Bachelorarbeit, 2018
42 Seiten
Introduction
Chapter 1: How Lithuania was able to severe tie with Russia, post-independence, compared to Ukraine?
Lithuania’s Unified Identity
Lithuania’s Aversion to Kleptocratic-Oligarchy
Lithuania’s Policy of Energy Diversification
Lithuania’s Security Post-Independence
Chapter 2: The Kravchuk-Kuchma era (1991-2005)
The Rise of Ukraine’s Nationalist President: Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994)
Kravchuk’s impact on Security and Identity
The Rise of Ukraine’s Corruption President: Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005)
Kuchma’s impact on Dependency
Kuchma’s Kleptocratic Clan
Chapter 3: The Yushchenko-Yanukovych era (2005-2014)
The Rise of Ukraine’s Reformist President: Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010)
Yushchenko’s Gas Wars with Russia
Yushchenko’s Security Ambition
Identity in the context of the Orange Revolution
The Rise of Ukraine’s Murder-in-chief: Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014)
Yanukovych’s impact on Kleptocratic-Oligarchy
Conclusion
Bibliography
To all the naysayers who doubted I would make it to university, your doubt served as my motivation.
I wish to thank my dissertation supervisor, Dr Robert Smith, whose counsel has been greatly appreciated.
I could not have got to this stage in my academic life without the love and boundless encouragement of my family, especially my mother and father, Lisa and John Whitehouse.
Finally, to my friend Vladyslav Oboronko, whose inside knowledge and experience served, in part, the reason for writing about this topic.
Independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 promised to be a fresh start for Ukraine and its peoples; a sovereign nation with the ability to pave its own destiny, free from the bloodied shackles of its Communist past. A nationwide referendum solidified the Ukrainian parliament’s declaration of independence garnering an irrefutable show of support for statehood.
Twenty-two years since gaining independence Ukraine was set to sign a landmark, comprehensive Association Agreement with the European Union; an agreement seen by many to represent the first phase of Ukraine’s alignment with the Western world. Even Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych had euphorically proclaimed “we [Ukraine] are walking towards Europe” (Kurkov, 2014: 3). However by August 2013, with three months to go before the official signing of the deal, Russia implemented a de facto trade embargo on Ukrainian exports, in addition, the EU demanded the immediate release of jailed opposition leader, Yulia Tymoshenko, a move Yanukovych flat out rejected. Facing stalemate on both fronts, on the 21st November 2013 Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, announced the suspension of preparations to sign the EU Association Agreement, opting instead for closer alignment with Russia. In response hundreds of thousands gathered at Independence Square in central Kiev turning it into a fortress against riot police and state funded provocateurs loyal to the President. In retaliation Yanukovych utilized the full force of the state to oppress protesters through police brutality, legislative action and judicially imposed bans. With no end in sight on the 21st February 2014 Yanukovych signs an agreement with opposition leaders to hold early presidential elections and restore the 2004 constitution (which limits the power of the President). Knowing that he would not go unscathed Yanukovych subsequently fled the capital. The following day he was impeached and Yulia Tymoshenko was released by proclamation of parliament. The Russian government viewed this as a coup led by Ukrainian nationalists and an act of aggression towards ethnic-Russian’s in Crimea and the Donbass. This subsequently but not exclusively resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, and the creation of separatist forces in Luhansk and Donetsk to declare independence from Ukraine in May 2014.
Four years on from the events known as the Revolution of Dignity and Ukraine is far from stable. The revolution highlighted four problem areas; Kleptocratic-oligarchy, Identity, Dependency and Security, which consecutive governments have failed to address, leading Ukraine down a path of self-destruction and perpetual crisis management; attributing this to decades long Russian influence and aggression entrenched in the nations leadership. First the dissertation will produce a case study questioning how Lithuania was able to severe ties with Russia, post-independence, compared to Ukraine? Then in order to contextualize the four problem areas, reference will be made to Ukraine’s four post-independent presidents; Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994), Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) in chapter 2, and Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) and Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014) in chapter 3. In conclusion the dissertation will argue that twenty-seven years of perpetual crisis management is due to the inaction of Ukraine’s post-independent presidents to tackle Kleptocratic-oligarchy, Identity, Dependency and Security, as areas identified for stifling the nations progress.
In providing a comparison Lithuania is the best suited case study for it was the first of the Soviet republics to declare independence on the 11th March 1990. Since then Lithuania has undergone a radical transformation from a small autonomous region of the USSR, to an independent European democracy as a thriving member of the EU, the Eurozone, the Schengen Area and NATO. Chapter 1 will therefore address how Lithuania, small in both populace and land mass, with a legacy of enslavement and oppression under Soviet rule akin with Ukraine, was able to successfully severe ties with Russia post-independence compared to Ukraine’s dismal attempts resulting in a prolonged period of crisis management? Reference will be made to the four problem areas.
