An Exposition Of Jaques Derrida's Undecidability As The Nature Of Deconstruction

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i. Title Page

ii. Thesis Abstract

Chapter 1 The Problem and Its Background
I. Introduction
II. Statement of the Problem
III. Conceptual Framework
IV. Significance of the Study
V. Objectives
VI. Paradoxical Assumption
VII. Scope and Delimitations
VIII. Methodology
IX. Operational Description of Concepts
X. Overview of the Rest of the Study

Chapter 2 Review of Related Literature

Chapter 3 Derrida, Deconstruction and Its Undecidability
A. Brief Background of Jacques Derrida
B. Traces of Derrida’s Thought that Challenge the Western Tradition
C. The Movement of Deconstruction and Undecidability
1. Inhabitation
2. Reversal
3. Displacement
4. Creation of New Terms/ Concepts

Chapter 4 Analysis and Interpretation

Chapter 5 Conclusion, Trends and Prospects

Bibliography

THESIS ABSTRACT

This thesis does not attempt to provide a fixed understanding of what deconstruction is all about. To claim such fixity would contradict the very principle of deconstruction itself. A fixed understanding implies a finality of meaning—but co ncepts such as totality and unity are fundamentally at odds with the program of deconstruction.

The author's ambition is to deconstruct Jacques Derrida’s notion of deconstruction by examining its inherent reliance on structure, despite its claims of free play, deferral, and multiplicity of meaning. The objective is simply to present the author's perspective to the readers, regardless of whether they adopt the view that "the author is dead." This author, nevertheless, offers a kind of leeway—a gesture of cooperation—in celebrating the "birth of the reader," in the spirit of “letting all the pastiche bloom.”

T he significance of this study, therefore, lies in the minds of its readers. While this thesis offers only a modest contribution to the vast body of human knowledge, it serves as an invitation for other philosophy students to continue this inquiry and to open new horizons for critical and philosophical dialogue.

The central problem explored in this study is how undecidability both transcends and returns to structure—how deconstruction operates in a kind of exile, continually moving back and forth within the boundaries of structure, despite its claims of free play and deferral.

This thesis adopts a quasi-Derridean ethos, though it ultimately offers a critique of that very position. It echoes, in some form, the oft-repeated claim that “deconstruction is always a deconstruction of the text” (Critchley, 1992, p. 22). Yet the author argues that the only way to deconstruct deconstruction is by returning it to structure. Although Derrida’s deconstruction is designed to oppose metaphysical concepts and structuralism, it is, in its subtlety, still metaphysically structured—despite its apparent shifts. Structuralism and metaphysics thus become points of no return, forming an impasse to total destruction. As such, the free play of the text occurs within the structure and the sphere of metaphysics. These are the playgrounds of the game—and the name of the game is undecidability. Undecidability, as the very nature of deconstruction, is the key to understanding its oscillation between structure and its own critique.

The study aims to highlight how and why Derrida challenges the Western philosophical tradition. It further seeks to explore the continuity and deferral of meaning within the movement of deconstruction, which—though said to dismantle structure—actually operates within its remnants.

The scope of this study is limited to the author's general understanding of “undecidability in deconstruction.” Derrida’s work is vast and includes numerous terms related to undecidability or double meanings—hinge terms such as supplement, dissemination, gramme, entame, parergon, greffe, trace, reserve, différance, hymen, and pharmakon. Only the last three are briefly mentioned here, with limited engagement with their original contexts (e.g., Mallarmé's hymen and Plato’s pharmacy), due to time constraints.

Furthermore, this study does not delve into Derrida’s readings of Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Henri Bergson, Emmanuel Levinas, André Gide, Sigmund Freud, and others. Instead, it focuses primarily on Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralism (semiology) and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology

The author also limits the study of deconstruction to written texts, excluding any legal texts, even though law is also subject to deconstruction.

CHAPTER 1 THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND

Introduction

Man is eternally compelled to think, to weave ideas, and to develop thought-provoking interpretations in an effort to account for more realistic or idealistic understandings of phenomena. This eternal restlessness reflects the never-ending free play of philosophical theorizing, continuing even into contemporary times.

Jacques Derrida’s "brave" deconstruction aligns with the aforementioned quandary. First, because it seeks to overturn the foundational concepts of metaphysics and structuralism that have dominated the entire history of philosophy. Second, because it rejects all forms of fixity and the finality of meaning in a text by introducing a dynamic play—a never-ending process of deconstruction and reconstruction; in essence, a deconstruction of deconstruction itself.

The advent of deconstruction, as it outwardly appears, is a bold critique of the very foundations of Western metaphysics and structuralism. Metaphysics has long been regarded as an all-encompassing science, occupying a privileged position as the arbiter of truth. Deconstruction, however, appears to liberate language from the constraints of metaphysics (a discussion further developed in Chapter 4).

Structuralism, on the other hand, emerged as an all-encompassing framework or paradigm in which everything is fixed and defined by structure. In this view, all meaning is reduced to structural relations—everything is subject to the constraints of structure. Structure, then, comes to replace meaning itself, becoming both the alpha and the omega, the telos of man.

Derrida’s deconstructive enterprise is a significant effort—a “turning of the tables” against metaphysics and structuralism, aimed at freeing language; allowing “language to go on holiday.” (This phrase was originally used by Wittgenstein, though he did not endorse the idea—instead, he sought to bring language back home, as in the Tractatus.)

The above celebration captivated the author, as Derrida’s provision of a gateway to the liberation of text and meaning—the dynamism of his play—led the author to embrace, rather than be daunted by, the complexities of Derrida’s philosophy.

However, the hidden crisis behind this celebration is veiled by the mystifying concept of “undecidability,” a challenging quandary within Derrida’s philosophy. This “undecidability” reveals that deconstruction is not a genuine liberation from structure; the so-called never-ending free play, dynamism, and deferment are all grounded in the creation of yet another structure—thus, another form of structure emerges.

The author envisions Derrida’s deconstruction as what Thomas Kuhn would call a “paradigm shift,” but one that occurs within the paradigm—within the structure, within the text—and represents an endless free play within the very playground of structure itself.

To escape structure does not mean one has truly surpassed or bypassed it; paradoxically, the more one attempts to do so, the more the hegemony of structure is revived. This study serves as a cinematographic exploration of how deconstruction traps itself within its own claimed paradox: the more deconstruction dismantles the constituents of structure, the more it remains situated within the sphere of structure.

Statement of the Problem

The author sought to demonstrate that Derrida ultimately failed to deconstruct the word “structure” itself, and that this failure was inherent in the very nature of its “undecidability.”

Specifically, the author aimed to address the following questions:

1. Why and how did Derrida fail to deconstruct the structure of metaphysical language?
2. How does “undecidability” present a self-contradictory character as a deconstructive treatment of language?
3. How does deconstruction transcend and return to structure?

Conceptual Framework

The Reconciliation of Structuralism and Deconstruction

Illustrations are not included in the reading sample

The author subscribes to the notion of the “birth of the reader,” which remains the ethos of this study. No one can claim that their interpretation is the final or most truthful understanding; such a claim contradicts the very principle behind the “birth of the reader.” The reader holds the privilege in the production of meaning—“the author is dead.” Therefore, the significance of this study lies with the reader, not the author

Nevertheless, this study serves as an invitation to other philosophy students to continue this work and to open new horizons for critical and philosophical dialogue.

Objectives

Despite this author’s adherence to the “death of the author,” she finds it necessary to enumerate three basic internal objectives, because in any play, one must be aware of and familiar with certain “targets.” Hence, these objectives must be kept in mind throughout this free play.

First, the author will emphasize Derrida’s protest against the Western tradition. Second, she will explore the instability, continuity, and deferment of meaning within both the text and the structure. Lastly, she will scrutinize the “movement of deconstruction,” where the concept of “undecidability” resides.

Paradoxical Assumption

Since deconstruction tirelessly operates within the built-in contradictions and paradoxes inherent in the text, this author frames deconstruction as caught in a paradox that nearly undermines its own identity: deconstruction’s “undecidability” ultimately returns it to structure and fixity.

Scope and Delimitations

The author delimits her study on deconstruction that is only within the margins of “reading the text,” not in a dialogue form or verbal conversation, because a dialogue especially an imperative statement, satisfies their meaning instantly and cannot be deferred or leave undecided, the statement like, “Pass your paper at the count of three!” the student would not think or reflect too much; consuming lots of hours to extract the meaning of the statement and do the reversal and displacement of binarism in it. But undeniably, the problem of ambiguity and vagueness and equivocality of language, that occurs in language, expressed in a dialogue form, is also an inevitable ground for misunderstanding; for instance, the mere utterance of the exclamation, “You’re so nice!”, can be misleading because the word “nice” is not always “pleasing” or “desirable” as we know. The word, “nice” came from the Middle English and Latin nescius, which means ignorant, from nescire: to not know. This time, “meaning” can be deferred here, in the word “nice.”

Anyway, any form of dialogue is a reflection of metaphysical concepts, hence, the author focused on the written text. In fact, the speech for Derrida is already in writing.

The deconstructive technique, as discussed in Madan Sarup’s book, can be applied to any text (Sarup, 1988, p. 37). However, this author limits her discussion to texts such as constitutions, republic acts, executive orders, ordinances, and other similar judicial proclamations, including terms and conditions of sales, because the meaning of these texts is already fixed. Here, “fixed” means that it is nearly impossible to interpret them in multiple ways—unlike literature or philosophical texts. This is because law is considered an exact science. It is no surprise, then, that memorizing every comma, colon, semicolon, and period—at least in the “Preamble”—is imperative. Although any constitution is open to amendments, these amendments become fixed once promulgated. The sense of finality is inherently built into this kind of text. Whether one agrees with or enjoys a particular law or policy, compliance is mandatory; otherwise, punishment is imposed for noncompliance, as prescribed by law.

Still, one can always return to such texts to explore and play with their origins and metaphysical meanings, deconstructing them as much as possible. However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations and failures of this approach when applying it in practice—in its concrete existential reality.

The concept of “undecidability” has been explored by various authors, including Madan Sarup, Ernesto Laclau, Alan Bass, Ian Parker, Jonathan Culler, Christopher Norris, Simon Critchley, and Richard Kearney, each presenting it in their own distinctive style within the framework of deconstruction. However, due to time constraints, the author limits her study and does not delve deeply into their diverse philosophical backgrounds.

In tracing Derrida’s thought, this author focuses only on Husserl’s phenomenology and Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology, due to the impossibility of including all the influences on Derrida’s work, as discussed in Chapter 3, “A Brief Background of Jacques Derrida.” Many philosophical figures shaped Derrida before he became Derrida. To fully understand Derrida, one would need to read his entire oeuvre. However, this author has primarily engaged with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s translation of Of Grammatology, Alan Bass’s translation of Writing and Difference, and Points, a collection of Derrida’s interviews edited by Elisabeth Weber.

