. A good student would be able to explain that to me in simple terms. Let me try again. What does cultural citizenship mean?

⁴⁰ Following Kimmel, I draw on the so-called the ‘spatialization of form hypothesis’: the idea that people use generic multipurpose schemas to structure the relationships between abstract concepts. On this view, the conceptual structures that organize the relations between concepts are not unique for abstract thought, but derive from existing schemas, e.g. image-schemas that derive from perception and motor-control. See George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind* (1987). Cf. Kimmel, *Metaphor, Imagery, and Culture*, p. 339-345.

⁴¹ On the distinction between content- and form-schemas, see Kimmel, *Metaphor, Imagery, and Culture*, p. 350-356.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 350

I understand your frustration, but it has less to do with what I am willing to do. Rather, it has to do with my role as a transdisciplinary researcher. Had I been talking to you as a philosopher, engaging in purely philosophical research, I would have been able to give you the one definition I would use in my own work. But in my role as transdisciplinary researcher, I have to deal with a whole range of interpretations.

I have explained what all these interpretations have in common, but for my project it is just as important to understand what separates them. That is why I formulated my second sub question as I did. I have to ask for your patience a bit longer, and explain first why there are so many different interpretation of ‘cultural citizenship’.

I said that a concept like ‘cultural citizenship’ involves three schemas. Now, each of these schemas can be the occasion for rivalling interpretations. First, the **constituent concepts** ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ (structured by content-schemas) are ambiguous themselves.⁴³ In section 1.2, I discussed three different sets of meanings as they occur in Dutch society today. Depending on the context, the word ‘cultural’ in the phrase ‘cultural citizenship’ may refer to the home-culture of immigrants, to a ‘different’ lifestyle, or to the cultural sector. Correspondingly, ‘citizenship’ may refer to national membership, to visibility in the public sphere, or to access to cultural institutions. I can now describe this with more precision: what precise conceptual entities different authors on cultural citizenship bring into a relationship differs from context to context.

Empirical studies on conceptual combination confirm that **two concepts can often be combined in more than one ways**. For example, an ‘elephant tie’ may be used in the sense of ‘a tie with pictures of elephants on it’, of ‘a very large tie’, or even of ‘a tie worn by a circus elephants’.⁴⁴ In each reading, different aspects of the concepts of ‘tie’ and ‘elephant’ are selected as bridge heads for interrelating them. They form different conceptions of ‘elephant tie’, which have in common only that they result from the same kind of cognitive process, i.e. the interaction of ‘elephant’ and ‘tie’. ‘Cultural citizenship’, then, is formed in a similar way as ‘elephant tie’, but here the process is less tractable because the concepts involved are more complex.

What is more, even if the meanings of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ were the same in each case, what would count as the most relevant **interaction between them** would still depend on the particularities of the context. Clearly, there is more than one way in which the cultural sector interacts with citizenship. For example, citizens are both users and producers of ‘culture’ and, they deal with different kinds of culture (e.g. media, art). Further, culture can be about citizenship, as in a film that represents the struggle of a citizen to be respected, visible or active in public life. In sum, the content and the form of

⁴³ In cognitive linguistic terms, in isolation, they have only (image) schematic structure, which can take on a number of instantiations when used in a particular context.

⁴⁴ Cf. Wisniewski, "Construal and Similarity in Conceptual Combination" (1996)

the concept can be combined in different ways depending on the context. Because the content and the form can work together in more than one way, the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ is open to many interpretations.⁴⁵

Can you at least give me an example of how this ambiguity may give rise to different interpretations of cultural citizenship?

Well, let us compare two conceptions as they have emerged in the literature on cultural citizenship (see table 3). I will refer to them as **academic conceptions**, because they fill in ambiguities in the uncontested core on the basis of the background assumptions of a particular academic field and paradigm.

⁴⁵ Following Kimmel, understanding ‘cultural citizenship’ involves bringing two mental spaces from a state of disconnection into a state of spatial coincidence (see p. 406). When you first encounter the term ‘cultural citizenship’ the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ are spatially distinct. If they can be related it is only as abstract ‘tokens’. You understand that *a* connection between ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ is required, but you cannot yet see or select a connection both meaningful and relevant. You may either fail to see any possible connection, or see several possibilities at the same time, without being able to choose between them.

The relevant meaning is grasped when the relevant features of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ are embedded in a foreground space that connects them, while the other qualities recede in a background space (Fauconnier calls it the Base or Parent space). The foreground space ‘imbues’ the abstract tokens with concrete qualities. In other words, the disciplinary conception introduces a temporary *focus*: some qualities of the constituent concepts are foregrounded, while other qualities recede in the cognitive background.

For detailed cognitive-linguistic descriptions of this process in adjective-noun compounds (such as ‘cultural citizenship’), see Fillmore, “Frame semantics” (1982); Coulson & Fauconnier “Fake Guns and Stone Lions: Conceptual Blending and Privative Adjectives” (1999); Sweetser “Compositionality and blending: semantic composition in a cognitively realistic framework” (1999); Tribushina, *Cognitive reference points: Semantics beyond the prototypes in adjectives of space and colour* (2008); idem, “Reference points in adjective-noun conceptual integration networks” (2011).

This literature analyses combining adjectives and nouns as a special case of conceptual integration, and draws on a development of Mental Space Theory (called Blending Theory), which emphasizes the emergence of new meaning from the partial integration of small pockets of meaning.

This kind of analysis makes two contributions. First, it shows and explains that the meaning of the nominal compound ‘cultural citizenship’ is not always reducible to the sum of its parts (‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’). Instead, finding a suitable connection between ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ may require considerable conceptual restructuring. The ‘focus’ that Kimmel talks about (Sweetser and Tribushina call it ‘active zone’, following Langacker and the terminology of cognitive grammar) need not light up qualities that were already part of the constituent concepts prior to the integration, but may imbue them with new qualities. For example, citizenship may now refer to ‘digitally accessing a museum collection’, even though citizenship has little to do with surfing the internet in other contexts. This may be why people often find the contribution of the second half of the term ‘cultural citizenship’ difficult to understand.

This literature further clarifies the role of the context in separating the active or foregrounded qualities from those that are passive or backgrounded. Which qualities are active or foregrounded, and will be involved in the integration depends on *the context of use*.

For my transdisciplinary approach, it is important that these contexts of use vary in scope, and that the scope of the concept of cultural citizenship may vary accordingly. Highly specialized contexts of use will focus on a more narrow range of qualities than less circumscribed contexts.

Table 3: two conceptions of cultural citizenship		
	Latino Studies	Cultural Studies
culture	(minority) ethnicity, language, and religion	symbolic representation and communication, especially in popular culture and media
citizenship	participating in the ‘imagined community’ of the nation	the formation of a unified citizen-identity by powerful institutions
interaction	claiming space for ethno-cultural differences in the ‘imagined community’ of the nation	destabilizing fixed representations in order to make room for marginalized lifestyles

In the first column you find the conception of Renato Rosaldo and his colleagues in the USA.⁴⁶ They are anthropologists working on **Latino minorities** in the USA, and the meanings of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ they pick out clearly reflects this concern. In this national and disciplinary context, the most pertinent interaction between culture and citizenship is how and to which degree the majority of Americans imagines their nation in a way that includes Spanish speaking minorities. It therefore makes good sense for Rosaldo and his colleagues to state that cultural citizenship simply ‘is’ this interaction.

However, in the spirit of integrating their insights with insights from other contexts, the specificity of their conception turns into a limitation. Rosaldo et. al. limit the scope of the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ to Latinos in the USA, but at least some of the things they say has actually wider relevance. Anthropologists drawing on their work have later applied the concept to other ethno-cultural minorities, not all of whom are immigrants, specifically Asians, Arabs, Native Americans and Indians. To be able to do so, they had to stretch the meaning of ‘cultural citizenship’ beyond the context-specific limits imposed by Rosaldo et. al.

The second column has the conception of cultural citizenship proposed by a second group of authors, from the interdisciplinary field of **Cultural Studies**.⁴⁷ Here, the scope of the concept is not restricted to ethno-cultural differences, but involves a much wider range of ‘cultural’ differences, including sexual orientation, ability, gender and lifestyle. But here too, there are contextual limitations in place. For instance, that ‘culture’ for these authors primarily refers to popular culture, media and ICT reflects the scope and presuppositions of their field. ‘Culture’ can do so because the linguistic form, in itself, is underspecified. The same is true for ‘citizenship’, and for their combination.

⁴⁶ The key publication is Flores & Benmayor (eds.), *Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space, and Rights* (1998). I will focus on Renato Rosaldo. I will fully introduce his work in chapter 2.

⁴⁷ For example Toby Miller, *Technologies of truth: Cultural citizenship and the popular media* (1998); idem, *Cultural citizenship: Cosmopolitanism, consumerism, and television in a neoliberal age* (2007); Nick Stevenson, “Culture and citizenship: an introduction” (2001); idem, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions* (2003). I will focus on Nick Stevenson, whom I will fully introduce in chapter 2.

We are finally going in the right direction, but we are not there yet. So far you have only been describing how other people define ‘cultural citizenship’. Will you also offer a definition of your own?

We now move onto my third sub question: what interpretation do you *advocate*? Recall that this is a question for participants in the debate, rather than for the moderator. As moderator my only concern is with the debate as a whole. My sole responsibility would then be to guard the inclusiveness and communicative effectiveness of the debate. Can the debaters find some common ground? Is there enough room for diversity, or does one participant dominate the others? To my mind, these are *political* questions, which should both be answered in the affirmative first if there is to be a debate at all.

Yet, although I have only organized the debate, I did so with a specific intent. I, too, come to this debate with an agenda of my own. I bring these authors together to help me think about ‘the Dutch windmill’. I said that academic conceptions of cultural citizenship emerge when it fulfills a circumscribed role in a disciplinary context. By contrast, the context for my project is a problem situation in society. This changes the rules of the game. Now, instead of drawing background assumptions from an academic field, I define ‘cultural citizenship’ against the background of Dutch society, specifically ‘the Dutch windmill’. This problem situation is not confined to a disciplinary structure, a single paradigm, or one group. It therefore requires a **transdisciplinary conception**, which is tailored to the Dutch context as a whole.⁴⁸

I expect that this transdisciplinary conception will be much closer to the uncontested core in its scope and ambiguity than the disciplinary conceptions of cultural citizenship we find in the literature. Even so, it is not without borders: possible meanings of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ irrelevant to the Dutch context will be deliberately discarded. I will not be concerned, for example, with the relations between different nations with the same state, simply because such issues are not relevant to ‘the Dutch windmill’. Debaters who want to talk about that will have to find someplace else.

I cannot give you this conception at the outset, simply because formulating it is one of my research goals.

Will you at least confine yourself to this conception, and leave all these others interpretations for what they are?

⁴⁸ Regional and international developments may factor in to it insofar they play a role on the national stage.

I have to disappoint you again. For I need to switch between circumscribed disciplinary conceptions on the one hand and my much more ambiguous transdisciplinary conception on the other hand.⁴⁹

Transdisciplinary researchers use the term ‘boundary concepts’ to analyze this switching process.⁵⁰ Boundary concepts are “objects which are plastic enough to adapt to local needs ... yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites”.⁵¹

Boundary objects develop and maintain coherence across different worlds by varying the degree of stabilization: they become weakly structured in common use and strongly structured in specialist contexts. I will have to switch between weakly and strongly structured ‘conceptions’ of cultural citizenship, in order to do justice to both the diversity of my participants and the need for a common debate with a shared agenda.

SECTION 2.2: A transdisciplinary debate

You are talking about a cultural citizenship debate. Is this an event that I can go to?

Not necessarily. I use the experience of a debate to help us think about more abstract interactions. These are not events that you might visit, but distributed phenomena that involve multiple places and times. Recall my discussion, in section 1.1., of **fictive inter-**

⁴⁹ In cognitive linguistic terms, this switching process can be described as a shift in experiential detail. I will draw on Kimmel, *Metaphor, Imagery, and Culture. Spatialized Ontologies, Mental Tools, and Multimedia in the Making* (2002).

Kimmel's description involves three claims. The first claim is that complex concepts consist of an array of linked sub-concepts. See note 37 above.

Kimmel's second claim is that the structures *internal* to ‘mental spaces’ are richer in experiential detail than the overall structure *between* them. This means that the structure of ‘cultural citizenship’ is more abstract than the structure of ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ individually.

From this follows the third claim: “*in order to form an image of complex concepts, we have to broaden our mental scope and zoom away from the details*” (p. 367). Now, the difference between disciplinary conceptions and a transdisciplinary concept is that they zoom out to a different degree.

In the case of disciplinary conceptions, zooming out from the details of culture and citizenship is a temporary stage, which is necessary to distance yourself from established structure in which ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ are apart, but which is subsequently overcome in a process of selecting relevant details.

Understanding a transdisciplinary concept involves a different cognitive process. Here, to form an image of the abstract concept all qualities of the constituent concepts ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ must fade into the background, until you are left with nothing but the very schematic overall structure that connects them (see p. 367). In technical terms, the ‘frames’ and ‘cognitive models’ that structure the constituent ‘mental spaces’ are completely backgrounded, until only the overall structure of the connectors that link them together is mentally retained. This overall structure may be represented as an abstract image-schema.

⁵⁰ The term ‘boundary object’ originates with Star & Griesemer, “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39” (1989). They stress that boundary objects “both inhabit several intersecting social worlds ... and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them” (p. 393). Because they facilitate both cooperation and diversity, boundary objects have much to contribute to integrative research.

Star & Griesemer build on Actor-Network Theory in Science and Technology Studies. They are specifically indebted to Latour, *Science in action* (1987), and Callon, “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay” (1986).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 393

action: using the schematic structure of face-to-face communication to organize thinking about more abstract processes. When I refer to ‘the cultural citizenship debate’ I make use of the same process. I am talking about a ‘fictive’ debate.

You speak of a transdisciplinary debate. How does such a debate differ from other kind of debates?

Two contrasts are relevant: (1) disciplinary as opposed to interdisciplinary research, and (2) inter- as opposed to transdisciplinary research. (See table 4).

TABLE 4: three kinds of research practices		
<i>disciplinary research</i>	<i>Interdisciplinary research</i>	<i>transdisciplinary research</i>
disciplinary autonomy	integration of disciplines	transcendence of disciplines
framed by a single discipline	framed by multiple disciplines	framed by societal problems
specialized scientific concepts	general scientific concepts	shared basic experiences and cultural models

The first contrast set opposes a transdisciplinary debate to **a debate within a single discipline**. ‘Discipline’ here means a group of academic researchers who share a sufficient body of research questions, objects, methods and exemplary cases to function as a single community with a distinctive language, history and culture.⁵² Well known examples are philosophy, physics and sociology. A transdisciplinary debate differs from a disciplinary debate in that it brings together participants from two or more disciplines.

A second contrast set opposes transdisciplinary to **interdisciplinary research**. These words sound similar, but refer to distinct research practices.⁵³ *Interdisciplinary* research developed to address the limitations of disciplinary specialisation, which may blind scholars to issues that fall outside the scope of their own discipline, and leave them unable to address complex issues comprehensively.⁵⁴ Interdisciplinary research tackles these limitations by combining the resources of two or more fields. An interdisciplinary *debate* takes place between scholars who not share the same disciplinary background, but who may share certain more general scientific principles and concepts.

⁵² How stable and clear-cut the boundaries between disciplines is open to debate, they may be thought of as neat boxes with fixed boundaries or as fluid continuums. I am not invested in any one these positions, but I do maintain that it is meaningful to talk about distinctive disciplines.

⁵³ There are many different definitions out there and the distinction between inter-, trans- and monodisciplinarity is far from stable. For classification, see Klein, “A taxonomy of interdisciplinarity” (2010).

⁵⁴ For recent overviews, see e.g. Frodeman (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity* (2010), and Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory* (2008). My definition draws on Repko. For an philosophical discussion, see Schmitt, “Towards a philosophy of interdisciplinary: An attempt to provide a classification and clarification” (2008).

Transdisciplinary research, as I understand it, goes a step further in that it seeks to replace discipline-driven research with problem-driven research.⁵⁵ Research of this kind is not framed by (inter)disciplinary questions and assumptions, but rather by real life problems in society. Typically, the problem is approached in a holistic way, which brings together contributions from disparate academic fields, and stakeholders outside of science. This diversity of perspectives makes it more difficult to on the one hand find enough common ground to enable communication, and on the other to make distinctions meaningful to each other. There are no given scientific concepts and theories that can do this integrative work. In order to enable a debate, the participants must first construct **a communication ground outside of science**. The need for this groundwork is what sets a transdisciplinary debate apart from (inter)disciplinary debates.

Is a transdisciplinary debate necessarily 'fictive', in your sense?

To the contrary, in most transdisciplinary research, integration is achieved by working together in a heterogeneous team of scientists, professionals and stakeholders. Such teams will regularly meet face-to-face, or interact via email and internet. Consequently, the different perspectives that are involved can be represented by people who actually hold that perspective. This has obvious advantages. If the interpretation of key concepts is biased against say the liberal convictions of one participant, this bias will immediately be called if one of the team members is actually a liberal. In short, in actual debates, the burden of fair representation is carried by the participants.

By contrast, I am trying to develop a new way of doing transdisciplinary research, which I call **the fictive integrative interaction approach**.⁵⁶ This approach involves bringing together perspectives from participants who are not actually communicating. The advantage of such a 'fictive' interaction is that it can draw in participants who would otherwise be unavailable, because they are abroad, ill, deceased, or engaged in other activities (such as disciplinary research).

The flip side of the coin is that in 'fictive' integrative interaction, the burden of fair representation is entirely on myself as 'moderator'.⁵⁷ Hence, I will need to take extra precautions against reducing other perspectives to my own point of view.

⁵⁵ See e.g. Leavy, *Essentials of Transdisciplinary Research: Using Problem-Centered Methodologies* (2011)

⁵⁶ To be precise, I mean by this the use of schematic structure and methodology from concrete face-to-face transdisciplinary communication to think about more abstract interactions between heterogeneous bodies of knowledge.

⁵⁷ The agency of the participants is an aspect of face-to-face transdisciplinary communication that cannot be projected onto the more abstract interaction.

The safest thing to do would be to simply repeat their own words, but I even then I would make my own selection. Moreover, it would render my narrative too complex, and fail to bring out the differences and commonalities between perspectives.

In my view, relying on systematic linguistic description is the next best thing. I will draw on **methods from cognitive linguistics** to *represent* the perspectives of the various participants in my ‘debate’. Rather than being merely guided by my subjective point of view, I will draw on theories that have been developed in an established discipline, and that are informed by scientific research. Linguistic description is not unbiased (which would be impossible to attain), but its assumptions are much easier to explicate than merely subjective prejudices. Moreover, these assumptions do not concern cultural citizenship directly, but have to do with the way meaning is represented in general.

Even so, to avoid cognitive linguistics from dominating the debate, I will rely on **transdisciplinary methods** to *integrate* these perspectives. Integration here involves “*distinguishing and linking ... scientific knowledge and knowledge from daily practice*”.⁵⁸ Both aspects, the distinguishing and the linking, are evenly important. Prior experiences with transdisciplinary research have uncovered several ways in which this dual aim may be achieved.⁵⁹ I will combine and fill in some of them in accordance with the nature of my project.

SECTION 2.3: An integrative agenda

You said that you want to develop an agenda for the transdisciplinary debate. What do you mean?

I would like to emphasize that ‘running’ the debate will not be part of this thesis. My more modest aim here is to develop a framework and a direction for the debate. To sense the distinction, you may think of the debate itself as a meeting, and of this thesis as its agenda. What follows is not the meeting itself, but a face-to-face conversation in which I unfold an agenda for the meeting, while the meeting itself is scheduled at a later day. The aim of this meeting is to bring together a wide range of perspectives. This requires a special kind of agenda, which I will refer to as an ‘integrative agenda’.

What requirements should the agenda fulfil?

I need to balance two design principles.

⁵⁸ Cf. Jahn, “Transdisciplinarity in the research practice” (2008), p. 32

⁵⁹ For an overview, see Bergmann et. Al, *Methods for Transdisciplinary Research* (2010).

The first design principle is that the agenda should be **integrative**, along several dimensions. To begin with, the agenda should bring together contributions from societal actors and various scientific disciplines fields and paradigms. Conversely, it should be accessible for and understandable to all people who are reflecting on cultural citizenship, in science as well in society. The agenda should further deal with the whole range of groups, identities and lifestyles that can be found in Dutch society. Finally, it should cover all relevant sectors of society, not only the arts and media but also religion, and politics.

