The Effectiveness and Functionality of Anti-Corruption Policies: A Comparative Case Study of Estonia and Ukraine

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

1.1. Relevance of the Research Topic

1.2. Grounds for a Comparative Case Study

1.3. New Institutionalism as the Guiding Theory

1.4. Research Question

1.5. Structure

2. Corruption as a Phenomenon

2.1. Definition of Corruption

2.2. Different Types of Corruption

2.2.1. Petty Corruption

2.2.2. Grand Corruption

2.3. Conceptualization of Corruption

3. The Theory of New Institutionalism

3.1. New Institutionalism

3.2. Rational Choice Institutionalism

3.3. Principal-Agent Theory

3.3.1. Principal-Agent Theory in an Anti-Corruption Context

3.4. Collective Action Theory

3.4.1. Collective Action Theory in an Anti-Corruption Context

3.5. Historical Institutionalism

3.5.1. Historical Institutionalism in an Anti-Corruption Context

3.6. Sociological Institutionalism

3.6.1. Sociological Institutionalism in an Anti-Corruption Context

4. Research Design

4.1. Methodology in Anti-Corruption Studies

4.1.1. Qualitative Anti-Corruption Research

4.1.2. Y-Centered Approaches

4.1.3. Qualitative Case Studies

4.1.4. Comparative Qualitative Case Studies

4.1.5. Process-Tracing as a Method

4.2. Research Design

4.2.1. Overview

4.2.3. Case Selection

4.2.4. Comparative Case Study and Data Sources

4.2.5. Process Tracing

4.2.6. Timeframe

4.2.7. Operationalization

4.2.8. Relevance

5. Case Studies

5.1. Estonia

5.1.1. Political System

5.1.2. Democracy in Estonia

5.2. Case Study on Estonia

5.2.1. Transition into Independence

5.2.2. Transitional Elections and Institutional Changes

5.2.3. Replacement of Soviet Elites

5.2.4. Reforms after Independence

5.2.5. Citizenship Laws

5.2.6. Judicial Reform

5.2.7. Security Police

5.2.8. Administrative Reforms

5.2.9. Privatization and Economic Reforms

5.2.10. Consecutive Governments and Soviet Elites

5.2.11. EU Membership

5.2.12. Cultural Factors

5.2.13. E-Government

5.2.14. Anti-Corruption Legislation

5.2.15. Developments after 2000

5.3. Conclusion on Estonia

5.4. Ukraine

5.4.1. Political System

5.4.2. Democracy in Ukraine

5.4.3. Protest

5.5. Case Study on Ukraine

5.5.1. History of Anti-Corruption Programs and Reforms

5.5.2. Petty Corruption

5.5.3. Anti-Corruption Programs after 2010

5.5.4. Procurement Legislation

5.5.5. Anti-Corruption Legislation

5.5.6. Politicization of State Agencies

5.5.7. Anti-Corruption Reforms from 2014-2020

5.5.8. New Anti-Corruption Agencies

5.5.9. The National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC)

5.5.10. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU)

5.5.11. Obstruction of NABU Investigations

5.5.12. The Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)

5.5.13. The Dysfunctionality of SAPO

5.5.14. The High Anti-Corruption Court (HAC)

5.5.15. Obstruction by the Constitutional Court

5.5.16. Deeper Institutional Issues

5.5.17. Privatization and Economic Transformation

5.5.18. The Impact of External Actors

5.5.19. Corruption of Parliamentary Groups

5.5.20. Opposition against Anti-Corruption Policies

5.6. Conclusions on Ukraine

5.6.1. Policies until 2014

5.6.2. Anti-Corruption Agencies after 2014

5.6.3. Systemic Problems

6. Analysis

6.1. Principal-Agent Theory

6.1.1. Application of the Theory

6.1.2. Country Comparison

6.1.3. Evaluation of the Theory

6.2. Collective Action Theory

6.2.1. Application of the Theory

6.2.2. Country Comparison

6.2.3. Evaluation of the Theory

6.3. Historical Institutionalism

6.3.1. Application of the Theory

6.3.2. Country Comparison

6.3.3. Evaluation of the Theory

6.4. Sociological Institutionalism

6.4.1. Application of the Theory

6.4.2. Comparison and Theory Evaluation

7. Final Conclusions

7.1. Control Mechanisms against Corruption

7.2. Universal Anti-Corruption Norms

7.3. Disruption of Historical Continuities

7.4. Effects of External Pressure

7.5. Outlook on Anti-Corruption Research

Research Objectives & Scope

The research thesis examines which factors explain the difference in the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption policies between Estonia and Ukraine. The primary objective is to identify how political measures and governance mechanisms impact corrupt practices in these national contexts, using new institutionalist theory to analyze the divergent reform trajectories from 1991 to early 2021.

