The Patrimonialization of Security. Bolivarian Circles, Genesis of the Loss of the Monopoly on the Use of Force in Venezuela and Its Influence in the Americas (2001–2003)

Índice

1. Dedication

2. Introduction
2.1. Justification of the chosen topic
2.2. Problem and purpose of the work
2.3. Questions and objectives
2.3.1. Research questions
2.3.2. Research Objectives
2.3.2.1. General
2.3.2.2. Specific
2.4. Methodology

3. Theoretical Framework
3.1. The state monopoly on the use of force
3.1.1. Loss of the Monopoly on the Use of Force
3.2. Patrimonialism.
3.2.1.1. Corruption
3.3. The culture of privilege
3.4. The Rule of Law.
3.5. Non-state armed groups
3.6. Security spillover theory
3.7. Criminal governance

4. Development
4.1. The emergence of the Bolivarian circles and their relationship with the Venezuelan Government
4.1.1. Origin and evolution of the Bolivarian circles
4.1.2. Role of the Bolivarian Circles in Hugo Chávez’s Political Project
4.1.3. Instrumentalization of the Bolivarian Circles by the Government
4.1.4. Dynamics between Bolivarian Circles and State Security Agencies
4.2. Contribution of the Bolivarian circles to the loss of the state monopoly on force
4.2.1. Activities and Operational Capacity of the Bolivarian Circles
4.2.2. Participation of the Bolivarian Circles in Citizen Security Tasks
4.2.3. Implications in the Loss of the Monopoly on the Use of Force
4.3. Non-state armed groups, patrimonialism, and erosion of the rule of law.
4.3.1. Patrimonialization of security during Hugo Chávez’s government
4.3.2. Privatization of public functions related to security
4.3.3. Weakening of the rule of law and equality before the law.
4.3.4. Consolidation of the culture of privilege
4.3.5. The Bolivarian Circles as hybrid actors between the state and the criminal realm.
4.4. Regional impact of criminal governance in venezuela
4.4.1. Influence of the Venezuelan case in neighboring countries
4.4.2. Expansion of illicit activities beyond borders
4.4.3. Normalization of criminal and non-state governance logics
4.4.4. Legitimization of new forms of authoritarian governance

5. Conclusions

Bibliographic References

Anexo A. Presence of Bolivarian Circles

Acknowlwdgements

Abstract

This research explores the transition of security management in Venezuela between 2001 and 2003. During this period, a process of gradual loss of the monopoly on the use of force began, thanks to the role played by the Bolivarian Circles and their contribution to this process.

Likewise, the symbiotic relationship between these groups and the government of Hugo Chávez is investigated, demonstrating how the president favored the establishment of a legitimized system of criminal governance and a progressive erosion of institutional integrity. Delving into the metamorphosis of the Bolivarian Circles, the results of our analysis offer us a vision of their evolution, which starts from structures of citizen participation to the patrimonialization of security, privatization of public functions, instruments of function usurpation, political domination, and oppression.

The research details how the government strategically managed these groups to consolidate its power, while exposing the interactions between these circles and the state security forces, outlining the emergence of a new order of authority that blurs the boundaries between the state and the criminal. Additionally, it considers how this reconfiguration, a product of these processes that influenced power and security in Venezuela, had repercussions beyond its borders, affecting the stability of the Latin American region.

Keywords : Patrimonialization of security, criminal governance, privatization of public functions, Bolivarian Circles, non-state armed groups

1. Dedication

First of all, to God, the supreme energy that moves the world.

It would be common to dedicate this research, a great chapter of my life, to my family and to all those who helped make this possible, but my wish is to dedicate these lines, which I have written with time and dedication, to the memory of Óscar Alberto Pérez, José Díaz Pimentel, Daniel Soto Torres, Abraham Lugo, Jairo Lugo Ramos, Abraham Israel Agostini, Lisbeth Andreina Ramírez Montilla.

It has already been six turns around the sun
since they departed to the eternal east
the last spark of the essence
of that lineage of warriors
who in the 19th century fought
for American independence,
men and women like many others,
like those who once lived, brave…

With the courage and determination
to defend what their reason and ideals
told them was right,
even if the cost was their own lives,
with the courage to take the step
that many of us did not take,
driven by the benefit of all...

The benefit of a kidnapped people
and sunk in misery
under the oppressive claw
of a handful of criminals
shielded by their blind, dark
and ambitious reason...

But they left behind a seed
of hope and inspiration,
as long as there is light, darkness will never win,
Let it be heard! No matter how small it is
IT WILL NEVER WIN!
Little David will always defeat Goliath...

“They may steal the voice of the fallen, but never the indelible essence of what they planted. LONG LIVE VENEZUELA!”

The purpose of this work is not the achievement of an academic objective, although it was developed in that context. The purpose is to provide you, the reader, the world, and academia with a tool that allows them to understand an important event that impacted the lives of many.

This work is not the voice of its author, it is the voice of Eduard in Argentina, it is the voice of Ernesto and María, Deyby and Samantha, and of my brother Carlos in the United States, it is the voice of my little daughter who, in 10 years, will ask me the same question that all of them, like more than 7 million Venezuelans scattered around the world, ask themselves from time to time: How did all of this happen to us? That is why I ask you from the bottom of my heart, to kindly give me a bit of your time so that before reading, you may watch the following video prepared exclusively for this text.

The text may be loaded with technical and academic material that explains and supports it, but the video carries the authentic voice of the authors who back the evidence in this research. It’s 24 minutes long, but I promise it will make sense.

https://vimeo.com/914007985

2. Introduction

The political and social transformation that took place in Venezuela during the periods of 2001 and 2003 was a stage marked by a series of significant changes. Processes such as the emergence and evolution of the Bolivarian Circles, later called Colectivos, represented a milestone that impacted various aspects with a depth that could not be measured at the time it occurred.

These groups, initially conceived as movements of citizen participation, acquired and usurped state functions, becoming key actors in the reconfiguration of social dynamics and security in Venezuela.

This study starts from the premise that security is a fundamental concern for any society. The erosion of the monopoly on the use of force through these groups, the privatization of public functions, and the patrimonialization of security meant the misuse and improper appropriation of the State’s resources and capabilities.

The research is based on a rigorous methodology that includes the analysis of primary sources, as well as secondary sources that offer interpretations and critical analyses of the events and their consequences. This multifaceted approach not only allows for an understanding of the complexity of the facts and their implications but also enables a critical evaluation of the proposed hypotheses and answers to the research questions formulated.

The work has a structure with key sections, identified as relevant for the development and verification of the stated problem, highlighting its significance.

This research is approached from a theoretical framework that emphasizes crucial concepts such as security, the monopoly on the use of force, patrimonialism, corruption, the culture of privilege, the rule of law, and the presence of non-state armed groups. This will allow us to generate a conceptual basis to understand the complexity of the phenomena studied and will provide a robust theoretical context for the subsequent analysis developed in the work, where the emergence, evolution, and instrumental role of the Bolivarian Circles in Hugo Chávez’s government project is explored, addressing how these groups, under the banner of Bolivarianism and citizen participation, became key tools for social mobilization and the use of other practices outside the legal framework, establishing a legitimate example of criminal governance.

Their relationship with security agencies facilitated the emergence of a power dynamic that disrupted the rule of law, traditional security structures, and other institutions in Venezuela.

2.1. Justification of the chosen topic

The study of the case of the group initially called circles and later Bolivarian colectivos, during the periods between 2001 and 2003, provides valuable information on the way in which these non-state armed groups played a leading role in the loss of the monopoly on the use of force in Venezuela, and how this has influenced the Americas.

In this regard, the Bolivarian circles emerged as social movements that supported the government of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías. Later, Chávez himself renamed them as Bolivarian colectivos and adopted them as an ideological shock force.

The patrimonialization of security refers to the appropriation, by groups or individuals with particular interests, of the resources and institutions provided by the State apparatus to ensure and guarantee security. This phenomenon can have serious consequences for the political and social stability of a country, as well as for international relations.

In the specific case of Venezuela, the Bolivarian circles emerged as social movements that supported the government of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías. Later, Chávez himself renamed them as Bolivarian colectivos and adopted them as an ideological shock force.

These groups became an important civilian force, armed and ideologically aligned with the government’s approval. During this period, they were key agents in the weakening of state control over the use of force, marking the formal beginning of the erosion of the state's monopoly in this area. This transformation has had significant implications for security within Venezuela and has resonated beyond its borders, contributing to a regional perspective. Eventually, this degenerated into what can be considered a legitimate model of criminal governance.

2.2. Problem and purpose of the work

In view of the loss of the monopoly on force by the state, several questions arise:

How did the patrimonialization of security in Venezuela occur during the 2001–2003 period?

What were the causes and consequences of this patrimonialization during the 2001–2003 period?

How did the patrimonialization of security during the 2001–2003 period influence the loss of the monopoly on the use of force by the Venezuelan State?

2.3. Questions and objectives

2.3.1. Research questions

- How did the Bolivarian circles emerge in the Venezuelan context?
- What is the relationship between the Bolivarian circles and the Venezuelan government?
- How did the Bolivarian circles contribute to the loss of the monopoly on the use of force in Venezuela during the 2001–2003 period?
- What was the role of non-state armed groups in national and state security in Venezuela during the 2001–2003 period?
- How did the patrimonialization of security influence the political and social stability of Venezuela during the 2001–2003 period?
- What impact did the loss of the monopoly on the use of force in Venezuela have on other countries in the Americas?
- How are the concepts of patrimonialism, rule of law, and criminal governance related to security in Venezuela during the 2001–2003 period?
- Can this phenomenon be considered an authentic and legitimate example of criminal governance in the Americas?

2.3.2. Research Objectives

2.3.2.1. General

This study examines the influence of the patrimonialization of security by the Venezuelan government between 2001–2003, highlighting the role of the Bolivarian circles in the erosion of the state’s monopoly on the use of force. It addresses how this dynamic gave rise to a legitimate model of criminal governance that has had repercussions on Venezuela’s security and influence in the Americas.

2.3.2.2. Specific

- Analyze the patrimonialist conception of power and its impact on political stability.
- Analyze how the concepts of patrimonialism, culture of privilege, and criminal governance relate to security in Venezuela during the 2001–2003 period.
- Analyze the role of the Bolivarian circles in the loss of the monopoly on the use of force in Venezuela during the 2001–2003 period.
- Explore the impact that the loss of the monopoly on the use of force in Venezuela had on

2.4. Methodology

For the development of this research, a rigorous documentary analysis will be conducted based on the study of primary and secondary sources selected according to the criterion of relevance due to their contributions to the topic addressed. The sources are chosen based on their ability to provide unique and meaningful perspectives on the phenomenon under study.

Due to the difficult access to some primary sources—either because they are not produced or because they are hard to access given that the topic is avoided by its actors—it becomes necessary to resort to secondary sources. These sources consist of government reports, journalistic articles, and academic literature, which will be examined with a critical approach, supported by a theoretical framework that will provide the foundation and strength to synthesize the material used, through which the aim is to formulate an independent judgment on the subject addressed. This theoretical framework allows us to interpret the collected data within an established theoretical context, thereby enriching the understanding and meaning of our findings.

The analysis process will begin with document selection, followed by immersion in the texts, and then application of content analysis techniques. This will allow the identification of patterns, recurring themes, and units of analysis in the first stage, followed by key arguments.

This method guarantees a broad contrast of perspective through the triangulation of sources, which will not only allow us to fulfill the principle of validation but also provide a comprehensive understanding of the object of study from various approaches, such as its discursiveness.

It is worth noting that documentary analysis faces challenges, first of all, because certain primary sources are restricted, likely due to the sensitive nature of the topic under study, and also because documents are most often interpreted subjectively. These challenges, however, do not hinder the rigor and relevance of the research, thanks to the careful selection of secondary sources and a critical emphasis on the interpretation of data.

The use of documentary analysis is justified as a methodology due to its interpretative breadth regarding the context and the perceptions of the authors; it is, on another level, the view of the subject through different eyes.

This is directly related to the encounter with a multidimensional view of the event, which will contribute to the generation of academic knowledge that allows, as far as possible, an understanding of the subject and the contrastability of hypotheses and the search for answers to the specific objectives proposed.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. The state monopoly on the use of force

Within the nature of States, security is one of those activities or commitments entrusted by the population or its nation, within a specific territory, in order to live under the structure of what we call the Nation-State.

According to Max Weber, within the composition of the modern State, one of its appreciable characteristics—legitimized through the nation and accompanied by positive law—is the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force or the use of legitimate violence within its territory:

"The modern state is an institution-based association of domination that has successfully sought to monopolize the legitimate physical violence as a means of domination within a territory and, to this end, has gathered all material means in the hands of its leader and has expropriated all feudal officials who previously had such means by right, replacing them with its own supreme hierarchies." (Weber 1919, p. 36)¹ The loss of this monopoly implies a weakening of the State and its ability to guarantee the security of both the population and its own institutional composition.

In his text "Politics as a Vocation", he describes that: "The state is that human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence within a given territory" (Weber 1979, p. 83)²

Clarifying that: "What is specific to our time is that all other associations and individuals are granted the right to physical violence only to the extent that the state permits it. The state is the sole source of the 'right' to violence." (Weber 1979, pp. 83–84)³

The State may delegate a certain portion of the use of violence, under regulation, for the protection of private property, such as, for example, in our current times, private security services or legitimate self-defense in the case of civilians, among others. All of this is subject to its strict regulation and for a specific function or situation.