Methodology

This study employed purely analytical research, utilizing the expository-analytical method. Analyzing or scrutinizing the entire thesis would be impossible without first presenting its underlying premises. Therefore, this study serves as both an exposition of Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction and its inherent undecidability, as well as an analysis of its movement.

This author adopts Derrida’s ethos, including the “birth of the reader” (where no one can claim a definitive interpretation), the deferment, instability, and continuity of meaning (where meaning cannot be fixed), and the equal footing of hierarchized binaries within structure (though this author applies this concept as a literary device rather than in practical life). However, this study remains a critique of these ideas, having traced the “fixed perpetuation” within deconstruction’s self-deconstructing movement.

Operational Description of Concepts

This author made some changes to the traditional title “Definition of Terms,” opting instead for “Operational Description of Concepts.” This is because any attempt “to define” implies fixity and finality. Moreover, it is nearly impossible to define concepts to everyone’s satisfaction, whether aesthetically or intellectually, so imposing fixity would contradict the objective of this study. Since this author works within a Derridean framework—where meaning is always deferred—the alternative title better reflects this condition. Rather than “definition,” the term “description” is preferred because describing allows for the possibility of play and variation in meaning, whereas defining suggests rigidity and finality. However, it must be emphasized that any “description of concepts” here does not claim any form of finality.

Another change is the replacement of the word “Concepts” in the title with “Terms.” In philosophy, the focus is often on analyzing concepts rather than mere terms. While concepts embody terms, the two are distinct. Therefore, using “terms” instead of “concepts” better reflects the scope of this study.

Albert Derrida’s enterprise is to deconstruct structure; however, this author must present the following list of “Operational Description of Concepts” in a structured manner, with the necessary alphabetical order implemented for convenience.

Author is dead- This phrase refers to the “disappearance” and “unimportance” of the authors’ thought and intention to his written text. “Death”, here, extinguishes the canonical interpretations of the text. But the real meaning of the author’s disappearance is to celebrate the “birth of the reader”.

Binarism- According to Quito, she describes binarism as a seemingly a priori structures that defy explanation, structured in the human mind such as high and low; heaven and earth. (Quito: 1990:529). Binarism is also known as dichotomies, polarities, oppositions, paradox, binary contrast or antonyms.

Birth of the reader - It is the readers who play the major part in the production of neaing regardless of the author’s intention despite its transparency in the text. And since, each reader interprets every text differently, no definitive meaning ever emerges, and hence, each text undermines its own claim to be meaningful (Kenny: 1994:365).

Center- It refers to an authorizing pressure that spawns hierarchized opposition (Sarup:1998:41)

Deconstruct- It is the term Jacques Derrida has coined to describe his enterprise; it is a simultaneous process of destruction-construction (Quito: 1990:729) and a translation of Martin Heidegger’s “Destruktion” in “Being and Time”.

Differance- It is a variant introduce by Derrida by which by replacing the “e” of difference by an “a” gives an active sense to what is otherwise a passive relation. (Differer has the senses both of “differ” and “defer”, which in the Middle English meant the same thing: there is thus no straightforward translation that catches both meanings, but nothing prevent us from using “differance” as a neologism in English to correspond to Derrida’s neologism in French) (Caws: 1988:161)

Displacement- It refers to a movement into deconstruction into which after the “reversal” of the inferior term (in the binary opposite) been put into a privilege position it must be “displaced” and “put” under erasure.

Inhabitation- It is the first phase/ movement of deconstruction begins by focusing on the naïve, commonsense, viewpoint on each particular issue (Ellis: 1989:37) as one does not suspect it (Derrida:1974:24). Also known as naivete, naivity.

Language- For Derrida, language is always in perennial postponement, as Madan Sarup puts it, language is a temporal process (Sarup: 1988:36). Each sign in the chain of meaning contain the trace of the other meaning which have gone before. Language then is forever at work (Derrida: 1974:xii)

Logocentrism- It refers to Derrida’s shorthand, for metaphysics as such in its valuation of speech, consciousness, truth, presence (Smith: 1984:74)

Meaning- For Derrida, meaning is not fixed it is always in perennial postponement, always deferred and continuous, unstable.

Philosophy - Various definitions have been offered regarding what philosophy is (although Derrida denies that his deconstruction is philosophical). For this author, philosophy can be described as an endless play of interdependent thoughts. It is a never-ending process of reflecting, doubting, synthesizing, and analyzing—without hierarchy. Given this nature of philosophy, the concept of “truth” is always deferred. The author embraces the principle that “all is in constant flux,” a notion attributed to the ancient thinker Heraclitus. Therefore, no philosophy can claim to hold the final “truth,” since life itself is never final. As long as life continues, philosophy will inevitably change. Every deliberate human activity is inevitably touched by this philosophical attribute—so then, what is not philosophic or philosophizing?

Phonocentrism- It refers to the the priority of the central presence has given to speech and that is closer to the possibility of presence (Sarup: 1988: 38)

Play- It refer to the absence of transcendental signified and hence, there can be no last judgement, meaning is infinitely deferred.

Reversal- It is a term used in the movement of deconstruction whose aim is to convert the inferior term in the hierarchized binarism to be placed in the privileged, dominant position.

Semiology- It refers to to the baptized term by Ferdinand de Saussure to refer to the science of signs (Evans: 1996:182), but some other , prefer to use semiotics, semiotics is also defined as the science of signs (Norris: 1982:25). Semiology of Saussure is also known as structural linguistics.

Sign- For Ferdinand de Saussure, sign is not just a word, but both a word and a concept. The former is the signifier and the latter is signified. Hence, the sign is always the combination of the signifier and the signified.

Signified- It refers to the concept that which is signified.

Signifier- It refers to the word, the audible sound which does the signifying.

Sous rature - It is French term translated in English as “under erasure”.

Structuralism- It is a philosophic movement emerged in the early contemporary period which hold that societies and culture possess a common invariant structure. This structure manifest in every aspect of society or culture in anthropology, history, psychoanalysis, and in linguistics.

Undecidability - The state of possessing a “double meaning” that cannot be reduced to either of its two senses. However, “double meaning” here does not imply equivocation or ambiguity.

Text - Referring to David Crystal’s observation that “there is no clear-cut distinction between ‘discourse’ and ‘text’ because both can be used broadly to include all language units with a definable communicative function, whether spoken or written.” Some scholars prefer the term “discourse,” while others use “spoken or written text.” In this thesis, “text” is understood as a mobile network of signifiers, without a fixed reference to one or more stable signifieds (Young, 1981, p. 37). Jacques Derrida also describes a text as “no longer a finished corpus of writing, a content enclosed in a book or its margin, but a differential network—a fabric of traces endlessly referring to something other than itself, to other differential traces” (Young, 1981, p. 29) .

Overview of the Rest of the Study

The next chapter presents the relevant foreign literature related to this study. Chapter 3 provides a brief background of Jacques Derrida and traces of his thought that challenge the Western tradition. The heart of this chapter is the movement of deconstruction, with a focus on the element of undecidability. Chapter 4 contains the author’s analysis and interpretation. Chapter 5 presents the conclusion, including trends and prospects in deconstruction.

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter explores various foreign literatures that partially relate to the present study. They have helped this author further refine an overlooked aspect—though sometimes only partially addressed by commentators and annotators of Derrida—within the concept of undecidability. Undecidability is not new to deconstruction, and several authors have expressed similar insights, albeit focusing on different aspects. Among these are Madan Sarup, Alan Bass, Ian Parker, Jonathan Culler, Christopher Norris, Simon Critchley, Richard Kearney, and Ernesto Laclau. Despite the richness of their discussions, this author has not found any that conclusively align with or fully address the focus of the present study.

Any attempt to understand deconstruction inevitably confronts its core feature: undecidability, or the “undecidable moment.” As Ernesto Laclau puts it, “To deconstruct the structure is the same as to show its undecidability” (Critchley, 1996, p. 54). Madan Sarup, echoing Derrida, states, “Writing is the freeplay or element of undecidability within every system of communication” (Sarup, 1988, p. 45). This freeplay is not literal playfulness but rather the condition where thought is free, situated within the undecidable moment. Derrida illustrates undecidability with Plato’s term pharmakon, a Greek word meaning either “poison” or “cure”— its effect depends entirely on how it is used (Sarup, 1988, p. 58). Another example is found in Nietzsche’s unpublished manuscript: a single sentence surrounded by question marks, “I have forgotten my umbrella!”—an instance of undecidability. Is it a private note, a citation, or an overheard phrase marked for later use? (Sarup, 1988, p. 58). Undecidability, then, transparently precludes definitive decisions, perpetuating a suspended status quo.

Alan Bass explores the relation between Derrida’s concept of undecidability— characterized by irreducible doubleness—and resistance to analytic processes, particularly the analyst’s own resistance (Smith, 1984, p. 67). He cites Mallarme’s hymen as an example of Derrida’s logic of undecidability, where the double meanings of “supplement” and pharmakon betray stable interpretation (Smith, 1984, p. 72). Undecidability is neither accidental nor caused by ambiguous words; rather, it is the ongoing practice of suspending decision and articulating doubleness (Smith, 1984, p. 72).

Ian Parker, in his discussion of the ‘birth of the reader’ and the ‘death of the author,’ cites Roland Barthes: “The death of the author is the birth of the reader, because readers engage with the text; they uncover the strategies the author has employed, consciously or unconsciously, making visible the cunning, the ruses, and the displacement between signs and emptiness inherent in the author’s game” (Parker, 1988, p. 61). In other words, it is the reader who plays the central role in producing meaning. For this reason, “there is no way of privileging any position to judge, interpret, or explicate the truth of the matter.” Certainly, there is no fixed or decidable meaning, Parker asserts (Parker, 1988, p. 61). This consequence of the birth of the reader effectively precludes all forms of fixity, as no meaning can be considered final or fixed.

Jonathan Culler explains that poetry, when subjected to exegetical pressure and self­reference, reveals the impossibility of self-possession. When poems denounce poetry as lies, self- referentiality becomes the source of undecidability—not ambiguity, but a structure of logical irresolvability. For example, if a poem claims that poetry lies, then it lies; but if the claim that poems lie is itself a lie, then the poem must be speaking the truth (Culler, 1982, p. 202). Thus, undecidability does not simply emerge from ambiguity but from an unresolved logical structure.

Christopher Norris, on the other hand, states: “If language is indeed, as some argue, undecidably suspended between grammar and rhetoric, forever revealing the performative character of its own constantive truth claims, then theory would always self-deconstruct into another kind of rhetorical assertion” (Norris, 1988, p. 137). In brief, undecidability in language causes it to constantly deconstruct itself, rendering any theory inherently incoherent.