The second principle is that the agenda should be focussed enough to give the debate direction and limit its scope. From a societal perspective, it is recommendable to rely on a wide range of knowledge. However, this is not an excuse to abandon the equally valid demands of scientific rigour and precision. You cannot talk about everything or you end up talking about nothing at all.

Can you be more concrete? What does an ‘agenda’ entail in this context?

The agenda will be developed in two steps, which are presented in the chapters that follow. The first step, presented in chapter 3, consists of rounding up **a list of research questions**. Think of this list as talking points for a meeting, which is one everyday meaning of an ‘agenda’. They specify what should (and what should not) be on the table in my ideal debate².

Chapter 3 will introduce seven authors. On the basis of their work, I will compile an unstructured list of 78 research questions. To be honest, the choice of these authors is somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that they are authors that I happen to be familiar with. Then again, I did choose them for good reasons. They are representative of the scope and diversity of an inclusive debate on cultural citizenship. They come from different disciplines, notably philosophy, cultural studies, cultural sociology and anthropology. There are two philosophers, but one works within a so-called ‘continental’ tradition that is typical for European philosophy, whereas the other works within so-called ‘analytical’ philosophy, typical for English language philosophy. In addition to scientific works I have included a policy document, as well as a book written for a general audience. Some authors are postmodern in orientation, whereas others are not. One limitation, which I regret, is that my authors are all men, which may open me to the objection that the agenda is gender-biased. The next step, in chapter 4, is to **integrate** the various perspectives. To be concrete, I will formulate a single normative question, containing three normative principles that are central to the cultural citizenship debate. These three normative principles will then be used to rework the unstructured list of 78 questions into a structured and somewhat shorter list of 12 research questions, with several sub ques-

tions. Questions on this final list should be general enough to be interesting from different perspectives, but specific enough to guide further research.

Chapter 5 will bring the thesis to a close with a **conclusion**, which will answer my research question.

CHAPTER 3: Formulating research questions

SECTION 3.1: Procedure

You have been talking about a debate on cultural citizenship, but in abstraction from the people who actually make up this debate. Who are they?

The debate, as I will present it here, will include seven ‘debaters’ (see table 5). They can be divided up in different ways.

Conceptually, three debaters use the integrated concept of ‘cultural citizenship’, and are part of the current debate. The other four do not combine culture and citizenship into a single concept, and are new inclusions in the (widened) debate.

Geographically, two debaters are from the Netherlands (2), whereas the other five are from the France (1), the UK (1), the USA (2), and Canada (1).

Historically, the writings included in my research cover half a century, from 1957 to 2007. Some of the authors wrote about culture and citizenship at the beginning of this time period, others wrote about it towards the end.

TABLE 5: seven ‘debaters’

	Name	Field	Country	Period
current debate	Council of Culture	cultural policy	Netherlands	2000-2007
	Renato Rosaldo	anthropology	USA	1987-2003
	Nick Stevenson	cultural studies	UK	1990-2012
widened debate	Paul Scheffer	immigration policy	Netherlands	2000-2007
	Jeffrey Alexander	cultural sociology	USA	1988-2003
	Paul Ricoeur	continental philosophy	France	1956-1973
	Will Kymlicka	analytical philosophy	Canada	1989-2001

How will you bring these authors together?

Within the scope of a single chapter, I will obviously not be able to discuss their theories at length. My more modest aim here is to show that the inclusion of such a wide range of authors in the debate will demand a **broadening** of its agenda. Precisely, I will first

compile a list of questions raised by their work, and then integrate them into a more manageable number of questions. This should offer a holistic perspective on ‘the Dutch windmill’.

Remind me, what do you mean by the Dutch windmill?

I introduced the model of a windmill (§1.2) to think about a problem situation in the Netherlands. Like a windmill, it involves three ‘wings’ which revolve around the same axis. The axis is the concept of ‘citizenship’. The three wings are three senses of ‘culture’ relating to citizenship: (1) the acculturation of immigrants, i.e. with different ethnicity and religion, (2) the symbolic representation of social minorities such as women and gays, and (3) the civic importance of the cultural sector. In the Netherlands, interactions between culture and citizenship have recently been contested in all these areas. This is the problem that formed the starting point of my research. I will refer to it as ‘the Dutch windmill’.

Formulating research questions is a critical step in translating this problem into an ‘epistemic object’: a delimited ‘object’ that is (re)described in such a way that it can be dealt with scientifically.⁶⁰ I will break the process up in stages: (1) I will compile an unstructured list of 78 questions; (2) I will formulate a single normative question; (3) I will rework the unstructured list into a structured list of 12 questions.

The first stage is “developing a catalogue of research questions”.⁶¹ I will explicate the questions raised by each author, and add them to the list. This **unstructured list** will be heterogeneous and consists of 78 research questions. This list is not only a step up to later stages but has its own value as a store of questions for further research. It will be organized in three sections, following a familiar division into descriptive, comparative, explanatory, and normative questions (see table 6).⁶²

TABLE 6: four types of knowledge

Type	Example
descriptive	what is cultural citizenship?
comparative	what differences and similarities are there between groups with regard to cultural citizenship?
explanatory	what effect, if any, does the (un)availability of cultural resources have on cultural citizenship?
normative	how, if at all, should citizenship be dependent on cultural membership?

⁶⁰ Cf. Bergman et. al., *Methods for Transdisciplinary Research* (2012), p. 74.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 109-110. Collecting questions from a wide range of sources is a confirmed way to achieve a common understanding of a problem situation, such as ‘the Dutch windmill’.

⁶² Cf. Alvesson & Sandberg, *Constructing Research Questions*, p. 14-16.

The second stage is to formulate a **single normative research question** that all participants can relate to.⁶³ This normative question will necessarily be unspecific, and must be filled in before it can function in any specific context. Its sole purpose is to function as an intermediate between the different perspectives. The single normative question should aim at the ‘transformation knowledge’ necessary to transform the problem situation in a target situation all participants can subscribe to.

The final stage is to rework the unstructured list into a **structured list**. This list will consist of **12** integrative research questions, with sub questions. You may think of them as questions the authors might jointly formulate in preparation of the ‘debate’.⁶⁴ The list must balance between being inclusive and being short enough so that it can be talked through on a single meet. It will maintain the same organization into descriptive, explanatory, and normative questions.

At each stage it is essential to be sensitive to differences in the description and framing of the problem. The need for agreement must be balanced with the importance of distinction.⁶⁵

Stage 1 will take up the remainder of this chapter; stage 2 and 3 will have to wait to the next chapter.

Let us focus on the first stage, then. Why do you call it an unstructured list?

The first stage will result in a lengthy list of very heterogeneous research questions. I refer to it as the **unstructured list**, because organizing and reducing the number of questions through selection and generalization will be held off at this stage. The goal here is to collect many different questions, and in the process to develop an agenda that is not limited to any particular conception of cultural citizenship.

⁶³ Cf. the principles described in Bergman et. al., *Methods for Transdisciplinary Research*, p. 110-112.

⁶⁴ Compare the group processes outlined in Bergman et. al., *Methods for Transdisciplinary Research*, p. 74.

⁶⁵ This balancing act can systematically be analyzed with a theory in cognitive linguistics called Blending Theory. It suggests that research questions must balance two demands: connecting with established bodies of knowledge and maintaining a distance from them. In Blending Theory they are represented as ‘counterfactual blends’ in which two axes intersect: an axis of similarity between the input spaces and an axis of distance between the wider domains from which these inputs are drawn. Cf. Mark Turner, “Counterfactual Blends as Instruments of Research in the Social and Behavioral Sciences” (1996), and Cornelissen & Durand, “More Than Just Novelty: Conceptual Blending and Causality” (2012).

Note that the integrative effect will not derive from the linguistic description. It comes from going back and forth, in my imagination, between the various participants, as if dividing my attention in a meeting in which they all participate.

In what order will you discuss these authors?

I will start with the agenda suggested by the *Council of Culture*. I will then broaden the agenda in two steps (see table 7).

TABLE 7: broadening the agenda				
start	Council of Culture	cultural policy	art and popular culture	access to and being active in societal institutions
step 1	Renato Rosaldo	anthropology	imagined community of nations or of immigrant minorities	participation in a re-imagined national community
	Nick Stevenson	cultural studies	symbolic communication through mass media and popular culture	entitlements and duties of citizens
step 2	Paul Scheffer	immigration policy	shared norms, symbols and history that hold society together	participation in a re-imagined national community
	Jeffrey Alexander	cultural sociology	autonomous discourse of civil spheres, formed by binary codes	participation in the national civil sphere
	Paul Ricoeur	continental philosophy	values shared by a historical national community	participation in the decision-making of the state
	Will Kymlicka	analytical philosophy	meaningful options for choice provided by a national vocabulary	virtues of citizens and their sense of a shared identity

The first step is to look **beyond Dutch society**, while remaining within the postmodern paradigm. I will discuss two international authors who also use the term ‘cultural citizenship’. The next step is to move **beyond postmodernism**, first within Dutch society, then internationally. These steps will leave us with an uncondensed list of questions.

SECTION 3.2: The modernism-postmodernism debate

Before you begin your analysis, I would like interject another perspective on your authors. The other day I was reading an article on the postmodernism-modernism debate. When I look at your table 7, I am curious to know whether these seven authors are modernists or

postmodernists. Are modernism and postmodernism among the paradigms that you seek to integrate?

I am not sure that postmodernism is a paradigm in my sense. Postmodern movements draw on a number of more specific paradigms, e.g. Critical Theory and Psychoanalysis, and are rather loosely knit. But since you are so fond of definitions, let me first ask what you mean by postmodernism.

I thought you were a philosopher. Are you really going to tell me that you are unfamiliar with the work of the likes of Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard and Rorty?

I know them, of course, but I don't feel confident to explicate what they have in common. Perhaps, as the prefix 'post-' suggests, what draws them together is a common opponent: modernism. But then we need to know what modernism was, or is.

What I took from the article I read is that postmodernists tend to believe in indeterminacy: they thrive on things such as ambiguity, difference, discontinuity and randomness.⁶⁶ But you may be right that postmodernists define themselves negatively, in terms of what is to be surpassed. These indeterminacies involve a negative element: the 'unmaking' of order, hierarchy, stability, and synthesis. Is that clear enough for you?

On this definition, we might say that the first three authors, who actually use the term 'cultural citizenship' are closer to the postmodern pole of your opposition, whereas the other, newly included, authors are closer the 'modern' pole. For now, let us say that in broadening the agenda we move from an one-sidedly postmodern perspective on cultural citizenship, to a more integrated perspective that also includes 'modernists'.

But, I hasten to say, I am afraid that this schema will ultimately prove much too simple. Things will turn out to be more complex, not because postmodernism is difficult to define, but because the modern-postmodern frame does not fit the self-interpretation of almost all of my authors. Most authors identify with neither the postmodernism nor the modernism side of the division; they have a different view of what the most relevant division would be.

⁶⁶ For a similar (but much more complex) definition, see Hassan, "Toward a concept of postmodernism" (1993). To avoid confusion, this definition would not be mine, as should become clear in what follows. Indeed, it seems to go against the grain of postmodern movements to define them in terms of binary oppositions. In addition, the definition covers only one aspect of postmodernism.

SECTION 3.3: The Council for Culture

We will see about that. Let us turn to the first stage of your proposed analysis. You said that you want to broaden an agenda that you feel is too narrow. What is this agenda? In other words, what is the starting point of your investigation?

I start in the Netherlands, with an agenda on cultural policy that was published a few years ago. In March 2007, the *Council for Culture*⁶⁷ published a strategic advice with the title *Innovate, participate!*⁶⁸, which offered the concept of **cultural citizenship** as a new way to think about cultural policy in the Netherlands.⁶⁹ I will take up this advice as a first (narrow) proposal for an agenda on cultural citizenship, which will then be widened by turning to other publications and other authors.

I would now like to outline the descriptive section of this agenda.

That is fine with me, but remind me: what do you mean by ‘descriptive’?

I mean how the Council *defines* cultural citizenship, like my own attempt that frustrated you in the last chapter. But be assured, we are now zooming in on one conception at the time, which is much easier to grasp.

The *Council for Culture* is an advisory board of the Dutch government in the fields of “the arts, culture and media”. Its recommendations cover subsidy decisions and policies in these fields, as well as “wider cultural issues”.⁷⁰ Correspondingly, the Council adopts a **broad definition of culture**: “the whole range of practices and customs through which members of society give their historical and social existence meaning”.⁷¹ To be concrete, *Innovate, participate!* deals with museums, the visual arts, archeology and landscape, archives, film, books and libraries, theatre, media, music, and dance.

⁶⁷ <http://www.cultuur.nl/>

⁶⁸ Raad voor Cultuur, *Innoveren, participeren! Advies agenda cultuurbeleid en culturele infrastructuur* (2007) [Innovate Participate. Advisory agenda on cultural policy and cultural infrastructure] (2007a). The Council has provided an English summary: Raad voor Cultuur, *Innovate, Participate!* (2007). On the background of the document, see Boomkens, “Cultural citizenship and real politics: the Dutch case” (2010).

⁶⁹ A similar term, ‘new cultural citizenship’ is used by *Interart*, a Dutch art foundation that aims to promote interdisciplinary and intercultural projects and debates. They have published a series of short texts on the issue, which I have not included in my research.

⁷⁰ The question of the Dutch government that led to the advice reflects this wide scope: “What problems should ... be resolved with priority within the culture as whole ...and what are promising developments the cultural policy of the government might take advantage of?” *Innoveren, participeren*, p. 3

⁷¹ Cf. *Werk- en adviesprogramma van de Raad voor Cultuur, 2006-2009*, p 9. The 2007 advice refers to this definition at p.12 note 3. The original Dutch: “het geheel van praktijken en gebruiken waarmee de leden van de samenleving betekenis verlenen aan hun historische en sociale bestaan”

If I may interrupt, I am more curious to know why the Council decided on the term ‘citizenship’, which to me is more of legal term.

I would rather say that it is political term. In my experience, most people who are not familiar with the literature on this subject find it very difficult to understand what the concept ‘citizenship’ contributes. In combination with the adjective ‘cultural’ the noun ‘citizenship’ does not mean the same thing as it does on its own. In fact, as someone with a background in political philosophy, I often feel that in combination with ‘cultural’ the concept of citizenship has lost its sting. For the Council, adoption of the term ‘citizenship’ signals a new stress on culture-political issues.⁷² But to me, too, it is sometimes difficult to put the finger on what is political or ‘civic’ about these issues.

What is clear is that **citizenship** or ‘participation’⁷³ highlights the importance of a well-informed citizenry.⁷⁴ More precisely, it points to the ability of citizens to ‘find their way’ within the public domain and ‘access’ information located there. The Council sees the public domain as an *information* domain. Correspondingly, it regards citizenship as active participation in a collectively maintained information domain. Being able to do so should allow citizens to understand changes and continuities in their society and shape their (collective) identity. A concrete example would be the ability to use the internet to find information about the history and cultural heritage of your society. All in all, the point that the Council wants to make is that being able to understand or construct who you are is not just of artistic but also of political importance.

Dutch citizens may be better able to understand their society if they would visit the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam which, as it happens, has just been renewed – is that what you mean?

Among other things. Cultural citizenship, as the Council defines it, is about **the ability of citizens to navigate and access cultural information**. A key phrase that is repeated across the document is “access to sources of culture and information”.⁷⁵ Museums provide access to cultural information, but so do the media, pop podia, and libraries. For example, the Council finds it just as important that historical knowledge is not locked away in archives but is accessible to all citizens. This is a ‘citizenship’ matter also in the sense that it cannot be developed by improving the government, or market processes. It

⁷² “More than in the past the Council will consider issues of a cultural-political nature”, *Innoveren, Participeren*, p. 3

⁷³ This synonym occurs in *Innovate, participate!* in various combinations: cultural participation, societal participation and art participation

⁷⁴ “Democratic and cultural citizenship stands or falls on well-informed citizens, and, by extension, on institutions that provide unhindered and mediating access to sources of culture and information”, *Innoveren, Participeren*, p. 4, 26, 94

⁷⁵ *Innoveren, Participeren*, p. 4, 26, 65, 68, 92, 94.

is on the level of individual citizens and civic organizations that changes must be made. This requires a pro-active attitude on the part of citizens and civic organizations.

The Council draws attention to the access of cultural information, because sources of culture have become more important for the functioning of society.⁷⁶ The term ‘culture’ highlights that citizenship increasingly is not only a matter of formal rights or economic autonomy, but also of **everyday struggles over meaning and identity**.⁷⁷ Knowledge, experience and information are increasingly mediated by the media. Culture as ‘giving meaning to your existence’ and citizenship as ‘participating in the information society’ increasingly interact.

Does the Council offer an explanation for this development?

The Council points to the rise of **new technologies and globalization**. With the rise of new (digital) media a “new societal reality” has emerged.⁷⁸ Other cultural changes that contribute to this new reality are globalization, migration and the rise of popular culture. As a result, what it means to be citizen is far from self-evident. It is no longer enough, for example, to say that I am Dutch, as I am also affected by global processes far beyond the boundaries of The Netherlands.⁷⁹ My idea of what it means to be a citizen is shaped by cultural products from places and cultures all over the world.

We have inadvertently moved on to the explanatory level. Would you like us to delve deeper into that, or are you more interested in the normative assumptions behind what the Council says?

The latter. What are these assumptions?

One assumption is that religion has been substituted by the media and popular culture as the primary source of meaning and identity. If the latter do not function in this way, this is ascribed to citizens’ ability to “find” and “access” them – problems extrinsic to the sources in question. By contrast, the council claims in the case of organized religion “the well” has “dried up” – a problem intrinsic to religious sources.⁸⁰ As a consequence, the

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 4

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 4, 13

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

⁷⁹ p. 13, see also p. 4

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 2. The Council makes this claim on the basis of Kronjee en Lampert, “Leefstijlen en zingeving” (2006). The claim remains controversial, however. For example, a different article in the same collection claims that religious judgments and organized religion continue to be an important source of personal and collective identity. Cf. Borgman, “De onlosmakelijke verbondenheid van religie en publiek domein” (2006)

Council's conception of cultural citizenship remains closely tied to the earlier notion of 'media wisdom'.⁸¹

A second notion is that dissolving boundaries enhances creativity and innovation, on various levels. On the national level, cultural citizenship should not stop at borders of the Netherlands, but involve participation in international cultural processes as well. The Council does recognize the value of the Dutch national heritage, but as part and parcel of "a cosmopolitan cultural climate".⁸² Similarly, while the Council acknowledges the value of "continuities" provided by religion and morality, it sees dissolving artificial boundaries as the best way to bring out such continuities.⁸³ Other boundaries that need dissolving are those between different societal sectors, cultural institutions, and citizens.

A third assumption is that if citizens have difficulty 'reaching' culture, it is up to the government and public institutions to 'show them the way'. This reflects a view of autonomy as something that must first be developed through political institutions or processes: they create the conditions under which citizens are able to find and choose for themselves the sources of culture and information that they need.⁸⁴

In my own mind, I am sure that the second assumption you specify betrays a postmodern conviction and perhaps the first assumption as well. Dissolving boundaries is clearly a form of 'unmaking'. Similarly, skepticism about the viability of established religion may very well reflect a general distrust of hierarchy and order. What do you think?

You may be right in this case, although it is difficult to say for a group of people that is internally diverse. The Council for Culture does not describe its advice as postmodern, but I don't know that they would object to that description either.

Either way, the point you are pressing is not the only one possible. That you pick out this aspect of the advice also says something about you. You should be aware that you look at the debate through a particular lens, which makes some features stand out, while others recede into the background. For example, I don't hear you float the idea that the Council has a one-sided focus on *public* institutions rather than private actors and companies, which is a totally different division that might be just as important.

⁸¹ The term media wisdom was introduced two years earlier, to replace the concept of 'media education' that the Council used before. Raad voor Cultuur, *Mediawijsheid: de ontwikkeling van nieuw burgerschap* [Media wisdom: the development of new citizenship] (2005).

⁸² *Innoveren, participeren!* p. 12

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 11-12

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2,

Let's leave it at that. How does all this add up to an agenda?

The advice of the Council for Culture suggests to me three questions, which together form a first proposal for a research agenda (see table 8 below).