Therefore, we can understand—based on a synthesis of the definition—that the entity that constitutes the State is the one formally and legally in charge of this activity, whose purpose is the security of its population and its integrity, thus protecting them from internal and external threats.

3.1.1. Loss of the Monopoly on the Use of Force

Although there may be diverse and varied reasons for the rupture, loss, or deterioration of the monopoly on the use of force, for the purposes of this research, we will observe that one of the difficulties it may experience is its erosion. This phenomenon can occur with the emergence of informal armed actors, where—through the consensual action or omission of the State—they are allowed to carry out activities that are inherently the responsibility of the State.

Some of the reasons for this to occur are those mentioned by Carey et al. (2015): “we explain militias as an option for evading the accountability costs facing governments that are clearly responsible for official violence» […] «If governments are sensitive to accountability costs attached to repression, unofficial links to militias offer a means to shift responsibility for violence, ‘‘these forces tend to be more ‘deniable’ and opaque than formal government security forces, allowing the state to avoid accountability’’ (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015, pp. 851–852) In this sense, “militias mitigate the risk of domestic and international liability for repression” (Carey et al. 2015, p. 852)

The idea formed from this is that they can be used against ideological, political, or any other type of adversaries as required by the State, since “We know that even democratic governments are willing to violate human rights for strategic benefits” (Carey et al. 2015, p. 852)

This dynamic contrasts significantly with that followed by the rule of law states, which confront subversive or criminal actors according to strategies outlined by their legal frameworks. These states use the legal instruments at their disposal to guarantee the security of their citizens, legitimately employing their force and defense apparatus against both internal and external threats.

3.2. Patrimonialism

From one perspective, “Patrimonialism is a type of rule in which the ruler does not distinguish between personal and public patrimony and treats matters and resources of state as his personal affair” (Quimpo 2007) In relation to this, Dr. Sonia Alda describ “The main characteristic is the lack of a clear distinction between the public and the private. Under this confusion, the direct consequence is that authorities, at the national, regional, or local level, hold their position and powers as private property, which explains why they exercise their authority and apply the law in a subjective and particular way, instead of objectively and generally.” (Alda 2023, p. 670)

Clarifying this, S. Alda (2023) allows us to delve deeper by understanding that patrimonialism takes root and reproduces itself in all facets of the three branches of the State, permeating it both horizontally and vertically, encompassing the various levels of public administration. This widespread capacity of patrimonialism facilitates a mutually beneficial interaction between state officials and criminal organizations. Within this framework, actors interested in engaging in corrupt practices offer personal incentives to officials in exchange for favors and protection.

Under this conception of power, the official considers themselves empowered to exempt or sanction certain individuals or groups at their discretion, releasing them from compliance with the law in exchange for a bribe. This deliberate capacity for exemption creates a system of impunity that benefits both illegal actors and those operating within the boundaries of legality, blurring the line between the two.

The result is a closed circle of privileged individuals who benefit from this system of favoritism, thus distorting the rule of law and equality before justice. In this context, and as the author expresses it, patrimonialism undermines the fundamental principles of a rule-of-law state, generating a structure where the law is applied unequally and favoring the consolidation of networks of corruption and complicity between the State and those actors who seek to distort and exploit the law.

Understanding all of the above, we then define the figure of patrimonialism as the action or behavior of those individuals who exercise functions or hold positions on behalf of the State, and who, according to the responsibilities granted to them, use the resources within their reach as if they were their own property and for their personal benefit, or that of a specific group or groups, clearly blurring the separation between the public and the private.

This practice distorts the public function and purpose of official positions, creating fertile ground for corruption. By transforming public service into a tool for personal gain, patrimonialism undermines the integrity of the state and fosters an environment where corruption becomes a natural and habitual consequence.

To understand this, it is necessary to distinguish between the public and the private: the public refers to the functions or assets that must be managed by the state and its representatives to meet or fulfill the needs and requirements of its population; the private refers to any attribution, responsibility, or dependent property derived from the individual integrity of any human being, and which can be handled personally in accordance with their own interests.

As descriptive examples, we will use the first case, in which a public official must sanction a group of people for having committed an infraction. The official fulfills their duty to sanction the individuals, regardless of their ideological beliefs. This demonstrates that the official is acting in the public interest, and not in their own interest or that of a particular group. This case evidences due process and the democratization of public functions.

As a second example: A public official must sanction a group of people for having committed an infraction. The official decides not to fulfill their duty to sanction the individuals, as they ideologically align with them. This demonstrates that the official is using their position for personal gain or the benefit of an interest group. Unlike the first case, this one privatizes public functions.

In this way, the privatization of public functions, properly defined from an abstract and semantic perspective of the term, refers to the disposition and will of those individuals or groups who, being in a position to carry out activities, hold posts, or manage resources assigned to them in order to fulfill or exercise a public function inherent to the state structure, make the decision—whether spontaneously, under coercion, or deliberately—to perceive and manage both the function and the resources as if they were their own property or personal assets.

3.2.1.1. Corruption

As a consequence and result of patrimonialism, a series of phenomena persist and take shape, such as corruption.

In relation to this: “The classification of corrupt acts is based on two criteria:

The first uses the current normative system as a measuring parameter, which grants rights, imposes obligations, and sets sanctions. The second relies on the beliefs and values of ordinary people, who do not necessarily view all acts legally defined as corrupt as actually corrupt, just as they may consider corrupt acts that are normally legal.”⁴ (Sautu 2004, p. 83)

Reinforced by the following chart:

Illustrations are not included in the reading sample

Figure 1 (Sautu 2004, p. 86)

This phenomenon is commonly addressed as an act of corruption, referencing

“Bayley’s definition, who clarifies that although the idea of corruption is conceptually tied to the act of bribery, it is a general term that covers the misuse of authority for personal gain, which does not need to be monetary.”⁵ (Sanda 1999, pp. 4–5)

Likewise, the World Bank defines corruption as “the phenomenon by which a public official is induced to favor particular interests in exchange for a reward.” The first observation is that, although the definition places the responsibility on the public official, the truth is that private agents must also be considered as susceptible to engaging in corruption. The second clarification is that rewards do not necessarily have a pecuniary character, and the benefits may include any form of gratification not directly measurable in monetary terms.⁶ (Gilli 2014, p. 43)

As Gilli (2014) points out, it is important to recognize that corruption is not a phenomenon that occurs solely within the public sector; there are broader definitions that consider it in a more general context. In this way, it can also be understood as “The conduct of someone who performs a certain social function that entails specific active or passive obligations aimed at fulfilling certain purposes, for the achievement of which they were appointed” […] “and who does not fulfill those obligations or fails to fulfill them in a way that satisfies those purposes, in order to obtain a certain benefit for themselves or a third party, as well as the conduct of the third party who induces or benefits from such noncompliance.”⁷ (Nino 2005, p. 109)

Until this point, we can interpret—and according to the order developed in this research—that it is crucial to recognize how the privatization of state assets and functions can, simultaneously, be both a manifestation and a facilitator of corrupt practices. Ultimately, what we are witnessing in this case is the unlawful appropriation of commonly used assets and functions, violating ethical and legal principles.

3.3. The culture of privilege

As a result of a marked and unequal polarization within society, inherent to patrimonialist states, a synergy is generated where a very important and deeply rooted factor actively present in the population emerges—based on the habit of obtaining advantages or privileges over certain situations, actions, or related matters—turning into a social norm.

In the words of author Martín Hopenhayn: “The culture of privilege is a symbolic order that interacts with established practices in which it is considered acceptable that a group of the population, hierarchically characterized either by their ethnic, racial or gender affiliation, their socioeconomic position, their belonging to political or cultural elites, their class status, or their blood or hereditary affiliation, has advantages over the rest of society with regard to networks of relationships that reproduce their privileged positions in the world of business and finance; power in instances of deliberation or decision; predominant voice in communication circuits where ideas, ideologies and political agendas are imposed; access to public resources for use in private benefit; impunity or special facilities before the justice system in relation to acts connected with economic crimes, harm to others, illicit forms of power and discrimination against others; influence peddling; ability to exert pressure, negotiate, manipulate and veto policies and government or State bodies; use of relationship networks to obtain contracts and do business, access better jobs, higher salaries and financing facilities, and better conditions for the development of capacities and the formation of cultural capital.”⁸ (HOPENHAYN 2022, p. 262)

S. Alda (2021) argues that the structure of certain systems allows for privilege and the conversion of public goods into private ones, which is deeply rooted in patrimonialism and its consequences on the state. In such an environment, both individual and group objectives do not align with law compliance but rather with the intent to evade them to obtain exemption. This attitude subverts equality before the law and fosters a system where success is not derived from adherence to legality, but from the ability to elude it. This phenomenon reveals a deliberate weakening of the legal structure, perpetrated by those in positions of authority within hierarchical systems.

Reinforcing this idea, Viridiana Ríos refers to the fact that “ECLAC has called 'culture of privilege' a culture characterized by normalizing power hierarchies, inequalities in access to productive assets, and therefore, asymmetries in the fruits of progress” […] “The culture of privilege is sustained by a series of inequality-generating practices” […] “that is, rules and institutions that may be formal or informal and that tend to favor social groups that were already more advantaged”⁹ (RIOS 2021, p. 13)

Taking this into account, we can form the idea that this culture is present in the configuration of our Western societies in America; from the structural basis at the time of discovery, conquest, and the subsequent processes, a culture of privilege was already being generated. This is visible in the privileges enjoyed by the colonizer over the colonized; and, prior to the independences, in the case of the Spanish colonies, in the visible inequality between criollos or those born overseas and peninsulares or those born in Spanish territory, who held a different status and which was one of the incentives to pursue independence.

This phenomenon, which worsened and grew with the evolution of societies, continuing under democratic regimes, is embedded within the customs and traditions of our cultures, being the subject of debate due to its effects, such as inequality and other negative consequences in the development of countries. In this way, it is explained that «When privilege is systemic, inequality is also systemic in all economic, political, and social spheres. When such normalization occurs, the non-privileged do not aspire to be equal, but rather to also become privileged, thus permanently fueling this culture»¹⁰ (ALDA 2021, p. 100); and that «The stronger the culture of privilege, the more likely it is to result in a “vicious circle” relationship between institutions and structures, which means there is less innovation on both sides, either because the system of privileges permeates structures and institutions, or because the de facto powers of the privilege system have veto power over institutional change that political will cannot overcome, or because in a culture of privilege there are mutual rewards between political and economic elites that produce a demobilizing effect. This becomes evident in economies intensive in raw materials, where privileges derived from large profits based on low wages and overexploitation of natural resources lead to the dominance of a rentier culture in both the public and private sectors»¹¹ (HOPENHAYN 2021, p. 266).

That is why there is a high probability that in societies where the culture of privilege is deeply rooted, they become a fertile breeding ground for these unequal practices. In such contexts, even meritocracy—which may be considered one of the tools used to counteract the influence of the culture of privilege—can be used as an incentive for individuals to maximize their abilities and chart a path with the intention of reaching positions where they can obtain privileges.

3.4. The Rule of Law

As one of the fundamental pillars in the West, the consolidation of just and equitable societies or countries is based on positive law. This principle is crucial in the prevailing culture of democratic regimes, which are distinguished from those of other continents. Positive law is established as the central pillar within the State, where the legislative power holds the essential task of creating laws. These norms regulate actions, behaviors, and human relationships. The State, in its unique and exclusive role, produces and adapts these legal instruments, ensuring their suitability and relevance to the proposed objectives.

On the other hand, the judiciary persists as a pillar of societies, bearing the imperative duty of applying, enforcing, and executing the sanctions corresponding to the noncompliance or violation of the established laws; for this, it has at its disposal various mechanisms and tools of the state. Rocher (2017) points out the critical importance of judicial independence. Judges must base their rulings exclusively on the facts and the applicable law, without influence from the executive or legislative powers. This independence is essential for the integrity of the judiciary and its ability to administer justice impartially.

The essence of the rule of law is based on the social pact by which citizens entrust the State with the power to legislate and enforce laws that guarantee the freedom and fundamental rights of individuals. This pact implies that, even though individuals retain their fundamental liberties, the State is granted the necessary authority to establish a legal order that regulates collective coexistence. In this context, it is worth clarifying, the State assumes the monopoly over the creation and enforcement of laws in order to ensure that all members of society can enjoy a fair and equal environment.

Its production and observance largely determine the effective realization of the life and liberty binomial, the essence of individual freedoms, which prevail within a framework of justice and social order.

According to H. Rackham’s translation, Aristotle already contemplated that “It is preferable that the law should rule rather than any one of the citizens,” thus “the norm acquires a role as a legitimizer of the state, of the power and authority exercised by public officials, in addition to its natural role of regulating human behavior.”¹² (ANAVITARTE 2013)

The laws passed regulate social life, and both authorities and citizens must be subject to them, under the so-called rule of law, the essence of the fundamental principle of the Rule of Law and of ideal democratic regimes, where no actor is above the law and institutions function with impartiality. Likewise, Antonio Pereira, referring to Anglo terminology, describes that “it presupposes a universe governed by law, and means that law must prevail and those who govern the political community must act according to it; that the law is applied equally to all, to rulers as well as to the governed. That is why ‘rule of law,’ although not literal at all, seems to be one of the least bad translations of imperio del derecho”¹³ (PEREIRA 2010, p. 171)

Another interpretation is: “the expression rule of law alludes to a regulative ideal over the exercise of power. According to this ideal, the legitimacy of power lies in its actions being adjusted to pre-established legal norms”¹⁴ (MARCILLA 2013, p. 177)

We can therefore understand that the nature and essence of the rule of law is to position the concept of law as a preventive mechanism within the structure of the state and its population, to avoid unequal arbitrariness, promoting the separation of powers for the maintenance of such orders, and the equitable exercise of duties related to the law and its enforcement.