Simon Critchley, offering a different perspective, argued about the pattern of reading found in deconstruction, emphasizing its overriding ethical significance. According to Critchley, “Derrida should be seen as a public thinker, and his work, with its growing emphasis on justice and responsibility, has important political implications” (in contrast to Richard Rorty’s consistent denial of the political implications of Derrida’s work). Critchley states, “To be sure, Derrida’s conception of justice as an experience of the undecidable cannot be instantiated in the public realm, but that does not mean that it has no consequence for politics” (Critchley, 1996, p. 2).

For Critchley, undecidability is the passage to any moral or political responsibility. He asserts, “There can be no moral or political responsibility without this trial and without this passage by way of the undecidables” (Critchley, 1992, p. 198). In the same work, he further explains, “Deconstruction, as the most rigorous determination of undecidability in a limitless context, or as a ‘philosophy of hesitation,’ opens an ethical space of alterity or transcendence” (Critchley, 1992, p. 236).

Richard Kearney, in a similar vein, writes in his essay “Derrida’s Ethical Return”: “Justice is Deconstruction and Deconstruction is Justice. Why? Because justice is the experience of aporia, of the impossible, of the undecidable” (Madison, 1993, p. 38).

Ernesto Laclau, like Critchley, explores the concept of “undecidability” with particular relevance to politics. He states, “The two dimensions of deconstruction—undecidability and decisions—are constitutive of the tension which makes possible a political society, but in order to produce all its political effects, deconstruction requires a theory of hegemony; i.e., a theory of the decisions taken in an undecidable terrain, because only hegemony can help theorize the distance between structured undecidability and actuality” (Critchley, 1996, pp. 2-3).

This insight connects with what this author discusses in the “Scope and Delimitations”: any written Constitution cannot be deconstructed with assurance of its existential possibility—its “actuality,” as Laclau puts it—because deconstruction of a constitution requires power, which Laclau calls “hegemony.” Deconstruction needs dominance, a certain form of conventional agreement that must conform to social relations.

Among the writers cited, this author’s work aligns most closely with Ernesto Laclau’s notion of “hegemony.” Laclau even admits he speaks as a political theorist rather than a philosopher. However, Laclau does not address the tendency of deconstruction to produce another form of structure through the ‘hegemony of undecidability.’ This tendency is the central thesis of this study.

CHAPTER 3 DERRIDA, DECONSTRUCTION AND ITS UNDECIDABILITY

This chapter presents a brief background of Jacques Derrida. The second part traces the development of his thought, particularly his challenges to the Western philosophical tradition, with a focus on the influences of Husserl’s phenomenology and Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology on the emergence of deconstruction. The third part explores the movement or phases of deconstruction—namely inhabitation, reversal, displacement, and the creation of a new term— where the concept of undecidability emerges through the double meanings of words.

A. Brief Background of Jacques Derrida

Jacques Derrida was a French philosopher of Jewish background, born on July 15, 1930, in El-Biar, Algeria, to a Jewish family. He moved to France at the age of nineteen due to the Algerian War in the 1940s. Derrida began studying philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, an institution known for producing intellectual elites, where he later taught from 1965 to 1984.

Derrida first gained wider public attention in late 1965, when he burst onto the philosophical scene with the publication of two lengthy review articles on books concerning the history and nature of writing. These appeared in the Parisian journal Critique and later formed the basis of his most important and arguably best-known book, Of Grammatology (Lechte, 1994, p. 106). However, his first published work was L’Origine de la Géométrie (1962), which was translated into English in 1978 as Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry. This book served as an introduction to his translation of Husserl’s 1936 paper, in which Derrida extensively examined the foundational principles of Husserl’s thesis

After four relatively quiet years, 1967 marked the simultaneous publication of three of Derrida’s major works: La Voix et le Phénomène (Speech and Phenomena, 1973), De la Grammatologie (Of Grammatology, 1974), and L’Écriture et la Différence (Writing and Difference, 1978). These works introduced, at least outwardly, the deconstructive approach to reading texts. During this period, Derrida also began to develop his own distinct philosophical style through seminal writings that engaged with key Western philosophical figures such as Plato, Hegel, Rousseau, Nietzsche, Freud, and Levinas—figures to whom Derrida extensively applied his method of deconstruction.

Other important works include Margins of Philosophy, Dissemination, and Glas, which are collections of essays. Meanwhile, Positions and Points are compilations of recorded interviews from radio, magazines, and journals. Some of his later and widely circulated works include Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, Specters of Marx, Of Spirit, The Post Card, and Psyche.

In the early 1970s, Derrida began teaching in both Paris and the United States. He held positions at several universities, including Johns Hopkins University, Yale University, and the University of California, Irvine. It was during his time at Yale that Derrida collaborated with Paul de Man to introduce deconstruction into the study of literature in the U.S.—an influence that quickly spread to other academic disciplines.

Derrida’s thought is not easy to grasp. One may encounter glimpses of its intricacies, but must find a point of entry—a way to navigate the complex, labyrinthine philosophy of Jacques Derrida.

Derrida belongs to the tradition of unorthodox philosophers—those whose unconventional ideas place them, as Rolando M. Gripaldo puts it, “in a class all by himself” (Quito, 1990, p. 101). In fact, Derrida resists classification altogether. He disclaims being a literary critic, although many of his commentators emphasize that his work often aligns with literary criticism. (Derrida, by his 9th or 10th grade, was already reading Gide, Nietzsche, and Valéry, as he recounts in an interview in Points, p. 341.) Similarly, he paid little attention to being called a philosopher—particularly a philosopher of language—even though much of his work engages with the philosophy of language, hermeneutics, and linguistics.

In the same book (Points), when asked, “Is there a philosophy of Jacques Derrida?” he simply answered, “No.” In another instance, he remarked: “The question of knowledge—what can be called ‘philosophy’—has always been the very question of philosophy itself.”

Derrida had good reasons for rejecting such labels: his intellectual enterprise was never confined to philosophy alone. Deconstruction, as he conceived it, can be applied across disciplines—including law, literature, history, psychoanalysis, linguistics, theology, and even architecture. Nevertheless, despite Derrida’s own protest against classification as either philosopher or literary critic, this author chooses to approach Derrida’s work as a philosophical undertaking.

Perhaps one way to recognize Derrida as Derrida is through his distinctive style of writing—particularly his frequent reworking of the French language. A prime example is his use of differance—a deliberately self-invented, conceptualized, and articulated neologism. It is no wonder, then, that he even changed his own name from “Jackie” to “Jacques.” In Points, he was asked: “Your name is Jackie. Did you yourself change your first name?” He replied: “Yes, I did. It was my decision. I wanted to be called Jacques, like the French kings. Jackie sounded too American, too familiar. So I made the change myself.”

You are asking me in fact, a very serious question. Yes, I changed my first name when

I began to publish, at the moment I entered what is, in sum, the space of literary or philosophical legitimation, whose, “good manners” I was practicing in my own way.

In finding that Jackie was not possible as the first name of an author, by choosing what was in some way, to be sure, a semi-pseudonym but also very French; But I never would change my last name, Derrida which I have always found to be quite beautiful, don’t you think.. (Derrida 1995:343) 23

Derrida had his own strategy for making a name for himself—eventually becoming a major figure on the philosophical scene. But before he emerged as such, he first immersed himself in the writings of many great thinkers, including Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Plato, Aristotle, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jean-Paul Sartre, Henri Bergson, Albert Camus, Ferdinand de Saussure, Karl Marx, among others. Over time, through his deconstructive breakthrough, Derrida himself became a prominent and influential figure.

He was once considered a disciple of Michel Foucault, but later marked his point of departure from that position. In his own words:

“The discipline must break the glass—or better, the mirror; the reflection, this infinite speculation on the master. And start to SPEAK.” (Derrida, 1978:32)

This statement encapsulates the core reason why Derrida deconstructed all of his philosophical readings: to avoid being labeled a disciple of any one thinker. His goal was not to follow but to interrogate, dismantle, and reconfigure the foundations they laid.

Traces of Derrida’s Thought Challenge to The Western Tradition

Derrida writes that we possess a metaphysical desire to make the end coincide with the means, to create an enclosure, to make the definition coincide with the defined, the ‘father’ and the ‘son’—all within the logic of identity, seeking to balance the equation and close the circle (Sarup, 1988, p. 57). In other words, he urges us to shift away from the sphere of metaphysics— an all-pervading system that positions itself as the sole guarantor of truth. But what is truth? This, as Madan Sarup points out, is a “habit of mind.” Western thought remains grounded in metaphysical assumptions, which claim to establish universal knowledge and absolute truths through generalization.

Derrida, however, attempts to free thought from the constraints of metaphysics. Through deconstruction, he seeks to dismantle false concepts, false truths, and false unities. As Robert Young observes, “Derrida can be seen as part of a history of attempts to produce a materialistic philosophy. Like Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger before him, he is trying to remove all vestiges of idealism from thought” (Young, 1981, p. 15).

Thus, the primary aim of deconstruction is to overcome the ethnocentricity—or more precisely, the logocentricity—in which Western thought is entangled, due to the historical development of its intellectual traditions within European languages and cultures (Caws, 1988, p. 160). According to Derrida, the traditional or metaphysical mode of reading misleads us by relying on false assumptions about the nature of the text. A traditional reader typically assumes: first, that language can express ideas without distortion; second, that within the hierarchy of language, writing is subordinate to speech; and third, that the author is the ultimate source of meaning. Derrida’s deconstruction subverts these assumptions, challenging the notion that a text is fixed or capable of yielding a single, final meaning.Claude Evans in his words: “Deconstruction has to investigate the “original wellsprings” of the tradition the ‘birth certificate’ of its fundamental concepts” (Evans: 1991: xix). But in order to investigate there is a necessary violent destruction of traditional concepts, a mental-dismantling, undermining of the “metaphysics of presence” that is embedded in our language and culture. To exceed the metaphysical orb is an attempt to get out of the orbit (Derrida: 1974:162). Hence, Derrida aimed to critique these three interrelated concepts; Metaphysics of Presence, logocenthrism and phonocentrism.

The term “presence” in the “Metaphysics of presence” was used by Derrida because the origin and foundation of most philosopher’s theory is “presence” (Sarup: 1988:37). This presence or state of “presentness” is the province of the known. We may be unsure of what took place in the past, of what is taking place elsewhere, as Madan Sarup says, “We rely on our knowledge of the present, the here and now, the present, perceptual world as we are experiencing it” (Sarup: 1988:37) Claude Evans in the same empathy, “What is real, is what is present to us in the present. What is past, is not anymore; what is future is not yet” (Evans: 1991: xx). In brief this “presence” is the main reason why we had been veiled by the tradition. Derrida “put into questions” this long “nowness” or “presence” that gives us a false truth.