TABLE 8: The initial agenda suggested by the Council for Culture		
Type	Nr	Question
descriptive	1	What interactions, if any, are there, between (1) practices and customs with which society members give meaning to their existence, and (2) their ability to navigate and access cultural information?
comparative	2	What differences and similarities are there between present-day social reality (characterized by globalization and ICT) and the social reality of other eras?
explanatory	3	In what way do recent developments (e.g. popular culture, ICT, globalization, and migration) affect the ability of citizens to access cultural information, in the process of giving meaning to their social and historical existence?
normative	4	Should artificial boundaries between institutions, citizens and worldviews be dissolved, so to maximize cultural access and cultural innovation?

SECTION 3.4: Renato Rosaldo

Who is Renato Rosaldo?

There is a huge question. I cannot tell you who Rosaldo is, but I can tell you something about his work, which is only one aspect of his identity. And even then I can only go into his work on cultural citizenship, setting aside other aspects of his work.

That is what I meant, of course. But I will humor you and rephrase. What is Renato Rosaldo's interest in cultural citizenship?

It may seem pedantic to quibble about formulations, but I need you to be more explicit than you would normally be in an everyday conversation. In that way your questions will optimally help me to maintain focus, and prevent me from going astray.

Working in Latino Studies, Rosaldo's concern is with the place within national cultures for the 'different' cultural practices of Latino minorities (such as Mixtecos in Mexico, Chicanos in the United States, and Ilongots in the Philippines). Rosaldo's chief concern is that **fostering a common culture may come at the expense of less common cultural practices**. The term 'cultural citizenship' must bring the problem to light, and justify Latino claims for the right to be different.

Latinos interviewed by Rosaldo and his colleagues reported being treated “as animals” or “like trash”, which he takes to mean that they are treated as “second-class citizens”.⁸⁵ In the same vein, they found that some ethnic minorities were, as a group, denied the use of public places such as parks and sport fields.⁸⁶

RESEARCH QUESTION 5: Is it deemed culturally acceptable in the Netherlands for minority groups to deviate from common norms and practices, and if so, that what extent?

RESEARCH QUESTION 6: In what way, if any, do attempts to foster a common Dutch culture affect the ability of minority members to form their own group(s), and to maintain their own cultural practices and places?

I thought we were talking about the Netherlands. How is Renato Rosaldo’s work relevant to the Dutch context?

The Netherlands does not have large communities of Latinos, as does the USA. But there are other ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, for instance Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. They have a different history than Latinos in the USA, but they may face similar exclusions. In Rosaldo, the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ is wedded to Latinos. But other scholars in Ethnic and Migration Studies have applied the concept to other ethno-cultural minorities, e.g. Latinos, Asians, Arabs, Native Americans and Indians. Hence, the Rosaldo-approach is relevant to all kinds of ethnic minorities, and may be applied to the ‘immigrant wing’ of ‘the Dutch windmill’ as well.

The limitation remains that Rosaldo’s theory is restricted to *ethnic* minorities. But I believe this limitation has more to do with disciplinary considerations: obviously, scholars working in ethnic studies focus on ethnic groups. This belief is strengthened by the fact that some research in this field has targeted social groups, notably children⁸⁷, women⁸⁸, men⁸⁹, and gays⁹⁰ – be it only when they also have a different ethno-cultural background. From here it is but a small step to consider citizens who are only socially ‘different’, not ethnically. We may ask, for example, whether women in the Netherlands are treated as first-class citizens, and whether they have an equal place in our national imagery. In sum, Rosaldo’s work is also relevant to the ‘social minorities’ wing.

⁸⁵ Rosaldo & Flores, “Identity, conflict, and evolving Latino communities: Cultural citizenship in San Jose, California” (1997), p. 60

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 67-72

⁸⁷ E.g. M. E. Franquiz, C. Brochin-Ceballos, “Cultural citizenship and visual literacy: US-mexican children constructing cultural identities along the US-Mexico border”

⁸⁸ E.g. K. M. Coll “Yo no estoy perdida: Immigrant Women (Re)locating Citizenship”

⁸⁹ E.g. L. Weis, C. Centrie, J. Valentin-Juarbe, M. Fine “Puerto Rican men and the struggle for place in the United States”

⁹⁰ E.g. H. N. Roque Ramirez “Claiming Queer Cultural Citizenship: Gay Latino (Im)Migrant Acts in San Francisco”

Rosaldo's work has not been applied to the media and the arts, which form the third 'wing mill'. But here I see possibilities as well. For Rosaldo offers a critique of the influential idea that print-media are most essential to the formation and representation of large groups, both the nation and its minorities.⁹¹ By contrast, he and his colleagues found that local events, such as public celebrations and protest rallies were (there and then) more important catalysts of group-formation than print-media. "Sacred places", ranging from churches to bars and shopping malls, played a pivotal role in bringing, for example, Puerto Ricans together with other Puerto Ricans. In this light, the Council of Culture has a narrowly individualist take on the role of media. Rosaldo raises a new question: what is the role of unmediated events and their cultural settings in mobilizing *communities* of citizens, and how does it compare to the role of mediated events?⁹²

RESEARCH QUESTION 7: Are minorities in the Netherlands allowed, in everyday practice, to use public spaces, and to participate in democratic processes, and if so, to what extent?

RESEARCH QUESTION 8: How, if at all, do public performances by minority members affect their ability to form their own group(s) and to maintain their own cultural practices and places?

RESEARCH QUESTION 9: Should minority groups in the Netherlands be granted the right to form and/ or maintain their own cultural communities, spaces and practices?

If I understand you correctly, Renato Rosaldo ties cultural citizenship to ethnic minorities but you feel that it can be extended to other groups. How does he define cultural citizenship that such an extension is possible?

As an anthropologist, Renato Rosaldo works with **a pervasive concept of culture**.⁹³ In other words, culture "refers broadly to the forms through which people make sense of their lives", rather than to one societal domain (e.g. art).⁹⁴

⁹¹ This was suggested by Benedict Andersons in his influential *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (1991). Anderson writes about the nation as a whole, but Rosaldo applies his ideas to both national and minority groups. Rosaldo presented this critique in an early working paper entitled in "Re-imagining national communities". The paper has not been published in print but is accessible at <http://ccsre.stanford.edu/pdfs/wps36.pdf>. See further Rosaldo & Flores, "Identity, conflict, and evolving Latino communities", (1997) p. 73-96.

⁹² For a Dutch perspective on this question, see Hajer & Uitermark, "Performing authority: Discursive politics after the assassination of Theo van Gogh" (2008). They point to the importance of talk shows, religious meeting places, and improvised mass meetings for enacting political leadership in times of crisis.

⁹³ For a detailed discussion, see his monograph *Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (1989). The book predates his published work cultural citizenship. However, it was when working on this book, in 1987, that Rosaldo first suggested the term 'cultural citizenship'. The first (unpublished) concept paper on the subject dates from the same year. On the intellectual history of the cultural citizenship project in the USA, see Flores & Benmayor, "Constructing cultural citizenship" (1997).

⁹⁴ *Culture & Truth*, p. 26

Rosaldo supports the view that citizenship is “a struggle over the meaning and scope of membership of the community”.⁹⁵ So conceived, citizenship is not a status that you either have or not but an on-going process with varying degrees of realization.

Rosaldo comes closest to formally defining ‘cultural citizenship’, when he writes that it “refers to the right to be different ... with respect to the norms of the dominant national community”, while “participating in the nation-state’s democratic processes”.⁹⁶ This tension between being different and belonging to the nation is central to the way he understands cultural citizenship.

My suggestion is that this tension is not unique for ethnic groups, but can also be found in other kind of minorities. Women, for example, may also experience a conflict between being themselves in the public sphere, and participating in political institutions that men have been established and which they still dominate.

How does Renato Rosaldo explain this tension?

Rosaldo claims that cultures differ in their degree of visibility.⁹⁷ A white American may clearly see that Latino’s are part of a larger culture, but his own culture may feel so natural to him that it remains invisible to him. On this view, people inadvertently place people on a scale ranging from ‘cultural’ to ‘non-cultural’. On the one end there are civil and rational Americans, on the other there are ‘others’, whom Americans cannot understand within their ‘normal’ rational and down-to-earth categories. These people are cultural not rational.

According to Rosaldo, the non-cultural end of the scale is usually associated with citizenship. Culture *visible as culture* is opposed to citizenship: “full citizens lack culture and those most culturally endowed lack full citizenship”.⁹⁸ This is no longer true in the eyes of the law.⁹⁹ But Rosaldo’s concern is not so much with formal ideals of citizenship, as with what he calls the “substantive level of exclusionary and marginalizing practices”.¹⁰⁰ For example, a woman who speaks in public, even though formally the equal of men may in practice be interrupted more often, receive less attention and have her ideas more often disqualified.

⁹⁵ Cf. Hall & Held, “Citizens and citizenship” (1990), p. 175. Quoted in Rosaldo, “Cultural Citizenship, Inequality and Multiculturalism”, p. 30.

⁹⁶ Rosaldo, “Identity, conflict, and evolving Latino communities: Cultural citizenship in San Jose, California” (1997), p. 57

⁹⁷ *Culture & Truth*, chapter 9

⁹⁸ *Culture & Truth*, p. 198

⁹⁹ The USA Constitution initially disenfranchised certain groups (e.g. men without property, women, and people of colour), although at the same time granting equal rights to all citizens.

¹⁰⁰ Rosaldo, “Cultural Citizenship, Inequality and Multiculturalism” (1997), p. 27

RESEARCH QUESTION 10: Are there any differences, in the Netherlands, in the ascription of culture and citizenship to majority members on the one hand, and minority members on the other hand?

RESEARCH QUESTION 11: Can differential *treatment* of minority members in the Netherlands, if there is any, be explained by differences in the *visibility* of minority cultures and the dominant culture?

I cannot tell: would you say that Rosaldo is a postmodernist, or rather a modernist?

I do not think that Rosaldo would object if we call him postmodern, but this is not the word he uses. Rather, Rosaldo presents himself as a ‘post-classical’ anthropologist. He criticizes the ‘classic’ anthropological analysis of culture, which regarded ‘culture’ as a set of meaningful patterns that is shared by all group-members, stands on its own, and is long-lasting.¹⁰¹ Classic ethnographies treated cultures like artifacts, with solid boundaries that set them apart from other cultures. They focused on events that are scripted and sophisticated, such as formal rituals.

Rosaldo feels that this kind of analysis does not do justice to processes, conflicts and changes.¹⁰² For example, a ‘classic’ analysis of a funeral would stress the official and public ritual, rather than the grief of the survivors.¹⁰³ To bring these aspects of ‘culture’ to the fore a different kind of ethnography is required. Rosaldo urges anthropologists to not only look at formal rituals but also at the informal settings of everyday life. ‘Culture’ encompasses both. He calls for analyses that take seriously the cultural force of emotions even if they find more fleeting expressions.¹⁰⁴

Rosaldo conception of cultural citizenship reflects his ‘post-classical’ position. He emphasizes that it “involve[s] conflicts and complex processes of negotiation more than stable conceptions of identity”.¹⁰⁵

On the whole, Rosaldo is certainly not a modernist, and in your scheme he is best described as a postmodernist. Even so, it is important to keep in mind that there are also aspects of his critique of ‘the classics’ that are not in your definition of postmodernism. For example, his emphasis on ‘emotional force’ reflects a focus on informality rather than ambiguity. In brief, he is a postmodernist, but not just a postmodernist.

¹⁰¹ *Culture & Truth*, p. 27. He specifically attributes this view to Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (1934). Other classic anthropologists he criticizes are e.g. Bronislaw Malinowski, Meyer Fortes and Edmund Leach.

¹⁰² *Culture & Truth*, p. 28

¹⁰³ *Culture & Truth*, p. 15

¹⁰⁴ *Culture & Truth*, p. 20

¹⁰⁵ “Re-imagining national communities”, p. 8. In this paper, the classical view is represented by Benedict Anderson’s well-known analysis of nation-building, in *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (1983). Rosaldo’s point is that if the nation is imagined, rather than being a natural given, it can and will continuously be re-imagined in a different way.

RESEARCH QUESTION 12: Do cultures involve processes, conflicts and changes, alongside, or more than, formal and enduring structures, especially in the Netherlands?

RESEARCH QUESTION 13: Does citizenship involve a substantive level of everyday practices alongside, or more than, formal ideals, especially in the Netherlands?

RESEARCH QUESTION 14: Do citizenship practices in the Netherlands involve fostering a common Dutch culture, and if so, is it imagined as unitary and stable or as involving conflict and change?

RESEARCH QUESTION 15: Does the cultural force of everyday statements and performances by minority members in the Netherlands suggest that they feel treated differently than other citizens?

SECTION 3.5: Nick Stevenson

Let us move on to the next author in your table. What is Nick Stevenson's theory of cultural citizenship?

To be clear, I do not presume to be able to represent his theory as a whole, which spans several publications. I have to make a selection of what seems relevant in the context of my debate, and the Dutch problem situation.

You keep saying these things, but they are already obvious to me. If I have a conversation with a friend, I also bring in only observations that seem relevant at that moment. You never share everything you are, that goes without saying. What you bring in depends on the friend, and the occasion. Keep that in the back of your head when I repeat my question: what is Nick Stevenson's interest in cultural citizenship?

Nick Stevenson is a British sociologist. Since 1995 he has published several articles and books on 'cultural citizenship'. I will focus on his monograph *Cultural Citizenship in the 'Cultural' Society: A Cosmopolitan Approach* (2003). His main claim in this book is that as politics and culture become more intertwined, communication and dialogue becomes more important for citizenship. Research on citizenship should reflect this, and focus on how the symbolic construction of citizenship in communication 'naturalizes' dominant identities and masks cultural differences.

For example, Stevenson maintains that heterosexuality, as the dominant way of 'being a man', is as much a cultural construction as homosexuality. Heterosexual men are often unaware of this similarity. Heterosexuality is represented as a 'natural' effect

of biology, whereas homosexuality is represented as ‘unnatural’ and a threat to civil life.¹⁰⁶

RESEARCH QUESTION 16: Are there, in the Netherlands, differences between the symbolic construction of dominant and minority identities, especially with regard to their alleged civility?

If I may interrupt, is this the same point as Renato Rosaldo makes when he talks about the visibility and invisibility of culture?

I am cautious about describing one author in terms of another. But you could say that the dominant ‘culture’ of heterosexuals is invisible to themselves, whereas they perceive homosexuals as clearly having a distinct (sub) culture. And Rosaldo and Stevenson both link this invisibility to citizenship. The heterosexual way of life is not only invisible but also dominates what is regarded as civil. Consequently, what heterosexuals regard as ‘natural’ will be expected from all citizens, including homosexuals.

But I should insert that Stevenson at one point distances himself from Rosaldo, who he feels places too much emphasis on the right to be different.¹⁰⁷ Stevenson’s concern is that such a one-sided emphasis on difference may undermine democratic communities, and should be complemented by prospects of solidarity. He insists that cultural citizenship should also be able to connect with the need for community, as long as this community is inclusive and cosmopolitan.

RESEARCH QUESTION 17: How inclusive are democratic communities relevant to the Netherlands?

RESEARCH QUESTION 18: Should cultural policies in the Netherlands take the value of both difference and solidarity into account, and if so, how can these values be balanced?

Does this mean that Nick Stevenson promotes a wider definition of cultural citizenship?

Stevenson claims that although citizenship becomes more intertwined with culture, this is not necessarily *national* culture. To the contrary, Stevenson points out that citizenship is increasingly decoupled from the nation, and now involves different spatial dimensions as well, notably the city and the world.¹⁰⁸

Clearly, for Stevenson ‘culture’ does not mean ‘national culture’. Nor does ‘culture’ mean a subsector of society: it does not refer to the values of one bounded group, or to the cultural sector as opposed to the market. Nor is culture necessarily global. Rather, for

¹⁰⁶ Stevenson, “Cultural Citizenship in the ‘Cultural’ Society: A Cosmopolitan Approach”, p. 26-7.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 29

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 35-36

Stevenson ‘culture’ refers to processes of representation, communication and dialogue as they occur in different spaces: national, subnational or international. He defines cultures as “systems of representations” or of “patterns of meanings embodied in symbolic forms”, notably the actions, objects and utterances people use to share their experiences.¹⁰⁹ In Stevenson’s view, the patterns they embody are not rooted to a single place but mobile. Cultures travel through diverse networks and are continuously intermixed.

This view of culture has implications for the way Stevenson defines citizenship. He criticizes the idea that citizenship is tied to the nation, which assumes that cultures are national and homogenous. In contrast, he ties citizenship to democratic participation on the subnational and international levels as well as the national level.

Moreover, Stevenson ties citizenship in this sense to the civil society rather than to the state. He is concerned with “the cultural dimension of citizenship”, namely the way different kinds of citizens are represented in communication and dialogue. Who is included and who is excluded in the way we imagine society? On this view, citizenship is not just about participating in political decision-making, but also concerns specifically cultural forms of power, such as the power to control discourses and interpretations. “Cultural citizenship”, Stevenson writes, “is the struggle for a communicative society”, by which he means a society that gives everyone an equal say in the way that society and its citizens are imagined and represented.¹¹⁰

RESEARCH QUESTION 19: Is citizenship in the Netherlands more than in the past decoupled from the nation, and increasingly so?

RESEARCH QUESTION 20: How do citizenship processes in the Netherlands relate to different spatial levels, i.e. the city, the nation and the world?

RESEARCH QUESTION 21: Are cultural patterns mobile and intermixing rather than being limited to a single bounded group, especially in the Netherlands?

RESEARCH QUESTION 22: Does citizenship involve struggles over discourses and interpretation, as well as participation in democratic decision-making, especially in the Netherlands?

RESEARCH QUESTION 23: Should all citizens in the Netherlands have an equal say in how the public sphere and participation therein is imagined?

I see in your table 7 that Stevenson works in the UK. What makes his work relevant to the Netherlands?

Stevenson speaks about the representation of all kinds of minorities, gays and women as well as immigrants. In his view, the relative invisibility of minorities in, for example, the

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 17

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 35

media cannot be reduced to economic or political inequalities. Rather, the problem is that some groups dominate what is said and who speaks in the media, excluding views and people that they perceive as ‘different’. This is a specifically cultural problem that calls for a cultural solution, namely to rework representations in a way that opens up space for difference and otherness, and that gives minorities an equal say in who speaks and in what is said.

This emphasis on the cultural nature of the problem is shared by all the authors I discuss. Distinctive is Stevenson’s view that minority issues are no longer limited to a single nation, but has global dimensions. Stevenson suggests that the representation of minorities should rather be seen as a European than as a Dutch problem.¹¹¹ Cultural identities should be protected on the European level, not so much through formal rights, but through fostering a European civil society based on solidarity and community with other groups and individuals.

Working in Cultural Studies, Stevenson certainly has something to say about the cultural sector.¹¹² Reflecting on recent developments such as new media, globalization and deregulation, Stevenson stresses that all media play an ambiguous role with regard to citizenship. They can both enforce exclusions and foster inclusion. All cultural forms exhibit cultural power, and shape our knowledge of public life. For this reason, cultural policies should treat all cultural forms as equal, and make room for an ever wider range of fantasies and ideals, including those that in the past have been scorned as irrational, inferior, private or ‘merely’ entertaining.

RESEARCH QUESTION 24: Should cultural policies in the Netherlands treat all fantasies and cultural forms as equal?

What I take from this is that Stevenson draws attention to various cultural exclusions. How does he explain such exclusions?

Stevenson wants to rework representations in a way that opens up space for difference. As we will see, this intention is shared by many of my authors. But the manner in which Stevenson aims to achieve this aim reflects a particular explanation of exclusions.

For Stevenson, making room for difference entails **deconstructing dominant discourses**. He maintains that what happens if minorities are culturally excluded is that they are assimilated to dominant discourses. For example, the dominant discourse represents women as the ‘the opposite sex’, as if there were a neat opposition between all men and all women, without anything in between. Instead, Stevenson believes, identities

¹¹¹ See Stevenson, “European Cosmopolitanism and Civil Society: Questions of Culture, Identity and Citizenship” (2005); idem, “European Cosmopolitan Solidarity: Questions of Citizenship, Difference and Post-Materialism” (2006); idem, “Cosmopolitan Europe, post-colonialism and the politics of imperialism” (2007)

¹¹² Chapter 4 of *Cultural Citizenship in the ‘Cultural’ Society* is entirely devoted to the media. Chapter 5 deals with consumer culture.

are fundamentally fragmented, and ambiguous. He concludes that in order to include such identities the very representations that exclude them must be deconstructed.