Its weakening, as well as the breakdown of this essence, has considerable effects within societies: “If the actions of state agents are immersed in particularistic logics and are not capable of guaranteeing the rule of law throughout the territory, security policies may become an additional source of insecurity”¹⁵ (URIBE 2010, p. 189), a situation that persists and is prone to occur when inequality and factors such as patrimonialism, and other practices, are perceived within a state.

The doctrine of the rule of law is essential to ensure that all citizens are equal before it, which is a fundamental counterbalance against the culture of privilege. This requires that laws be transparent, accessible, and uniformly applied, ensuring that no individual enjoys special privileges and that rulers are equally subject to the laws that govern citizens (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2023)

3.5. Non-state armed groups

Among the actors that operate within a state, the concept of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, as we have summarized in previous pages, is intended exclusively for the state and those designated through it to carry out various functions on its behalf.

Outside of this framework and regulation, there operates a group of criminal actors who represent a threat both to the state and to its population. Examples of this include criminal organizations and their various forms, terrorist organizations, guerrillas, and groups or collectives of armed individuals acting outside the normative order, where countless motivations to form these movements are contemplated.

In turn, it is increasingly common to find non-state armed groups, such as defense contractors, with the State as their main employer, for the fulfillment of various functions. Although these actors may use force for political or criminal activities, among others, they do not belong to the state security and defense apparatus. This represents a clear challenge for states and a source of violation of national laws, with some minor exceptions in countries that formally allow the establishment of such actors.

Their objectives and activities may vary, as previously mentioned. Commonly, they may be of a criminal or illicit nature, or political, ideological, or religious. Although not limited exclusively to these ideas, they tend to repeat within a pattern across different continents of the world. Their composition is regularly of a vertical tendency, with a leader or group of leaders at the top, and the other members as subordinates in a kind of hierarchy, where their internal rules or norms prevail. Thus, one of their main difficulties is complying with the laws, rules, or norms of the state, since they possess a wide range of action outside the state order, which tends to undermine the legal and social framework.

For the United Nations, these are those who “have the potential to use weapons in the application of force to achieve political, ideological, or economic objectives; are not within the formal military structures of States, alliances between States or intergovernmental organizations; and are not controlled by the State or States in which they operate” […] “In light of this definition, we can deduce that what characterizes these groups is the willingness to use violence as a means to achieve their objectives outside formal governmental mechanisms”¹⁶ (HERNÁNDEZ 2022, p. 225).

Although these groups are present within states in various forms, they represent a security threat with a multidimensional order. There are some regimes, mostly of an authoritarian nature, that show a marked tendency to use them as pressure groups to achieve certain objectives and evade responsibility for actions that may generate consequences for their governments. Carey et al. (2015) point out that militias are used by states as a means to reduce their responsibility for repressive acts both nationally and internationally, thus serving as strategic instruments of impact, shock, and confrontation.

3.6. Security spillover theory

The theory that what occurs in a nation-state—in its internal, social, or economic policies—can influence both the region and geographically neighboring countries, also applies to the field of security.

In our case study, this theory is reflected in various aspects throughout the period under analysis, but it becomes especially evident as a medium- and long-term resulting effect of the phenomenon addressed.

For this reason, those internal phenomena that intensify within the borders of a nation-state can overflow its boundaries and have the capacity to influence and directly affect other states in the region where the originating state is located.

The means by which this may occur are diverse: from criminal organizations and the wide range of illicit markets and activities these groups engage in, to migration, and even a less overlooked one—the permeability of ideology or thought, which can take root in other states or regions.

In a world of constant innovation and evolution, where threats are no exception, Kai He “Which refers to the unintended consequences of certain threats. For example, climate change, transnational crimes, and natural disasters are originally not “security” issues per se.36 However, due to spillover effects, these transnational problems have become a threat to the wellbeing of human beings and even the survival of states.37 Therefore, these transnational threats are “security spillover” challenges” (HE 2019, p. 147).

Its impact on both regions and states is widely acknowledged: “the “security spillover” problems are normally well recognized by states as common threats. However, due to the lack of trust and cooperative mechanisms, it is not easy for states to work together. It is a typical “collective action” problem” (HE 2019, p. 148). Since international relations usually involve different means than those used internally to address these challenges, “military means will not be useful for states to cope with these “security spillover” challenges” (HE 2019, p. 150). An additional effort is needed, as ordinary methods often prove insufficient and ineffective.

The reasons may vary, but it is a fact that collective work is necessary to confront these challenges. This is why, on some occasions, the interest and concern of countries in a region over the crises of one of their members lead them to adopt measures through the necessary means to prevent these phenomena from generating undesired effects in their own states or in the region in general. Clearly, states perceive that security spillovers imply the cross-border overflow of negative externalities.

3.7. Criminal governance

Within state structures, vulnerabilities constantly arise. These are areas that exceed the state's capacity to address, which—at a multidimensional level—are sometimes, and for various reasons that will not be listed in this research, indicative of a state perceived as unable to meet the needs of its population.

Inequality, resulting from the social and economic context or embedded in the culture of privilege and patrimonialism that generates it, encourages the emergence of structures parallel to those of the state. These actors take advantage of the situation, drawing the population into a kind of dependency relationship in which social values and ethics become blurred, leading to the integration and approval of such practices by private actors.

Dr. Carolina Sampó sheds light on the issue by offering an important approach with an American perspective on the concept of criminal governance: “Criminal governance, understood as the establishment of a parallel social order to that imposed by the State—in which a wide variety of public services are provided, including security, conflict resolution, administration of justice, and basic goods—pulls the legitimacy that civil society grants to criminal organizations; and with it, enables the expansion of the power projection of these organizations beyond the borders in which criminal governance is exercised”¹⁷ (SAMPÓ 2021, pp. 11–12).

In some cases, there may be instances where these actors are seen as instruments of the government. In most cases, the emergence of these actors, who exercise criminal governance, takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of the state, clearly without approval or authorization, as it is an illicit activity. However, it is not outside the realm of possibility that they become instruments of governments to act informally. They become privileged groups, as a consequence of patrimonialism in governments, where—amid a clear weakening of the rule of law—a deliberate decision is made to disregard the enforcement of laws in order to favor these actors, by not sanctioning them and allowing them to carry out this activity with impunity, in exchange for benefits or support that may contribute to various representative areas of the government that tolerates them.

4. Development

4.1. The emergence of the Bolivarian circles and their relationship with the Venezuelan Government

4.1.1. Origin and evolution of the Bolivarian circles

Since its colonial beginnings and composition, the South American territory we now know as Venezuela has been a dynamic people marked by various transformations. A land of drastic, radical, and significant changes that have altered the course of history.

Throughout history, and approximately from the year 1560 onward, figures such as the Indigenous Chief Guaicaipuro, the Indigenous Chief Tiuna, José Leonardo Chirinos, Simón Bolívar, José Antonio Páez, Ezequiel Zamora, Antonio Guzmán Blanco, up to Rómulo Betancourt, president after the penultimate military dictatorship in Venezuela under General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, have had an impact that has left its mark in different ways and to varying degrees on the composition of the Republic and its nation. They have become icons and symbols of a heritage with a rich oral tradition that includes myths, legends, and stories about heroic men, forming part of the cultural heritage of the people and reflecting their beliefs and values.

After the arrival of Rómulo Betancourt to the presidency, the well-remembered Punto Fijo Pact was established. The pact was signed on October 31, 1958, by the leaders of the three main political parties in Venezuela at the time: Acción Democrática (AD), Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD). After the overthrow of the military dictatorship of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, this pact aimed to guarantee democratic stability in Venezuela through alternation in power, cooperation among political parties, and respect for electoral results.

After a series of social and political events over the course of approximately 30 years—including economic crises, political corruption, political and social polarization, and military coups—there emerged a figure of a candidate who would put an end to the aforementioned pact: “Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías.”

Hugo Chávez, militar de profesión, apresado como responsable y luego indultado por su participación en el fallido golpe de Estado militar del año 1992, fue visto en 1998 como una figura de esperanza para un sector vulnerable de la población venezolana, llegaría a la presidencia. Una ideología política distinta y atractiva, a diferencia de la forma de los partidos tradicionales y sus tendencias de centro-derecha, que tuvo un predominio de gobiernos de centro-izquierda en los primeros años luego de la vuelta a la democracia.

In Venezuelan history, political myths and the figure of Simón Bolívar have played a fundamental role in the construction of ideologies and national narratives. Bolívar, often portrayed with a Manichaean image and in most cases as a messianic figure distanced from human traits, is venerated as a national hero. He is, and has been, a central pillar in the shaping of Venezuela’s political identity.

His cult and mythification have shaped the nation, as have its symbols: the flag, the coat of arms, and the national anthem. This phenomenon of “civil religion” intensified with leaders such as Antonio Guzmán Blanco and has endured over the years, up to the present, with the most illustrative example being Article 1 of the Venezuelan Constitution following its reform in 1999, which states that the Republic shall base its values and principles on “the doctrine of Simón Bolívar, the Liberator.”¹⁸

The idea of a transition from the Bolívar myth to the figure of Hugo Chávez emerged and materialized in 1998, when, amid various crises and political-social phenomena, he positioned himself as a renewer of the republic and of Bolívar’s thought, appealing to the Bolivarian legacy. In a context such as that of Venezuela at the end of the 21st century, his discourse found its place.

The Bolivarian Circles were conceived under a notion of social justice and inclusion by Chávez in 2001. This social project was fundamentally organized as a mechanism of participatory democracy and social organization, enshrined and extensively mentioned in the country’s Constitution of 350 articles. With the idea of greater participation and greater transparency in political and public affairs, it was consolidated as a space for interaction and closeness with the state apparatus to address needs, strengthen and integrate communities, articulating a broad range of reach and capabilities that encompassed political, social, economic, and community spheres, as well as planning and development, social economy, culture, training and information, comprehensive education and leadership, comprehensive health and environmental protection, comprehensive security and prevention, infrastructure, urban planning and transportation, productive work, research and technology, tourism, sports, and food security, as indicated by its national coordinator (CHAVES 2003).

Although one of its premises was that this social project would not be subject to partisan or personal manipulation, it functioned as a tool to promote and sustain Hugo Chávez’s revolutionary government project. The idea aimed to achieve a “total community” unified under Bolivarian ideology, with roles capable of organizing and channeling community demands, and with the capacity to shape ideological formation.

The diversity of its members encompassed a wide range of profiles—from ordinary citizens, experienced politicians, to military personnel without political training but with experience in other areas of knowledge—which represented a particularly characteristic challenge to the idea of a homogeneous unity given their plurality.

As indicated in the coinciding descriptions by Arenas (2015), Uzcátegui (2010), and Hawkins (2008), the circles were characterized by a mixture of nationalism and communitarianism that challenged the forms of democracy to which Venezuelans were accustomed. Chávez’s promise to meet unmet needs sidelined the other traditional parties and institutional mediating actors, becoming the seedbed for the pursuit of establishing new autonomous institutions aligned with the president.

It was not until after the 2002 coup d’état—a significant event in which they played a considerably active role in the reinstatement of Hugo Chávez to the presidency—that they evolved as a social pressure group, positioning and consolidating their empowerment, and were renamed in 2003 as “Colectivos.” After this process, they gained greater presence, organization, political and social participation, with predominance among vulnerable classes and in political affairs. This name remains in use to this day.

4.1.2. Role of the Bolivarian Circles in Hugo Chávez’s Political Project

The Chavista “Revolution” began as a social and avant-garde project, quickly transforming into a broad political and social movement. This evolution was a reflection of the adaptability of the Bolivarian project under Chávez’s leadership. However, the movement faced challenges regarding its ideological cohesion and the construction of an organized social base. The proposal of the Bolivarian Circles raised a series of questions about democracy, as their composition pursued the ideological uniformity of society under the premise of Bolivarianism, which was the banner and creed of the political project.

“Chávez then understands perfectly that he cannot advance in his process if he does not build an international force and a national force that allows him to carry out the transformations he proposes. And that is why he seeks, and is continually seeking, how to build the political instrument capable of leading the process and how to better organize the people”¹⁹ (HARNEKER 2003).

The Bolivarian Circles functioned as an articulating extension of the faction that sympathized with the government project, playing a fundamental role due to their capacity for reach and influence among their followers, facilitating the strengthening, indoctrination, and dissemination of the project, always under the premise of Bolivarian nationalism.

Their influence extended into various areas, as already mentioned in the previous section, since they received direct support from the government and its leadership, where a vulnerable class felt included and influential in decision-making through an attractive rhetoric consistent with the class struggle. In this way, they became involved in participation in campaigns, social missions, and social activities, acting as a pressure group—defenders and militants of the ideas and the project that promised to bring social justice to marginalized classes.

4.1.3. Instrumentalization of the Bolivarian Circles by the Government

As we have been mentioning, the conception of these spaces was intended to function as platforms for community mobilization and citizen participation in various areas—an objective that, in many cases, was not fulfilled. Instead, they were used for purposes that extended their scope of action into the sphere of political and repressive control through intimidation, harassment, and political violence against ideological opponents who represented a threat to a specific objective or the project in general.

