The Influence of Institutional Investors on Corporate Management and Corporate Governance in Germany

Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Methodology
• 3. Theoretical Differentiation of the Object of Investigation
  • 3.1 Shareholder Activism
  • 3.2 Investors
    • 3.2.1 Institutional Investors
    • 3.2.2 Non-Institutional Investors
  • 3.3 Corporate Governance
  • 3.4 Corporate Management
• 4. Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors in Germany – Status Quo
  • 4.1 The Growth of Institutional Share Ownership
    • 4.1.1 Renunciation from the "Wall Street Walk"
    • 4.1.2 Liquidation of “German Inc.”
  • 4.2 The Principal - Agent Theory and Agency Costs
    • 4.2.1 The Principal – Agent Conflict in Listed Companies
  • 4.3 Demands of Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance
  • 4.4 Importance of Instruments used by Institutional Investors
    • 4.4.1 External Instruments
    • 4.4.2 Internal Instruments
  • 4.5 Intermediary Result
• 5. Explanatory Models for Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors
  • 5.1 Single-Variable Explanation Approaches
    • 5.1.1 Size of Stakes and Cross Holdings
    • 5.1.2 Legal Explanations
    • 5.1.3 Aftermarket Liquidity
    • 5.1.4 Portfolio Management
  • 5.2 Multi-Variable Explanation Approaches
    • 5.2.1 The Model of Shleifer and Vishny
    • 5.2.2 The European Governance Network Approach
  • 5.3 Intermediary Result
• 6. The Corporate Governance System in Germany
  • 6.1 The Need for Information versus the Protection of Information
  • 6.2 Direct Firm Level Monitoring
    • 6.2.1 Institutional Investors and the German Annual General Meeting
      • 6.2.1.1 Commercial Banks
      • 6.2.1.2 Mutual Funds
      • 6.2.1.3 Insurance Companies
    • 6.2.2 Indirect Firm Level Monitoring
      • 6.2.2.1 Takeovers or the Market for Corporate Control
      • 6.2.2.2 Board Composition and Board Structure in Germany
    • 6.2.3 Institutional Investors and Board Independence
  • 6.3 Implementation of the German Corporate Governance Code
  • 6.4 Corporate Governance in an International Context
  • 6.5 Intermediary Result
• 7. Empirical Results on the Success of Activism by Institutional Investors
  • 7.1 Evidence on the Effects of Shareholder Activism in the USA
  • 7.2 Evidence on the Effects of Shareholder Activism in Germany

Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)

This thesis aims to provide a multi-perspective analysis of the influence of institutional investors on corporate governance and corporate management in Germany. It investigates the status quo of shareholder activism by institutional investors, explores explanatory models for this activism, and examines the German corporate governance system in this context.

• The role of institutional investors in German corporate governance
• The impact of shareholder activism on corporate management decisions
• Explanatory models for shareholder activism by institutional investors
• The effectiveness of different instruments used by institutional investors
• A comparison of the German corporate governance system with international standards

Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)

Chapter 1 introduces the research topic and outlines the methodology. Chapter 2 details the methodological approach. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework, defining key concepts such as shareholder activism, institutional investors, corporate governance, and corporate management. Chapter 4 analyzes the current state of shareholder activism by institutional investors in Germany, including the growth of institutional share ownership and the use of various instruments. Chapter 5 examines explanatory models for shareholder activism, focusing on both single-variable and multi-variable approaches. Chapter 6 delves into the specifics of the German corporate governance system, including direct and indirect firm-level monitoring, board composition, and the implementation of the German Corporate Governance Code. Chapter 7 presents empirical results on the success of shareholder activism, comparing evidence from the USA and Germany.

Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)

Institutional investors, shareholder activism, corporate governance, corporate management, Germany, agency costs, principal-agent theory, corporate governance code, empirical analysis.