Stevenson is also postmodern in his extension of citizenship to the self.¹¹³ He shares with several of my authors the idea that citizenship is not just a formal matter, but involves questions of feeling and subjectivity as well. However, his view of the self is typical. Drawing on psychoanalysis, Stevenson maintains that the human psyche is not homogenous, but involves a conflict between the unconscious and the self. The self may seem a whole, though, because the self tends to assimilate the unconscious wishes to his own. Because we are afraid of ambivalence, we tend to “take shelter” from conflicts by enforcing the illusion that some things are purely and objectively good, while others are wholly bad. In this way, cultural dominance is prefigured in the emotional violence of the self. Stevenson concludes that we must work to open ourselves to the unconscious, that is, to inner processes that we do not understand and that are beyond our control.

RESEARCH QUESTION 25: Can, in the Dutch context, cultural exclusions of groups, wishes, and cultural forms, if they exist, be explained by their assimilation to dominant discourses and/or a fear for ambivalence?

From all this I gather that Stevenson is a postmodernist. Do you agree?

Of the seven participants in my ‘debate’, Stevenson is the only one who self-identifies as a postmodernist, although with qualification. His argument, he says, is “postmodern to the extent to which it questions distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘popular’ culture”.¹¹⁴ But Stevenson adds that his argument is also egalitarian (in the sense of promoting cultural inclusion), and democratic (in the sense of fostering dialogue across cultural divides). In the concept of cultural citizenship, these three features coalesce.¹¹⁵

In sum, Stevenson’s argument is clearly a postmodernist. His focus on conflict, fragmentation and uncontrollable processes fits your definition. But that is not all there is to say about his identity. I think he would be the first to point out that we have many overlapping identities. We should therefore take precautions not to reduce his argument to what we already know about postmodernism.

¹¹³ *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*, p. 60-65

¹¹⁴ *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*, p. 145

¹¹⁵ They also came together in Raymond Williams’s idea of a ‘common culture’, on which Stevenson builds. The ‘culture in common’ that Williams called for was a culture of dialogue, to which ordinary citizen could equally contribute, and in which the meanings of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ culture would be open to reinterpretation. On this concept, see Williams, “the idea of a common culture” (1989).

SECTION 3.6: Paul Scheffer

We now have moved beyond your initial three questions to a much longer list of over twenty questions. To me that seems enough to capture the depth and breadth of your topic. Why do you insist on bringing a second group of authors to the table?

Rosaldo and Stevenson raise new questions, which were not in the initial agenda. For example, they beg the question whether the representation of Dutch Muslims as uncivil has to with an inability on the part of native citizens to see their own religious or secular presuppositions. This is not a matter of *access* to information, as the Council for Culture would have it, but rather a matter of its *perception*.

Even so, Rosaldo, Stevenson and the Council also share certain assumptions. A case in point is their focus on everyday struggles over meaning, as opposed to formal and structural aspects of culture, such as rituals and traditional narratives. They also share a concern with dissolving boundaries as a way to make room for creative processes. In other words, these authors bring some interactions between culture and citizenship to the foreground, while relegating other aspects to the background. In their own context this makes good sense, but in the wider context of ‘the Dutch windmill’ the foreground and background features are both interesting, as they may both open solution paths that may help to transform the Dutch problem situation. We should consider all aspects of the problem, and all possible solutions.

As we will see, the next four authors foreground different features of culture and citizenship. Sometimes they are features the first group placed in the background, but in other cases they are entirely different. For example, several of the new authors raise the issue of the autonomy of (a) culture, which they feel should be protected, either against other social spheres (e.g. the market) or against other cultures. On this view, boundaries are not obstacles to overcome, but safeguards that need to be maintained.

An inclusive debate requires a wider range of perspectives. Otherwise, we run the risk of doing what Rosaldo and Stevenson criticize in society at large: naturalizing one perspective (e.g. a process view of cultural citizenship) while excluding others (e.g. the value of autonomy). In other words, we should be sensitive to other ways of exclusion than my first group of authors can articulate, and open up the debate to perspectives they would probably represent as irrelevant or mistaken.

What is Paul Scheffer's contribution to the cultural citizenship debate?

I will discuss a book that Scheffer wrote in 2007¹¹⁶, when he was a publicist working for a Dutch daily newspaper, and part-time professor in Urban Studies at the University of Amsterdam.

Paul Scheffer is well-known in the Netherlands for his essay, in 2000, on 'The Multicultural Drama'.¹¹⁷ This essay is widely regarded as a turning point in the Dutch public debate on immigration. During the 1990's, criticizing immigration policies was still a political taboo in the Netherlands, especially on the political left.¹¹⁸ As a publicist associated with the Labour Party (PvdA), Scheffer broke the taboo. He challenged the then dominant idea that the integration of ethnic minorities was primarily an economic issue, claiming a cultural crisis and the need to defend "Dutch culture"

To answer your question, Scheffer's interest in culture and citizenship stems from a deep felt concern with strengthening the ties that bind society together. Scheffer points the finger at a number of social problems in the major Dutch cities, following the influx of large groups of immigrants that started in the 1960's. These social problems include the development of a new lower class of immigrants, conflicts between traditional and modern values, segregation in neighborhoods and schools, and feelings of estrangement and uncertainty among both immigrant and native citizens.¹¹⁹ According to Scheffer, such problems evidence an underlying cultural crisis: they reveal a lack of cultural unity. Cultural unity should come from shared norms, narratives and rituals, and without it individuals cannot distance themselves from their particular identity and circumstances, and regard themselves as citizens.¹²⁰

RESEARCH QUESTION 26: Is participating in shared norms, narratives and rituals necessary for inhabitants of the Netherlands to regard themselves or to be regarded by others as Dutch citizens?

RESEARCH QUESTION 27: Are social problems surrounding immigrants in the Netherlands due to a lack of cultural unity?

¹¹⁶ The original Dutch title was *Land van Aankomst* [Land of Arrival] (2007). The English versions of this book (which remains close, but is not a literal translation) was accepted as his doctoral thesis, and published in 2011 under the title *Immigrant Nations*. To accommodate both editions, I will refer to chapter and paragraph titles where possible. Where I have to refer to page numbers, I will discern between English (E3) and Dutch page numbers (D5).

¹¹⁷ "Het multiculturele drama", *NRC Handelsblad*, 29 januari 2000.

¹¹⁸ On this shift, see Baukje Prins, "The Nerve to Break Taboos: New Realism in the Dutch Discourse on Multiculturalism" (2007). On the right, Frits Bolkestein, then leader of the conservative-liberal party (VVD), had raised similar concerns back in 1991, asserting that the achievements of Western civilization must be defended against the Islamic world.

¹¹⁹ See chapter 1 (uncertainty and estrangement), chapter 2 (social divide and segregation), and chapter 8 (value conflicts).

¹²⁰ See Chapter 9, paragraph "Rituals of citizenship" ["Zonder 'wij' gaat het niet].

How does Scheffer conceptualize culture, citizenship and their interaction?

Scheffer presents his views on culture and citizenship as a critique of ‘multiculturalism’. He means by this the view that “society is made up of more or less autonomous cultural communities”.¹²¹ It might mean, for example, that Moroccan immigrants would not be held to the same laws as other Dutch citizens, but be privy to exemptions. They might be uniquely allowed to open prayer rooms in schools, or to dispose of their dead in a way forbidden for other citizens, because these practices are part of their ethnic heritage. In Scheffer’s view, multiculturalism would so undermine the ties that bind citizens together that the Dutch nation would disintegrate, like a fragile object. The political community would fall apart in separate cultural subgroups, which would refrain from judging and criticizing other groups, in the name of tolerance.

In contrast, Scheffer stresses that immigrants are not merely bearers of an ethnic identity, but always also citizens.¹²² They should participate in the same civic norms, narratives, and rituals as other citizens. These are the “ties” that hold society together, and together they embody the Dutch idea of citizenship. Immigrant and native citizens participate in them alike, and they should be the same for all citizens. Equal treatment should be the norm. Rather than ‘difference’, Scheffer emphasizes “shared citizenship”, by which he means that “we are all invited to enter in the public arena as equals”.¹²³ He calls for “a strong culture of citizenship”, which is not nostalgic, or dominated by native citizens, but based on civic ideals to which everyone can aspire.¹²⁴

In Scheffer’s view, making room for difference is not a matter of less unity, but of a different unity. He calls for a ‘new we’ that is more inclusive. Current times demand a re-imagination of the Dutch nation in a way that is more inclusive, but still a unity. For example, the Dutch must come to terms with the ambiguities of their colonial past; its low points, such as slave trade, and genocide must become part of collective narratives. In this process of re-imagination everyone should participate, irrespective of background and origin.

All in all, Scheffer invites us to look beyond problems related to immigration to a problem of Dutch society as a whole. Debates on immigration must be set against the wider background of difficulties with developing and maintaining a national unity with a civic rather than an ethnic character.

¹²¹ E198, N269. Especially in the English edition, Scheffer distinguishes between ‘strong’ and ‘moderate’ forms of multiculturalism. His criticism is mainly directed against the strong version, although it remains unclear who supports this version. The weak version, which he ascribes to Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh and Tariq Modood is also problematic for Scheffer, because it places a greater emphasis on groups than he deems normatively desirable.

¹²² On citizenship, see especially chapter 9.

¹²³ E32

¹²⁴ E29

With all this emphasis on national unity, it will not surprise you that Scheffer is critical of attempts to weaken the ties between citizenship and the nation.¹²⁵ Although he calls for a cosmopolitan attitude, Scheffer feels that such an attitude should not be couched in terms of world citizenship. Beyond the nation citizenship fails to relate to a community one can feel responsible for.

RESEARCH QUESTION 28: Did the Dutch government at some point after 1960 promote multiculturalism in the sense of the co-existence of autonomous cultural communities?

RESEARCH QUESTION 29: What effect if any, does immigration to the Netherlands, since 1960, have on cultural unity?

RESEARCH QUESTION 30: Are shared norms, narratives and rituals necessary and sufficient to prevent the Dutch nation from falling apart in separate cultural communities?

RESEARCH QUESTION 31: Should the norms, narratives and rituals of Dutch society be changed so to include the perspectives of immigrants?

RESEARCH QUESTION 32: Should all citizens be treated equally regardless and be judged by the same norms, regardless of their ethnicity?

How does Scheffer explain difficulties with maintaining a national unity?

Underlying Scheffer's interest in unity, and his nightmare of disintegration, is a view of the modern nation as "a human invention that's continually being reshaped".¹²⁶ The Dutch nation did not grow naturally. It was built by human hands, and it is still a work in progress. To explain present-day difficulties with national unity, Scheffer points to the Dutch history of nation-building.

According to Scheffer, the Dutch nation has developed in a relatively harmonious fashion since it was founded in 1648.¹²⁷ The Netherlands is one of a few countries in the world without disputed borders. It not internally divided by independence movements, and has no oppressed fellow countrymen abroad. The various groups or 'pillars' within the Dutch nation (such as Catholics and Liberals) shared the same language, history and ethnicity; remaining differences were pacified by compromise.

Scheffer claims that this history has given rise to an overly relaxed self-image. The Dutch tend to deny that they have or even need a national identity. For example, they did not (until quite recently) want to require migrants to learn Dutch, because the Dutch downplay the importance of the Dutch language. Moreover, they avoid conflicts at

¹²⁵ See chapter 6, paragraph "World Citizens in the Making" ["Wereldburgers in wording"]

¹²⁶ E117, N161. Following Benedict Anderson's idea of the nation as an 'imagined community'.

¹²⁷ Cf. Chapter 4, paragraph "Migration and nation-building" ["Migratie en natievorming"]

all costs, which leaves little room for debate. In Scheffer's view, the Netherlands suffer from "a culture of avoidance".¹²⁸

In contrast, Scheffer points out, conflicts are part and parcel of nation-building for most nations in the world. To remind the Dutch that conflict is inevitable, he points to the conflict-ridden history of the USA. He calls for a "rediscovery of America": just as Columbus discovered America in 1492, the Dutch must today discover the USA's more typical process of nation-building.¹²⁹ Scheffer claims that in spite of its self-image as a 'nation of immigrants', the American experience is not unique and contains lessons for the Netherlands, and Europe more generally.

In particular, Scheffer points to several continuities between present-day conflicts surrounding immigration in Europe, and previous periods of resistance to immigrants in the USA.¹³⁰ For example, in 1751, one of the founding fathers, Benjamin Franklin, voiced similar concerns about German immigrants as right-wing politicians in the Netherlands now raise about Muslims. Franklin questioned the loyalty of German immigrants, their willingness to integrate, and feared that they would 'Germanize' the USA. In the same vein, in the 1850's, a large movement opposed further immigration of Catholics because this would undermine the USA's 'Protestant' culture. In the 20th century, concerns were raised about Japanese 'picture-brides': Japanese women brought to America by Japanese immigrants solely on the basis of photographs.¹³¹ The Netherlands today know similar oppositions to 'marriage migration'. In sum, the American experience is "a tale of ethnic conflict and opposition to newcomers".¹³²

Scheffer does recognize that there are also significant differences between the 'old' immigration to the USA and the 'new' immigration to Europe. One difference is that the European nation-states have already reached an advanced state of nation-building, and already have a long history behind them.¹³³ Consequently, immigrants face the task of becoming part of a pre-existing nation. New is further that European states have more comprehensive welfare systems than the USA, which have the downside of making immigrants dependent on the state.¹³⁴ The immigrants themselves are also different. For example, Muslim immigrants have brought a new religion into Europe, the Islam, which does not have a history of separating religion and politics and rejects liberal values with regard to homosexuality and gender equality.¹³⁵

RESEARCH QUESTION 33: Is the Dutch nation as it is today (partly) the result of deliberate attempts to build a nation?

¹²⁸ Cf. Chapter 4: "The Netherlands: A Culture of Avoidance" ["Nederland vermijdingsland"]

¹²⁹ Cf. Chapter 7: "The Rediscovery of America" ["De herontdekking van Amerika"]

¹³⁰ Cf. Chapter 7, paragraph "Opposition to immigrants" ["Het verzet tegen immigranten"]

¹³¹ Cf. Chapter 7, paragraph "The Golden door Shuts" ["De gouden deur gaat dicht"]

¹³² E227, N306

¹³³ E216, N293

¹³⁴ E82-83, N113-114

¹³⁵ See Chapter 8

RESEARCH QUESTION 34: What similarities and differences are there between recent immigration to the Netherlands, since 1960, and (earlier) waves of immigration to other, so-called classical immigration countries, especially the USA?

RESEARCH QUESTION 35: Have Dutch citizens and/or politicians avoided conflicts, if so, how does this affect the acculturation of immigrants, if at all?

What new light does Scheffer shed on the Dutch problem situation?

Compared to the view of the Council of Culture, Scheffer's contribution is twofold. First, whereas the Council emphasizes global cultural processes, Scheffer points to specificities of the Dutch national history.

I already mentioned the unconflicted history of nation-building and its advanced state at the time of immigration. I also referred to the comprehensive welfare system in the Netherlands, which according to Scheffer is a source of conflict characteristic for the Netherlands and other European countries. Further, I talked about the culture of avoidance that Scheffer witnesses in the Netherlands.

In addition, Scheffer reminds us that the Netherlands played an active and at times morally suspect role in the onset of globalization. The Netherlands is one of eight European states that at the height of colonialism subjugated a large part of the world. The legacy of this history is still felt today. A substantial number of immigrants in the Netherlands today are from former colonies. Moreover, the loss of its overseas territories and the awareness of its own racism was a shock for the Netherlands, which contributes to present-day uncertainty about Dutch culture.

Finally, Scheffer points out that the Netherlands, and other countries in West-Europe are much more secular than the rest of the world. This makes it more difficult for Muslim and other religious immigrants to reconcile their faith with shared citizenship. A yawning gap between secular and religious worldviews fosters the individualization of religious experience, which in turn encourages orthodoxy and radicalism.

RESEARCH QUESTION 36: What unique characteristics, if any, does the Dutch nation have compared to other nations?

RESEARCH QUESTION 37: Does the Dutch history of colonialism affect present-day immigration, if so, in what way?

QUESTION 51: If Paul Scheffer is a modernist, what new issues does he raise beyond those already acknowledged by your three postmodern authors?

It strikes me as significant that Scheffer describes engagement with society in terms of detachment: it involves "detaching" yourself from what is familiar and trying to consider

it “from a distance”.¹³⁶ Like Renato Rosaldo, Scheffer regards the nation as an ‘imagined community’ that can be ‘re-imagined’. However, he calls for critical self-examination on the part of the majority as well as minorities.¹³⁷ To act as a citizen is to distance yourself from your heritage, and obtain a detached vantage point. Unlike in Rosaldo, this mutual process of self-examination should result in a new unity, i.e. shared norms, narratives, and rituals. In sum, Scheffer differs from my first three authors in emphasizing distance and detachment, and drawing attention to the value of unity, rather than its potential downside.

RESEARCH QUESTION 38: Should both immigrant and native citizens engage in self-examination?

SECTION 3.7: Will Kymlicka

What is Will Kymlicka’s interest in culture and citizenship?

Will Kymlicka is a Canadian political philosopher. His long-term project is to make room within liberal theory and practice for group-differentiated citizenship. Kymlicka claims that right-bearers are owed respect not only as citizens but also as members of the group to which they belong.¹³⁸ His first book offered a liberal defense of minority rights as a means to protect the cultural heritage and continued existence of minority cultures such as Canada’s aboriginal peoples.¹³⁹ In his most recent book, Kymlicka turns to animal rights, arguing that citizenship rights should be so extended to include (domesticated) animals.¹⁴⁰ What connects these works is a concern with articulating the moral reasons behind the established liberal practice of granting group-specific rights to the members of minorities, as well as extending the scope of this practice.

My research is limited to Kymlicka’s work on **the rights of cultural minorities as they relate to citizenship**. This line of work has moved beyond indigenous peoples (e.g. Indians) to include, in addition, national minorities (e.g. the Québécois in Canada) immigrant groups (e.g. Latinos in the USA), and non-ethnic social minorities (e.g. the disabled).¹⁴¹ In different ways, all these groups should be guaranteed access to a rich and

¹³⁶ E325, D441

¹³⁷ Cf. Chapter 1, paragraph “Integration requires self-examination” [“Integratie vraagt om zelfonderzoek”]

¹³⁸ See e.g. *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (1989), p. 210

¹³⁹ Ibid, see especially chapters 8 and 9.

¹⁴⁰ This book is co-authored with Sue Donaldson. It was not included in my research, but is mentioned here to establish his overall-project. Donaldson & Kymlicka, *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights* (2011).

¹⁴¹ Kymlicka turns to these other kinds of cultural minorities in “Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity” (1991). See also his book *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), especially p. 11-26.

Kymlicka’s distinctions are grounded in different origins of cultural plurality: multinational groups were present at the founding of the nation, immigrants arrived later through immigration, and social minorities (e.g. the disabled) are inherent in any cultural group. These distinctions have been criticized for being too

pervasive culture that gives them plenty of options to choose and live a life that they consider valuable.¹⁴² According to Kymlicka, this is only possible if citizenship rights are not the same for each individual, but depend in part on the cultural group(s) of which they are a member.

To highlight the importance of culture, Kymlicka has introduced two terms which are similar to my term cultural citizenship: ‘multicultural citizenship’ and ‘intercultural citizenship’.¹⁴³ To grasp the difference, you should first know that he defines citizenship as “a relationship between the individual and the state”.¹⁴⁴ This means that citizenship involves two levels of analysis: the level of institutions, and the level of individual skills, knowledge, beliefs, habits and virtues. Now, Kymlicka (somewhat arbitrarily, in my view) reserves the adjective ‘multicultural’ for the institutional level, and saves the term ‘intercultural’ for the individual level (see table 9).

TABLE 9	
multicultural citizenship	intercultural citizenship
institutional level	individual level
public policies and institutions (i.e. the state)	skills, knowledge, virtues
highlights that citizens belong to the state in different, group-specific, ways	highlights that citizens must acquire skills and knowledge to be able to deal with diversity

So defined, ‘multicultural citizenship’ revolves around the idea that citizens relate to the state in different ways, depending on their particular identity, history, culture and language. In particular, public policies and public institutions must repair biases and disadvantages against minorities, if necessary through group-specific rights or policies. By contrast, ‘intercultural citizenship’ concerns the skills and beliefs individual citizens

black and white. To my mind, the more interesting question is whether Kymlicka is right that the origin of cultural plurality is morally relevant.