Although from the moment of their announcement their creation caused controversy—since their designated registration center was the very house of the Venezuelan government—and although their national coordinator, Rodrigo Chaves, argued that they did not receive funds directly from the state²⁰, President Chávez had announced the use of a budget ranging around US$140 million from the Intergovernmental Decentralization Fund.

It is still questioned—like an open secret from the State—the use of other informal methods for their financing and logistical support, since without this intervention their expansion and operation would not have been possible. However, this support also raised concerns about their independence and the possibility that they were being used to promote the government’s agenda.

The lack of control over institutions led the government to integrate the Bolivarian Circles into the State apparatus, which in turn led to an increase in the number of public employees and an expansion of the public sector budget. Thus, the Bolivarian Circles received technical and political training so they could occupy positions of responsibility from the lowest levels of public administration to managerial roles. This incorporation raised yet another debate about the co-optation of their leadership and the blind sense of debt-based commitment of their members to the government project, thereby limiting the autonomy of the institutions.

At the same time, it served as an incentive for those who had not yet joined this group, since they would have the opportunity to access employment within public administration.

4.1.4. Dynamics between Bolivarian Circles and State Security Agencies

Although the nature of both entities is of a different kind, they converge in one: “blind obedience to the government.” The subordinate character of the Bolivarian Circles and of the State security agencies to the figure of the president made them feel, in a certain way, that they shared and pursued the same objective—one from the civil sphere, and the other from the governmental sphere as guarantor of State security. Likewise, both adhered to Bolivarian thought: some for ideological value, and others as representatives of the State by constitutional mandate, as stated in Article 1 of the Constitution, as a doctrine on which the State is based.

Although it is clear that not all members of the State security agencies shared the thought expressed in the brief excerpt from Simón Bolívar’s letter to the General Headquarters of Cúcuta dated April 8, 1813—“I am a soldier and my duty prescribes nothing other than blind obedience to the government, without examining the nature of its orders, which no doubt are and must be the most prudent and just, thought out and conceived with depth and wisdom”²¹ (BOLÍVAR 1813)—the coercive capacity of superiors within the security agencies, along with the distorted concept of discipline, led to tolerance by the security agencies themselves. These agencies would deliberately comply with the order issued from the highest sphere of State power and would choose not to restrain or prevent the deviant behaviors of this organization, due to the imminent and inescapable sanction they would face in the hypothetical case of failing to do so.

This granted the Bolivarian Circles protection from the government and impunity in their actions, as they could evade the legal responsibilities that certain tasks would entail.

The use of the military, intermediate bodies, and police forces in social tasks inherent to their functions fostered closeness with groups aligned with the government, favoring a specific sector and blurring the boundaries of their roles, which became increasingly unclear. This was especially evident when they had to take action involving the population with opposing political alignment, where the Bolivarian Circles could be observed acting hand-in-hand with security forces as support, and in many cases, with impunity—crossing the boundaries of legality to put an end to actions being carried out by opponents.

4.2. Contribution of the Bolivarian circles to the loss of the state monopoly on force

4.2.1. Activities and Operational Capacity of the Bolivarian Circles

Beyond the specific activities outlined at their inception, their participation was observed in acts of intimidation, harassment, and persecution of opposition figures and leaders, journalists from media outlets with editorials contrary to the government process—most often through the use of physical violence.

Although their organizational handbook states that each circle may be composed of between 7 and 11 members, by the end of 2001, coordinator Henry Álvarez claimed that there were approximately 7,000 Bolivarian Circles throughout the country, which could represent a minimum of about 70,000 members, assuming an average of 10 members per circle—although they regularly exceed that number. By 2002, the Minister of the Interior at the time, Diosdado Cabello, stated that the number of circles had increased from 80,000 to 130,000.

According to the LATINNO (2004) citizen participation database, at its peak, the project involved approximately 2,000,000 people. By October 2002, General Enrique Medina Gómez, referred to by the official discourse as a dissident military officer, stated that around 2,000 to 3,000 members of the Bolivarian Circles were armed.

In its early stages, as a starting point, its greatest concentration was in the capital of the country, specifically in the Sucre parish, in the 23 de Enero sector, where the project’s pilot plan and its activities were actively implemented. This sector, strategically located near the government palace, had broad operational capacity with total freedom. Over time, they expanded to other communities and other states.

4.2.2. Participation of the Bolivarian Circles in Citizen Security Tasks

According to the book Fundamentals of Organization of Bolivarian Circles (n.d.), in its section related to comprehensive security and prevention, where security matters are addressed from a multidimensional perspective, reference is made to a “Community Citizen Security Plan” and to the “Security Conditions for Mobilizations.” Based on Article 55²², Article 326²³ of the Venezuelan Constitution, and Article 5 of the Organic Law of National Security—which contemplate rights referring to citizen participation in matters of security and defense—the members of the Bolivarian Circles of the Sucre parish, especially those in the 23 de Enero sector, began implementing neighborhood surveillance policies.

This was accompanied by internal provisions from the security agencies, which, despite not having a formal directive from their ministry or corresponding municipality, by order and agreement between the top leadership of the government, the leaders of the Bolivarian Circles, and the directors of the security bodies, were prohibited from entering this sector, as security would fall under the responsibilities of the harmonious coexistence derived from the Circles' project. This occurred progressively, eliminating some agencies within 23 de Enero until it became total, according to police officer J.A.L (2024). From that moment on, preventive patrolling in this sector was delegated to the various Bolivarian Circles of the parish, thus usurping and overlapping the functions of State security.

For this task, as for some others, they received training from State security agencies, a fact evidenced in 2002 as reported by Analítica (2002), with the complaint of 30 officers from the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (D.I.S.I.P) who were dismissed for refusing to provide training to the Bolivarian Circles under the execution of the Rangel Plan. This plan consisted of using the resources, personnel, and assets of D.I.S.I.P to train, prepare, and supply these groups.

Nevertheless, this project was carried out, as described by Liscano (2024), providing them with training in areas such as strategic intelligence, idealized counterintelligence (camouflaged under the title Social Intelligence and Situational Room by Haiman El Troudi, 2010), and various combat methodologies, use and handling of firearms, tactical shooting, and operations in confined spaces, among others related to the functions performed by security agencies.

During its early years, both high-ranking government officials and the leaders of the movements largely denied any public association with the possession or use of firearms. However, the open statements by leaders such as Lina Ron about being armed and ready to defend the revolution “to the ultimate consequences,” including the use of firearms if necessary, reveal the falsity of these denials. This is reinforced by the words in the documentary Tupamaro: Urban Guerrillas, directed by Martin Markovits (2019), where one of its leaders and promoters, Alberto “Chino” Carías, recounts their armed operations, both for surveillance and crime prevention, exposing murders carried out with impunity and to the detriment of the rule of law and the monopoly on force.

The events of April 11, 2002, during the failed coup d’état—where images show civilians and supporters of these groups shooting from Llaguno Bridge at the opposition demonstration located on Baralt Avenue—gave rise to the national and international argument that their actions were not aimed at the opposition protesters, but at the State’s police forces, as described in Memoirs of a Coup d'État by Arroyo (2012). This marked the legitimization of the actions of non-state armed groups and the delegitimization of the actions of the Metropolitan Police; an institution that, immediately after this event, was stripped of certain functions and interrogated and questioned by the IACHR (2003).

Years later, an institution with more than 40 years of professional experience faced dissolution as a form of reprisal for the events of April 11. This served as an exemplary warning of what would happen to security agencies that opposed the government regime, paving the way for the creation of a national police force aligned with values and leadership loyal to the government, thus enabling the discretionary use of its functions.

4.2.3. Implications in the Loss of the Monopoly on the Use of Force

The loss of the monopoly on the use of force was intentional and deliberate on the part of the government, and this is evidenced by the need to form a shock force that would serve as a defense group for the revolution, even if this included the use of force.

The actions of April 11 marked not only the usefulness of these groups for the government and its project, but also propelled a better organization of these groups and the provision of tools to prevent future actions that could put the Chavista government project at risk. In this way, they began to regroup under the name colectivos.

This period, from its formation in 2001 until its rise as colectivos, represented the beginning of the loss of the monopoly on the use of force by the State. The creation of parallel actors carrying out security and territorial control tasks represented a significant risk of social and institutional breakdown. The lack of effective institutional control and the presence of armed groups operating with impunity was a critical grievance against stability and order in Venezuela, which spread and extended throughout the national territory.

The responsibility that was delegated to the Bolivarian Circles provided them with the opportunity to develop their knowledge and methods in criminal governance. The deficiencies in security and other critical areas within communities, such as food security, were responsibilities delegated by the government to the Bolivarian Circles. Using State resources, exerting influence and influence peddling, they served as a link between the common citizen and the government and its entities. This dynamic created a distorted impression of equity between the Bolivarian Circles, which were perceived as the means to access the government. This fact led the population of these mostly vulnerable sectors to feel greater empathy toward the members of these movements, over the members of State apparatuses, who did not offer them guarantees or a sense of belonging, which was instead provided by the members of these organizations that proclaimed themselves as their defenders.

The implications of this, added to the intentional loss of the monopoly on force, are that the performance of security activities by these groups did not guarantee a decrease in criminal incidents, nor respect for the law and Human Rights. These actions contributed to an increase in homicides and criminality in the areas under their control. The discretionary use of justice, impunity, and the participation of some circles in violent and repressive actions were the x-ray of the future that was foreseen for State security.

4.3. Non-state armed groups, patrimonialism, and erosion of the rule of law

As a knowledgeable figure regarding the scope of security agencies and their leading role within the State, Hugo Chávez was aware of the need to influence and place the various components of this force-usage structure on his side and under his sympathy, following a turbulent Venezuelan history marked by violent, armed, and military uprisings.

After his rise to the presidency, the army and intermediate security forces such as the National Guard gained political and civic prominence. The inclusion in social projects and the appointment of Hugo Chávez's sympathizers to strategic positions within security institutions, along with former and retired military personnel in high-level political management roles, not only prompted a change in the country but also a restructuring of its army, its components, and other security agencies.

4.3.1. Patrimonialization of security during Hugo Chávez’s government

The patrimonialization of security during Hugo Chávez’s government represented a concerning erosion of the rule of law in Venezuela, as it was characterized by the use of public security institutions and resources for private or political interests. This situation has led to a series of negative consequences.

The ideologization of security agencies under the Bolivarian ideology of his political project allowed him to link the army’s historical past to a shared nationalist sentiment, positioning himself with a revisionist stance and as a defender of national values, in contrast to a rhetoric of the past that, from his perspective, expressed the decomposition of the nation's principles, the forgetting of its foundational struggle, and the loss of identity as a nation.

This allowed him to evade Article 328 of the National Constitution²⁴, which describes the armed forces as an institution without political affiliation, since his project was based on the values of the ideas of Simón Bolívar—an ideology under which the historical formation of the Venezuelan armed forces was based. Therefore, defending Bolívar's ideas was synonymous with defending Hugo Chávez’s government project.

This granted him a fairly broad scope of action within the armed forces which, added to his past as a member and participant in a failed armed rebellion, allowed them to conceive the idea and feel that the State was being led by one of their own, granting him the highest level of support.

Support that would be used at the discretion of Hugo Chávez for the achievement of the objectives of his government project, which could not have been attained without the backing of the institutions and powers of the State, which had as a guarantee mechanism the individuals in charge of the use of force in the event of any threat against those institutions. In this sense, the armed forces would not act reactively against him because they ideologically pursued the same objective—or at least that was what they were made to believe—thus losing their non-deliberative character. This facilitated co-optation and corruption, as appointments and promotions would frequently be based on political loyalty rather than merit or professional competence.

The cost of this was the loss of professionalism and independence within the security forces, reducing their effectiveness and compromising the public’s trust in these institutions.

4.3.2. Privatization of public functions related to security

Since security institutions became subject to discretionary use within the government’s agenda and based on loyalty to the project, they were in a position to choose against whom to exercise the powers granted to them by the rule of law—and against whom not to.

This process was characterized by outsourcing, informality, the creation of parapolice or paramilitary groups, and the active participation of the Bolivarian circles in tasks that traditionally corresponded to the state security forces.

With the consent ordered from their leadership and from the top of the State, the intervention of security agencies was affected in both scope and autonomy regarding the guarantee of the impartial fulfillment of their functions, as is the nature of such institutions, which must not have ideological, racial, or discriminatory distinctions under an equitable criterion in the execution of their duties.

The polarization of society allowed this security scheme to identify good or bad, poor or rich, red or white, thus defining in certain security policies—deliberately—against whom to act and against whom not to.

In this way, the State’s security forces would be used at convenience and in pursuit of personal or private interests of the government in power. The reason for this may be multicausal: either due to fear of being dismissed from their posts in the case of senior positions within the security bodies, due to affinity with the government project, or in the case of subordinate personnel, due to fear of sanctions from superiors, which could materialize in unfair and indiscriminate punishments, dismissals, or judicial proceedings where the government’s influence would carry considerable weight—resulting in arbitrary detentions or actions against the law, due process, and the loss of freedom of their officers—since even the word of a leader from a Bolivarian circle would be given more credibility than that of a law enforcement officer representing the State.

It would be extensive to describe the occasions, between 2001 and 2003, in which, by superior orders, the security forces were not allowed to act to restore public order, or in which they were observed acting alongside non-state groups, as well as those in which violent actions by non-state groups were observed without any response from the security forces. Not to mention a common denominator: acting against groups opposing the government in power.