Academic Richard Krickus puts forward a romanticized view of Lithuanian independence driven by heritage and national revival, arguing that “[the] abiding commitment to the Lithuanian language, culture, and territory, to the Roman Catholic Church, and to a shared history… have produced a Lithuanian identity” (1993: 157).
In 1569 Lithuania and Poland entered into a union engulfing Ukraine as part of its territory, known as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Poland’s gentry invited Lithuania’s pagan ruler, King Sigismund II, to take up the Polish throne, but on one condition, “the price was conversion to Catholicism” (Lukowski, 2010: 1) as a result, Catholicism was imposed on the peasantry through the use of the Polish language. Despite this, Lithuania enjoyed a great amount of autonomy, whose territory remained largely united. On the other hand Poland was given jurisdiction of what would be considered modern day western and central Ukraine, imposing a more draconian form of Catholicism and a more forceful adoption of the Polish language, whilst Imperialist Russia encompassed Ukraine’s eastern and southern territory. The Lithuanian peasantry came to view the church as being “the only institution that could take any kind of lead in the paralysed Commonwealth” (Lukowski, 2010: 67), this according to Krickus “earned [the Lithuanians] a reputation for their devoutness” (1993: 162), to which Lukowski argues was due to the fact “the clergy… played a dominant role in the production of writings… regarded… in some sense ‘enlightened’” (2010: 68), serving as a catalyst for Lithuanian revivalism during the interim period between 1795-1988 which saw efforts by Imperialist then Soviet Russia to quell such none conformist Socialist attributes. A turning point came when in 1988 Vilnius Cathedral was returned to the Catholic Church – a symbolic gesture, as Krickus argues, the Lithuanian people “had found what they were looking for” (Krickus, 1993: 172), this served as momentum for the duration of the struggle towards independence. On the other hand Soviet authorities in Ukraine allowed for seminaries to take place, but only because they realized “the wave of patriotic mobilization that the Russia church leaders had generated… and that in the long run it might be more effective to exploit this potential, rather than to annihilate the entire institution” (Institute for Christian Studies, 2016: 2), this continued before and after Ukrainian independence as a means to infiltrate the Ukrainian populace. Enveloped in the fact that whilst Orthodoxy is followed by “84 percent” (World Trade Press, 2010: 13) of the populace, the faith is divided between those who follow the Moscow Patriarchy, constituting “51% of the population” (World Trade Press, 2010: 13), and those who follow the Kyiv Patriarchy with a “26%” (World Trade Press, 2010: 13) following.
Lithuanian democracy and independence was short lived, during the Soviet era it endured through the hearts and minds of the Lithuanian peasantry, as Krickus points out “the resistance relied upon common folk for support years before a substantial number of intellectuals challenged Soviet hegemony” (Krickus, 1993: 167), the parliamentary system established in 1918 gave Lithuanians, the majority of which were Catholic, poor and worked in agriculture, a voice and representation with parties such as the Christian Democratic party, the Peasant Union and the Farmers’ Association. It is for this reason that Krickus is right in his initial argument of Lithuanian independence being a romanticized struggle. It is perhaps why in the 1990 Soviet Council election the pro-independent “Sajudis-backed candidates won… 80 percent of the seats” (Krickus, 1993: 173), this saw Vytautas Landsbergis, Sajudis party leader, elected chairman of Soviet Council, to then have it dissolved, and create the “newly established Lithuanian Supreme Council, the single most powerful body in the new Republic of Lithuania” (Krickus, 1993: 173), which saw the return of the parliamentary system. The transition from a single party state to a multi-party system proved to be much more difficult for the Ukrainian populace to spearhead. Whilst it is true resentment ran deep, especially in light of Chernobyl and the Holodomor, and independent movements existed in the Soviet era such as Rukh, despite this none were able to make sufficient electoral progress, compared to those in Lithuania. In Ukraine “The [Communist party] remained a powerful force against change” (Henderson & Robinson, 1997: 53), as emphasized by the fact it took three election cycles until 1998, for the old-guards of the Communist party to lose their parliamentary majority. The inability of the Ukrainian populace to act quickly in mounting a challenge to the Communists in the 1990 and 1994 elections, gave the Communist elites the time needed to solidify their roles in the hierarchy of Ukraine’s public and emerging private sector, leading to the formation of a kleptocratic-oligarchy.