Derrida used the term “logocentrism” as a shorthand for the “metaphysics of presence”. Logocentrism is a Greek term logos derives from the verb ‘legin’, meaning first, “to gather, pick­up, lay together”, and then “to recount, tell, say, speak. Logos bears a number of related meanings: “A logos maybe an utterance, as the words spoken, or a statement, either in the sense of an act of asserting that something is the case or in the sense of that which is asserted (Evans: 1991:xx). In philosophy, “logos” is simply “reason” and hence, led to the development of the word “logic”, one logocentric example in the history is the hierarchized opposition (binarism), wherein the superior, (privileged, positive) term belongs to the “presence” and the logos, the inferior (negative) term serves to be in the status of fall. Example of this metaphysical formula is the dominance of spirit over matter; truth over error; soul over body; wherein spirit, truth, and soul belong to the “logos”, the “presence”. While matter, error and body always mark a fall, always inferior and negative. This adherence to “logos”, the “presence” in the history of Western Metaphysics or known as logocentrism, is the belief that the first and last things are the “logos”, the word, the Divine Mind, the infinite understanding of God, an infinitely creative subjectivity and closer to our time, the self-presence, of full self-consciousness (Derrida: 1974: lxvii). In the beginning, the word “logos" play a crucial role in Christian thought: “When all things began, the word (logos) already was” (Evans: 1991: xxi).

Now, this “logos”, the “presence”, is related to what Derrida calls “phonocentrism” the priority given to speech over writing. It is also upon the idea of the assumption of “presence” why speech is prior to writing. Speech is closer to the possibility of presence, because meaning is apparently immanent, above all when, using the inner voice of consciousness, we speak to ourselves (Sarup: 1988:38). In the moment of speech, meaning is grasp immediately and capture presence, what is immediately present to consciousness. Voice becomes a metaphor of truth and authenticity, a source of self-present, “living speech” (Norris: 1982:28). Whereas, writing, there is an absence of direct presence of the author’s voice, a second-hand mode of communication, a pallid mechanical transcript of speech and so always at one remove from my consciousness (Sarup: 1988:39). Therefore, speech is attached and intimate to the apparent moment of presence and for this reason, prior to writing. This phonocentrism that Derrida relates to logocentrism is one of the effects of “presence.” Phonocentrism-logocentrism relates to centrism itself as Derrida argues, “It is this longing for a center, an authorizing pressure that spawn hierarchized oppositions (Derrida: 1975: lxix). It is the human desire to posit an “central” presence at beginning and end (Sarup: 1988:41). As expected, the privileged term in the dichotomies (polarities/ binarism) belongs to the presence and the logos. Whereas, inferior or the negative term serves to define its status and mark a fall (Derrida: 1975: lxix).

Against the tradition: Derrida attempts to deconstruct speech/ writing, this unorthodox prioritizing and made a reversal writing/ speech (Quito: 1990:107). Writing, is in fact, the precondition of language and must be conceived as prior to speech (Norris: 1982:28). But the word “writing” is not the concept of what dictionary meaning can offer us, it is not even a graphic activity of putting down one’s thought (Quito: 1990:107). Writing for Derrida destroys self­presence, it is therefore impersonal because it is the mechanical grouping of words according to grammar and structure (Quito: 1990:108). Derrida affirms that even before one utters his spoken words, writing had already transpired. Writing is eliminated by spoken language because speech is this deferred presence of meaning already found in writing (Quito: 1990:110). To cite Derrida:

Writing is the dissimulation of the natural, primary, and immediate presence of sense to the soul within the logos. Its violence befalls the soul as unconsciousness. Deconstructing this tradition will therefore not consist of reversing it. of making 'writing innocent. Rather of showdng why the violence of writing does not befall an innocent language. There is an origmary violence of writing because language is first, in a sense I shall gradually reveal, writing (Derrida: 1974:37).

So the reign of speech/ writing hierarchy is over for Derrida, it is now the turn of writing/ speech.

This author cuts her discussion on Derrida’s concept of writing and now proceed to the influence of structuralism particularly the semiology of Ferdinand de Saussure (the word, “semiology” is a science of signs, but Lechte prefer to use “semiotics”, other calls it “structural linguistics”). Derrida has also criticized Structuralism, for him, it is simply one episode in the whole Western thought that remains grounded on metaphysical concepts (Young: 1981:15). For example, in theology, the source of meaning is God, the Bible, or the Word of God, in Nietzsche, “Will to Power”, in Heidegger. “Being”, in Cartesian, it is the “I”, in Kant, “Reason”, for Hegel the “Absolute”, these metaphysical concepts are sensed as absolute and Derrida called it a center, a point at which the substitution of contents, elements or forms is no longer possible (Derrida: 1978:282). Furthermore, metaphysical philosophers such as Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel, in their account, a priori ideas exist independently of individual human beings. For Plato, the “Forms” are fixed in a timeless realm outside the universe; for Spinoza, the “Modes” and “Attributes of God” are immanent in every part of the universe; for Hegel, the “Categories” are embodied in human society language and culture and institutions (Harland: 1993:58). These forms, modes, absolute spirit are metaphysical concepts that have tantamount meaning for “structure”. “Structure”, is similar to metaphysical concepts is an innate fixed scheme, an underlying system beneath all system, structured, programmed even in the human mind. Like for instance, the logic operating by means of binary contrast, high and low, heaven and earth, masculine and feminine (Quito: 1990:529). Foucault says, “the system beneath all thoughts, the structure underlying all structure is enough to explain everything in other words there is no need for a God (Quito: 1990:531). But this author contends that, this structure replaced the position of God in the sense of its being the “telos” or “end” of man; not necessarily domineering because it is impersonal and unconsciousness. These adherence to structure (structure is from the past participle form, structum of the of the Latin verb, struere, to put together, put in order, which has the special senses of piling up, building and arranging) is named “Structuralism”. Structuralism is a general intellectual movement whose headquarters have been in France and whose heyday was in the 1960’s and whose kernel tenet is that all cultures, societies possess an invariant, structural commonalities. This being the case, the structure likewise, manifest in every aspect of society or culture not only in Anthropology (Levi-Strauss) but also in philosophy (Michael Foucault), history (Louis Althusser), psychoanalysis (Jacques Lacan), Literary Criticism (Roland Barthess) in linguistics or semiology (Ferdinand de Saussure).

Language for Saussure, is always organized; it is a structure; it is a system of signs, and that each sign is composed of two parts: a signifier, the word or the sound pattern and a signified which is the concept (Lechte: 1994:151).

To illustrate, language as a system of signs.

Illustrations are not included in the reading sample

There is a fixed distinction between the signifier and the signified. The signifier represents the word or the acoustic sound; whereas the signified is the concept designated by the signifier. There is no natural relation between the signifier and signified and therefore psychological. The relation between a signifier and signified is entirely arbitrary, that the concept or signified “tree” is designated by the word “tree” in English.

Illustrations are not included in the reading sample

This is arbitrary because no one ever gets the chance to evaluate nor decide whether a particular signifying sound was or was not appropriate to the thing signified.

But Derrida claims to have a solid textual evidence for his reading, since he finds Saussure asserting a “natural bond” of sense to the senses that binds meaning (concept) to sound (Evans: 1991:158). Derrida quoting in Course in General Linguistics: the natural bond Saussure says, “the only true bond, the bond of sound”. This natural bond of the signified (concept or sense) to the phonic signifier would condition the natural relationship subordinating writing (visible image) to speech (Derrida: 1974:53-35). No wonder why Derrida criticized Saussure for prescribing that “linguistics should be a study of speech alone rather than of speech and writing.” (Sarup: 1988:39). This is the main reason why Saussurian semiology is phonocentric for Derrida.

Derrida again, scrutinizes the Saussarian model of sign, according to which, the signifier and signified relate as if they were “two sides of the same sheet of paper”. Therefore, there is no fixed distinction between the signifier and the signified (Sarup: 1988:35). Madan Sarup instantiated.

Suppose you want to know the meaning of a signifier, you can look it up in the dictionary; but all you will find yet more signifiers, whose signifieds you can in turn look up, and so on. The process is not only infinite but somehow circular; signifiers keep transforming into signifieds, and vice versa, and you never arrive at a final signified which is not a signifier in itself (Sarup: 1988:35)

In other words, the signifier and signified as in the blank sheet of paper is no longer distinguishable as one does not know which one is the front and the back. As Derrida said, “I try to place myself at a certain point at which... the thing signified is no longer easily separable from the signifier” (Lechte: 1994:108). A signifier can aspire to become a signifier. Therefore, there is no final signifier and final signified, and that makes the distinction collapsed. This being the case, meaning therefore, is not immediately present in a sign, because it is scattered or dispersed along the whole chain or signifiers (Sarup: 1988:35). Hence, meaning is not fixed and final for Derrida, meaning revealed in an endless act. Here, now comes the “play”. One could call “play”, the absence of the transcendental signified as limitless of play, that is to say as the destruction of onto- theology and the metaphysics of presence (Derrida: 1974:50). Again in “Writing and Difference,” D e rrida continues, “The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely” (Derrida: 1978: 280).

The above condition made language a temporal process, for Derrida, “When I read a sentence the meaning of it is always somehow suspended, something deferred. One signifier relays me to another; earlier meanings are modified by later ones” (Sarup: 1988:36). This being the case, “meaning” cannot be fixed, it is in always unstable, it always continues, defers, playing in the abyss, playing in exile.

There is a wide range of intricacy in the notion of deconstruction (it does not matter here, if this author writes it in a small or capital D, it does not have any semantic differences). But this author needs to fix or box the notion deconstruction of only one particular critic.

Because of the vast commentary on deconstruction and its intrinsic complexities, this author is terribly in undecidable moment as to how she could possibly start and end this chapter with enlightenment. Firstly, to define deconstruction, is to contradict the very principle of deconstruction itself, because to define (comes from the Latin word definire, to limit, finish, end; from the word ‘finis’ means boundary, end) is to “fix” the meaning and fixing the meaning into a “flat description” or “flat-definition” is not in the province of deconstruction, “Meaning” is said to be always postpone, deferred. Secondly, deconstruction is always on the verge of “undecidability”, meaning to say, “Meaning”, is not only deferred but always and forever in the terrain of undecidability. This undecidable moment is a permanent moment, a never-ending moment. Because of the said premises, one cannot understand deconstruction by some author’s definition of it. But, any attempt to define “deconstruction” is to claim fixity, finality. It is the contrast to the principle of deconstruction because of the inherence of undecidability that tends to disown, repudiate “fixity”.