There are even incidents in which aggressions by pro-government groups were observed, along with the obstruction of any actions in response to the events. One such case was reported by BBC Mundo (2002), which took place on August 2, 2002, when an armed group called the Revolutionary Movement Carapaica claimed responsibility for having fired shots during a demonstration against the Metropolitan Police. This act remained unpunished and was not investigated, as it involved a group that supported the government. However, regarding this, President Chávez only stated to the media: “If it’s true that there are groups, armed and hooded, to defend the government, I ask them to think again, because the government does not need the help of armed groups”²⁵ (CHÁVEZ 2002), thereby weakening not only the fulfillment of the inherent duties of security agencies but also the rule of law.

4.3.3. Weakening of the rule of law and equality before the law

One of the predominant and fundamental milestones for the development of the processes within Hugo Chávez’s government project was the ability to influence and manipulate the rule of law, since through this he could acquire a broad margin of action and impunity for his actions, avoiding sanctions for conduct that was, by law, classified as criminal.

In this context, the Bolivarian circles are understood as a means of pressure and use of force, to bypass the legal and constitutional limitations imposed on the formal representatives of the use of force. This reinforces the idea put forth by Nathan Quimpo (2007), Carey et al. (2015), when mentioning that State governments can use non-state armed groups to carry out actions that involve the use of force, thus avoiding accountability for the consequences of such actions.

The government’s ability to permeate institutions and branches of the State, with the Judiciary being a primary target, facilitated the opportunity to use and administrate justice in a discretionary and self-serving manner, using interpretive frameworks lacking impartiality regarding actions or events that warranted this act of corruption—clearly exercising its functions with bias and value judgments, under the endorsement and approval of the executive branch, which would legitimize it under the present and participatory gaze and the silence of the other branches and institutions.

The tolerance and lack of action in the face of violent acts perpetrated by non-state armed groups, along with the imposition of arbitrary sanctions on opposition leaders, opposition citizens, political adversaries or government critics, journalists, and media outlets providing a different perspective, constitute violations of the rule of law and due process, corroding the democratic foundation of the State and compromising the integrity and functioning of its institutions.

Master Carlos Rangel (2015), in his book “La Venezuela imposible”, recounts a vivid story he calls “The Forced Criminal”²⁶ in which then-President Hugo Chávez, during the military parade of February 4, 1999, commemorating the coup d'état he led, tells a story where he is approached by a low-income man asking for help so that he would not be “forced” to commit a crime. The top representative of the Venezuelan people justified it with a Machiavellian stance, arguing that he himself, in such a situation, might choose to commit a crime: “the end justifies the means.”

These actions, which tend to blur the boundaries of legality—where inequality manifests in the tolerance of illicit activities by individuals or groups affiliated with the government, while the opposition faces persecution and harassment—mark the deliberate, selective, and convenient eligibility in the use of justice. In this way, incidents such as those already mentioned involving the non-state armed group Carapaica firing on the Metropolitan Police, and those that occurred on April 11, remained unpunished and were tolerated as acts of defense by revolution fighters.

4.3.4. Consolidation of the culture of privilege

The marked polarization that emerged in Venezuelan affairs—dividing the population between good and bad, red and white, pro-government and opposition—disconnected and labeled one part against the other, rather than recognizing a nation belonging to a State. This established a classification that evolved from a class struggle to an ideological struggle, where privileges were enjoyed by those who supported the government project. In many cases, those who held a different opinion were forced to conform as a method for resolving processes or seeking privileges that would otherwise be inaccessible.

“The culture of the little notes,” as described by Dr. Nelly Arenas, refers to “the old custom of handing the head of state letters or at least ‘little notes’ with direct and personal requests for help regarding very specific needs or shortages in health, employment, money, or housing, which grew to the point that the president had to assign several of his aides to receive and process the petitions.”²⁷ (ARENAS 2015, p. 180). This practice penetrated various levels of public administration, becoming a routine and normalized method for addressing the population’s demands and needs. But to access this “benefit,” as it was called, one had to meet certain requirements, and one of them—an essential one—was to sympathize with or actively support the government’s ideology.

A clear example of this can be seen in the documentary Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas, when “El Chino” Carias has a conversation with a person who mentions that a relative was having an issue with the payment of the food voucher, and asks if he knows anyone at the ministry to help resolve the problem. The character, who served as an advisor to the pro-government faction in the National Assembly, responds affirmatively, gives him his phone number, and commits to interceding on behalf of the person to solve the issue.

This behavior, already entrenched in society and instrumentalized due to the participation, at various levels of responsibility, of personnel from institutions politically aligned with the government project, represented an incentive not only for the general population who needed access or had the necessity—and in many cases, the desire—to obtain privileges, but also for those officials building careers within the institutions. This was because the only way to access managerial positions was to demonstrate affinity, political allegiance, and a willingness to facilitate whatever processes were necessary in service of and for the convenience of the so-called revolution, even if that implied corruption. Corruption that would go unsanctioned, as this phenomenon was replicated as a chain or network across different levels of State institutions.

The internalization of this phenomenon by the population reached the point of being used in everyday life, within communities and in the development of daily activities. Belonging to a party or movement became a matter of fate, mostly imposed by social conditions and ideological alignment, rather than the result of an informed political choice or conscious political decision.

These facts became evident later with the so-called “Tascón List,” mentioned in the Human Rights Watch report (2008), which is named after the legislator who made it public, pro-government Deputy Luis Tascón. The list was a database containing the names and personal information of millions of Venezuelans who signed a petition requesting a recall referendum against then-President Hugo Chávez. Most of these citizens were subjected to public shaming, and those who held public positions were, in large part, removed from their posts. The list became a tool used by the government when deciding to deal with, select, hire, or work with someone. Those who appeared on that list would be excluded from positions of responsibility or eligibility, and, in the case of the general population, could not enjoy the so-called culture of privilege, which hindered resolution of various processes—such as accessing credit. The memorable phrase “He who signs against Chávez is signing against the homeland”²⁸ (El Universal, 2003), spoken by Hugo Chávez himself, remains in the memory of Venezuelans who, at the end of 2003, were calling for a political, democratic, and peaceful change in the country.

In the same manner, this also unfolded in the field of security, since, being used at the government’s discretion, the use of force by security agencies became a selective tool, carefully observing which groups it could be used against and which ones it could not—all under the shadow of the Tree of the Three Roots, and nothing beyond it.

4.3.5. The Bolivarian Circles as hybrid actors between the state and the criminal realm

At this point, the magnitude of the organization of the Bolivarian Circles and the presence of their members in various areas of politics and public administration becomes clear, as they simultaneously participated in militant civic engagement. In the area of security, the Bolivarian Circles posed a controversy between the formal and the informal due to their coexistence and overlap with state security actors, increasingly blurring the boundaries between what is legal and illegal.

Shielded by political will and under the umbrella of Article 55 of the National Constitution, they argued that they were exercising a constitutional right by providing security to their communities. However, by committing acts of violence, breaking the law, and other crimes, they moved from a supposed constitutional right to the commission of crimes that, in most cases, went unsanctioned. This dynamic has led to a weakening of the rule of law and an erosion of equality before the law, fluctuating between public policy and participation in actions that violate the law.

Finally, for the government, the Bolivarian Circles became an essential tool for the defense of its project. Under the argument of citizen participation, they served as a means to exert pressure and violence against political and ideological adversaries. When the legitimate use of force by the State’s security agencies could not be deployed, the government turned to the Bolivarian Circles, freeing itself from responsibility under the argument that it could not control “the passions of men”—although it clearly could have sanctioned these actions had the political will existed.

In many societies, the grey zone tends to be present due to acts of corruption or other internal phenomena that contribute to the development of these activities—mostly related to officials representing State institutions. In the present case, the scope of this sphere was expanded with the inclusion of this organization which, although it does not belong to the State, holds the duality of being able to act both within and outside the bounds of legality.

4.4. Regional impact of criminal governance in venezuela

4.4.1. Influence of the Venezuelan case in neighboring countries

The figure of Hugo Chávez’s government project marked a milestone not only in the region; the Bolivarian Circles became international and spread their ideology across various continents. There are records of Bolivarian Circles in Germany, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the United States (Cincinnati, Houston, Miami, Milwaukee, New York, Seattle, Colorado), Spain (Galicia, Tenerife), France (Paris), the Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, among others.²⁹ The Bolivarian ideology expanded, and with it, its practices—which, had their failure not been demonstrated, could have caused havoc in different parts of the world.

The influence of political and social events within Venezuela had a spillover effect in the region. The regional impact of criminal governance in Venezuela and the instability resulting from its methods of managing security gave rise to a series of processes that progressively evolved, particularly in bordering countries such as Colombia, which went through different stages. The political events in Venezuela and the multi-causal crisis they generated not only had internal implications but also triggered a geopolitical realignment in the region.

In the case of Colombia, which for years had fought tirelessly against guerrillas, drug trafficking, contract killings, and other forms of crime, subversive groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) found in the Venezuelan government a possible ally and financier, due to the stance of its president and the emergence of paramilitary and parapolice organizations—adding a common adversary, which in this case was cooperating with the Colombian government: the United States of America.

This action was confirmed over the years when the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London published the report book analyzing documents seized from the guerrilla leader known as Raúl Reyes, who was killed during the military operation "Fénix." This report, El colombiano (2011), was commissioned by President Álvaro Uribe Vélez in order to obtain an analytical perspective from an independent institution, external and free from the bias of Colombian institutions. The authenticity of the content analyzed was certified by INTERPOL, although some official representatives of the Venezuelan government denied the authenticity of its content.

In this report, the FARC is linked in various ways to the government of Hugo Chávez, even mentioning requests for subversive activities within Venezuela, the request for guerrilla training in techniques and tactics for groups sympathetic to the government—that is, the “Bolivarian Circles”—as well as offers of funding from the government and the presence of guerrilla camps on Venezuelan territory. These approaches and events could only be possible in a fragile state where institutions, the rule of law, and the monopoly on force are patrimonialized and servilely used in service of and for the benefit of the agenda of its leaders, rather than for the welfare of the population and the autonomous fulfillment of their institutional functions.

Journalist Roberto Giusti refers to this topic about Colombian paramilitary groups and their ties to the Venezuelan government: “Now no one has the slightest doubt that the mountains of Táchira and the foothills of the Sierra de Perijá are the site of a new demilitarized zone, a San Vicente del Caguán that is much larger and friendlier, where the social, economic, and political organizational models of the FARC are being replicated: coca cultivation and cocaine production, totalitarian justice against those who violate established norms (a shot to the head for cattle thieves on protected farms, leniency for those who do not pay), guerrilla installations for the training and military instruction of inexperienced FBL members and Bolivarian Circles, hospitals, cooperatives, and permanent camps where Colombian citizens are held captive, including, possibly, former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.”³⁰ (GIUSTI 2003).

In relation to this, Colombian journalist Gilberto Londoño wrote the following lines referring to Hugo Chávez: “For him, his friends and protégés are, first and foremost, the members of the FARC, and those of the ELN. They move freely from one side of the Colombian-Venezuelan border to the other. They kidnap Colombians who are then held on the other side. A few days ago, the bodies of two non-commissioned officers from our army appeared in the state of Apure (Venezuela). Why were they found there? Who kidnapped and then murdered them? FARC or ELN. Venezuelan planes, piloted by captains of the Venezuelan National Guard, land in Cúcuta without permission and carrying weapons. Members of both subversive-terrorist factions feel safe. The Bolivarian Circles are their allies, protectors, and maintain direct lines to President Chávez.”³¹ (LONDOÑO 2003)

The beginning of this process of privatization of functions triggered a series of social phenomena of multi-causal origin—among them insecurity—which, during the analyzed period and progressively, evolved into migration, transnational crime, among others. This allowed these networks, under the complacency and impunity granted by state institutions, to develop logistical, methodological, and technical capabilities that were exported, camouflaged within Venezuelan migration. Although the percentage was small, it grew over time and through the adoption of new methods. As Rangel (2015) notes, Venezuelan prison centers became operational hubs for organized crime, where some inmates who belonged to these non-state armed organizations, along with other criminals, used those networks to expand within and beyond national territory. Thus, it can currently be traced how criminal organizations of Venezuelan origin apply the method of criminal governance in countries like Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, engaging in activities such as migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, among others.

Although their operational centers are publicly traceable to Venezuelan penitentiary centers, the patrimonialized Venezuelan security system does not act against these facilities, as they are under the control of criminals and not under the authority of the State. Another symptom of the patrimonialization of security that originated during the 2001–2003 period. These models of criminal governance, like the one developed by the “Bolivarian Circles,” provided their members—who later formed criminal organizations—with a tool that was integrated, practiced, and developed within their structures. A tool that would later be used once they became transnational criminal organizations.

Another symptom of the patrimonialization of security has been the evident corruption within the security agencies in charge of border defense, which progressively evolved into a form of neopatrimonialism. Through corruption, collaboration, tolerance, and even participation of the Armed Forces and their various branches in different criminal activities, a wide range of criminal operations has been permitted—by air, sea, and land—in exchange for monetary profit. This profit, structured as a network, is received in larger proportions by political elites, and in decreasing proportions according to rank and position within the security agencies. Crime became a business and a source of economic income for security institutions.