During the Soviet era there were multiple channels through which the oligarchs and Communist elite’s exerted power and monopoly, 1) in the political realm, as mentioned above and 2) through energy manipulation. Lithuania’s energy situation in 1990 can be characterized as being low energy efficient in experiencing “high levels of dependency on energy imports from Russia… 70 percent in 1990” (Balmaceda, 2013: 215), compared to Ukraine’s “50 percent” (Balmaceda, 2013: 261) energy dependency in 1991, this was because Lithuania lacked domestic energy resources – producing oil which “never covered more than 2 percent of domestic consumption” (Balmaceda, 2013: 209), it was in recognition of this that Balmaceda argues was part of a “broader consensus on the need to take whatever measures would be necessary in order to rejoin Europe as soon as possible” (Balmaceda, 2013: 215), it achieved this through energy diversification.
Lithuania’s first diversification initiative started in 1995 with the construction of the Butinge Oil Terminal, this allowed Lithuania to receive large quantities of non-Russian oil by tankers via the Baltic Sea, located on its north-west coast. The reason for this was due to the increased likelihood, post-independence, that Russia would sanction Lithuania with an oil blockade reminiscent of what happened “in April of 1990, after its declaration of independence, it faced a three-month oil blockade” (Balmaceda, 2013: 215), which brought the economy to a temporary standstill, a situation Lithuania did not want to see repeated. Ukraine’s failure to diversify meant it retained Soviet infrastructure and personnel which left it liable to Russian interference and dependency; whereas when Lithuania became independent, and Soviet-Russian personnel left the Ignalina nuclear power station, it was “able to significantly diversify Ignalina’s technical support structure… with Swedish assistance” (Balmaceda, 2013: 217). As a result Lithuania reduced its dependency on Russia “from 70 percent [in] 1990 to 42 percent in 2003” (Balmaceda, 2013: 250), attributing this to Lithuania’s ability to diversify, protect and modernize its energy sector absent of Russian dominance and dependence.
In June 1992 Lithuania held a nationwide referendum on the question of Soviet troop withdrawal from Lithuanian territory, the result was categorical, “91 cent of voters desired an unconditional troop withdrawal by year end with Russia being obliged to pay compensation for damage the Soviet military had caused since 1940” (Webber, 1996: 181), this gave Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the newly established Supreme Council, the mandate and leverage needed to rid Lithuania of Russian military presence in pursuit of NATO membership. The Ukrainian position on this issue was far less aggressive in its immediate opposition to continued Russian military presence, however, instead of seeking withdrawal it laid claim to the Black Sea fleet, as will be discussed in chapter 2. With the mandate given, Landsbergis called for an immediate withdrawal by the end of the year, however Russian Defense Minister, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, was none compliant suggesting that “a wind-down could only begin after the task of transferring troops from Germany… had been completed, and not, therefore, before 1994” (Webber, 1996: 180), such a stance by the Russians enabled the Lithuanians to propose an ultimatum, either Russia withdraw its troops within the given time frame or Kaliningrad would be denied energy supplies until said troops had be withdrawn. According to Balmaceda, Lithuania’s role as the gatekeeper between Russia and Kaliningrad in the transit of energy was an “important element of its own power vis-á-vis Russia, [acting] as a virtual guarantee against a possible Russian gas embargo” (2013: 222), adding that Russia’s role as the regions dominant energy supplier “suddenly became crucial international relations issues… complicating post-independence state-building” (2013: 3). With the election of Lithuania’s first post-independent president, Algirdas Brazauskas in November 1992, vowed to uphold Landsbergis demand. Succumb by internal and external adversaries the Kremlin resumed bilateral talks and “placed greater emphasis on good relations” (Webber, 1996: 183), in hope that anti-Soviet animosity would ease if seen as conceding to Lithuania’s independent demands, this was not to be. An agreement was reached for the complete and unequivocal withdrawal of Soviet troops by the end of August 1993, which led to Lithuania upholding its commitment in continuing to supply energy to Russia’s none-attached entity; therefore averting a prolonged scenario of crisis management.
Chapter 2 will present readers with a chronological account of post-independent Ukraine’s various phases of crisis management. In order to present a cohesive and concise analysis of the four problem areas, identity and security shall be discussed in the context of Kravchuk’s presidency (1991-1994), and dependency and kleptocratic-oligarchy in the context of Kuchma’s presidency (1994-2005). The four problem areas have been assigned in accordance with who had the biggest impact on them. Placing emphasis of how Kravchuk and Kuchma dealt with them, analysing their efforts, or lack of, to resolve them, with the hope of demonstrating to readers the inability of Ukraine’s immediate political leaders to avert crisis management which continued into the turn of the century.