Many books written about Derrida express their difficulty in understanding Derrida, even in the encyclopedia, a written passage “Deconstruction is not easy to define”. Richard Rorty declares, “I have never found or been able to invent a satisfactory definition of that word (deconstruction). I often use it as a shorthand for the sort of thing Derrida does” (Critchley: 1996:15).

Because of the intricacy mentioned above, the method of doubting could be of help. The point of Simon Critchley is a good start, in his words: “Deconstruction is a philosophy of hesitation” (Critchley: 1992:42). It is very much akin to Cartesian doubt, “to doubt” is not to be complacent of what is already given, of what is already present; to doubt is to deny what is given; of what is present and pre-established, “to negative everything and wanted to begin from virtual zero” (Quito: 1990:102). In fact, the whole system of deconstruction started from doubt and hence, working against “metaphysics of presence”. No wonder the primary aim of deconstruction is to overturn (reverse) all these metaphysical concepts. Metaphysical philosophers start out from the very largest abstract concepts which are then made to produce further terms by a process of internalbinary fission (Harland: 1993:59). Like for instance, according to Plato, Being divides into Identity versus Difference (in the sophist); according to Spinoza, Substance divides into Extension versus Thought; according to Hegel, Being (in one sense) divides into Being (in other sense) versus Nothing (Harland: 1993:59). These binary opposites undergo a reversal of priorities and made the hierarchy in “equal footing” which will be discussed in the movement of destruction.

But in spite of Derrida’s radical undermining on the Metaphysics of presence, the origin, or the traditional, Derrida has always been emphatic in his claim that deconstruction is not a simple rejection of traditional scholarship and rigor: critical deconstructive reading has to pass through traditional rigor even if the ultimate effect is to show that such rigor is never an absolute and well founded as it claims to be (Evans: 1991: xv). Deconstruction is not something negative; it is not a process of demolition according to Derrida (Critchley: 1992: 21).

Jacques Derrida’s investigation on the question of origins might well begin upon the influence of Jean-Jacques Rosseau in the 18th century for that is the time of the problematic quest; a quest for origin begins. In Rosseau’s insistent words, “We must begin by discarding all the facts” (McKennia: 1992:66). Furthermore, this quest for origin lead to a more complicated influence of Husserl and Heidegger to Derrida. The term deconstruction was a neologism introduced as a translation of Martin Heidegger’s word, “Destruktion” in “Being and Time”. In “Being and Time”, Heidegger possesses the task of the de-struction (Destruktion) of the history of ontology, a task that is necessary because Western metaphysics since Plato has been governed by a fatal misapprehension of Being itself (Evans: 1991:xix). It must be remarked, that Derrida’s deconstruction is apparently a major modification of Heideggerian enterprise.

Quite imperatively, Heidegger’s “Destruktion”, have influence by Edmund Husserl, the teacher of Heidegger, who broached the “phenomenological method”, the method of extracting the essence of a thing, essence is prior to existence. Husserl gave the most detailed methodology for this phenomenological investigation either in concrete intentional object (such as chair, table) or abstract entities (e.g. love, liberty, justice) as created by the mind or as in the mind. The basic method of all phenomenological investigation is the “Reduction”. In Greek, “epoche”, cancelling or bracketing the reference to external things, so as to confront the pure phenomena. The investigator has set aside or bracket (but not deny as Cartesian Method) the existence of the phenomena to be able to focus on the essence of the thing. But to focus on the essence, he has to ignore its existence. As Husserl put it, “The mere existence of a thing does not add anything to its essence (Quito: 1990:178) and Quito’s instantiation, “there is no essential difference between 100 possible thalers and 100 actual thalers, that 100 thalers actually exist does not add one iota to the essence of 100 thalers” (Quito: 1990:178). This is the reason why it is necessary to bracket the existence, existence is only contingent, existence is not the very theme of phenomenology, it is the essence.

Derrida’s deconstruction does not look for the essence, (In fact, to assert the “essence” is ground to a form of finality or fixity, but deconstruction is always in the rigorous mechanics of dynamism, the dynamic character of language, of text, of thought) but the process of deconstruction may somehow influenced by phenomenology because, “Deconstruction” is a project of critical thought whose task is to dismantle precepts and concepts which we normally steeped in social norms like language culture and traditions (Quito: 1990:729). Derrida somehow accepted some of the tenets of phenomenology, a “text” in Derrida’s term.

Another important trace in Derrida’s deconstruction is the influence of Structuralism in which Derrida question the hierarchy of binarism. His claim that one of the terms (the dominant one) defines the terrain of the other (the subordinate, negative one). Such in the case of Saussurian semiology in which this author has already exposed in the politics of binarism; the sign is both the signifier represents a positive and the signified, the negative, a deprived version of the former. Because the meaning if sign is bind by a bond of sound, that made the relationship of Signifier and Signified arbitrary. We no longer question whether a certain word is appropriate to the thing signified. This arbitrariness made all binary opposites, unbalanced or, say, hierarchized, like for instance in reason/unreason, truth/falsity, unity/chaos, good/bad, wherein the first term represents a positive value and the second term represents the negative value.

This binary system or dichotomies is some kind of law, that reduces everything into two, structured to be in duo. This made Derrida saturated, the one term, the positive, always outweigh the balance of the other term, the negative. But this dominant or privileged terms such as reason, truth, unity, good, according to Derrida, are actually dependent on, and can themselves be define by their opposition, the negative: unreason, falsity, chaos, bad. In other words, one cannot understand: reason, truth, unity, good without having a priori notion of its opposition or negation. Obviously enough, Derrida placed this inferior or negative terms into the dominant position that was previously occupied by the privileged or positive terms. But that kind of dominance or call it “hegemony” does not overpower the previous dominant. Derrida made this binary opposites in equal footing, in which this author will explain further in the “movement of deconstruction”.

B. The Movement of Deconstruction and Undecidability

Derrida caveats us that Deconstruction is not to be understood in the negative sense that would mean demolition, as this author presented earlier. In an interview of Derrida, collected in “Points”, he emphatically asserted that:

Deconstruction as such is reducible to neither a method nor an analysis (the reduction to simple elements): it goes beyond critical decision itself that is why it is not negative, even though, it has often been interpreted as such, despite all sorts of warnings. For me, it always accompanies an affirmation exigency (Derrida: 1995:83)

So, deconstruction is not a demolition, abolition because it allows the play of the positive and the negative in equal footing. The binarism has no hierarchical influence. The positive is no more a positive, and the negative, the negative. Fixed concepts, absolute, final, discourse has been altered by a play and dynamism.

The movement of deconstruction as here to be presented: 1) inhabitation; 2) reversal; 3) displacement; 4) creation of new term; is different to the three basic exegetical operations: 1) understanding the text; 2) judging how correct one’s understanding of the text is and 3) stating what one judges to be the correct understanding of the text (Lonergan: 1972:155). The only common denominator is that both work on the text, but the entire system of deconstruction, whose aim is to deconstruct the structure is different from a hermeneutical approach,whose final aim is to understand better the structure, no necessary reversals and displacements here. Deconstruction is a kind of approach that aims to show inherent contradiction of the tradition makes them the starting point on his analysis (as to be discussed in inhabitation), whereas; a more conventional, traditional approach tends to stop as soon as soon as structure or binarism (contradictions) is identified (such in the case of hermeneutics). Strangely enough, Derrida’s deconstruction transcends to conventional, or metaphysical tradition and therefore was able to transcend this inherent binarism.

1. INHABITATION

The first phase or movement of deconstruction begins to operate by “inhabitation” (this word was preferred by Spivak, but some authors like Ellis used “naivete” or naivety). By inhabiting a text, one must focus on the naïve, common sense or banal assertion, say a particular issue, a particular text as one does not criticize it. Inhabiting the text, is just like getting familiar with the structure. In fact, in the words of Derrida, “it is borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms...” (Derrida: 1974:24). Inhabitation is getting familiar with the structure, going to all its direction, it needs to borrow the structure to understand the structure. The movement of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures (Derrida: 1974:24). Inhabitation, means tracing the movement of the text, by close reading the text because it has a goal of unmasking the aged-old pretense of the Western Tradition. It has the goal to undermine it or “out it in question” therefore, inhabitation does not stop from getting familiar with text, its built- in structure. Having thus, focus on its naivete, one hand to “undermine it” or “put it in question and problematize it (Ellis: 1989:137). This is now the stage of searching in a very suspicious and meticulous manner, the deconstructive flow moves to its next stage.

2. REVERSAL

The second movement of deconstruction is known as reversal. Reversal is the rejection, a distortion of any establish hierarchy in any traditional authoritative meaning of the text. Derrida prioritize this reversal of hierarchy in order to attack the traditional, or say, metaphysical thought­system. It is now a shift from what is previously accepted to what is not: between truth and falsity; sense and non-sense, reason and madness. Derrida suggest that we should try to breakdown the megalomania of the privileged term (i.e., reason, truth, unity) by which we are accustomed to think and “which ensure the survival of metaphysics in our thinking.” (Sarup: 1988:41). Western thought, says Derrida, has always been structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities: good/evil; being/nothingness; presence/absence; truth/error; identity/difference; masculine/feminine. These polarities (binary opposite) as stated earlier, the second term in each pair is considered the negative, the deprived, the inferior, the undesirable, derogatory version of the first. It therefore appears that evil is the absence of good, error is the distortion of truth. These dichotomies are not simply contradiction of their meaning; but are structured in a hierarchical order which prioritizes the first term of the pair. The first term in each opposition traditionally constitutes the privileged entity, the better state. (Sarup: 1988:42). Derrida writes: “One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first to overthrow the hierarchy. It is not enough simply to neutralize the binary opposition of metaphysics”. (Derrida: 1974: lxxvii) This hierarchy perpetuates the privilege of the dominant terms; good, being, presence, truth, identity, masculine over evil, nothingness, absence, error, difference, feminine. But through reversal these inferior or negative term placed now in the dominant position privileged position which aims to place both members of the term on equal footing, facing each other squarely. Hence, evil, nothingness, absence, error, difference, feminine placed the dominant position of the good, being, presence, truth, identity, masculine. But in the next phase of deconstruction this reversal must be displaced (Derrida:1974:lxxvii).

3. DISPLACEMENT

Apparently, the aim of deconstruction is to over throw the hierarchy in binarism, after reversal it must be displaced, the winning term is put “under erasure” (sous rature) (Sarup: 1988:56). Sous rature, is a French term usually translated in the English-speaking world as “under­erasure”. To put a term “sous rature” is to write a word, cross it out and then print both word and deletion (Sarup: 1988:35). As mentioned, the winning term in the reversal must be displaced like for instance: error/truth, madness/reason. Error and madness, the winning terms must be put “under erasure”.