4.4.2. Expansion of illicit activities beyond borders

The implementation and development of these practices—patrimonialization of security, weakening of the rule of law, and the loss of the monopoly on the use of force—created space both within and beyond national borders for the participation of a large number of actors engaged in various illicit activities. This opportunity, due to several factors, was influenced and utilized by the government as a method to exert influence over different spheres of the region.

In this regard, Colmenares (2011) explains it as Hugo Chávez’s attempt to fulfill a geopolitical project, which in its phases contemplates the structuring, financing, and logistical support to groups with Bolivarian affinity.

This strategy responds to the need to articulate a network that would support his government project: “In a statement before the United States Congress in January 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that President Chávez was 'undermining democracy in Venezuela and destabilizing security in the Latin American region’”³² (COLMENARES 2010, pp. 15–16).

This was the case reported in a diplomatic cable by the United States Ambassador to Panama, Linda Ellen Watt, when referring to Hugo Chávez’s intention to influence Panama’s internal affairs: “Another legislator agreed that Panamanian union leaders may be receiving Venezuelan money, but argued that did not matter much because those union leaders would oppose the Social Security reforms regardless of any encouragement from Venezuela." […] "A December 13, 2004 article in La Prensa, the largest circulation Panamanian daily, posited the presence of up to 10 apparently subversive Bolivarian Circles in Panama, with nominal allegiance to and apparently linked financially with Hugo Chavez's 'Bolivarian Revolution.' (See Ref tel) (Note: Venezuelan defense attaché Javier Gamboa, who departed Panama about five months ago, reportedly bragged about being a proponent of the Circles. According to unconfirmed reports, the Circles began in Panama several years ago.) The La Prensa article identified former El Siglo newspaper co-owner Angel Padilla Beliz and Panamanian lawyer Fernan Casis as Circle leaders but gave no hint about the extent of the group’s membership or influence.” (WATT 2005)

Other findings include the one mentioned by the President of the Republic of El Salvador, Antonio Saca (2007), regarding the interference of Bolivarian Circles linked to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front of El Salvador.

Political analyst Kirio Waldo (2007) states that both Hugo Chávez’s government and the Bolivarian Circles were providing training and funding, establishing intelligence, counterintelligence, and disinformation cells for the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador, with the aim of destabilizing social peace and the electoral process.

El Nacional newspaper of El Salvador (2007) refers to an investigation into alleged links with these groups, which were reportedly financed with approximately $200 million, and notes the presence of these circles in countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, where they carry out activities to spread the Bolivarian Revolution.

Among other sources, El Universo of Ecuador (2005) refers to nine Bolivarian movements that claim to have no links with the Bolivarian Circles, despite the constant travel of their leaders to Venezuela. It highlights the presence of a party called Movimiento Victorioso Revolucionario, known for its similarities in structure, participatory organization, and activism with Hugo Chávez’s Movimiento Quinta República—coincidentally known by the same acronym: MVR.

In the case of the Republic of Peru, Colmenares (2011) mentions the arrest of two Peruvian citizens who, after attending meetings with Bolivarian Circles in Ecuador, attempted to enter Peru with $150,000 in cash. The investigation allegedly found that the funds were intended to finance similar movements in Peru.

Colmenares (2011), who defines the Bolivarian Revolution as an asymmetric threat, conceptualizes these phenomena as new threats according to Hugo Chávez’s vision of exporting Bolivarianism. This is due to the non-use of military resources, taking as its foundation the hemispheric concept of Multidimensional Security adopted in Mexico City in October 2003.

Within this model of asymmetric threat, the Bolivarian Circles are a human resource that forms part of its structure. And among its methodological strategies of New Threats, it includes phenomena such as poverty and social inequality, corruption, arms trafficking, health risks, and natural disasters.

Illustrations are not included in the reading sample

Figure 2. Asymmetric threat model (COLMENARES 2011, pp. 15–16)

In addition to the method previously mentioned and used by Hugo Chávez’s government, over time activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, gasoline smuggling, biopiracy, illegal mining, trafficking of wildlife and endangered species, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking were added. Depending on the case, one can observe the presence of internal actors, external actors, and the passive participation of security agencies.

The impunity with which these activities took place gave rise to organized crime groups like those we currently observe, which use the Venezuelan platform as a center of operations, transit point, or hub from which they can move across its borders and territory, distributing their activities to the north or south of the Americas, taking advantage of its geographic location. These actions require a criminal and institutional framework that develops by exploiting the patrimonialization of security, criminal governance, and the privatization of public functions, all of which foster a culture of privilege and selective justice.

4.4.3. Normalization of criminal and non-state governance logics

The normalization of criminal and non-state governance logics in Venezuela reflects a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has taken deep root in its political and social structure. The evolution of Hugo Chávez’s government project into a hybrid State, where the line between governability and criminality—or State and criminal—has been blurred. This process continues to intensify over time, but it progresses imperceptibly, as it has become a reality to which the Venezuelan population has grown accustomed and adapted over the past 23 years.

Under this framework, as noted by INSIGHT CRIME (2023), a symbiosis has been observed between state actors and criminal groups, giving rise to what is known as a hybrid State. Non-state armed groups, which still maintain their ideological origins and positions, have received training in various areas related to military and police knowledge and have been integrated into state structures³³, collaborating closely with authorities to maintain social control over the population and counter threats to the political project of the government. These hybrid armed groups not only collaborate with the State but have also formed alliances with other internal and external criminal actors (INSIGHT CRIME 2023).

In this way, the criminal governance adopted by these groups has been perceived as a kind of political leadership of criminal groups over vulnerable populations, where the population often sees these organizations as a sort of “Robin Hood,” since they provide security and certain benefits that are mostly managed in the name of and through the State—resources that, regardless of the existence of these groups, would be allocated and distributed to these populations (wealth distribution). Within their space of criminal governance, these groups legitimize the communities’ skepticism toward State security agencies.

It is worth noting that, during a certain period, Hugo Chávez’s government had the support of an ideological group of governments from Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina—alliances that, under a common premise and mutual agreement, acted permissively toward the grievances committed by any of them, so that none would voice opinions that could cast doubt on the actions of the others.

4.4.4. Legitimization of new forms of authoritarian governance

The government of Hugo Chávez marked an era of profound transformations not only within the country but also across the region. It was characterized by the legitimization of governance models that deviated from traditional democratic values toward a more authoritarian model. These changes resulted from a series of policies and reforms that reflected a desire to impose his government project in an authoritarian manner, consolidate power, and reorient Venezuelan society.

Although Chávez promoted the creation and strengthening of structures such as the Bolivarian Circles, communal councils, and communes—which sought to foster greater citizen participation in alignment with his political project—these instances ultimately curtailed independence, limited pluralism and alternation, and restricted the autonomy of civil society. The laws and regulations implemented reflected the will and demands of the president and were backed by institutions subordinated under his leadership. Centralizing power revealed a reorganization of the territory and institutional structures of the State.

The closeness of relations and support for repressive governments at the international level, the rejection of efforts to promote human rights, and backing for leaders of authoritarian regimes such as Libya and Iraq is a coherent reflection of the internal practices promoted by Hugo Chávez through the Bolivarian Circles—reproducing, on the international stage, the shock group he had built on the national level.

This stance, projected through Hugo Chávez’s foreign policy, is evidenced by concrete actions—such as the decoration of controversial leaders—and aligns metaphorically with the spirit of power consolidation and ideological alignment that the Bolivarian Circles represented in their domestic context.

Forums such as the São Paulo Forum and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), under the leadership of Hugo Chávez, were platforms that promoted ideological propagation amid a passive complicity toward these practices. Prospectively, governments through proper tools should have foreseen what was to come. This represents the local and regional legitimization of these forms of government. A deeper analysis of each of the countries that accompanied him during this process reveals similar patterns, which progressively degenerated in matters of security. The most evident current example is the close relationship with former Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa and the Bolivarian movements in Ecuador. The security snapshot of Ecuador in the year 2024 needs no explanation—it speaks for itself regarding the similarities and parallels.

5. Conclusions

The thorough investigation into the patrimonialization of security in Venezuela between 2001 and 2003 reveals a period of significant political and social transformation, marking the beginning of a turning point in the country's contemporary history.

This phenomenon, which is intrinsically linked to the emergence of the Bolivarian Circles through the permissive interaction with Hugo Chávez’s government and project, highlights the complex network of privatized power dynamics that led to a reordering of the structure and functioning of security.

Although this research succeeded in unraveling and understanding the causes, development, and consequences of this process, it has provided a comprehensive view of the outcome that the patrimonialization of security had for the stability of the country and the region.

The emergence of the Bolivarian Circles under the premise of an organization for citizen participation, which was intentionally turned into a pressure group used to operate within a gray zone as part of a hybrid tool model. This allowed the government to use force against its political opponents both inside and outside the bounds of legality.

The transfer of state security responsibilities to non-state armed groups and the opposition to security agencies carrying out activities proper to their duties in certain sectors represented an erosion of the monopoly on the use of force.

The induced and systematized polarization of the population through different means was a vital point to identify against whom to apply the use of force and against whom not to. Having the effect of a culture of privilege, an object that was institutionalized with the aim of gaining loyalties, under the premise of a common struggle based on the nationalist ideals of the political project, the highest legal instrument of the country (the constitution), which are shared with the nation’s history coinciding in "Bolivarianism", reinforced with the Marxist ideology of class struggle, sharpened the polarization.

The privatization of public functions and State powers facilitated the execution of formal and informal actions, due to the absence of opposition, encouraging corruption and other illegal acts.

The absence of impartial sanctions represented an important milestone that weakened the rule of law, institutional autonomy, and democratic order, obstructing the separation of powers.

The discouragement of security forces through arbitrary sanctions, and impunity for non-state armed groups.

These were phenomena that occurred simultaneously with the support of political will, marking how the patrimonialization of security began in Venezuela. Giving rise to various consequences, among them the beginning of the loss of the monopoly on the use of force.

Thus, and in response to the premises of this research:

- The Bolivarian Circles emerge as a structure of citizen participation and community empowerment, aligned with Chávez’s government project.
- Their transformation into ideological, politicized, and armed groups closely linked to the government reflects an intentional deliberate strategy to consolidate a tool to use its power through social control.
- The symbiotic relationship between non-state armed groups and the government facilitated a patrimonialization of security, where the functions of security agencies were expropriated from their exclusivity or delegated to the Bolivarian Circles. Resulting in the erosion of state functions and of the monopoly on the use of force, contributing to a legitimate example of criminal governance.
- As the rule of law was weakened through the use of selective justice, the Bolivarian Circles operated as a gray zone actor, serving as a tool to evade responsibility for the use of force in acts of violence.
- The patrimonialization of security was fertile ground and an incentive for the emergence of criminal phenomena; its discretionary and selective use facilitated another tool for the government to achieve its objectives. At the same time, it provided space for the development of criminal governance with government approval, increasing inequality and the culture of privilege.
- The proliferation and influence of the Bolivarian Circles in different scenarios sought to cause regional destabilization.
- The spillover effect in the region resulting from the loss of the monopoly on the use of force was manifested in the progressive degeneration and consolidation of migratory phenomena, smuggling, migrant trafficking, human trafficking, transnational organized crime, and a large number of other activities contained within the criminal ecosystem.
- The concepts of patrimonialism, rule of law, and criminal governance were articulated within the same space in progression. The patrimonialization of security, selective justice, the privatization of the functions of the rule of law, allowed criminal governance to develop with total impunity in certain sectors of the country, resulting in the coining of the term of a legitimate model of criminal governance, permitted and promoted by the state and its institutions.

This logic responds to the equation in which the result may be variable:

(Patrimonialization of Security + Privatization of the functions of the rule of law) + Non-state armed groups / Territory = Legitimate Model of Criminal Governance

Likewise, this study reveals to us:

- The patrimonialization of security was an intentional, gradual, and multifaceted process that weakened the monopoly on the use of force. Security is an essential condition within sovereignty, the nation, and the State. Delegating security functions to non-state groups such as the Bolivarian Circles, and their armed evolution, generated a power vacuum, filled by these actors. This phenomenon fragmented State authority and created an environment in which the exercise and enforcement of law depended more on loyalty to the regime than on democratic and legal principles.
- The patrimonialization of security originated from various factors, from Chávez’s political will to consolidate his power and government project, to the internationalization of the Bolivarian ideology, using as a tool the component of the Bolivarian Circles, instrumentalized through different means. The cost of this process was deep and long-lasting, in some cases observable to the present day.

Therefore, this research confirms our hypothesis:

It is observable that the groups called Bolivarian Circles had an active influence in different States of America and the world.

In Venezuela, during the periods from 2001 to 2003, a process of patrimonialization of security occurred, with the emergence of a non-state armed group called Bolivarian Circles, which usurped security functions and, with government approval, implemented a legitimate model of criminal governance. In this period, the beginning of the loss of the monopoly on the use of force was observed.

This phenomenon of the loss of the monopoly on the use of force, in the medium and long term, had a spillover impact in the region, especially in neighboring countries, as it progressively degenerated into a large number of activities within the criminal ecosystem.

This only represents one method by which a State can lose the monopoly on the use of force.

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HE, K., 2019. Constructing dynamic security governance: institutional peace through multilateralism in the Asia Pacific. Journal Of Contemporary East Asia Studies [en línea], vol. 8, no. 2, DOI 10.1080/24761028.2019.1675240. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1675240.

ARENAS, N. y CALCAÑO, L.G., 2020. Los círculos bolivarianos: el mito de la unidad del pueblo. América Latina Hoy [en línea], vol. 39, DOI 10.14201/alh.22769. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.14201/alh.22769.