• Comparative analysis of anti-corruption reforms in Estonia and Ukraine.
• Application of new institutionalist theoretical branches (Principal-Agent, Collective Action, Historical and Sociological Institutionalism).
• Investigation of the role of political elite replacement and institutional design.
• Evaluation of internal and external drivers, including EU accession processes and protest movements.
• Assessment of the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies in disparate political systems.

Excerpt from the Book

Summary of Chapters

1. Introduction: Presents the research interest, the comparative study of Estonia and Ukraine, and outlines the theoretical foundation and the thesis' central research question.

2. Corruption as a Phenomenon: Explores definitions and the conceptualization of corruption, differentiating between petty and grand corruption.

3. The Theory of New Institutionalism: Introduces various branches of new institutionalism and provides theoretical frameworks and hypotheses to analyze anti-corruption effectiveness.

4. Research Design: Describes the methodology, specifically the qualitative y-centered comparative case study and the process-tracing method, justifying the approach to the research question.

5. Case Studies: Provides detailed empirical analyses of political systems and anti-corruption reforms in Estonia and Ukraine, tracing major developments from 1991 to 2021.

6. Analysis: Applies the theoretical branches discussed in chapter 3 to the empirical findings, comparing both countries to evaluate the explanatory power of the theories.

7. Final Conclusions: Synthesizes the results of the analysis, providing insights into the factors that determine effective governance and anti-corruption policies.

Keywords

Corruption, Anti-Corruption Policies, New Institutionalism, Estonia, Ukraine, Governance, Accountability, Political Elites, Principal-Agent Theory, Collective Action Theory, Historical Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism, Transparency, Institutional Reform, Policy Effectiveness.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the core focus of this thesis?

This master's thesis analyzes and compares the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption policies in post-Soviet states, using Estonia and Ukraine as primary case studies.

Which theoretical approach does the author utilize?

The author applies the framework of "new institutionalism," integrating sub-theories such as Principal-Agent Theory, Collective Action Theory, Historical Institutionalism, and Sociological Institutionalism to explain success or failure in anti-corruption reforms.

What is the main research question of the work?

The work seeks to answer: What factors explain the difference in the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption policies in Estonia and Ukraine?

Which scientific methodology is employed?

The study uses a qualitative, comparative y-centered case study design and employs process-tracing to reconstruct causal mechanisms within each country.

What does the main body of the work cover?

The main part encompasses an in-depth empirical comparison of institutional changes, political elite strategies, the impact of international pressures (such as EU accession), and the specific outcomes of anti-corruption agencies in both nations.

How are the key terms and concepts characterized?

Key terms include corruption—defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain—and specific categories like "petty" versus "grand" corruption, framed within institutional norms.

Why did the author specifically select Estonia and Ukraine as case studies?

Both countries emerged from the Soviet Union with similar institutional legacies, yet they demonstrate starkly contrasting outcomes in their anti-corruption performance, making them ideal for a "most similar systems design."

What role does the "Principal-Agent Theory" play in the analysis?

It helps analyze the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, specifically looking at whether principals (e.g., the public) can successfully monitor and control their agents (e.g., public officials) to prevent corrupt behavior.

Which role does the "Euromaidan" play in the trajectory of Ukrainian reforms?

The Euromaidan movement, occurring in 2013-2014, serves as a critical juncture for Ukraine, marking a significant shift in public pressure and the subsequent attempt to create new, specialized anti-corruption agencies.

What conclusion does the author draw regarding Estonia?

The author concludes that Estonia's early, radical disruption of Soviet-era institutional norms and its commitment to professionalized, meritocratic public administration were decisive factors in ensuring the effectiveness of its anti-corruption framework.