Illustrations are not included in the reading sample

This device , “sous rature” derives from Martin Heidegger who often crossed out the word Being (like this: Being) and let both deletion and word stand because the word was inadequate yet necessary (Sarup: 1988:35). The marks of erasure acknowledge both the inadequacy of the terms employed, their highly provisional status, the fact that thought cannot manage without them. Derrida has a mistrust of metaphysical language but accepts the necessity to work within that language (Sarup: 1988:42). But the winning terms: error and madness for instance, being put under erasure is no longer understood as the distortion of truth or the negative twist of reason. “To be put under pressure is to make room for the irruptive erasure of a new concept, a concept which no longer allows itself to understood in terms of the previous regime” (in the hierarchized binarism) (Derrida: 1974: lxxvii). In brief, displacement is the stage wherein the new concept of these winning terms is going beyond the boundaries of metaphysical, traditional thought-system. These winning terms are no longer the negative, the inferior, the deprivation of the previous dominant terms. According to one recent commentator, “deconstruction celebrates dissemination over truth, explosion and fragmentation over unity and coherence, undecidable spaces over prudent closures, playfulness and hysteria over care and rationality (Sarup: 1988:59). (This is the main reason why this very author made use of the word “pastiche,” in her Abstract because it suggests a seemingly an artistic distortion, a chaotic art, that is branching in this (Post Modern Period).

In sum, displacement shows that the battle between the polar opposites (binarism) is a false antithesis. There is a space between them in which new concept lies, a new system outside the system of metaphysics, the hierarchy has abolished not to fall again into the same trap, into the same closure of metaphysics which Derrida tries to erase.

This creation of new term is also to be considered another phase of deconstruction. But other book like Quito, consider only reversal and displacement; other book does not mention about inhabitation but only reversal, displacement plus the creation of new term or concept. In order to have these all, this author’s presentation on the movement of deconstruction is not two, not three, but four: inhabitation, reversal, displacement and the creation of new term.

4. THE CREATION OF NEW TERM/ CONCEPT:

This creation of new term, is not actually a necessary deconstruction of the alphabet like in the case of differance (by which replacing ‘e’ of difference by an ‘a’). This something new, is a concept that already surpassed from the sphere of metaphysics. This new concept is what Robert Young called the “third term”, since it partakes of and transgresses both sides of the opposition (Young: 1981:18). Derrida calls theses new terms as brisures or hinge-words (Derrida: 1974:65). Their effect is to break down the oppositions by which we are accustomed to think and which ensure the survival of metaphysics in our thinking: matter/spirit, subject/object, signifier/signified, veil/truth, body/soul, text/meaning, interior/exterior, representation/presence, appearance/essence (Young: 1981:18).

In this creation of new concept, gives way to the birth of “undecidability”, “the undecidable moment” Deconstruction then is the attempt: to locate the promising text to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signified to reverse the resident hierarchy only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed (Derrida: 1974: lxxvii).

Again, Derrida in an interview written in the book, “Points”, the question but not in fact in questioned-form goes like: “You use undecidable words. Thus, the “hymen” in Mallarme is at once virginity and marriage, Plato’s ‘pharmakon,’ cures and poisons.” Derrida’s noteworthy remarked:

“Words of this type situate perhaps better than other, the places where discourses can no longer dominate, judge, decide: between the positive and the negative, the good and the bad, the true and the false. And thus the temptation to exclude them from the language and from the city, so as to reconstitute the impossible homogeneity of a discourse, a text, a political body (Derrida: 1995: 86).

Mallarme’s “hymen” and Plato’s “Pharmacy”, practices the logic of undecidability; that the birth of double meaning of words, double reading, becomes irreducible to virginity nor to marriage solely. Because hymen simultaneously meant to virginity and marriage or consummation. To cite Derrida: “hymen is neither confusion nor distinction, neither identity nor difference, neither consummation nor virginity, neither the inside nor the outside (Derrida: 1974: lxii). On the other hand, the “pharmakon” is both a poison and remedy. Derrida writes: “The pharmakon” is neither the cure nor the poison, neither good nor evil, neither inside nor the outside, neither speech nor writing (Derrida: 1974: lxxii). And so many others terms like, supplement, dissemination, gramme, entame, parergon, greffe, trace, reserve and along with deconstruction is the word Derrida popularized: “difference,” in which a condition for both difference and sameness. These terms having a double meaning is irreducible either to its two sense, hence, always in undecidable terrain.

In the foregoing discussion, deconstruction therefore is always a double procedure, a double reading, a double writing, a double thinking always and forever undecidable. Alan Bass in his essay, “The Double Game”, he quoted”

We find ourselves constantly being brought back to this text by the paradoxes of the double and of repetition, the blurring of the boundary, lines between ‘imagination’ and ‘reality’, between the ‘symbol’ and the thing ‘symbolizes’ (Smith: 1984:72).

Hence, undecidability is the position of no possible winner, no dominant, no element is in the privileged position, enough to say the, “justice of doubleness” in deconstruction.

It must be remarked that the word, undecidability is not by accident, invented by Jacques Derrida. It was in fact, an articulated literary-devise he borrowed from structuralism also. The undecidability is implicitly implied in the tenet of Structuralism, wherein, undecidability is the state of an individual that has no decision, undecidable to modify, create new words, meanings because language is independent of him and therefore independent of his consciousness. As Saussure puts it, langue (language as a system) is the social side of speech, outside the individual who can never create or modify it by himself, it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of the community (Harland: 1987:12). In other words, language is shared, ultimately by a society and individual has no chance to decide to create or modify it. It is essentially a collective contract which one must accept in its entirety if one wishes to communicate (Barthes: 1964:14). In the words of Harland: “The special feature of this contract is that no one ever gets the chance to evaluate it before signing. The individual absorbs language before he can think for himself. The individual can reject particular knowledge that society explicitly teaches him, he can throw-off particular beliefs that society forcibly imposes upon him, but he has always already accepted the words and meanings though which such knowledges and beliefs were communicated to him (Harland: 1987:12-13). And because language is system of contracted values that it resists modification, a decision coming from a single person. No one ever gets the chance to decide whether a signifier (word) is appropriate to the thing specified (concept); whether “meaning” is meant to the thing signified. In other words, the society structured the “meaning” imposed upon him and therefore fix and final. Hence, an individual has no privilege to decide to alter it. This is the original version of the word, undecidability (the state of incapability to decide) in the structuralist point of view, that was later articulated by the play of Derrida’s deconstructive movement.

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

This chapter was guided by three questions: 1. Why and how did Derrida fail to deconstruct the structure of metaphysical language? 2. How does “undecidability” present a self-contradictory character as a deconstructive treatment of language? 3. How does deconstruction transcend and return to structure?

Derrida’s Struggle to Deconstruct the Structure of Metaphysical Language

1. Why and How Did Derrida Fail to Deconstruct the Structure of Metaphysical Language?

This chapter begins by examining Derrida’s central critique of the Western philosophical tradition—his challenge to what he calls the “metaphysics of presence,” “logocentrism,” and “phonocentrism,” as well as his dispute with Saussure’s structuralism. These traditions collectively form what Derrida calls the “old winner,” the intellectual heritage that privileges presence over absence, truth over error, and signified over signifier. Derrida’s method of deconstruction arises as a way to dismantle this hierarchy. However, Derrida himself recognizes that one cannot entirely escape metaphysical language; deconstruction must borrow from the very system it critiques (Sarup, 1988:42; Fischer, 1985:35). His concept of sous rature (writing under erasure) demonstrates this tension—terms like “truth” and “error” are both preserved and crossed out to prevent one from dominating the other. Despite this radical gesture, Derrida is not able to fully dismantle the concept of “structure” itself. While he critiques its internal hierarchy, he leaves the word “structure” largely unexamined, thus risking a new binary between structuralism and deconstruction itself.

Derrida’s failure to fully deconstruct the concept of structure stems from his own admission that philosophical critique cannot step outside the system it interrogates. His declaration, “We have only one language, the language of metaphysics” (Fischer, 1985:35), underscores a central paradox: even radical critique must operate through inherited terms, concepts, and binaries. Derrida exposes the constructedness of Western metaphysical categories but cannot completely escape their logic, because critique itself relies on them to be intelligible. This dependency becomes evident in his technique of sous rature, in which concepts are both used and marked as inadequate. By crossing out words like “truth” or “origin” while still writing them, Derrida demonstrates that meaning cannot simply be abandoned; it must be worked through. Thus, rather than abolishing structure, Derrida continually re-inscribes it, creating a critique that both undermines and sustains the system it seeks to destabilize (Sarup, 1988:42).

Another reason Derrida fails to completely dismantle structure is his tendency to focus on dismantling hierarchies within the structure, rather than interrogating the word “structure” itself. His attention to oppositional pairs—such as presence/absence, truth/error, or signifier/signified— unmasks how metaphysical thought privileges one term over another, yet Derrida largely treats structure as a neutral backdrop for these operations. This omission risks elevating deconstruction as a counter-framework that unintentionally mirrors the system it critiques, setting up a new binary: structuralism versus deconstruction. In this way, Derrida’s critique reveals its own complicity, as it cannot fully evade the metaphysical terrain it analyzes. The result is a tension in his thought: deconstruction destabilizes meaning but does not eliminate the metaphysical assumptions embedded in language, leaving it perpetually entangled in the very structures it seeks to dismantle (Fischer, 1985:35).

Finally, Derrida’s critique shows that metaphysical structures cannot simply be destroyed because they are not merely philosophical constructs but deeply ingrained ways of thinking and interpreting reality. As Peter Caws (1988:162) argues, “We grow up in an intelligible world already structured, and most of the time we do not notice this.” These structures form the very conditions of intelligibility; they cannot be rejected outright without losing the ability to think or communicate meaningfully. Derrida acknowledges this by treating metaphysical concepts as both necessary and inadequate. Deconstruction, then, is not a project of annihilation but of perpetual critique: an effort to dismantle hierarchies while accepting that structure itself remains indispensable. This tension is the key to understanding why Derrida never fully transcends metaphysical language—because doing so would require abandoning the very ground upon which critique stands.

2. Undecidability as a Self-Contradictory Deconstructive Strategy

Central to Derrida’s philosophy is the concept of “undecidability,” which destabilizes meaning by showing that every sign is part of a chain of deferrals—meaning is always postponed, never fully present. This is illustrated in his discussion of how language functions: every word points to another, deferring meaning indefinitely. Even reading itself becomes “undecidable,” as every reader interprets text differently (Fischer, 1985:37). Derrida uses this to unmask metaphysical assumptions, yet the very logic of undecidability creates its own paradox. While meant to free interpretation from fixity, undecidability creates a new kind of fixity: a perpetual postponement of meaning that becomes its own form of determinacy. As Quito (1990:729) observes, deconstruction is “a simultaneous process of destruction and construction,” which means it cannot escape its own iterative movement. Thus, undecidability risks undermining itself by becoming another system, albeit one defined by perpetual play.