UZCÁTEGUI, R., 2010. Venezuela, la revolución como espectáculo: Una crítica anarquista al gobierno bolivariano. S.l.: El Libertario.

DE LA TORRE, C., PERUZZOTTI, E. y DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES LATINOAMERICANAS Y CARIBEÑAS, C., 2008. El retorno del pueblo : populismo y nuevas democracias en América Latina [en línea]. S.l.: s.n. Disponible en: https://biblioteca.uazuay.edu.ec/buscar/item/73858.

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES MEMORIA POPULAR LATINOAMERICANA, 2003. CON LOS POBRES DE LA TIERRA: Desarrollo de la Revolución Bolivariana [en línea]. Vídeo. 2003. S.l.: s.n. Disponible en: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojiHHIf6qj4.

RADIO ALTERNATIVA DE CARACAS, 2003. Rodrigo Chaves describe el trabajo de los Círculos Bolivarianos. Aporrea [en línea], [consulta: 29 diciembre 2023]. Disponible en: https://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n6266.html.

POSADA, E., 1988. Congreso de las Provincias Unidas 1811-1816: Leyes, actas y notas [en línea]. 2. S.l.: Fundación Francisco de Paula Santander. Disponible en: https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/handle/unal/8400/Congreso_de_las_Provincias_Unidas.html?sequence=22&isAllowed=y.

PROYECTO LATINNO, [sin fecha]. Círculos Bolivarianos. LATINNO [en línea]. [consulta: 12 diciembre 2023]. Disponible en: https://latinno.net/es/case/19003/.

CÍRCULOS BOLIVARIANOS, [sin fecha]. Libro Fundamentos de Organización Círculos bolivarianos [en línea]. S.l.: s.n. Disponible en: https://web.archive.org/web/20130717151932/http:/circulosbolivarianossocialistas.bligoo.es/media/users/8/417543/files/31249/LIBRO_DE_LOS_CIRCLS_BOLIVARIANOS_PARTE_I.pdf.

ANALÍTICA, 2002. Ex funcionarios de la Disip denunciaron haber sido expulsados por negarse a entrenar a los círculos bolivarianos. Analítica [en línea]. 15 mayo 2002. [consulta: 31 diciembre 2023]. Disponible en: https://www.analitica.com/actualidad/actualidad-nacional/ex-funcionarios-de-la-disip-denunciaron-haber-sido-expulsados-por-negarse-a-entrenar-a-los-circulos-bolivarianos/.

BONILLA-MOLINA, L. y TROUDI, H.E., 2004. Inteligencia social y Sala situacional [en línea]. S.l.: UBV y la Dirección del Despacho Presidencial. Disponible en: https://urru.org/videosbolibananos/Textos/Inteligencia_social_y_sala_situacional_2004.pdf.

THE UNDERGROUND DOCUMENTARY GROUP, 2019. Tupamaro: Urban guerrillas. Internet Movie Database [en línea]. Disponible en: https://m.imdb.com/title/tt4128582/?ref_=vp_vi_tt.

CARVAJAL, I., 2012. Memorias de un golpe de Estado: Cronología 11, 12, 13, y 14 de 2002. S.l.: Coordinación de Archivo y Transcripción de Comunicaciones Presidenciales.

ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS, 2003. Informe sobre la situación de los Derechos Humanos en Venezuela [en línea]. S.l.: Organización de los Estados Americanos. Disponible en: https://www.cidh.org/pdf%20files/Venezuela2003.pdf.

Venezuela: Surge grupo armado. BBCMundo.com [en línea], 2002. 5 agosto 2002. [consulta: 1 enero 2024]. Disponible en: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_2175000/2175041.stm.

RANGEL, C.J., 2017. La Venezuela imposible: Crónicas Y Reflexiones Sobre Democracia Y Libertad. S.l.: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2008. Una década de Chávez: intolerancia política y oportunidades perdidas para el progreso de los derechos humanos en Venezuela [en línea]. S.l.: s.n. Disponible en: https://www.hrw.org/es/report/2008/09/19/una-decada-de-chavez/intolerancia-politica-y-oportunidades-perdidas-para-el.

EL UNIVERSAL, 2003a. «EL QUE FIRME CONTRA CHÁVEZ ESTÁ FIRMANDO CONTRA LA PATRIA». El Universal [en línea]. 17 octubre 2003. [consulta: 29 noviembre 2023]. Disponible en: https://archive.ph/20120716151635/http:/universo.eluniversal.com/2003/10/17/pol_ava_17A1419870.shtml#selection-549.0-549.59.

Informe revela en detalle los documentos confiscados tras la muerte de alias «Raúl Reyes». El Colombiano [en línea], 2011. 10 mayo 2011. [consulta: 2 enero 2024]. Disponible en: https://www.elcolombiano.com/historico/documentos_de_alias_raul_reyes_son_revelados_por_instituto_internacional_de_estudios_estrategicos-PFec_132940.

BBC, 2011b. Insisten en conexión entre las Farc y el gobierno de Hugo Chávez. BBC Mundo [en línea]. 10 mayo 2011. [consulta: 2 enero 2024]. Disponible en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2011/05/110510_colombia_venezuela_chavez_farc_wbm.

GIUSTI, R. y EL UNIVERSAL DE CARACAS, 2003. EL CAGUÁN VENEZOLANO. El Tiempo [en línea]. 8 mayo 2003. [consulta: 2 enero 2024]. Disponible en: https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-973815.

ARANGO, G., 2003. NO QUEDA DUDA ALGUNA: Los últimos, y penúltimos acontecimientos han dejado en claro lo que algunos ingenuos no querían creer. El Tiempo [en línea]. 20 febrero 2003. [consulta: 2 enero 2024]. Disponible en: https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-995279.

COLMENARES, L., 2011. La Exportación de la “Revolución Bolivariana” hacia América Latina. Military Review [en línea], vol. TOMO LXVI ENERO-FEBRERO 2011, no. ENERO-FEBRERO 2011, Disponible en: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/Spanish/MilitaryReview_20110228_art001SPA.pdf.

WATT, L., 2005. Cable Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América en Panamá. Archive.org [en línea]. [consulta: 9 noviembre 2023]. Disponible en: https://archive.org/details/05PANAMA234.

Por «Círculos Bolivarianos»: Investigan posible injerencia de Chávez. Nacional, 2007. Impresa. 10 diciembre 2007. pp. https://biblioteca.utec.edu.sv/hemeroteca/NOT_svedh/2007/20071211/EDH20071211NAC002P.PDF.

EL EXILIO TV, 2007. CIRCULOS BOLIVARIANOS AMENAZAN EL TERRITORIO [en línea]. Vídeo. 2007. S.l.: s.n. [consulta: 1 febrero 2024]. Disponible en: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4C8LaWS8wQ.

EL UNIVERSO, 2005. Hay nueve movimientos ‘bolivarianos’ en Ecuador. El Universo [en línea]. 21 agosto 2005. [consulta: 18 febrero 2024]. Disponible en: https://www.eluniverso.com/2005/08/21/0001/8/7B30D1E9196A45958AB7E19E1E311481.html/.

INSIGHT CRIME., 2018. La delegación del poder estatal: Los “colectivos”. Insight Crime [en línea], Disponible en: https://insightcrime.org/es/investigaciones/la-delegacion-del-poder-estatal-los-colectivos/.

INSIGHT CRIME, 2023. El ascenso del Estado criminal híbrido en Venezuela: #ESTADOHÍBRIDO. Insight Crime [en línea], Disponible en: https://insightcrime.org/es/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/El-ascenso-del-Estado-criminal-hibrido-en-Venezuela-InSight-Crime-1.pdf?_gl=1*ii72yo*_ga*MTk0NTQwNzk5Ni4xNzA2NzMxNTgw*_ga_DDHRSLDESP*MTcwNjczMTU3OS4xLjAuMTcwNjczMTU3OS4wLjAuMA..*_ga_27CNJPD4K9*MTcwNjczMTU3OS4xLjEuMTcwNjczMTYwMy4zNi4wLjA.

NTN24, 2019. José Miguel Domínguez ‘Miguelito’: De colectivo armado a director de la FAES. NTN"$ [en línea]. 7 mayo 2019. [consulta: 25 diciembre 2023]. Disponible en: https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-actualidad/jose-miguel-dominguez-miguelito-de-colectivo-armado-a-director-de-la-faes-106661.

Jurisprudencia referenciada

ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DE VENEZUELA, 1999. Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. República Bolivariana de Venezuela [en línea], Disponible en: https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/storage/documentos/botones/constitucion-nacional-20191205135853.PDF.

ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, 2002. LEY ORGÁNICA DE SEGURIDAD DE LA NACIÓN [en línea]. S.l.: República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Disponible en: https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2008/6667.pdf.

Anexo A. Presence of Bolivarian Circles

Alemania

https://web.archive.org/web/20051018073747/http://netzwerk-venezuela.de/inhalt/bielefeld/

Brasil

https://web.archive.org/web/20061130194037/http://www.circulosbolivarianosbr.kit.net/

Canadá

https://www.securefreesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CANADA_ON_GUARD_JUNE_20143.pdf

Chile

https://web.archive.org/web/20051215111225/http://espanol.groups.yahoo.com/group/colectivoctubre8/

Estados Unidos

- Cincinnati: https://web.archive.org/web/20070928221710/http://www.bostonbolivarian.com/orgs.html
- Houston: https://web.archive.org/web/20031012222924/http://espanol.groups.yahoo.com/group/circulobolivarianodehouston/
- Miami: https://web.archive.org/web/20030603161141/http://www.bovmiami.org/bienvenidos/
- Milwaukee: https://web.archive.org/web/20060809060648/http://www.mwsocialforum.org/node/82
- Nueva York (También Boston): https://web.archive.org/web/20210515133817/http://nybolivarian.blogspot.com/
- Seattle: https://web.archive.org/web/20060820005402/http://seattlebc.revolt.org/
- Colorado: https://web.archive.org/web/20060716203726/http://www.americans-for-chavez.com/about.html

España

- Galicia: https://web.archive.org/web/20030518210016/http://groups.msn.com/circulobolivarianogalicia
- Tenerife: https://web.archive.org/web/20030502110919/http://www.circulobolivarianodetenerife.8m.com/
- Tenerife: https://web.archive.org/web/20021209083140/http://usuarios.lycos.es/cbtenerife/

Francia

https://web.archive.org/web/20110720011937/http://cbparis.free.fr/

Holanda

https://web.archive.org/web/20080616053252/http://www.circulobolivariano.nl/

Noruega

https://web.archive.org/web/20090817141717/http://www.venezuelava.no/index.php/quienes-somos

Sri-Lanka

https://web.archive.org/web/20060824061026/http://www.lankatruth.com/main_photo_page/20060108.htm

Acknowlwdgements

"If the world knew the ideas that have been lost due to the discredit of those we call scholars, it would understand why Socrates referred to sophists as masters of rhetoric, but not of philosophy."

To God, absolute source of energy that fills my life day by day.

Niño lú, B.O, Páez, with their spirits are my light.

To my Mariana, my eternal companion, you are my lighthouse when I lose the north. I LOVE YOU!

To my Granny, you are already proud, my old lady. Pipi, Foncho, I LOVE YOU, my dear ones!

This work was the sum of many things, of mixed feelings, and the understanding of others that, if it weren’t for this medium, I would not have been able to understand.

To my dear little mother. The morning talks, even though you attentively listened to me talking like crazy, led me to many reflections. Mom, you are a very good source of inspiration. I love you!

To my little daughter. Daughter... Your energy and love made me willingly endure not resting even when I needed to, thank you for understanding that daddy had to study and couldn't play.

To my eldest daughter... For your support and sensitivity, sitting down to listen to me talk about things you don't understand, and nodding telling me it was okay, filled me with strength knowing that someone was learning things that would have been important to me if they had been explained to me in my youth.

To my older brother, with the respect and love I have for you, I always had you and your family in mind while writing these lines. Thank you!

To my middle brother, my fundamental source of energy and support, helping me confirm my ideas, to you and your family. Thank you!

To my family and friends Eduard, Carlos, who gave me strength despite the distance to get here. Distance is a line of time, but love unites borders, breaking down barriers.

To my suited brothers, for their love and understanding in my absence during this journey.

To Licenciado Ventura, your encouragement was what made me reach the end of all this—without you I would never have achieved it. Thank you, Maestro!

To Maestro Carlos Rangel, your noble gesture of collaborating with such an important text is worthy of admiration. I hope the world listens to your ideas and manages to understand what happened to us, so that Venezuela is not impossible.

To J.A.L. and E.R., even though time passes, the experiences are never forgotten, and for some things, one must have strength, endurance, and courage. I admire you!

To my director Sonia Alda, the path is right when there is good guidance. Coal under pressure becomes a diamond. Thank you!

And to all those who helped and collaborated, if I forgot you, it was not with bad intentions, but due to fatigue. Thank you!

[...]