¹⁴² Kymlicka discerns different kinds of minority rights. He claims that whereas national groups have the right to maintain a separate nation, immigrants have waived this right, and are now only due the right to maintain aspects of their ethnic particularity *within* the public institutions of their new society. Access to the culture of this new society should give them enough options to choose from.

Ethnic differences remain, and both types of minority rights are therefore permanent. By contrast, Kymlicka claims that non-ethnic groups, such as gays and women, should only be granted *temporary* rights to special representations, until they are no longer systemically disadvantaged.

Cf. *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 26-32.

¹⁴³ Kymlicka introduces the first term in the title of his 1995-book, *Multicultural Citizenship*, but in the text he mostly uses the term ‘(group)-differentiated citizenship’. The concept of ‘differentiated citizenship’ derives from Iris Marian Young, “Polity and group difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship” (1989). Cf Kymlicka & Norman, “Return of the citizen: A survey of recent work on citizenship theory” (1994), p. 370. Kymlicka’s second term only appears in “Multicultural States and Intercultural Citizens” (2003). My discussion draws on this article, which is the best introduction to his views on interactions between culture and citizenship.

¹⁴⁴ “Multicultural States and Intercultural Citizens”, p. 147

possess in dealing with diversity. On this level, citizenship education is required, which should encourage individuals to have the ability and desire to learn about and interact with other groups, especially neighboring groups within the same country.

With this distinction in place, Kymlicka brings out tensions between progress on the institutional and the individual level. Ideally, the two levels should work together in a society's conception of citizenship, so that multicultural reforms reinforce intercultural skills, and vice versa. But in reality they not always do. For example, although Belgium is a multicultural state, Francophones would much rather learn English than Flemish. They prefer global interculturalism over local interculturalism. Similarly, conservative religious groups may support the policy of group-specific education, but see no value in exchanges with other faiths on the individual level.

All in all, if Kymlicka were to use the term 'cultural citizenship' it might refer to a relationship of individuals with the state **mediated by their membership in one or more cultural group**. We might then add that cultural citizenship has these two levels, individual and institutional, which may work together or be out of sync, depending on what these different groups can agree upon to be just.

RESEARCH QUESTION 39: Does the way that citizens relate to the state, in the Netherlands, depend (in part) on their identity, culture, history and/or language?

RESEARCH QUESTION 40: What skills, if any, do Dutch citizens have in dealing with (members of) other cultural groups?

RESEARCH QUESTION 41: How do 'multicultural' policies and 'intercultural' skills interact, if at all, in the Netherlands?

RESEARCH QUESTION 42: Should citizenship rights and/or policies in the Netherlands be group-specific?

RESEARCH QUESTION 43: Should public policies and public institutions in the Netherlands repair biases and disadvantages of (members of) minority groups?

RESEARCH QUESTION 44: Should citizens be encouraged to learn about and interact with (members of) other cultural groups?

It is clear to me that Kymlicka finds cultural groups important, and argues that they should be protected by rights. But I do not yet understand his motivation. Why this focus on cultural groups?

Underlying Kymlicka's defense of group-specific measures for cultural minorities is a concern with what I call **loss of culture experiences**: instances in which individuals lose the culture that formed the shared context in which they used to choose and shape

their way of life.¹⁴⁵ This goes much further than a change of opinions, habits or values: in cases like this the whole cultural context in which you deliberate about your life is impoverished or even lost; it may be because your cultural context no longer exists, or because it has lost its innovativeness. Either way, when you lose the context of a rich and diverse culture, Kymlicka argues, you will also lose the very ability to choose and live your own way of life, which liberals hold so dearly.

For this reason, Kymlicka wants to protect cultures, especially minority cultures, against impoverishment and decay. On the other hand, being a liberal, Kymlicka wants to do so in a way that grants citizens the freedom to choose their any conception of the good life that they deem worthwhile.

To balance these two demands (protection and freedom) he opts for an egalitarian approach: liberal states can intervene in matters of culture but only when it affects all conceptions of the good life equally. To make this work, Kymlicka needs to distinguish between two aspects of a culture: (1) aspects that are shared between all conceptions of the good life, and that warrant protection, and (2) aspects that are tied to a particular conception of the good life and that should be left open to change. He speaks of a 'loss of culture' when the first aspect of a culture is threatened, but not when a change occurs on the second level.

The idea of losing your culture remains elusive to me. What does Kymlicka mean exactly, and how does he say it happens?

Kymlicka sees loss of culture experiences as a possible result of cultural interchange. He admits that cultural interchange is often desirable and unavoidable. But there are cases in which the contact between cultures leads to the decay or diminishment of one of these cultures.

For example, Kymlicka acknowledges that in multinational states such as Belgium or Canada, the languages of the different national groups can mutually enrich but also threaten each other.¹⁴⁶ When the majority language is made the official state language, this may undermine the vitality of minority languages.

¹⁴⁵ Kymlicka analyzes such experiences through the lens of Ronald Dworkin's defense of art-subsidies. Kymlicka takes Dworkin's argument beyond the art sector to society as a whole. For the original argument, see Dworkin, "Can a liberal state support art?" (1985). For Kymlicka's view, see his "Dworkin on freedom and culture" (2004).

¹⁴⁶ On this example, see "Dworkin on freedom and culture" (2004), p. 123

For another example, see p. *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* p. 170/196. This more extreme example involves a tribe in Indonesia where "children jumped off a cliff to their death in an attempt to emulate a Superman feat they had just seen on (recently introduced) television". In this case, the introduction of television, which in the long run is desirable progress, in the short run threatens the very existence of the tribe. It would "create internal disintegration". Kymlicka argues that as long as the tribe lacks the cultural resources to deal with new technologies, a ban on television is morally acceptable and even required. Restrictions on the freedom of individual members are justified in order to protect their cultural membership.

Kymlicka argues that in such cases, in order to even things out, the state should also support public schooling and government services in minority languages. Members of minority groups may be forced to learn the language of their group if they personally prefer not to; protecting collective languages sometimes trumps individual freedoms. According to Kymlicka, this is something entirely different from paternalism, which would concern *what* people believe, rather than the ‘language’ in which they express them.

Central to Kymlicka’s argument is the idea that the viability of a nation’s cultural structure depends on support by the state. This becomes clear when Kymlicka discusses the difference between national minorities (such as the Québécois in Canada), which live in a separate territory, and immigrant minorities (e.g. Moroccans in the Netherlands). Kymlicka claims that liberal states should help sustain the cultural structure in the case of national minorities, but not in the case of immigrants. Why this different treatment? Kymlicka offers a moral and practical argument. They both have to do with the different relationship to nation-building that national and immigrant minorities have.

The moral argument is that most immigrants, according to Kymlicka, have the option of staying in their original culture; they have chosen to uproot themselves, and in so doing, have waived their original right to cultural support.¹⁴⁷ Immigrant groups do not see themselves as separate and self-governing nations, but aim to become part of their new nation. Their right to cultural support now applies to their new nation, and to the process of integrating into it. By contrast, national minorities did not choose to become part of the larger society, and their culture will cease to exist if it is not supported by the state. In brief, immigrants become part of the nation-building of the larger society, but national groups need protection against it.

The practical argument is that immigrant groups are dispersed and too assimilated to try to recreate their nation in their new country. Kymlicka insists that a rich national culture is impossible to maintain without the backing of a state. Only a minority that is self-governing and that has its own territory can make its own decisions about language, immigration and education.¹⁴⁸ This kind of self-control allows them to sustain a separate national culture.

RESEARCH QUESTION 45: Do immigrant groups in the Netherlands aim to become part of the nation as a whole, or do they see themselves as separate?

RESEARCH QUESTION 46: How can variations in the richness of the Dutch cultural structure, if there are any, be explained?

¹⁴⁷ Cf. *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 96. Refugees are the exception, but even in their case, their original culture continuous to exists after they have left it.

¹⁴⁸ Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, chapter 4. Kymlicka emphasizes that it is actual control over such issues that allows a national culture to persists, not just symbolic expressions of national identity.

RESEARCH QUESTION 47: Does the viability of Dutch culture depend (in part) on support by the state?

RESEARCH QUESTION 48: Does the choice to immigrate to another country waive any right to have your original culture supported by the new state?

Kymlicka sometimes seems to be concerned with culture in a general sense, as in the Western civilization, but at other times with particular cultures, such as the Dutch culture rather than the Belgium culture. How does he define ‘culture’?

Central to Kymlicka’s conception of culture¹⁴⁹ is a distinction between structural and non-structural aspects of cultures (see table 10). His proposal is that ‘structural’ aspects of a culture warrant protection, whereas ‘non-structural’ aspects should be left open to change.¹⁵⁰ For example, it is not a political problem that French-Canadians have since the 1960’s become less Catholic, and have changed their voting behavior.

¹⁴⁹ The best introduction to his conception of culture is his article “Dworkin on Freedom and Culture” (2004). It brings together scattered remarks on culture, and clarifies his debt to the American philosopher Ronald Dworkin.

¹⁵⁰ On this distinction, see *Liberalism, Community, and Culture*, p. 166-167, *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 101-105. Kymlicka refers to the structural aspect as “the structure of a culture” and calls the non-structural aspect “the character of a culture”.

The idea of a ‘cultural structure’ was introduced in 1985 by Ronald Dworkin in a chapter called “Can a liberal state support art?”. In this article, Dworkin proposed that state support for the arts should be directed at “the structure of culture, the possibilities that it allows, rather than on discrete works ... of art” (p 229-230). In other words, he drew a distinction between the particular forms of culture we may value (e.g. paintings, sports, thrillers) and “the structural frame” that makes such values possible. Dworkin claims that ‘culture’ in this structural sense determines the scope of what we can possibly see the value of. On this view, if an art form, opera for example, were to completely disappear from a culture its members would lose the possibility to *value* opera. This would leave them with fewer values to choose from; it would impoverish their context of choice. Dworkin therefore thinks that it is important for all citizens that art forms from the past, such as opera, are kept alive, which requires that some citizens continue to practice it. Similarly, it matters to all citizens that artists maintain the innovativeness to develop new dimensions of value; otherwise the cultural structure will be impoverished for everyone. In short, cultural change that affects the availability of values is a change in cultural *structure*, whereas change that merely affects particular works of art is not.

Kymlicka sometimes describes the ‘cultural structure’ as a ‘primary good’. See e.g. *Liberalism, Community, Culture*, p. 166-167. Briefly, a primary social good is useful to anyone, regardless of their conception of the good life. Kymlicka borrows this term from John Rawls. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), §15 for his initial formulation, and “Social Unity and Primary Goods” (1982) for a later elaboration.

However, we should not reduce Kymlicka’s position to that of Dworkin or Rawls. He criticizes both of them for assuming that societies have only a single ‘cultural structure’, failing to properly distinguish between cultural and political community. Instead, Kymlicka claims that many countries now form a single political community but include multiple *cultural* communities. Cf. *Liberalism, Community, Culture*, p. 177-178.

TABLE 10	
structural aspects of a culture	non-structural aspects of a culture
language, history, and other structural frames that make a range of values <i>available</i>	opinions, habits, institutions, and fashions that <i>endorse</i> specific values
should be protected by the state if they would otherwise be impoverished or lost	should not be interfered with by the state but left open to change even this means that they will impoverish or perish
important for all conceptions of the good life	tied to a particular conception of the good life

Now, when Kymlicka uses the term ‘culture’ it refers to **the structure of a culture**. So defined, it could still refer to a whole civilization, so that the Netherlands and the USA would share the same culture. But that is not what Kymlicka means.

To highlight this, Kymlicka at some point begins to reserve the term ‘culture’ for cultural structures that are pervasive and central to the identity of its members.¹⁵¹ He now speaks of ‘*societal* cultures’: cultures that are “territorially concentrated” and that are “centred on a language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life”.¹⁵² All liberal democracies have such a culture, but they differ from nation to nation. Historically, virtually all liberal democracies have attempted to create a shared language and a sense of common membership in the social institutions using that language. Every self-governing nation has made its own decisions about such issues as language and education and in so doing has shaped its own societal culture. By contrast, Kymlicka expects minority groups that are not self-governing to be unable to shape a societal culture of their own. Such groups rely on the cultural structure of the wider society of which they are a part.

RESEARCH QUESTION 49: What aspects, if any, of Dutch culture are shared between different conceptions of the good life, and what aspects are tied to any one such conception?

RESEARCH QUESTION 50: What kind of protection, if any, should the state offer to cultural structures in the Netherlands?

¹⁵¹ This idea of societal cultures is influenced by Margalit and Raz, “National self-determination” (1990). They identified six characteristics of groups that are candidates for the right of self-determination. Broadly, they pick out two kinds of groups. Firstly, groups which are *constitutive* for the identities of its members; membership is not based on achievement, but on mutual recognition of belonging to the same group. This recognition is based on general characteristics that are socially salient, and is important because it grounds people’s self-esteem, appraisal not of their ends, but of themselves as valuable. Secondly, Margalit and Raz pick out groups that are *pervasive*; their culture encompasses many important aspects of life, so that they significantly determine the options of people growing up among their members. *Encompassing* groups, which are both constitutive and pervasive, are candidates for self-determination

¹⁵² Cf. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p. 346

RESEARCH QUESTION 51: Should state interventions in matters of culture affect all conceptions of the good life equally?

How is Kymlicka's work relevant to the Netherlands?

Kymlicka's work is mostly relevant to the immigrant 'mill wing'. As I see it, Dutch critics of 'multiculturalism', such as Paul Scheffer, also point to the danger of cultural loss. They feel that migration (especially from non-Western Islamic countries), and European integration threaten to impoverish Dutch culture. They seek to defend the Dutch nation against such threats, and Kymlicka's work may help to clarify the moral reasons behind such a defense. Then again, Kymlicka puts them into perspective, by suggesting that self-governing nations are very unlikely to experience a severe loss of culture, since they have control over policies regarding immigration, education and language.

From what you said before, I gathered that Kymlicka was a proponent of multiculturalism. What makes you say that his work is most relevant to Dutch critics of multiculturalism?

You are right that when we look at their rhetoric Kymlicka and Scheffer appear to be diametrically opposed. Kymlicka presents himself as a defender of multiculturalism, and Scheffer presents himself as a critic of multiculturalism. However, when we dig deeper, it becomes clear that they both share a concern with defending 'culture' against threats of impoverishment and loss.

The difference is that for Scheffer nation-building and social unity are only part of the solution, whereas for Kymlicka they are also part of the problem. Where Scheffer is afraid that Dutch society may fall apart, Kymlicka is concerned that striving for unity may come at the expense of minority cultures. But in a multination state such as Canada the minorities involved are actually nations. These nations face similar threats as the Dutch nation, which is now after all a 'minority' within the EU.

Critics of Dutch 'multiculturalism' are concerned with its lax attitude towards immigrants. Initially, immigrants to the Netherlands were stimulated to maintain their own culture. Interestingly, Kymlicka puts the worries such critics of multiculturalism in perspective, by reminding them that multiculturalism as it is conceived in Canada does not at all involve a lax attitude towards immigrants.¹⁵³ To the contrary, the 'cultures' in Canadian multiculturalism are *national* cultures, which new immigrants are expected to integrate into.

Dutch 'multiculturalism' is therefore not at all something that Kymlicka would endorse. Rather, Kymlicka and Scheffer share a concern with the impoverishment of the

¹⁵³ See Kymlicka, "States, nations and cultures" (1997)

culture of a nation. In this connection, it is significant that Kymlicka's argument about the loss of culture is adapted from a reflection on the impoverishment of the arts, and by extension, popular culture.¹⁵⁴ This suggests that the Dutch should not only be concerned with a possible diminishment of national culture due to globalization and immigration, but also with pressures on the arts due to budget cuts. Here Kymlicka's work is relevant to the 'cultural sector 'mill wing'.

RESEARCH QUESTION 52: Is there evidence that the richness of the Dutch 'societal culture' diminishes?

RESEARCH QUESTION 53: How do the demands of immigrant groups in the Netherlands compare to the demands of national minorities and indigenous peoples elsewhere?

Would you say that Kymlicka is a modernist?

I would not use that term to describe Kymlicka's position. He is not concerned with the modernism-postmodernism division. Rather, he intervenes in another quarrel, between liberalism and multiculturalism. Initially, Kymlicka sought to mediate these two broad positions, defending what he calls a 'liberal multiculturalism'. More recently, he defines his own multiculturalism in opposition to nation-building. Kymlicka sees this as the last of three stages in the development of the debate over multiculturalism.¹⁵⁵

The first stage was a debate between individualists and collectivists, taking place in the 1970's and 1980's.¹⁵⁶ At this stage, multiculturalism was seen as an alternative for an overly individualistic view of the self, emphasizing that one's self is always bound up with one's membership in a cultural community. Kymlicka contributed to the second stage of the debate, arguing that the concerns of collectivists, at least in their weak form, can be addressed from within the liberal tradition, when we look beyond political theory to the actual practice of liberal democracies. Kymlicka seeks to explicate the 'considered convictions' embedded in liberal practices.¹⁵⁷ He shows that in actual practice liberals do treat minority groups differently than the majority, because they do give independent weight to cultural membership. The third stage centers on the recognition that states engage in nation-building, promoting a common language and common membership. Multiculturalism is best understood as a necessary response to nation-building, in order to the loss or diminishment of minority cultures.

¹⁵⁴ See note 156 above.

¹⁵⁵ Cf Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p. 336-347

¹⁵⁶ In political theory these positions are also known as liberalism and communitarianism, respectively.

¹⁵⁷ See Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p. 5-7. Kymlicka's method, especially the concept of 'considered conviction', draws on John Rawls. Rawls developed the notion considered convictions in his early paper "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics" (1951). Rawls later revised this procedure; see "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" (1980).

Kymlicka's argument for the differentiation of citizenship may sound similar to a postmodern defense of 'difference', but it is not. Kymlicka's argument is couched in terms of formal rights and justice.¹⁵⁸ He seeks to extend the range of formal rights to culture, claiming that this requires the recognition of rights that are group-specific rather than being the same for each citizen. This is where Kymlicka's work is relevant to the social minorities 'mill wing'. In dealing with social groups such as women and gays, Kymlicka recommends the extension of the language of rights to the members of repressed groups *qua group-member*. On this view, they derive rights not only from their membership in the nation, but also from their belonging to a repressed group.

RESEARCH QUESTION 54: What similarities and differences are there between the demands of 'social groups' (e.g. gays, and women) and immigrant groups in the Netherlands?

SECTION 3.8: Jeffrey Alexander

QUESTION 59: Why is Jeffery Alexander interested in interactions between culture and citizenship?

Jeffrey Alexander is a sociologist from the United States, where he is currently co-director of the Yale Center for Cultural Sociology. My discussion will cover his cultural sociology, especially his monograph *The Civil Sphere* (2006).¹⁵⁹

Alexander aims to show that the civil life of modern societies, such as the USA, is not merely rational and utilitarian, but has a deeper cultural layer. He believes that this cultural dimension of modern civil societies is structured in the same way as a religion: civil life has its own 'sacred' symbols, narratives, norms and rituals. In the same vein, citizenship for Alexander does not mean formal membership. Rather, **citizenship has a cultural dimension**, which involves communicative and symbolic processes.

¹⁵⁸ "Multicultural States and Intercultural Citizens", p. 164

¹⁵⁹ In earlier work, Alexander sought to revive the functionalism of Talcott Parsons. His cultural turn starts with a rereading of Emile Durkheim's religious sociology in *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* [1912]. This led Alexander to the discovery, during an empirical investigation of the Watergate crisis, of the sacred and profane dimensions of civil society. Alexander found that the Watergate crisis involved a shift of focus from everyday 'profane' political goals to more fundamental 'sacred' customs and morals, which were perceived to be endangered by the Watergate break-in. See Alexander, "Culture and political crisis: 'Watergate' and Durkheimian sociology" (1988), and, by contrast, his neo-functionalist analysis of the same crisis in "Three models of culture and society relations: Toward an analysis of Watergate" (1984). On the development of his cultural sociology leading up to the *The Civil Sphere*, see Philip Smith, *Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, The Gulf War, and Suez* (2005), p. 230-1, n1.

For article-length introductions to Alexander's work, see Thompson, "Durkheimian cultural Sociology and Cultural Studies" (2011), Langer, "The Return of the Repressed: Alexander's Cultural Pragmatics" (2007) and McLennan, "The 'New American Cultural Sociology': An Appraisal" (2005). For a Dutch review, see Menno Hurenkamp, "Nette helden: Besprekingsartikel van Jeffrey Alexander 'The Civil Sphere'" (2009).