Derrida’s idea of “undecidability” lies at the heart of his deconstructive method, revealing that meaning is never fully present but always deferred in an endless chain of signifiers. This insight disrupts the metaphysical search for fixed truths, exposing language as a dynamic, shifting field of play. For Derrida, words do not have inherent meaning; instead, each word leads to another, like links in an infinite chain. This makes interpretation inherently unstable, since no text can fully capture its own meaning, and every act of reading adds new layers of interpretation beyond the author’s control. Fischer (1985:37) emphasizes this instability, observing that “the possibility of misinterpretation is intrinsic in writing.” In other words, texts inevitably escape authorial intent and become subject to endless reinterpretation, making them “undecidable.”

Yet, this very instability presents a profound paradox. By refusing closure, undecidability creates its own kind of structure—one defined by infinite deferral. Instead of dismantling systems altogether, undecidability replaces one form of determinacy with another: the determinacy of perpetual openness. Quito (1990:729) captures this tension well by describing deconstruction as “a simultaneous process of destruction and construction.” Derrida’s strategy does not erase meaning but keeps it in motion, constantly reconstructing it in ways that prevent final resolution. In this sense, undecidability risks becoming another system, one that trades fixed meaning for a fixed state of uncertainty. What begins as a liberating critique of metaphysical closure can harden into its own kind of rigidity, as readers and scholars are bound by the very idea that meaning can never be pinned down.

Furthermore, undecidability invites us to question whether it truly transcends metaphysical thought or simply reinscribes its patterns under a new guise. By emphasizing that meaning is always deferred, Derrida challenges the dominance of metaphysical presence, but this challenge itself requires a form of “presence”—the persistent concept of deferral. In other words, even the logic of undecidability depends on structural relationships, demonstrating that language cannot escape its own metaphysical underpinnings. Derrida’s work illustrates that this is not a weakness but a necessary condition of thought: philosophy can only critique itself from within its own structures. This makes undecidability both radical and self-limiting, a reminder that critique is always entangled in the systems it interrogates (Sarup, 1988:42).

Finally, this paradoxical nature of undecidability reflects Derrida’s broader project: to keep interpretation alive, to resist closure, and to challenge the dominance of singular meaning. It is not about offering final answers but about keeping philosophical inquiry open. However, its refusal to settle can feel unsettling or even oppressive, as it denies readers the comfort of resolution. In practice, undecidability forces scholars and thinkers to embrace complexity and contradiction as essential features of meaning-making. This tension gives deconstruction its power and its vulnerability—while it succeeds in destabilizing metaphysical hierarchies, it risks becoming its own “metaphysics of instability.” Derrida himself seems aware of this irony, framing deconstruction not as a finished theory but as an ongoing, iterative process, a perpetual movement of questioning (Critchley, 1992:22).

3. Deconstruction’s Return to Structure: Perpetuation and Fixity

Although Derrida seeks to transcend metaphysical notions of structure, deconstruction inevitably circles back to them. Derrida’s critique does not abolish metaphysics but operates within it, constantly reworking and destabilizing its terms. This recursive nature is why Critchley (1992:22) notes that “deconstruction is always a deconstruction of the text,” never reaching a final point of resolution. The irony is that while Derrida rejects traditional fixity, his method introduces another form of it: the fixity of perpetual deconstruction, a process that is circular and ongoing, “ad infinitum.” In this sense, structure itself becomes undecidable, capable of signifying both stability and change. This insight complicates Derrida’s own project—while he exposes metaphysical binaries, his method risks becoming another structure, one that sustains itself through endless repetition. This paradox demonstrates that deconstruction cannot fully escape the terrain it critiques but instead inhabits it critically, embracing tension rather than resolution.

Derrida’s project begins with a critique of metaphysical structures, yet his own method remains entangled with them. He openly acknowledges that deconstruction cannot take place outside of metaphysical language—it must borrow its terms and concepts to challenge them (Sarup, 1988:42; Fischer, 1985:35). This is why Derrida employs strategies such as sous rature (writing under erasure), which preserves and crosses out terms simultaneously. For instance, binaries like “truth/error” or “good/evil” are both exposed and destabilized rather than erased entirely (Derrida, 1974:xxviii). However, even this strategy demonstrates that deconstruction is not a total escape from structure; rather, it is a critical practice within it. Derrida recognizes that philosophy cannot step outside of its own tradition, and so deconstruction becomes a way of working through metaphysical systems rather than dismantling them entirely.

This recursive process introduces a deeper paradox. In rejecting traditional notions of fixity, Derrida establishes a new kind of fixity: the perpetual movement of deconstruction itself. Critchley (1992:22) emphasizes this when he states that “deconstruction is always a deconstruction of the text,” suggesting that it is an iterative process with no endpoint. Rather than a single act of destabilization, deconstruction is a continual engagement—a repetition that becomes its own structure. In this sense, the concept of “structure” is no longer tied exclusively to stability and order; it becomes undecidable, signifying both continuity and disruption. This dual meaning of structure complicates Derrida’s own claims, revealing that even a philosophy built on instability must operate within a framework that provides coherence. Thus, the very movement of deconstruction becomes circular: it resists closure yet creates its own rhythm of repetition, turning instability itself into a kind of permanence.

This paradox is central to Derrida’s contribution to philosophy. Deconstruction does not seek to destroy metaphysical thought but to make its assumptions visible, to reveal how its supposed stability is itself constructed and contingent. However, by continually returning to these structures, deconstruction demonstrates that philosophy is always caught in a dialogue with its own traditions. Even its critique of binaries such as presence/absence or speech/writing depends on those very binaries to function. This creates a philosophy that is both deeply critical and deeply humble: Derrida acknowledges that his project is not a final solution but a practice of perpetual questioning. This makes deconstruction profoundly relevant—not because it offers closure but because it teaches us to live with the tension of ideas that refuse to be settled, emphasizing thought as an ongoing process of renewal rather than resolution.

Finally, Derrida’s willingness to embrace this tension shows that deconstruction is less about escaping structure than about transforming our understanding of it. By placing structure in a state of undecidability—allowing it to mean both order and disruption—Derrida opens space for new ways of reading, thinking, and engaging with texts. This is why Quito (1990:729) describes deconstruction as “a simultaneous process of destruction and construction,” a philosophy that tears apart meaning only to rebuild it in a way that destabilizes certainty. In this way, deconstruction itself becomes a living structure: not static, but dynamic; not rigid, but perpetual. It thrives in this paradox, refusing to settle into a single definition and instead inviting readers to join in its endless play of interpretation.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION, TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

This chapter weaves together the central insights of the study, revisiting its core arguments and exploring their wider philosophical implications. Rather than seeking to provide a definitive conclusion, it embraces deconstruction’s very spirit of openness and undecidability, presenting this work as an ongoing conversation rather than a finished statement. From this perspective, the chapter also reflects on the evolving trends in deconstructive thought, highlighting its growing influence across diverse fields and intellectual traditions. Finally, it turns toward the future, considering the prospects of deconstruction not as a fixed destination but as a dynamic and transformative practice—one that continues to challenge assumptions, provoke dialogue, and remain deeply relevant in navigating the complexities of our interconnected world.

Conclusion

This study sought neither to finalize nor to exhaustively define the concept of deconstruction, as such an effort would contradict its very nature. Deconstruction, by its own principle, resists totality, finality, and absolute meaning. Instead, this work has endeavored to critically examine Jacques Derrida’s notion of deconstruction and its paradoxical reliance on the very structures it claims to subvert.

What, then, is to be concluded in an undecidable terrain? To conclude is to fix meaning, to claim finality of understanding or interpretation—but this author does not, for she is not the only one authorized to claim legitimacy. Any attempt to finalize this discourse would betray the very spirit of deconstruction. Yet, for the meantime, what is worth concluding here is that “undecidability” grants leeway to both sides of contradiction, giving justice to opposing terms, with deconstruction itself included in this dynamic.

Deconstruction, rather than escaping structure, emerges as a new form of structuralism— one that embodies both fixity and free play, dislocation and continuity. Nothing escapes structure now because of its dual nature: structure as stability and structure as the playground of disruption. Undecidability, then, becomes the very name of the game. It explains why deconstruction inevitably circles back to the structure it sought to overturn. Structure determines deconstruction’s movements; it allows deconstruction to play in the abyss, to dwell in exile, and yet remain tethered to the frameworks it critiques.

The author’s critique underscores the impossibility of a “pure” deconstruction detached from structure. The very act of deconstruction becomes a re-inscription within the frameworks it interrogates. Derrida’s engagement with language, semiology, and phenomenology illustrates that even subversive philosophical gestures are tethered to the traditions they seek to critique. This interplay highlights the enduring complexity and philosophical depth of deconstruction: it is neither a rejection nor a simple affirmation of structure but an ongoing negotiation of meaning.

By focusing on key concepts such as differance, hymen, and pharmakon, and by engaging selectively with Saussure’s structuralism and Husserl’s phenomenology, this study offers a limited yet meaningful contribution to the discourse surrounding Derridean thought. While modest in scope, the work invites readers to rethink the boundaries between critique and structure, rupture and continuity, and authorial intention and readerly interpretation.

Ultimately, this research affirms that the vitality of deconstruction lies not in a conclusive understanding but in its openness, its resistance to closure, and its call for continued philosophical inquiry.

Deconstruction reveals that every attempt to dismantle meaning paradoxically reaffirms meaning’s necessity. Even as Derrida proposes a radical critique of metaphysical foundations, his method demonstrates that such critique must be articulated through language, a system governed by its own rules and limits. Language both destabilizes and stabilizes; it is the very condition that makes critique possible. This double-bind further confirms that structure and play are not opposing forces but interdependent dimensions of the same philosophical terrain.

Moreover, undecidability is not a sign of weakness or incompleteness but of philosophical strength. It invites humility in interpretation, resisting dogmatism while sustaining a lively dialogue between competing views. By refusing to settle into rigid systems, undecidability makes room for intellectual creativity, enabling philosophy to renew itself continually. Deconstruction thrives in this dynamic of tension, offering a way of thinking that embraces multiplicity and difference without sacrificing rigor.