---

¹ «El Estado moderno es una asociación de dominación con carácter institucional que ha tratado, con éxito, de monopolizar dentro de un territorio la violencia física legítima como medio de dominación y que, a este fin, ha reunido todos los medios materiales en manos de su dirigente y ha expropiado a todos los funcionarios estamentales que antes disponían de ellos por derecho propio, sustituyéndolos con sus propias jerarquías supremas.» (WEBER 1919, P. 36)

² «El político y el científico» describe que el «Estado es aquella comunidad humana que, dentro de un determinado territorio (el «territorio» es elemento distintivo), reclama (con éxito) para sí el monopolio de la violencia física legítima» (WEBER 1979, P. 83)

³ «Lo específico de nuestro tiempo es que a todas las demás asociaciones e individuos sólo se les concede el derecho a la violencia física en la medida en que el Estado lo permite. El Estado es la única fuente del «derecho» a la violencia» (WEBER 1979, P. 83, 84)

⁴ «la tipificación de los actos corruptos subyacen dos criterios: El primero utiliza como parámetro de medición el sistema normativo vigente que otorga derechos, impone obligaciones y fija sanciones. El segundo se apoya en las creencias y valores de la gente común, la cual no necesariamente visualiza como corruptos todos los actos que son definidos legalmente como tales, así como puede considerar corruptos actos que son normalmente legales» (SAUTU 2004, p.83)

⁵ «a la definición de Bayley, quien aclara que, aunque la idea de corrupción esta conceptualmente atada con el acto de cohecho, es un término general que cubre el mal uso de la autoridad para la utilidad personal, que no necesita ser monetaria» (SANDA 1999, p. 4-5)

⁶ «el “fenómeno por medio del cual un funcionario público es impulsado para favorecer intereses particulares a cambio de una recompensa”. La primera observación es que, si bien la definición focaliza la responsabilidad en el funcionario público, lo cierto es que los agentes privados también deben ser considerados como susceptibles de incurrir en corrupción. La segunda aclaración es que las recompensas no necesariamente tienen un carácter pecuniario, y las ventajas pueden incluir cualquier forma de gratificación no directamente medible en dinero» (GILLI 2014, p. 43)

⁷ «La conducta de quien ejerce una cierta función social que implica determinadas obligaciones activas o pasivas destinadas a satisfacer ciertos fines, para cuya consecución fue designado» […] «y no cumple con aquellas obligaciones o no las cumple de forma de satisfacer esos fines, de modo de obtener un cierto beneficio para él o un tercero, así como también la conducta del tercero que lo induce o se beneficia con tal incumplimiento» (NINO 2005, p. 109)

⁸ La cultura del privilegio es un orden simbólico que interactúa con prácticas establecidas en el que es considerado aceptable que un grupo de la población, caracterizado jerárquicamente bien por su adscripción étnica, racial o de género, bien por su posición socioeconómica, bien por su pertenencia a élites políticas o culturales, bien por su estatus de clase, o bien por su filiación sanguínea o de herencia, tenga ventajas sobre el resto de la sociedad respecto de redes de relaciones que reproducen sus posiciones privilegiadas en el mundo de los negocios y las finanzas; poder en instancias de deliberación o decisión; voz predominante en los circuitos comunicacionales donde se imponen ideas, ideologías y agendas políticas; acceso a recursos públicos para uso en beneficio privado; impunidad o facilidades especiales frente a la justicia ante hechos relacionados con delitos económicos, daños a terceros, formas ilícitas de poder y discriminación sobre otros; tráfico de influencias; capacidad de presión, negociación, manipulación y veto frente a políticas y estamentos de gobierno o de Estado; uso de redes de relaciones para obtener contratos y hacer negocios, acceder a mejores puestos de trabajo, mayores remuneraciones y facilidades de financiamiento, y mejores condiciones para el desarrollo de capacidades y la formación de capital cultural» (HOPENHAYN 2022, p. 262)

⁹ «La CEPAL ha llamado “cultura del privilegio” a una cultura caracterizada por normalizar las jerarquías de poder, las desigualdades en el acceso a activos productivos, y por tanto las asimetrías ante los frutos del progreso» […] «La cultura del privilegio se sustenta en una serie de prácticas desigualadoras» […] «es decir, reglas e instituciones que pueden ser formales o informales y que tienden a favorecer a los grupos sociales que ya eran más favorecidos» (RIOS 2021, p. 13)

¹⁰ «Cuando el privilegio es sistémico, la desigualdad también lo es en todos los ámbitos económico, político y social. Cuando tiene lugar esa normalización, los no privilegiados no aspiran a ser iguales, sino a ser también privilegiados, alimentando de manera permanente esta cultura» (ALDA 2021 p. 100)

¹¹ «Mientras más fuerte es la cultura del privilegio, más tiende a darse una relación del tipo “círculo vicioso” entre instituciones y estructuras, lo que significa que hay menos innovación en ambos lados, porque el sistema de privilegios permea estructuras e instituciones, o bien porque los poderes fácticos del sistema de privilegios tienen una capacidad de veto sobre el cambio institucional que la voluntad política no logra torcer, o porque en una cultura del privilegio hay recompensas mutuas entre élites políticas y económicas que surten un efecto de desmovilización. Esto se hace evidente en economías intensivas en materias primas, donde los privilegios por grandes ganancias sobre la base de bajos salarios y sobreexplotación de recursos naturales llevan al predominio de una cultura rentista tanto en el sector público como en el privado» (HOPENHAYN 2021, p. 266)

¹² «Es preferible que la ley gobierne, antes que alguno de los ciudadanos» de esta manera «la norma adquiere un rol como legitimador del estado, del poder y de la autoridad que ejercen los funcionarios públicos, además de su rol natural de reglamentación de las conductas humanas» (ANAVITARTE 2013)

¹³ «presupone un universo regido por el derecho, y quiere decir que el derecho debe ser quien impere y los que rigen la comunidad política deben actuar conforme a él; que el derecho se aplique por igual a todos, a los gobernantes como a los gobernados. Por eso, “imperio del derecho”, aunque nada literal, parece ser una de las traducciones menos malas de rule of law» (PEREIRA 2010, p. 171)

¹⁴ «la expresión imperio de la ley alude a un ideal regulativo sobre el ejercicio del poder. De acuerdo con dicho ideal, la legitimidad del poder reside en que su actuación se ajuste a lo establecido por normas jurídicas preconstituidas» (MARCILLA 2013, p. 177)

¹⁵ «Si la acción de los agentes del Estado está inmersa en lógicas particularistas y no es capaz de garantizar el imperio de la ley en todo el territorio, las políticas de seguridad pueden convertirse en una fuente adicional de inseguridad» (URIBE 2010, p. 189)

¹⁶ «tienen el potencial de emplear armas en el uso de la fuerza para alcanzar objetivos políticos, ideológicos o económicos; no están dentro de las estructuras militares formales de los Estados, alianzas entre Estados u organizaciones intergubernamentales; y no son controlados por el Estado o Estados en que operan» […] «A la luz de esta definición podemos deducir que lo que caracteriza a estos grupos es la voluntad de usar la violencia como medio para lograr sus objetivos al margen de los mecanismos gubernamentales formales» (HERNÁNDEZ 2022, p.225).

¹⁷ «La gobernanza criminal, entendida como el establecimiento de un orden social paralelo al impuesto desde el Estado en el que se proveen de servicios públicos de lo más diversos - que incluyen seguridad, resolución de conflictos, administración de justicia - y bienes básicos, tracciona la legitimidad que la sociedad civil otorga a las organizaciones criminales; y con ella, posibilita el incremento de la proyección del poder de esas organizaciones, más allá de las fronteras en las que se ejerce la gobernanza criminal» (SAMPÓ 2021 p. 11-12).

¹⁸ Article 1 – Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is irrevocably free and independent and bases its moral heritage and its values of liberty, equality, justice, and international peace on the doctrine of Simón Bolívar, the Liberator. The Nation’s inalienable rights are independence, liberty, sovereignty, immunity, territorial integrity, and national self-determination.

¹⁹ «Entonces Chávez entiende perfectamente que no puede avanzar en su proceso, si no construye una fuerza internacional y una fuerza nacional que le permita hacer las transformaciones que se propone. Y por eso busca, y está buscando continuamente como construir el instrumento político capaz de conducir el proceso y como organizar mejor al pueblo» (HARNEKER 2003)

²⁰ “We have never organized ourselves into cooperatives, microenterprises, family businesses, foundations, civil associations, among others, and these present projects to the institutions responsible for managing State resources, be they mayors’ offices, governorships, ministries, or foundations, whether aligned with the government or the opposition, since they are all institutions and public servants and it is their constitutional duty to attend to us, advise us, and support us.” (Chaves, R. 2003)

²¹ «Yo soy soldado y mi deber no me prescribe otra cosa que la ciega obediencia al gobierno, sin entrar en examinar la naturaleza de sus disposiciones, que sin duda son y deben ser las más prudentes y justas, meditadas y concebidas con la profundidad y sabiduría» (BOLÍVAR 1813)

²² Article 55 (CRBV): Every person has the right to protection by the State, through the citizen security bodies regulated by law, in situations that constitute a threat, vulnerability, or risk to the physical integrity of individuals, their property, the enjoyment of their rights, and the fulfillment of their duties. The participation of male and female citizens in programs aimed at prevention, citizen security, and emergency management shall be regulated by a special law. State security bodies shall respect the dignity and human rights of all persons. The use of weapons or toxic substances by police and security personnel shall be limited by the principles of necessity, appropriateness, timeliness, and proportionality, in accordance with the law.

²³ Article 326 (CRBV): National security is based on the cooperation between the State and civil society to fulfill the principles of independence, democracy, equality, peace, liberty, justice, solidarity, environmental promotion and conservation, and the affirmation of human rights, as well as the progressive satisfaction of the individual and collective needs of Venezuelan men and women, on the basis of sustainable and productive development with full coverage for the national community. The principle of shared responsibility is exercised in the economic, social, political, cultural, geographic, environmental, and military spheres.

²⁴ Article 328: The National Armed Force constitutes an essentially professional institution, without political affiliation, organized by the State to guarantee the Nation’s independence and sovereignty and to ensure the integrity of the geographical space through military defense, cooperation in maintaining internal order, and active participation in national development, in accordance with this Constitution and the law. In fulfilling its duties, it shall be at the exclusive service of the Nation and under no circumstances of any person or political faction. Its fundamental pillars are discipline, obedience, and subordination. The National Armed Force is composed of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Guard, which operate in an integrated manner within the scope of their responsibilities to fulfill their mission, with a comprehensive social security system of their own, as established by their respective organic law.

²⁵ «Si es verdad que hay grupos, armados y con capuchas, para defender el gobierno, les pido que piensen de nuevo porque el gobierno no necesita de la ayuda de grupos armados» (CHÁVEZ 2002)

²⁶ «El delincuente obligado»

²⁷ «La vieja costumbre de entregar al jefe de Estado cartas o, al menos, «papelitos» con solicitudes directas y personales de ayuda para necesidades o carencias muy concretas de salud, empleo, dinero o vivienda, creció hasta el punto que el presidente debió encargar a varios de sus acompañantes el recibir y tramitar las peticiones». (ARENAS 2015, p. 180)

²⁸ «El que firme contra Chávez está firmando contra la patria» (El Universal 2003)

²⁹ See Annex A.

³⁰ «Ahora nadie tiene la menor duda de que las montañas del Táchira y las estribaciones de la sierra de Perijá son la sede de una nueva zona de distensión, un San Vicente del Caguán mucho más extenso y amigable, donde están reproduciendo las formas de organización social, económica y política de las Farc: siembra de coca y producción de cocaína, justicia totalitaria contra los infractores de las normas establecidas (un tiro en la nuca a ladrones de ganado en las fincas vacunadas, lenidad en las que no pagan), emplazamientos guerrilleros para el entrenamiento e instrucción militar de bisoños efectivos de las FBL y círculos bolivarianos, hospitales, cooperativas y campamentos fijos donde permanecen cautivos ciudadanos colombianos, incluyendo, posiblemente, a la ex candidata presidencial Ingrid Betancourt» (GIUSTI 2003).

³¹ «Para él, sus amigos y contemplados son los miembros de las FARC, en primer término, y los del ELN. Ellos se pasean tranquilos de un lado a otro de la frontera colombo-venezolana. Secuestran colombianos que son retenidos al otro lado. Hace pocos días aparecieron en el estado de Apure (Venezuela) los cuerpos de dos suboficiales de nuestro ejército. ¿Por qué se encontraron allí? ¿Quién los secuestró para luego asesinarlos? Farc o ELN. Avionetas venezolanas, piloteadas por capitanes de la Guardia Venezolana aterrizan en Cúcuta sin permiso y con armas. Los integrantes de ambas facciones subversivas-terroristas se sienten tranquilos. Los Círculos Bolivarianos son sus aliados, protectores y tienen línea directa con el presidente Chávez» (LONDOÑO 2003).

³² «En una declaración ante el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en enero de 2005, la secretaria de Estado Condoleezza Rice sostuvo que el Presidente Chávez estaba “minimizando la democracia en Venezuela y desestabilizando la seguridad en la región latinoamericana» (COLMENARES 2010, p. 15-16)

³³ José Miguel Domínguez ‘Miguelito’: From armed colectivo to FAES director “After the dismissal of Rafael Bastardo as director of the Special Action Forces (FAES) attached to the Bolivarian National Police (PNB), José Miguel Domínguez took over the position as head of the security force. Domínguez is known for leading armed colectivos of Nicolás Maduro’s regime and is one of the gunmen involved in the killing of the young Bassil Da Costa, who was murdered during an anti-government protest on February 12, 2014.” […] “According to investigations by Runrunes, the now-director of the FAES has a record for aggravated homicide dating back to the year 2000 and is also linked to the murder of Edison Flores, a CICPC detective, who was killed in 2008.” (NTN 2019)