Alexander's project, then, is to analytically describe and empirically investigate this cultural dimension of civic life. In *The Civil Sphere* he shows that in crucial stages of the development of the USA civil sphere, Americans have invoked the same discourses of civility and anti-civility to recognize some groups as American, while excluding others. The motives of groups as different as Catholics, German immigrants, and women, were initially represented as anti-civil, and only gradually accepted as civil. In this way, the scope of the American civic identity has become more universal, occasional restrictions notwithstanding.

RESEARCH QUESTION 55: Does citizenship have a cultural dimension consisting of civic symbols, rituals, norms and narratives?

RESEARCH QUESTION 56: Have Dutch citizens at different times invoked the same discourse of civility and incivility?

RESEARCH QUESTION 57: Should all ethnic and religious minorities in the Netherlands, including non-Western immigrants and Muslims, be represented as civil?

If he is writing about the USA public sphere, does Alexander's theory also have relevance for the Netherlands?

To me, his work is very relevant to the Dutch context. First of all, Alexander is not only talking about the USA, although this is primary focus. Indeed, chapter 18 of *The Civil Sphere* discusses the incorporation of Jews into the public spheres of European nations. In 18-th century Germany, for instance, Jewish citizens were denied civil freedoms such as the freedom of press (to print prayer books), and the freedom of congregation (public worship in synagogues). Nor could Jews participate in crafts, or use their own language in public interactions.¹⁶⁰ Such exclusions were justified not just in religious terms but in civil terms. In art and media of the time, Jews were represented as archaic and tribal, secretive, aggressive, divisive and hierarchical. It is only because their representation as anti-civil was successful that the exclusion of Jews became publicly acceptable.

In the Dutch civil sphere, similar exclusions were and are at work, most recently with regard to Muslim immigrants. Alexander's contribution to the Dutch debate is the idea that such exclusions from the civil sphere have a genuinely *cultural* logic.¹⁶¹ On this

¹⁶⁰ *The Civil Sphere*, p. 464

¹⁶¹ A colleague of Alexander, Ron Eyerman, has developed a cultural analysis of the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh and their interpretation in Dutch media. See Eyerman, *Cultural Sociology: Cultural Sociology of Political Assassination: From Mlk and Rfk to Fortuyn and Van Gogh* (2011), chapter 5; idem, *The assassination of Theo Van Gogh: from social drama to cultural trauma* (2008); idem, "Art and Assassination as Public Performance" (2005). For a Dutch view on the merits of this kind of approach, see De Haan, "Morele paniek of cultureel trauma? Over de betekenis en de gevolgen van de moord op Theo van Gogh" (2007).

In his doctoral thesis, Justus Uitermark has applied Jeffrey Alexander's concept of 'the civic sphere' to the Netherlands. Published as *Dynamics of Power in Dutch Integration Politics: From Accommodation to Confrontation* (2012). Uitermark criticizes Alexander's theory for 'bracketing out' power inequalities. But as I see

view, when Muslims are treated as non-Dutch and uncivil, this cannot be fully explained by the nature of the Islam or by social-economic differences.

According to Alexander, the same cultural processes are at work in the inclusion and exclusion of all kinds of groups, regardless whether they have a different ethnicity, race, gender, or sexual preference. All these groups have been symbolically represented as uncivil, and been excluded from the ‘sacred’ core group of society. When the loyalty of Muslims to the Dutch society is put into question (like the loyalty of Catholics before) this is a discursive process that has no basis in some intrinsic characteristics of Muslims, as a group, or their religion. For this reason, the remedy is not to change the beliefs or practices of Muslims but to re-represent them as civil and ‘Dutch’. In other words, they must convince other citizens that they can embody civic ideals such as rationality just as much as the members of any other group.

I have indicated how Alexander’s work is relevant to the immigrant and minority wings of ‘the Dutch windmill’. Rest it to show his relevance to the cultural sector wing. Alexander details how and to what extent mass media (news and fiction) influence who is regarded as a citizen.¹⁶² On the one hand they are bound to prevailing ideas about what is civil and uncivil, but on the other hand they have some latitude in translating these ideas into situation-specific evaluations of actors and motives. For instance, Stowe’s novel *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* stimulated the formation of antislavery movements, by offering a fictional representation of race relations in a way that provoked empathy for African-Americans. Whether citizens have access to such fictional representations may therefore have significant political impact.

RESEARCH QUESTION 58: Does the Dutch civil sphere function similarly as other civil spheres, notably the civil sphere of the USA?
RESEARCH QUESTION 59: Do exclusions of groups from the Dutch civil sphere result from their symbolic representation as uncivil?
RESEARCH QUESTION 60: Do the mass media influence who is regarded as a citizen, if so, in what way?

How would Jeffrey Alexander define cultural citizenship?

To be clear, he does not use the term ‘cultural citizenship’, but he does use ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ separately.

it, Alexander’s theory is better understood as an attempt to account for a specifically *cultural* kind of power, which he deems irreducible to power processes in other subsystems. See Alexander, *The Performance of Politics: Obama’s Victory and the Democratic Struggle for Power* (2010), Part I, and his essays “Power, Politics, and the Civil Sphere” (2010) and “Performance and power” (2011).

¹⁶² *The Civil Sphere*, p 69-84. See also Alexander & Jacobs, “Mass communication, ritual and civil society” (1998)

According to Alexander, ‘culture’, in modern societies, is tied to the civil society. By ‘civil society’ he means “a solidary sphere, in which a ... universalizing community comes to be culturally defined”.¹⁶³ To be concrete, it encompasses the media, government and political parties, the law courts, and civil associations. These institutions articulate ideals about solidarity, and together they make up the civil sphere.

Alexander claims that the civil sphere is empirically differentiated from other spheres, such as the state, the market and the family. Whereas in other sphere social divisions (due to income, power, life style, etc.) dominate, the civil sphere is regulated by the ideal of a universal community. In the civil sphere social differences eventually yield to intergroup solidarity. In the West, this solidarity draws from a wide range of cultural traditions, including Christianity, Romanticism and the Enlightenment.

Central to Alexander’s theory is the idea that culture has ‘relative autonomy’ from social structure and action.¹⁶⁴ On this view, ‘culture’ cannot be fully explained in terms of money, power, or preferences, but has its own, symbolic, structure. Alexander stresses that civil society is not merely an institutional sphere, but has a subjective dimension as well. This subjective dimension consists of “structures of feeling” that are opened up and mediated by social representations.¹⁶⁵

The most fundamental representations are signs that categorize motives, actors, and institutions as either pure or impure.¹⁶⁶ On this view, all civil societies conceptualize the world into the pure (who deserve inclusion) and the impure (who deserve exclusion), just as religions divide the world into the saved and the damned.¹⁶⁷ In the USA, motives such as reasonableness, engagement and autonomy are considered pure, but motives

¹⁶³ *The Civil Sphere*, p. 31

¹⁶⁴ For a discussion of this idea in different sociological traditions, see his “Analytic debates: understanding the relative autonomy of culture” (1990).

¹⁶⁵ *The Civil Sphere*, p. 54. This idea harks back to Emile Durkheim, who believed that representations can become relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the conditions of their production. In individuals, this means that at least some representations become independent from sensory-motor experience (cognitive scientists now call them ‘amodal’ representations). These representations have a ‘purely intellectual’ structure.

In addition, Durkheim drew a distinction between individual and *collective* representations. The first reflect individual mental states, whereas the latter are social in origin and reflect the state of the collective. Durkheim argued that sociology (as the study of society) should focus on collective representations, rather than on the mental life of individuals, which should be left to psychologists. Cf. Durkheim, “Individual and Collective Representations” [1898].

In *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* [1912] Durkheim further elaborated the idea of collective representations, claiming that what makes them “entirely different from purely individual representations” (p. 18) is that they “express collective realities” (p. 11). Specifically, they express the social reality of society as a whole, which transcends individual minds.

¹⁶⁶ In *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* Durkheim claims that categorization is morally necessary. Because society “requires a degree of logical and moral conformity” it seeks to “prevent dissident views” by treating divergent minds as no longer human (p. 19). This is why we feel that some social constraints cannot be shunned without thereby placing ourselves outside of society. Durkheim claims that societies divide the world into two domains: the sacred and the profane. Sacred and profane qualities are diametrically opposed, and have nothing in common. The mind rejects any intermingling of even contact between the two domains. Things can pass from one domain to the other, but only in a way that affirms the duality.

¹⁶⁷ Alexander, “Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification” (1993); Alexander & Smith, “The discourse of American civil society: A new proposal for cultural studies” (1993); Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, chapter 4.

such as hysteria, passivity and dependency are considered impure. Citizens, then, are identified with pure values, whereas non-citizens are identified with impure values

If these dualities appear overly schematic, this is because they are only skeletal patterns, which are transformed into much richer chronological patterns by means of narrative. Narratives help citizens to understand their personal progress through time, and to link up with collective progress.¹⁶⁸ Such narratives involve plots, characters, and genres. “The basic plot of civil society”, Alexander claims, is “the story of integration and participation via citizenship”.¹⁶⁹ Its heroes fight for the extension of citizenship; its anti-heroes seek to restrict its scope. The dominant genre is utopian or ‘romantic’: the story of citizenship is a story of progress.

The term ‘cultural citizenship’, if applied to Alexander’s theory, might denote the interplay between cultural structures and processes that determines who is included in the civil sphere and judged to be a citizen, and who is not. But I want to emphasize that in Alexander’s view, the symbolic dimension of civic life is not always equally salient. In times of crisis, civic discourse becomes polarized and schematic, but in everyday politics values are not so sharply articulated and opposed.

RESEARCH QUESTION 61: Does the Netherlands have a civil sphere that is empirically different from other spheres, notably the market, the family and the state?

RESEARCH QUESTION 62: Are civic ideals more universal than other kinds of ideals?

RESEARCH QUESTION 63: Are inhabitants of the Netherlands symbolically represented as either civil or uncivil, without anything in between?

I am thinking of the polarization in the Netherlands after the murder of Theo van Gogh by a Muslim of Moroccan descent. In the months that followed, the loyalty of Muslims was called into question and mosques were attacked. Does Alexander offer an explanation for this kind of polarization?

He does. Alexander claims that in times of crises, such as a political assassination, a “generalization of communication” takes place. Alexander means a movement away from utilitarian processes of everyday life, and towards the re-experiencing of fundamental values.¹⁷⁰ Social life is no longer routine but the cultural framework of society becomes subject of public scrutiny. The fundamental values of society are either reaffirmed or reformulated. As we have seen, Alexander believes that these fundamental values take the form of binary oppositions.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. The Civil Sphere, p. 60-64

¹⁶⁹ Alexander & Jacobs, “Mass communication, ritual and civil society” (1998), p. 31

¹⁷⁰ On the concept of generalization, see Parsons and Shils “Values, Motives, and Systems of Action” (1951).

In the wake of the Van Gogh murder, social life in the Netherlands became more polarized. Inhabitants were divided up in good citizens and bad citizens. It was not just that Muslims were no longer trusted. What is more, the value of freedom of speech now dominated narratives about cultural citizenship. Dutch citizenship became defined in terms of the acceptance of the quintessentially Dutch value of freedom of speech. The freedom of speech and its negation are an example of a fundamental value that came to the fore in that time of crisis following the murder on Theo van Gogh.

On this view, research on cultural citizenship should focus on exceptional events, such as national elections, high-profile scandals, riots, political murders and war. It is in such exceptional times that collective symbols and formed, changed and invoked.

RESEARCH QUESTION 64: Should research on cultural citizenship focus on exceptional events rather than on everyday routines?

Alexander is clearly a proponent of Structuralism, which was the very target of post-structuralism, an important strand within the postmodern movement. Surely, you will agree that he is the quintessential modernist?

You could say so. But, again, that is not how Alexander would phrase it. He works with a different opposition, between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ programs in culture and sociology.¹⁷¹

By a strong program, Alexander means a program that recognizes the autonomy of cultural structure vis á vis social structure. In this type of analysis cultural structure is described independent from the *social* context in which it emerged. Instead, it is embedded in a specifically *cultural* horizon of meaning.

By contrast, weak programs¹⁷² attempt to explain cultural structures in terms of an underlying social structure. On this view, structured sets of meaning, such as the binary oppositions that Alexander talks about, are ultimately driven by social forces that are ‘more real’, such as power.

Notice that Alexander’s concern here is not with an opposition between structure and process, but with the relationship between *two kinds of structures*, one cultural and one social. He believes that for a cultural sociology to be possible it must have its own

¹⁷¹ See Alexander & Smith, *The Strong Program in Cultural Sociology: Elements of a Structural Hermeneutics* (2003). The term ‘strong program’ originated in science studies, e.g. David Bloor, *Knowledge and Social Imagery* (1976). In Alexander’s reading, the strong program in science studies understands science as a ‘collective representation’, and stresses the uncoupling of cognitive content from natural determination. In the same vein, he calls for the uncoupling of cultural from social structure.

¹⁷² Alexander regards cultural studies as such a weak program. He believes that in this field culture is reduced to social structure, especially power. Instead, he calls for an interpretive approach to cultural sociology, drawing on Max Weber and especially Emile Durkheim. See Sherwood, Smith & Alexander, “The British are Coming... Again! The Hidden Agenda of Cultural Studies?” (1993)

independent object of investigation, namely structures of meaning that partially enable and constrain action, and do so relatively independent from other kinds of constraints.

RESEARCH QUESTION 65: Does culture (i.e. symbolic communication in the civil sphere) have analytical autonomy vis-à-vis social structure and action?

SECTION 3.9: Paul Ricoeur

What is Paul Ricoeur's concern with culture and citizenship?

Paul Ricoeur is a French philosopher, specifically a phenomenologist.¹⁷³ My discussion is limited to his early writings on philosophical anthropology and political philosophy.¹⁷⁴ The concepts of culture and citizenship are central to this body of work.

Ricoeur calls for a **cultural politics** that guarantees a place within society for the critical and creative activity of what he calls 'men of culture': artists, thinkers, and scientists.¹⁷⁵ This kind of activity must be protected against three tendencies in modern societies: not taking seriously the heritage of the past, failing to renew reified customs and values, and being absorbed by the utilitarian and functional processes of the work-

¹⁷³ In later work Ricoeur draws heavily on hermeneutics, but the work I am discussing here pre-dates his hermeneutic turn. In addition to phenomenology, Ricoeur's political work is influenced by the Personalism of a group of thinkers around the journal *Esprit*, such as the French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier. On this influence, see Dauenhauer, *Ricoeur: The Promise and Risk of Politics*, chapters 1 and 2.

¹⁷⁴ The principle work is *Fallible Man* [1960], which contains Ricoeur's early philosophical anthropology, and deals with the question how human beings can use and misuse their freedom of will. I will also draw on a number of essays that were originally published in French between 1956 and 1965. English translations of these essays are included in the collections *History and Truth* (1965) and *Political and Social Essays* (1974). *Fallible Man* is written in very technical language; a more accessible way to understand the book is through Ricoeur's use of the journey metaphor.

In *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur aims to develop a philosophy of the human being. Ricoeur presents this project as a journey. His first concern is to find the appropriate "starting point" for this journey. In fact, there are two starting points: one pre-philosophical and one properly philosophical.

The pre-philosophical starting point is an understanding of the human being as 'a playing field of two forces' and as 'situated in between origin and end'. This pre-understanding reveals the depth and complexity of the human situation, but does not suffice as a philosophical starting point.

Philosophically, Ricoeur takes as his starting point a paradox according to which the human being is both finite and infinite. This paradox was initially formulated by Descartes, and developed by Kant, Hegel and Husserl. These philosophers serve as Ricoeur's "guides" in the philosophical stage of his journey. They allow Ricoeur to break with the pre-philosophical, give philosophy its own independent starting point, and develop a properly philosophical understanding of the human being as *fallible*.

Such a properly philosophical understanding requires a "roundabout way via the object" (p. 18).

The final stage of Ricoeur's journey (chapter 4) is to return to the pre-philosophical understanding. He seeks to recover its depth and complexity on the newly established philosophical level. To achieve this, Ricoeur must move from the level of knowing to the level of feeling. In this stage of the journey, he can no longer rely on his four "guides" (who were concerned with knowing). He must go his own way. In several "steps" Ricoeur shows that the great ideals of humanity have a 'material' aspect.

Fallible Man is part of a larger three-volume project on the philosophy of the will. This early body of work must be distinguished from his mature philosophical anthropology. In this later development, Ricoeur shifts from 'the will' to 'action' as central notion. Instead of the use and misuse of the will, his mature work deals with the fragilities and capabilities that human beings display in their various activities.

A good discussion of *Fallible Man* within the wider context of Ricoeur's early work is Don Ihde, *Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur* (1971), chapter 3.

¹⁷⁵ Ricoeur, "What Does Humanism Mean?" [1956]

ing life. For example, artists should have the opportunity to engage in creative activity without having to worry about money or about the societal relevance of their work.

Ricoeur invites us to look beyond the questions raised by foreign cultures ‘besides’ us, to the heritage of the Greco-Latin culture ‘behind’ us. As a humanist, his concern is with cultural memory, and the renewal of the classical heritage. Important values are crystallized in works of art, institutions and customs and it is the task of ‘men of culture’ to recapture and renew these values. This requires an arena guaranteed by the state in which artists and scientists can freely engage in critical and creative activity. Culture should not be demanded to be economically or politically useful but should be granted its own efficaciousness. In brief, the sphere of culture should have some autonomy vis-à-vis economics and politics.

Paul Ricoeur does not explicitly connect this cultural politics to **citizenship**. But questions of citizenship are central to his political work. He even goes as far as defining political philosophy as “a reflection on citizenship”.¹⁷⁶ Just as in his reflection on culture, Ricoeur’s concern is with the *autonomy* of politics, especially vis-à-vis economics. He stresses that politics involves its own kind of relationship, i.e. a relationship of power. Ricoeur’s aim is to explicate this power relationship, in both its positive and its negative manifestations, by way of a reflection on the nature of citizenship.

RESEARCH QUESTION 66: What do works of art tell us about cultural citizenship?

RESEARCH QUESTION 67: How do Dutch citizens and does Dutch society as a whole relate to the Greco-Latin heritage?

RESEARCH QUESTION 68: Should the Dutch state guarantee a place for creative activity protected from the utilitarian and functional processes of the working life?

RESEARCH QUESTION 69: Should Dutch society invest in memory and critical renewal of its cultural heritage, if so, to what extent?

How does Paul Ricoeur define culture and citizenship?

On the one hand, Ricoeur synthesizes culture and politics as structurally similar: they are both expressions of the human freedom of will.¹⁷⁷ As such they are both **fallible**: in

¹⁷⁶ Ricoeur “Ethics and politics”, p. 330. For Ricoeur’s work on citizenship, see Dauenhauer et. al., “Ricoeur and the tasks of citizenship” (2000), and Deweer, “Ricoeur on Citizenship: A Picture of a Personalist Republicanism” (2012)

¹⁷⁷ The synthesis is most developed in *Fallible Man*. Here Ricoeur claims that culture and politics have in common that they are both constitutive of our humanity, by guiding our feelings towards intersubjective ideals. He writes: “we must add the ... political and cultural dimensions to objectivity; they make a human world out of the mere nature they start with” (p. 112). It is against this shared background that he then goes on to distinguish the political ideal (power) from the cultural ideal (worth).

In technical terms, Ricoeur analyzes politics and culture as two distinct ‘worlds’ opened by two substantive ‘objects’ or intentions of consciousness, namely power (embodied in political intuitions), and worth (embodied in works of culture and religion). Ricoeur follows Kant and Husserl in formally analyzing the human will as

culture and politics alike our freedom is fundamentally good but susceptible to evil. On the other hand, Ricoeur analyzes culture and politics as distinct levels of civilization, in which the freedom of will and its perversion take on a unique form.¹⁷⁸

Politics, for Ricoeur, is defined by **the quest for power**.¹⁷⁹ He claims that power differences and the exercise of authority give the political sphere autonomy vis-à-vis the economic sphere. Power and authority belong to a special kind of relationship, which first becomes possible through the establishment of a state. By constituting itself as a state a people begins to work out a political relationship that is irreducible to economic relationships. This makes a new, political, kind of freedom possible. This means that for Ricoeur the state is first of all a positive phenomenon.

But with political freedom come evils specific to the political sphere, which cannot be reduced to economic exploitation. For instance, Ricoeur may agree with Stalinism's economic aims, but criticizes its abuse of political power in trying to achieve them.¹⁸⁰ Such misuses of power are a secondary possibility, which presuppose the freedoms that originate with the establishment of a state.