This study, therefore, does not close a discussion but opens a space for ongoing inquiry. Future readers and scholars are invited to inhabit this undecidable terrain, to participate in the endless game of interpretation, and to discover how structure, in its dual nature, shapes every act of critique. If deconstruction is indeed “playing in exile,” as Derrida suggests, then its exile is a productive one—a space where thought is freed to question, experiment, and imagine. The task of philosophy is not to escape structure but to navigate its complexities with awareness and insight Trends

In the broader field of philosophy, deconstruction continues to influence diverse areas of inquiry, from literary criticism and cultural studies to political philosophy, theology, and digital media theory. Its impact is not confined to one discipline, and its very nature as a critical practice resists closure. Yet, rather than outlining definitive trends, this author intentionally refrains from providing a fixed map of contemporary debates. This decision is itself a gesture that reinforces the eternal logic of undecidability—the refusal to impose finality on a movement that thrives precisely on openness and deferral.

Instead, the task is now passed to the reader: to situate deconstruction in different fields and discourses, to trace its resonances and contradictions, and to decide how it functions in varied contexts. This openness invites radical questioning, which has become a central feature of contemporary critical debate. Scholars and readers alike continue to grapple with profound philosophical inquiries, such as: 1. Is deconstruction political or anti-political? 2. Should we politicize deconstruction or deconstruct the political? 3. Is deconstruction historical or ahistorical? 4. Is deconstruction anti-truth or does it propose an alternative understanding of truth? 5. Is deconstruction hermeneutic or ahermeneutic? 6. Are all readings misreadings? 7. Are all interpretations misinterpretations?

Scholars and readers of deconstruction continue to grapple with questions that resist easy resolution, illustrating the radical openness of Derrida’s project. One recurring debate concerns the relationship between deconstruction and politics: is it inherently political or anti-political? Should its methods be employed to advance political agendas, or should deconstruction itself turn its gaze upon the concept of politics, dismantling its assumptions?

Another area of contention is its relationship to history. Some argue that deconstruction is ahistorical, concerned primarily with language and textuality, while others see it as deeply historical, revealing the traces of historical forces embedded within every text. This tension mirrors a broader philosophical inquiry into whether deconstruction disengages from reality or uncovers its deepest structures.

Questions of truth and interpretation further complicate these debates. Does deconstruction reject truth altogether, or does it instead reconfigure our understanding of truth as always mediated, contingent, and deferred? Similarly, scholars ask whether deconstruction should be understood as a hermeneutic project—a method of interpretation—or as a fundamentally ahermeneutic gesture that disrupts the very possibility of interpretive mastery.

These tensions extend to questions of reading itself. If meaning is always deferred and interpretation is endlessly open, does this imply that all readings are misreadings, or that all interpretations are in some sense misinterpretations? Such provocations remind us that deconstruction is not a tool that guarantees interpretive certainty but a practice that unsettles authority, questions stability, and reveals the play of meaning at work in every act of reading.

These questions illustrate that deconstruction is neither a stable theory nor a rigid system but an invitation to engage in an endless game of interpretation. Deconstruction itself is not exempt from misreading; rather, it anticipates misunderstanding as part of the free play of text, language, and writing. Its openness and complexity ensure its relevance in every discipline it touches, even as it resists any singular or definitive articulation.

In an age shaped by digital technology, deconstruction has found renewed vitality. The emergence of hypertext, artificial intelligence, and virtual spaces brings Derrida’s reflections on writing, trace, and dissemination into fresh focus. These technological landscapes mirror deconstruction’s own insistence on the instability of meaning, as digital environments allow for infinite rearrangement, reinterpretation, and interaction. The world of networked communication offers a new arena where the undecidability Derrida spoke of becomes even more palpable.

Ethical and political conversations also continue to draw on deconstructive thought. Derrida’s later writings on hospitality, justice, and democracy have inspired scholars to examine how metaphysical binaries influence power relations and social systems. Deconstruction does not simply critique structures; it also opens up space for ethical reflection and alternative visions of justice, making it a vital resource for addressing global inequalities and pressing political challenges.

Far from being a complete break with earlier philosophical traditions, deconstruction is increasingly seen as a deepening of structuralist and postmodern thought. Its conversations with phenomenology, semiotics, and metaphysics reveal it not as a rejection of tradition but as an ongoing dialogue with it—one that reframes familiar concepts and exposes their hidden complexities. This intellectual lineage highlights the enduring richness of deconstruction’s philosophical heritage.

In the classroom, deconstruction is finding new life as a teaching tool. It encourages students not only to read texts critically but to see interpretation itself as a dynamic, creative act. By questioning assumptions, exploring contradictions, and embracing multiple perspectives, students learn that meaning is not something simply given but something to be engaged with actively. In this way, deconstruction remains a transformative practice, inspiring new generations to think critically and imaginatively about the world around them.

Prospects

Does deconstruction truly make a difference in the coming millennium—or will its difference itself remain the same? Such a paradox captures the essence of deconstruction: it refuses to be a final answer, even to its own relevance. Instead of being a fixed intellectual legacy, deconstruction remains a practice of questioning, a method that resists closure, and a philosophy that thrives on perpetual renewal. Its future cannot be charted as a linear path but must instead be imagined as a constellation of conversations, tensions, and creative disruptions. To speak of its “prospects” is, therefore, to embrace uncertainty itself as its greatest strength.

Rather than offering a blueprint for philosophical progress, deconstruction invites a radical reimagining of knowledge. Its very refusal to settle into a singular definition guarantees its vitality, making it less a doctrine and more a living, breathing intellectual practice. In this light, deconstruction’s future lies not in institutionalization but in its ability to unsettle institutions themselves—whether those of academia, politics, or culture. It thrives precisely where meaning becomes unstable, where interpretation fractures into multiplicity, and where power structures are revealed to be contingent rather than absolute. Future scholars are thus tasked not with resolving its ambiguities but with deepening them, not with simplifying its insights but with complicating them further.

Today, deconstruction’s influence has moved far beyond its philosophical and literary origins. It has become a powerful lens through which law, ethics, architecture, psychoanalysis, postcolonial thought, and environmental studies interrogate their own foundations. This interdisciplinary reach shows that deconstruction is less a theoretical system than a way of thinking, a discipline of suspicion and attentiveness that cuts across fields of inquiry. In doing so, it challenges us to expose the assumptions beneath our most trusted narratives, destabilizing the hierarchies that shape knowledge and social order.

Yet this power comes with a challenge: deconstruction cannot be neatly codified or domesticated without betraying its very essence. Its openness means that it will continue to be misunderstood, critiqued, and reimagined—and perhaps this is precisely why it endures. Far from being a weakness, this instability is the source of its philosophical resilience. Derrida’s writings will continue to be reinterpreted, their meaning proliferating rather than narrowing, their significance multiplying with every reading. This refusal of closure transforms his works into fertile ground for generations of thinkers who will uncover new resonances and new critiques in his words.

A particularly promising direction lies in dialogue with non-Western philosophies. By engaging Derrida’s ideas alongside Eastern, Indigenous, and other global intellectual traditions, deconstruction can expand beyond its European philosophical roots and destabilize the metaphysical binaries it critiques on a deeper, cross-cultural level. Such exchanges may lead not only to richer understandings of deconstruction but also to a more inclusive global philosophy that resists the dominance of any single intellectual tradition.

In a fragmented world defined by competing narratives, crises, and political polarization, deconstruction’s critique of binary thinking offers a necessary intellectual compass. It does not seek to impose certainty but to help us navigate complexity with humility. Its emphasis on undecidability teaches us that meaning is always negotiated, that truth is never absolute, and that philosophy’s responsibility is not to eliminate contradiction but to dwell within it thoughtfully. In this sense, deconstruction is not a retreat from political or ethical engagement but a deepening of it.

As its influence grows in applied fields—law, ethics, environmental humanities, digital media—deconstruction proves its capacity to do more than theorize; it acts as a tool for understanding the world’s complexities and imagining more just ways of living within it. By questioning hidden assumptions, exposing power dynamics, and embracing multiplicity, deconstruction shows itself to be not merely a critique but also a creative force.

Ultimately, the future of deconstruction cannot be separated from the future of thought itself. This thesis invites students, scholars, and readers to approach it not as a closed system but as an intellectual adventure—one that demands curiosity, humility, and courage. Deconstruction’s prospects are not confined to the academy; they live wherever people dare to question meaning, power, and structure. Its difference may remain the same, but perhaps that is precisely the point: in its refusal to settle, deconstruction guarantees that philosophy will remain alive, unfinished, and endlessly provocative.

Finally, this thesis stands as an invitation—not a conclusion—for students, scholars, and readers to encounter deconstruction as a living, evolving intellectual adventure rather than a fixed or closed system. Philosophy, as this study reaffirms, is not a quest for final answers but an ongoing practice of questioning, rethinking, and opening new possibilities. Deconstruction challenges us to approach texts, ideas, and structures not with the expectation of mastery, but with curiosity, humility, and a willingness to be unsettled.

For future thinkers, this is both a challenge and an opportunity. To engage with deconstruction is to enter a space where contradictions are not failures but sites of discovery, where meaning is not something to be possessed but something that emerges in dialogue and debate. This thesis encourages readers to experiment with its methods, to test its boundaries, and to push its insights into new contexts. In doing so, deconstruction becomes less a tool for dismantling meaning than a way to expose complexity, revealing how even our most stable assumptions are open to reinterpretation.

Its prospects extend far beyond the academy, reaching into every space where questions of meaning, power, and structure shape our lives. Whether in politics, art, technology, or everyday discourse, deconstruction invites us to see that knowledge is never neutral, that truth is always relational, and that questioning is itself a form of ethical engagement. It is precisely in this refusal to settle for easy answers that deconstruction proves its enduring relevance—a reminder that thought, like life, is at its most vibrant when it remains open, critical, and alive to possibility

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

A. Translated Oeuvres by Jacques Derrida

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Points, Interview 1974-1994 trans. Peggy Kamuf et al. ed. Elisabeth Weber

Stanford California: Standard California Press, 1995

Writing and Difference . Trans Alan Bass United States of America: The University of Chicago Press, 1978.

B. Other Words Consulted

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Harris, Roy, Language Saussure and Wittgenstein. London: Routledge, 1933

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Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. ed. Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye, trans. Wade Baskin Glasgow: Collins Fontana, 1974.

Smith, H. M. D. & William Kerrigan, Ph. D. Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis and Literature. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Seung, T. K. Structuralism and Hermeneutics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Young, Robert, Untying the Text. A Post Structuralist Reader. London: Routledge, Keggan Paul, 1981

C. General References

An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Dylan Evans. London: Routledge, 1996.

Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought. WL. Reese. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980.

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Gen. ed. Robert Audi. Cambridge University Press, 1995.

The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought eds. Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1977.

The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy. Kenny Anthony, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

The Standard Dictionary of Philosophy. Dagobert D. Runes Ph. D. New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1983.

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