The Rise of Ukraine’s Nationalist President: Leonid Kravchuk 1991-1994,
The rise of Kravchuk is by no means a unique scenario, having joined the Communist party in the late 1950’s he soon rose through the ranks in which “he headed the Propaganda and Agitation Department before his elevation in the late 1980’s to secretary for ideological questions” (Yekelchyk, 2015: 71), as a result he grew to understand, manipulate and ultimately utilize the logic of his opponents arguments and ways of operating to his advantage. He was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Rada in 1990, serving as interim leader during the breakup of the USSR. Not keen on relinquishing power, he ran for president in Ukraine’s first democratically held election in 1991, “years of combatting nationalism on the [Communists] behalf had made him familiar with nationalist concerns and able to talk their language when it suited him” (Henderson & Robinson, 1997: 118) despite this Kravchuk enjoyed support from former Communists turned business moguls who “were afraid of the effects of economic reform” (Henderson & Robinson, 1997: 198). Kravchuk won with “61.59 per cent of the vote in a six-horse race” (Henderson & Robinson, 1997: 118). The landslide victory of a former Communist bigwig like Kravchuk served as a catalyst for other Communist elites turned oligarchs who “realized that in the age of mass politics, the mantle of democratic nationalists could offer the… elites a better claim at legitimacy” (Yekelchyk, 2007: 186), here-on-in the oligarchs were empowered to infiltrate the political process for their own gains. As a result most oligarchs later ventured into politics therefore institutionalizing their consolidation of power, these “including two of Ukraine’s presidents – Kuchma and Yanukovych, [and] most of the prime ministers – Lazarenko… and Tymoshenko” (Yurchenko, 2018: 31). Once elected Kravchuk, according to Yekelchyk, was presented with the question, “what post-Soviet Ukraine was really being transformed into…?” (2007: 193) the answer was clear, crony capitalism coupled with kleptocratic-oligarchy.
During the early years of Kravchuk’s time in office he merged together the concepts of identity and security as being indivisible and interwoven; referred to as “territorial nationalism (defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and statehood)” (Henderson & Robinson, 1997: 198). As argued by economist Anders Aslund who viewed Kravchuk as a pragmatist for during his tenure he did not define Ukraine “as an ethnic state. It was a jurisdiction, a territorial and legal entity” (2009: 31), adding that he understood Ukraine’s diverse demographic and was not trying to create a hegemony, the Ukrainian identity in Kravchuk’s eyes “was defined as civic and political and not as ethnic” (2009: 31 & Yurchenko, 2018: 44).
On security his rhetoric was tough, once calling Russian claim over Sevastopol an “imperial disease” (Wood et al, 2016: 7) and irrefutable stating that “Crimea was to remain an integral part of an independent Ukraine” (Krawchenko, 1993: 93), however his words failed to result in a defined national security policy due to two major foreign policy faux pas.
From the very beginning Kravchuk was categorically committed to rid Ukraine of Soviet nuclear weapons by agreeing to hand over “all its 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with 1,180 warheads” (Aslund, 2009: 39) to Russia. However in pursuit of an independent defense policy Kravchuk halted the transfer of its nuclear arsenal due to a “lack of assurances that warheads were actually being disassembled in Russia and not added to the Russian arsenal” (Webber, 1996: 145), as a result Kravchuk passed through a motion in parliament demanding international monitors observe the transfer; the request was denied by both Russia and the US. In retaliation Kravchuk issues a statement declaring that Ukraine has “’voluntarily renounced the right to possess nuclear weapons’” (Webber, 1997: 148), adding that Ukraine as “a right of entitlement by virtue of Ukraine’s status as an ‘equal successor state of the former USSR’” (Webber, 1997: 148). This did not go down well in Washington, with US Secretary of Defense William. J Perry arguing it was the “single biggest threat to international peace and security” (Aslund, 2009: 39), due to the fact that the dissolution of the USSR had made Ukraine the third largest nuclear power in the world and that Ukraine was still a young, rogue state in the process of democratization. Academic Mark Webber argues “a nuclear capability did little to enhance Ukrainian security and much to undermine it” (1996: 211), therefore it can be argued that Kravchuk’s belief in continued semi-security ties to Russia, through the inability to relinquish its Soviet-era nuclear arson, was the failure of looking inwards, on retaining its current capacity, as oppose to looking outwards, to its future security safeguards.
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