Now, Ricoeur defines **citizenship** as "the power to take part in the administration of the state".¹⁸¹ To be a citizen means to participate in the collective decision processes that are organized through the state.

Culture, as Ricoeur defines it, is constituted by **the quest for worth in the eyes of the other**.¹⁸² In other words, 'culture' is the sphere of the exchange of opinions among

a synthesis of rational understanding and intuitive sensibility. But for Ricoeur this formal analysis is but a first step. The next step extends it to a practical and affective synthesis. Power and esteem belong to the affective synthesis, in which the transcendental synthesis in 'objects' is interiorized. They are the human passions with which we subjectively respond to the intersubjective 'objects' that guide our social life.

Ricoeur claims that the human will is fallible because it involves a disproportion between understanding and sensibility. This disproportion provides the occasion for evil. Again, this disproportion is not just formal and epistemological, but affective. In the final analysis, fallibility is a disproportion of *feeling*. Feelings such as lack, dread, loss reveal that we do never live up to our ideals. They remind us that the synthesis that would make us coincide with ourselves is only intentional. As fallible human beings, we do not live up to the ideals of power and esteem, but are prone to their perversions: the quests for domination and honor.

¹⁷⁸ The analytical strategy dominates in "The Tasks of the Political Educator" [1965], where Ricoeur writes that "articulation of the phenomenon of civilization *on different levels* alone allows for the appearance of what is *irreducible* in politics" (p. 276, emphasis added). Ricoeur claims that politics has its own pathologies and therapies, which can only be brought out by 'bracketing' economic issues; just as in analyzing culture it is best to 'bracket' political issues. Ricoeur concludes that it is impossible to attain a systematic view that would tie culture and politics together in a single view of civilization (p. 282). Attempts to do so would result in a "violent synthesis". See Dauenhauer, *Ricoeur: The Promise & Risk of Politics* (1998), p. 72-78.

¹⁷⁹ See "The political paradox" [1957]. Ricoeur's later work on ideology and utopia, which is not covered here, connects power to 'the cultural imagination'. See "Ideology and utopia as cultural imagination" (1976), his *Lectures on ideology and utopia* (1986), part III of *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II* [1986], and several essays collected in *Lectures 1: Autour du Politique* (1989). Subsequently, Ricoeur presents his mature philosophical anthropology, and shifts focus from 'the will' and its passions to 'action' as central category. He now emphasizes the tension between (1) power as domination, and (2) power as acting and living together. A good introduction to this line of work is his article "The Moral, The Ethical and The Political" [1993].

¹⁸⁰ Cf. "The Tasks of the Political Educator", p. 276

¹⁸¹ Ricoeur "Ethics and politics", p. 250

¹⁸² Cf. *Fallible Man*, p. 120. Ricoeur sometimes also uses 'culture' in wider the sense of an entire 'civilization', which would encompass both the spheres of power and worth. See "The Task of the Political Education", p. 272.

equals. In the cultural sphere, we pursue the aim of being esteemed and approved by others, which Ricoeur calls the quest for ‘recognition’.¹⁸³ Recognition of our humanity by others allows us to understand what it means to have worth. Cultural works express our humanity in a concrete way, and allow us to search out what it means to be human. For example, experimental art explores new possibilities of being.

Like politics, culture has its own blessings and evils. Culture first of all makes a new kind freedom of possible. In particular, culture gives us the freedom to develop a personal life beyond our working and political life. But with this new freedom comes the possibility of its misuse: the development of feelings of superiority over others and their values. Ricoeur stresses that such cultural evils cannot be reduced to the abuse of power, but have their own constitution.

All in all, Ricoeur is more hesitant about juxtaposing culture and politics than the authors we have considered so far. Then again, Ricoeur feels that politics is ultimately grounded in culture. Political citizenship, as the participation in power, is first made possible by cultural participation, in the sense of being part of an exchange of valuations. I would therefore like to suggest that if Ricoeur had used the term ‘cultural citizenship’ he would have used in the sense of **the participation in the quest for recognition**. This means that it has a political dimension only indirectly, because of the dependence of political relationships on prior relationships of value.

RESEARCH QUESTION 70: Which (groups of) Dutch citizens do participate in the exchange of opinions?

RESEARCH QUESTION 71: Do Dutch citizens have the freedom to develop a personal life beyond their working and political life?

RESEARCH QUESTION 72: What perversions, if any, of the quest for cultural citizenship can be witnessed in the Netherlands; specifically, do (certain) Dutch citizens feel superior over (members of) other groups?

You mentioned that Ricoeur ultimately grounds politics in culture. How does he explain their connection?

You should know that according to Ricoeur politics is more ‘abstract’ than culture, other than you might think.¹⁸⁴ He places economics, politics and culture on a continuum that runs from abstract tot concrete, so that economics is most abstract and culture is most concrete.

¹⁸³ For later work on recognition, which is not covered here, see *The Course of Recognition* [2004]. The third part of this book addresses recognition in the political sense of mutual recognition (*Anerkennung*). Ricoeur engages recent work on the politics of recognition, e.g. Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth. See also his speech “Asserting personal capacities and pleading for mutual recognition” (2010) [2004].

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Ricoeur, “The task of the political educator”. See also his “Ethics and Politics”, p. 327

For Ricoeur, **economics** is tied to the accumulation of goods, by which he means tools, machines and techniques, but also documents and books. On this level, we may speak of a global civilization consisting of the totality of means and mediations available to human beings. Tools and books are exchanged and used by people from all culture. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. For the first time in history, we are conscious of belonging to a single human civilization which enlarges its capital, its knowledge and its instruments. However, this global civilization remains abstract in the sense that it does not exist anywhere. Each historical group appropriates the available means through more concrete institutions and valorizations.

Politics is more concrete than economics, but still more abstract than culture. If we look at the political organization of communities we are confronted by a plurality of states. Different nations have developed their own institutions. These institutions are more ‘concrete’ than tools and books, in the sense that they have circumscribed historical and geographical limits. There is no global state, only a plurality of states. They are the concrete forms through which humanity appropriates the available tools and knowledge in a manner that is unique for each state. Each institution has its own power structure and its own legal form, which have a unique history.¹⁸⁵ Then again, politics is more abstract than culture, because political institutions are based on consensus, on abstract values that are separated from their roots in concrete historical traditions.

Culture, finally, is more concrete than politics, in that its products cannot be separated from their value in a particular historical context. On this level, there is an even greater plurality of what are now best called ‘cultures’. Even within the same state there can be a plurality of historical communities, each with its own values, traditions, and symbols. Each historical group develops entirely concrete representations of its own existence and values. They are the images and symbols by which a group expresses its adaptation to reality. They form the ‘creative kernel’ of a community. Mankind realizes its abstract existence in a plurality of concrete cultural forms.

According to Ricoeur, **culture is the most fundamental level** of experience. Tools and books become useful only when they are considered worthwhile. For example, the ancient Greeks did not use techniques available to them to save human labor because slavery was a cheap and acceptable alternative.¹⁸⁶

In the same vein, political institutions cannot be fully separated from historical communities. Ricoeur defines the state as the organization of *a historical community*.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ This history does not take the form of an accumulation, that is, of unidirectional progress. In the sphere of politics, there is no accumulation but a different kind of dynamics, which involves recurring struggles, the death and birth of empires. See Ricoeur, “Universal Civilisation and National Cultures”, p. 279

¹⁸⁶ Ricoeur, “The task of the political educator”, p. 279. On this example, see also his “Universal Civilisation and National Cultures”, p. 279

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Ricoeur’s “Ethics and Politics”. This definition of the state draws on Eric Weil, see Ricoeur’s note 2.

On this view, the modern state is grounded on an ethical consensus.¹⁸⁸ On the one hand, this consensus is limited to those rather abstract values about which a consensus can be reached. This consensus remains abstract in that it disregards the deep sources of these values. On the other hand, the consensus is not purely formal, but involves the content of accepted norms, narratives and symbols.

RESEARCH QUESTION 73: Can political institutions be separated from historical communities and their values?

RESEARCH QUESTION 74: What similarities and differences are there between politics and culture, and the ideals they involve?

I suspect you do not want call Ricoeur a modernist either, but I would still like to know what sets his work apart from postmodern approaches?

Underlying Ricoeur's analysis of culture and politics is a theory of feeling, or as he calls it, a theory of the passions.¹⁸⁹ Ricoeur analyzes the quest for power (politics) and the quest for worth (culture) as *feelings* in which we become conscious of something outside ourselves.¹⁹⁰

This means that feelings have a dual reference. On the one hand, they refer to something outside us. Feelings are projected on things, on persons and on the world. On the other hand, feelings reveal how we are inwardly affected by things, persons and the world. On this view, to be powerful or to be worthwhile is to view objects in a certain way, *and* to constitute the subject in a certain way. In other words, feelings of power and worth break through the normal opposition between object and subject.

For example, political institutions involve a synthesis of an 'object' and a subject: the state and the citizen are constituted *together*. We know and feel what power means through our experience with political institutions that embody this ideal. The quest for power seeks to interiorize this ideal, this synthesis, but this is never wholly achieved. As fallible human beings, citizens never fully live up to the ideal. The ideal is internalized only as an inner conflict that is never fully resolved.

In the same vein, works of art bring about a synthesis of an 'object' or ideal (the idea of humanity¹⁹¹) and a subject (the human being). In works of art and monuments the two are constituted *together*, in a synthesis 'on' the object. Art works and monuments

¹⁸⁸ In his later work, Ricoeur develops this idea in discussion with John Rawls. *Pace* Rawls Ricoeur claims that a purely formal conception of justice is at best a rationalization of a substantial 'sense of justice' that it always presupposes. See Ricoeur "Is a Purely Procedural Theory of Justice Possible? John Rawls' Theory of Justice" (2000), p. 50.

¹⁸⁹ For this paragraph I am indebted to Idhe, *Hermeneutic Phenomenology: the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, chapter 3. Ricoeur draws on the trilogy of passions found in Kant's Anthropology, see *Fallible Man*, p. 111.

¹⁹⁰ As such they are amenable to phenomenological description. In technical terms, Ricoeur understands feeling as an 'intentional' behaviour, which refers beyond itself toward the world.

¹⁹¹ Humanity not in the collective sense of 'all human beings' but in the sense of their human quality. See *Fallible Man*, p. 107

bear witness to the human search for recognition by the other. We know what we are worth only through our encounter with works of art in which our search for recognition is materialized. Again, the ideal of complete recognition can never be fully achieved in the subject, but is interiorized as a felt conflict. As fallible human beings we always fall shy of the ideal.

It follows that for Ricoeur, ‘cultural citizenship’, would he use the term, would not just refer to ‘interhuman participation’ in cultural groups or cultural institutions, but in addition to ‘suprapersonal participation’ in an ideal, namely the ideal of humanity.¹⁹² To belong to a group is always also to belong to a horizon of meanings against which to be a human person becomes a meaningful project. For Ricoeur, this ideal of humanity is not merely subjective, or intersubjective, but has an objective quality. To relate to this ideal is to relate to an object that surpasses any representation. Works of art point to something beyond our understanding, to which we can nevertheless relate.¹⁹³

To answer your question, Ricoeur’s belief in objectivity beyond representations is a rather different tune than a postmodern stress on the discursive nature of identity, as we saw in Nick Stevenson. But, I hasten to add, it is just as different from Alexander’s structuralism. Indeed, from Ricoeur’s perspective, Stevenson and Alexander share the view that there is no world beyond our representations. Ricoeur disagrees. In his view, when we feel powerful or recognized, we relate to a world that has objective existence independent of the observer. Then again, Ricoeur is closer to Alexander in the sense that they share a concern with the structural aspects of culture. Only, Ricoeur analyzes them differently, as resulting from our relationship to a world outside us, rather than from our relationship to fixed representations.

<p>RESEARCH QUESTION 75: What objective ideal, if any, does the quest for cultural citizenship involve?</p> <p>RESEARCH QUESTION 76: Do perversions of the quest for cultural citizenship result from a disproportion between objective ideals and subjective feelings?</p> <p>RESEARCH QUESTION 77: Should cultural citizenship research focus on the interpretation of works of art?</p>
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How is Ricoeur’s work relevant to the Netherlands?

Ricoeur brings new perspectives to each of my three ‘mill wings’. Ricoeur’s work is relevant to the immigrant wing in that it place it in perspective. Like Will Kymlicka, Ricoeur points to the possibility of ‘cultural loss’. However, Ricoeur offers an alternative to pre-

¹⁹² See *Fallible Man*, p. 103

¹⁹³ Ricoeur formally analyses the intentionality of consciousness with the help of Kant’s distinction between intentionality and intuition. Kant dissociates the relationship to the in-itself (intentionality) from our vision of it (intuition). For Ricoeur, as for Kant, the relation to the object is an intention without an intuition. See Ricoeur, “Kant and Husserl”, p. 158.

vailing concerns with cultural losses due to globalization and immigration. Instead, he draws attention to the danger of losing touch with the Greco-Latin culture ‘behind us’. Without Dutch citizens who are devoted to the memory and renewal of the classics important values will be lost to us.

Ricoeur’s work is also relevant to the cultural sector ‘wing’. Like Jeffrey Alexander, Ricoeur warns against economic and political reasoning encroaching upon the cultural sector. In the current political climate in the Netherlands this danger seems quite real. For example, artists are now required to be entrepreneurial. In the same vein, students are encouraged to take up studies that economically useful, rather than studies in the humanities. Quite the contrary, Ricoeur insists that ‘men of culture’, be they artists or students, should be allowed to be ‘useless’ in a strictly economic or political sense. They should engage in the cultural work of remembering, and renewing cultures, as well as translating between them.

The third ‘mill wing’ concerned social minorities such as gays. Here Ricoeur reminds us of the dangers of reifying past exclusions. Champions of ‘Dutch culture’ should be wary of reifying current customs and narratives. This would stand in the way of the renewal of Dutch culture. Emancipating repressed groups is as much our responsibility as handing down our heritage to a new generation. Current debates in the Netherlands sometimes tend to oscillate between the extremes of feeling superior to other cultures, and of failing to take seriously your own heritage. Ricoeur invites to steer a course in between: the critical renewal of Dutch culture. In particular, Ricoeur points to the need of all cultures, to be reconciled with the progress of the global human civilization.¹⁹⁴

RESEARH QUESTION 78: Should cultural heritages be renewed in the interest of the emancipation of repressed groups?

¹⁹⁴ On the relevance of Ricoeur’ later work to current debates on globalisation, see Erfani & Whitmire, “Ricoeur and the pre-political” (2008)

CHAPTER 4: Integrating research questions

SECTION 4.1: Single normative question

I now face the task of moulding my 78 research questions into a research agenda. To this end, I have to make the most of the **fictive integrative interaction** that I presented as the hallmark of my approach. Recall that the participants in this kind of action are not actually communicating, but are brought together by me *as if* they were participants in a transdisciplinary team. The integration of the research questions we collected should be the result from this way of thinking about the interaction between my authors.

To be more concrete, I have thought about the integration process as a series of meetings, in which all my authors participated, and in which they all had an equal say. During the first ‘meeting’ I asked my participants to pull together and formulate a single normative question, which is presented below. As it turns out, this question involves three normative principles, which will be discussed at some length in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. The single question and the three normative principles should be general enough for all participants to agree on, but specific enough to guide interventions in the problem situation with which I began (the Dutch ‘windmill’). Four additional ‘meetings’ were organized to rework the research questions that were collected in the previous chapter. They will be discussed in section 4.5.

Now, my first step is to convene a ‘meeting’ in which my authors pull together to formulate a single normative question that identifies the principle themes for a debate on cultural citizenship. It is due time to return to that problem situation in the Netherlands where my research began. I am now in a position to suggest a way to deal with this problem situation, namely a **contextual approach**. Such an approach does not seek to resolve oppositions, such as unity and diversity, or stability and change, on a theoretical level, but seeks to identify *circumstances* in which one or the other seems most prudent. The way forward for the debate on cultural citizenship is to spell out not only normative principles, but also the circumstances in which they or do not apply.

I will first present the single normative question, and then elaborate the three normative principles and their contextual application.

The single normative question:

How should culture and citizenship interact in the Netherlands so as (1) to promote the equality between various groups, (2) to protect the viability and richness of culture(s), and (3) to balance solidarity and difference?

This question involves three normative principles which, to my mind, should guide any intervention in the Dutch problem situation: (I) most of my authors are in some way or another concerned with equality or reciprocity; (II) most of them are concerned with the viability and richness of culture(s); (III) most of them are balancing unity and diversity. In the next three sections, I will explain what they entail, and identify the *circumstances* in which they are or are not called for. Finally, to bring these three principles home, I will apply them to the three ‘mill wings’ of the Dutch problem situation.

SECTION 4.2: Principle I: make culture equally accessible to all citizens

The first principle is that of **equality or reciprocity**. **The state and other powerful institutions should** in principle **treat** different groups and individuals in the same way when it comes to their having access to ‘culture’. That is, power differences should not be abused to privilege the culture of one group over another, or to exclude one group from common culture while including another. Then again, we have also seen that this principle is context-dependent: in some circumstances it seems sensible to treat groups differently. What are these circumstances?

One circumstance is a history of oppression, for example in the cases of African-Americans, women and gays. Because of this history, treating such groups in the same way as dominant groups may leave historical oppressions for what they are, instead of mending the wrongs of the past. In these cases special treatment may be necessary to allow members of these groups to fully and equally participate in the common ‘culture’, as well as their own subculture. It is open to debate whether this special treatment should address them as individuals or as groups, but I am convinced that some kind of special treatment will often be necessary.

Another circumstance is the co-existence of multiple nations in the same state. In these circumstances, the nation-building in which all states engage is likely to engender inequalities, which need to be repaired by countermeasures that ensure that citizens can be part of the multination-state in different ways.

A third circumstance is the existence within a nation of (minority) groups that do not so much have a history as a present of being treated as less than a full citizen; for example immigrants who are still seen as aliens even though they are naturalized. Or the chronically ill or handicapped who cannot contribute in the same way to society, but who should no less and no less fully be considered citizens as other inhabitants.

If equal treatment does not seem the best solution in some circumstances, why still uphold equality as a general principle? Because it seems to me that the burden of proof should be on the differential treatment, showing that it does not lead to new forms

of inequality, but repairs inequalities that are already there. Policy interventions should in their implementation of the general principle of equality be sensitive to exceptional circumstances, but these circumstances should still be seen as precisely that: exceptions to a rule. Otherwise we end up with the opposite problem, described by Paul Scheffer, that only dominant groups are held responsible, and the role of minority groups is swept under the carpet. In sum, culture should be equally accessible to all citizens, even if it is not always in the same way and form.

How can this principle be applied to my problem situation, that is, to the three ‘wings’ of the ‘Dutch windmill’? With regard to the **immigrant** wing mill, it means that native inhabitants do not have a privileged position when it comes to (re-)imagining the nation. Nations should be seen as having a civic rather than an ethnic character, which is shaped by all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity or faith. This does not mean that nations should not be granted their own ‘culture’, but rather that it should be universal enough to accommodate citizens from various descents, including Muslims and other non-Western immigrants. Because Muslims are now under pressure, extra attention should be given to their fair representation and visibility in the Netherlands.

Muslims may face exclusions today, but there is no history of oppressing Muslims in the Netherlands. This is different on the **other minorities** ‘wing’. Much has been achieved with respect to the emancipation of women and gays, but we should still take into account their long history of oppression and marginalization. This means that in order to secure their access to culture (both common culture and their own sub culture) differential treatment may be warranted. For example, it may be a good idea for the state to actively foster the representation of all kinds of women and gays in the media, and in the arts.

With regard to the **cultural sector**, the equality principle entails that the arts, popular culture and religion should be accessible to all citizens, at least insofar they need it fully function as a citizen. Not only the rich should have access to culture but the poor as well. This can be secured in different ways, ranging from private funding and market solutions to state subsidies. Also, ‘culture’ should not be an elite affair, but be accessible to citizens with different levels of education. In addition, the cultural sector as a whole has a responsibility towards all citizens to provide them with role models and narratives that can help them to fully function as a citizen in today’s complex society.

SECTION 4.3: Principle II: protect the richness and viability of culture

Almost all of my authors are in some way or another concerned with **the richness and viability of culture**. Some believe that in order to achieve this viability the autonomy

of culture vis-à-vis other spheres must be protected, others are more optimistic about the possibility of cultural experience in the midst of market or political processes. In other words, there is agreement on the end, but not on the means.

For policy interventions, it means that what constitutes the viability and richness of culture(s) should not be treated as a given, but as an outcome of political process. In a democracy we should entrust to citizens, and the debate going on between them, the judgment what cultural processes and institutions are worth protecting. Without a rich culture there is nothing left for 'cultural citizens' to participate in or be a member of, and because of this shared predicament, citizens should be able to reach a consensus on a minimum that must be upheld regardless of their conceptions of culture and their view of the good life. Again, we have seen that there are exceptional circumstances, where such an agreement cannot be trusted, or may even be impossible.

The first circumstance is a distortion of the political process. Even if all citizens partake in the process, some may dominate public opinion, while others may be unable to make themselves heard or seen, because they lack the cultural resources to do so. If some groups or individuals are systemically disadvantaged in terms of money, education, or power, they may be unable to convey to other citizens the value of what they feel need to be protected in order to have rich and viable culture. In such cases, the best protection of culture(s) depends on repairing cultural and social disadvantages of (some) citizens. For example, it should be ensured that immigrants have the means to participate in the (re-)imagination of the nation on a par with native citizens.

Another circumstance is when citizens lack the cultural resources to judge and value different cultural forms and practices. Cultural citizenship, here in the sense of an active and responsible role of citizens in shaping their culture, requires well-educated citizens. Cultural practices are often required tastes, and require background knowledge to be judged fairly. If most citizens do not see the value of a cultural practice, opera for example, the best solution is not to bypass citizens altogether, but to try and convince them otherwise.

Again, in spite of these exceptional circumstances, it should still be upheld as a general principle that those aspects of (a) culture should be protected which a majority of citizens can agree upon as contributing to its richness and viability.

Now let us apply this principle to the 'Dutch windmill'. On the immigrant 'wing', the principle draws attention to the possible effect of immigration on the viability and richness of the receiving culture. We have seen that critics of 'multiculturalism' in the Netherlands are worried that a large influx of immigrants, especially from non-Western countries, may lead to cultural loss. To my mind, this worry is overstated. To begin with, 'Dutch' culture has the full backing of a nation-state, which is still a powerful force, even

if its role is diminishing somewhat due to European integration. It therefore seems not very likely that ‘Dutch’ culture in general will disappear or severely diminish. Besides, immigrants, especially Muslims, do not dominate public opinion. To the contrary, they are a minority that is itself victim of misrepresentation and underrepresentation. Their presence does not constitute a distortion of the political process.

With regard to the ‘other minorities’, what comprises a rich and viable culture is one in which women, gays and other minorities have the cultural resources to imagine and enact what it means to be a citizen. This requires special attention, because what is a rich enough culture for the majority may not be a rich enough culture for minorities. Here worries about the presence of large numbers of non-Western immigrants seem more justified, as at least some of them have known to be hostile towards women and gays. This seems to threaten the presence and visibility of gays and women in physical public spaces, but not in the media. To remedy this situation, gays and women should be offered the cultural resources to claim their own space in public life.

With regard to the cultural sector, the viability and richness of ‘culture’ appears to be most clearly under pressure in the Netherlands. In recent years, the sector has faced severe budget cuts, affecting public broadcasting, cultural organizations, and arts and humanities studies. If ‘Dutch’ culture is threatened by decay it is not by immigrants but by politicians who see culture as a private affair. The authors that I have discussed criticize this idea, showing instead that culture is important not just for private life, but for public life as a citizen. Politicians should steer a middle course between the extremes of reducing culture to private and claiming that culture always needs public support. In other words, politicians should take seriously the question what ‘culture’ is necessary for citizens to fully participate in public life.

SECTION 4.4: Principle III: balance unity and diversity

Several of my authors struggle with **the balance between unity and diversity**. Some of them weigh to the side of unity; others weigh to the side of diversity. What it conveys to me is that there simply is no such thing as ‘the right balance’, at least not in our fallible knowledge. Policy interventions should remain sensitive to the value and downside of both unity and diversity. Or, rather, unity or diversity alone is not a helpful principle when it comes to concrete interventions.

To my mind, policy interventions should resist the temptation to ‘settle’ questions of unity and diversity prematurely, instead letting the debate between them completely play out. The twelve questions that I have presented in chapter 4 may help to guide and

fuel this kind of debate. We will not be able to reach agreement on ‘the right balance’ but what we can do is identify more clearly the circumstances in which unity and diversity become a problem.

We have seen that striving for unity becomes problematic when it disenfranchises citizens falling outside of the mainstream. For example, an emphasis on a single shared language for all citizens become problematic when it has the effect of excluding rather than including immigrants. In the same vein, having shared norms become a problem when they are so rigid in form or application that as a result cultural minorities are no longer able to participate in cultural life. In brief, unity should not eradicate difference to the extent of excluding citizens from participating in the public sphere or the national culture.

We have further seen that forging a common culture becomes a problem when it stands in the way of minority group-formation, leaving group members unable to meet up with other members, and to form collective movements. In this case, one kind of unity comes at the expense of another.

Conversely, diversity may stand in the way of collective action. Many political problems can only be addressed by combining forces, either through the state, or through civil associations. We should acknowledge the importance of a ‘power-in-common’ which depends on the ability to overcome differences and pool resources. A special case is the protection of culture(s) through collective action. If an emphasis on difference paralyzes a group and render it unable to protect its culture, it may have the paradoxical effect of creating less rather than more diversity.

An intermediate case is when cultural differences become ‘spatialized’ resulting in ghettos or other forms of segregation. This is not a problem in groups that have a prior relationship to a certain territory, such as indigenous groups and large-scale national minorities. Here having their own territory may legitimately contribute to maintaining their culture. But it does become a problem in South-African apartheid, and segregation of African-Americans in the USA, as well as more subtle cases such as concentrating immigrants in one neighbourhood. In these cases, spaces of difference become spaces of exclusion. Such exclusions are not motivated by a desire to make room for difference, but rather by the opposite desire to create a ‘pure’ space from which certain differences are eradicated. They show that in practice the opposition between unity and diversity easily becomes so unstable as to become unworkable.

How can unity and diversity be balanced in the Dutch problem situation? On the ‘immigrants’ wing, both unity and diversity are at times important. Unity is called for in cases such as the common language (Dutch) that makes communication possible. It is up to debate whether immigrants should be offered courses in their own language, but if

they are in the Netherlands to stay, they certainly should become as fluent as possible in Dutch. Otherwise immigrants run the danger of being locked up in the private sphere, not being able to fully participate in public life. There is much more room for diversity, however, with regard to cultural practices and interpretations of history. It is not clear that such differences are necessarily stumbling blocks for cultural citizenship. To the contrary, being active in a community with distinct practices and narratives is just as likely to be a stepping stone to cultural participation.

With regard to 'other minorities' such as gays and women, the need for diversity probably outweighs the need for unity, precisely because these groups have a history of oppression behind them. For gays and women to be able to fully function as a citizen it is of crucial import that there is room for widely different ways of being a citizen. It must be recognized that in principle a homosexual can be as good a citizen as a heterosexual. This also means that biased views of the family and its civic role should be avoided. In the same vein, the civic role of women and of activities that, at least in the Netherlands, are regarded as 'feminine' (such as care) should be fully recognized. In these cases there is no need for coordination that trumps the need for diversity.

Balancing unity and diversity is probably most difficult with regard to the cultural sector. On the one hand there is need for coordination. To take a case in point, different theatre groups with different styles partly use the same infrastructure, for example, they perform at the same theatres. Similarly, different TV-shows and series work together on the same net. It is in the best interest of the sector as a whole that the vitality of this shared infrastructure is protected. On the other hand, artists and cultural entrepreneurs should have ample room to adhere to their own vision. There is no easy solution to this dilemma. Probably the best that can be achieved on a theoretical level is to provide as clear as possible an articulation of what is at stake in these opposing demands.

SECTION 4.5 Structured list of research questions

The final step is to convene four additional 'meetings' to restructure the 78 questions that I have collected in the previous chapter: one meeting on descriptive, one meeting on comparative, one on explanatory and one on normative research.

Each 'meeting' followed the same procedure. First, the questions were grouped by similarity, according to an organizing principle all participants could agree on. Second, for each group a main question was formulated, general enough so that it could be used by each of the participants, but otherwise as specific as possible. Finally, no more and no less sub questions were formulated until each of the original questions was represented. In this way, a shared 'agenda' was reached that all participants could agree on.

Descriptive questions

1. How is cultural citizenship best described?¹⁹⁵
 - (a) as a fluid process, a fixed structure, or both?
 - (b) as a formal practice, as an everyday practice, or both?
 - (c) as mobile and intermixing, as bounded to a group, or both?
 - (d) as involving consensus, as involving conflict, or both?
 - (e) as urban, national, international, or all of the above?
 - (f) as the same for all citizens, as different for different groups, or both?
 - (g) as universal or as bound up with a particular conception of the good life?
 - (h) as involving an objective ideal, as context-dependent, or both?

2. To what extent do in the Netherlands the majority on the one hand, and minorities and other repressed groups on the other hand, have cultural citizenship?¹⁹⁶
 - (a) Can they participate in cultural and democratic practices?
 - (b) Can they use public spaces?
 - (c) Can they deal with members from other social or cultural groups?

3. How did/does cultural citizenship develop in the Netherlands?¹⁹⁷
 - (a) Did/does the government promote the integration or the autonomy of cultural groups?
 - (b) Did/does the government deliberately attempt to build a nation?
 - (c) Did or does the richness of the Dutch national culture diminish?
 - (d) Did a state and a civil sphere form that is relatively autonomous vis-à-vis other spheres?
 - (e) Do citizens remember and renew the Greco-Latin heritage of the West?
 - (f) Do citizens have the freedom to develop a personal life beyond the spheres of work and politics?
 - (g) Do some citizens feel superior over (members of) other social or cultural groups?
 - (h) How is cultural citizenship imagined in cultural works in the Netherlands?

¹⁹⁵ Based on questions 12, 13, 21, 22, 20, 26, 39, 49, 55, 62, 63, 75

¹⁹⁶ Based on questions 5, 7, 17, 40, 70

¹⁹⁷ Based on questions 28, 33, 52, 61, 66, 67, 71, 72, 73

Comparative questions

4. What differences and similarities are there between cultural citizenship
 - (a) in the present and the past¹⁹⁸
 - (b) of majority/dominant groups and of minority/repressed groups¹⁹⁹
 - (c) different kinds of minorities
 - (d) in the Netherlands and in other countries²⁰⁰
5. What differences and similarities are there, in the Netherlands, between culture and politics, specifically citizenship?²⁰¹

Explanatory questions

6. How, if at all, is the cultural citizenship of various inhabitants of the Netherlands affected by?²⁰²
 - (a) recent developments (e.g. globalization, immigration, mass media, ICT)
 - (b) government actions and policies (e.g. nation-building)
 - (c) the visibility of various groups (e.g. in public performances)
 - (d) the history of the Dutch nation (e.g. colonialism, conflict-avoidance)
 - (e) the cultural unity and diversity of the Dutch nation
7. How can exclusions of social and cultural groups from cultural citizenship best be explained?
 - (a) as resulting from the way are represented
 - (b) as a failure to live up to an objective ideal
8. How is the present cultural unity and diversity in the Netherlands best explained?
 - (a) as resulting from immigration, or responses to immigration, or a lack thereof
 - (b) as resulting from shared norms, narratives, and rituals or a lack thereof
9. What does the present richness/poverty and viability/unviability of Dutch national culture result from, e.g. does it result from interventions by the state?

¹⁹⁸ Based on questions 2, 19 and 34

¹⁹⁹ Based on questions 10, 15, 16, and 54

²⁰⁰ Based on questions 36, 34, 53 and 58

²⁰¹ Based on question 74

²⁰² Based on questions 3, 6, 8, 11, 24, 35, 37 and 60

Normative questions

10. On what general normative principles should the cultural citizenship of all Dutch citizens be based?²⁰³
 - (a) Having an equal say in the imagination of cultural citizenship?
 - (b) Equal treatment and judgment, regardless of ethnic identity?
 - (c) Dissolving boundaries between citizens?
 - (d) Promoting self-examination?
 - (e) Promoting knowledge about and interaction with other groups?
 - (f) Equal representation, e.g. as civil?
 - (g) Renew your heritage in the interest of emancipation?
 - (h) Each group has a right to maintain its own culture (including immigrants)?

11. To what general normative principles should government actions and public policies with regard to cultural citizenship adhere?²⁰⁴
 - (a) Treat all fantasies and cultural forms as equal?
 - (b) Take into account the value of both solidarity and difference?
 - (c) Make room for the perspective of immigrants?
 - (d) Make rights and policies group-specific where necessary?
 - (e) Repair biases and disadvantages of (members of) repressed groups?
 - (f) Protect structural aspects of cultures?
 - (g) Affect all conceptions of the good life equally?
 - (h) Guarantee a space for creative activity protected from other spheres?
 - (i) Invest in the memory and renewal of cultural heritage?

12. What general methodical principles should cultural citizenship research follow?²⁰⁵
 - (a) Should it focus on everyday routines or on exceptional events?
 - (b) Should it focus on the interpretation of works of art?

²⁰³ Based on questions 4, 9, 23, 32, 38, 44, 48, 57 and 78

²⁰⁴ Based on questions 25, 18, 31, 42, 43, 50 and 51

²⁰⁵ Based on questions 64 and 77

CHAPTER 5: Conclusion

I can now answer my research question: *can (1) an integrative agenda be developed for a transdisciplinary debate on cultural citizenship, (2) if so, in what way?* I will address the two parts of this question in sections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.

SECTION 5.1: Evaluating the concept of cultural citizenship

The answer to the first part seems simple: it can be done, as I have shown in chapters 3 and 4. However, there is more to it than that.

The concept of cultural citizenship is more successful in some respects than in other. The concept may be approached in two ways: the first route is to start with ‘citizenship’ and add to it the adjective ‘cultural’; the second route is to start with ‘culture’ and add to it ‘citizenship’. Of these routes, the first is more successful than the second.

The concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ makes an important contribution to citizenship studies. It draws attention to cultural dimensions of citizenship, such as being equally and fairly represented in the media, being able to access and use cultural information, and having the ability to express yourself through ‘culture’. It shows that citizenship is not merely a matter of rights, which you either do or do not have, but involves degrees of belonging. The concept highlights the informal and formal struggles over meaning and identity that citizens are involved in, and in which their ‘citizenship’, in a cultural sense, is at stake.

The second route, which starts with culture, and then adds the concept of citizenship, does not seem as successful. It does bring out interactions between culture and politics that otherwise might go unnoticed, such as the civic importance of shared narratives, rituals, customs and symbols, as well as the importance of places and communities in which citizens can celebrate their difference. The concept contributes to reflection on the changing relationship between citizenship and various senses of culture, e.g. the cultural practices of immigrant groups, the sub culture of social minorities such as gays, or the handicapped, and the cultural sector, involving art, popular culture and, I have added, religion.

Although the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ certainly does make a contribution to cultural studies, it is doubtful whether this contribution could not be made in another way, which involves less conceptual confusion. To be more concrete, it is not always clear what the term ‘citizenship’ contributes, compared to alternatives such as *public* culture,

cultural *participation*, or cultural *politics*. When the Council of Culture introduced the term ‘cultural citizenship’ in the Netherlands the term was expected to bring its original political connotations to the cultural sector. This strategy does not seem very successful. Outside of citizenship studies, when ‘citizenship’ is linked to ‘culture’ this is achieved by stretching it beyond its original political meaning and watering it down to ‘membership’ or ‘participation’. Hence, it loses the distinctive meaning which it was supposed to bring to cultural studies. If that is what happens, why not speak of cultural ‘participation’ or ‘membership’ in the first place?

Another limitation of the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ concerns its suitability for *integrative* research. This kind of research has two dimensions: a horizontal integration of knowledge from various scientific disciplines, and a vertical integration of scientific knowledge with knowledge from societal actors. The term ‘cultural citizenship’ turns out to be well suited for the first kind of integration, but less so for the second kind.

The concept of cultural citizenship is already used in a variety of disciplines and paradigms, and, as I have shown, might be useful in others where it is not yet used. Due to its ‘uncontested core’ (interactions between culture and citizenship) it is successful in *bringing together* ideas from a range of disciplines and paradigms in a single debate. Since the uncontested core allows for different interpretations, the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ is flexible enough to allow for a great deal of *diversity* within the debate. For these two reasons it is suited for the horizontal integration of disciplines and paradigms *within* science.

Be that as it may, I have to conclude that the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ is not very successful in bringing about the vertical integration of science and society. For the concept proves very difficult to understand for non-experts. It turns out that they find it trying to see any connection whatsoever between citizenship and culture. For them, the concept of citizenship is too specific and too far removed from the concept of ‘culture’ to find a meaningfully and relevant interaction between the two. The concept of ‘culture’, in turn, seems too broad to convey to a lay public what this new dimension of citizenship is about. We have seen that ‘culture’ means different things to different authors, ranging from symbolic communication in general, to the subcultures of social minorities and the ethnicity and language of immigrants – this is very confusing for non-experts.

For this reason, I recommend that that further integrative research on interactions between politics and culture focus on a specific case study in which cultural citizenship is at stake, rather than on the concept itself. In particular, I propose focusing on a cultural controversy. Such controversies are already politically significant events: they generate political debate and attract public attention. Like the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ they can bring together diverging perspectives around a common ‘core’.

Examples of cultural controversies in the Netherlands that may be used include the controversy over the scope and limits of freedom of speech, the controversy over the *hijab* (headscarf) and *niqab* (burqa) worn by Muslim women, the controversy over the public funding of public broadcasting and the arts, the controversy over gay marriage, or the controversy over what kinds of immigrations should be allowed to come to the Netherlands. Such controversies involve a common ‘core’, in the sense of a contested idea or practice, but this idea of practice is weakly structured enough to allow for various interpretations and opinions. In this way, controversies reveal that the public sphere is not just based on consensus, but also involves conflict.

SECTION 5.2: Evaluating the fictive integrative interaction approach

The answer to the second part of my research question is more complex. Recall that I proposed a procedure for developing an integrative agenda, which I dubbed the *fictive integrative interaction approach*.²⁰⁶ It involves conjuring up a debate between proponents from different disciplines and paradigms who have not been communicating. In chapters 3 and 4 I have put this procedure to the test. It is now time to evaluate it.

As it turns out, the bottleneck of my approach is not so much the *integration* of the different perspectives (chapter 4), but rather their *representation* (chapter 3). Although I have more or less succeeded in the end to represent each of my authors, this has been a very time consuming effort, and one with many pitfalls. It is difficult to describe ideas in a way that should be accessible to non-experts, while doing justice to their complexity.

It now seems to me that this problem is partly due to my medium of choice: the text. This kind of textual representation is very dependent on concepts, which as it happens are often discipline-specific. Moreover, it is difficult to get an overview without expert knowledge of the authors or at least the wider traditions in which they work. For these reasons I am now convinced that further research should instead use at a visual medium and possibly multimedia. Visual communication is less dependent on abstract concepts, using concrete graphics instead. In addition, it allows the ‘reader’ to get an overview of the structure of the argument (which can be visualized) before delving into the details of the argument (which may still be represented by text).

Difficulties of representation are, as I said at the start, the price to pay for bringing all these different perspectives together in a ‘fictive’ debate. I am still convinced that this price is worth paying. Because of the ‘fictive’ nature of my debate, using the structure of a debate for authors who are not actually communicating, I have been able to integrate

²⁰⁶ See section 2.2.

perspectives that are not on speaking terms, such as structuralism and postmodernism, or so-called 'continental' and analytical philosophy. The advantage of a fictive debate is that it can follow the 'logic' of the problem situation that it addresses, bringing in all kinds of knowledge relevant to it, without being limited by the same practical obstacles as organizing an ordinary debate or pooling together an actual transdisciplinary team. Moreover, in an ordinary debate or a transdisciplinary team problems of representation are also likely to occur, the only difference is that here the burden of representation is on the participants themselves.

As for the integration of my various perspectives, my conclusion is that formulating and subsequently integrating research questions is an effective method for knowledge integration. Research questions have two advantages. First they are brief, and as such are much easier to work with than large bodies of text. Second, their openness makes them more acceptable from other perspectives, and well suited to guide further research. Further integrative research should develop a more systematic way to translate large bodies of text into more manageable questions. It also should try to make the process of integrating these questions more tractable.

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