Bachelorarbeit, 2012, 56 Seiten
1.1. Turkish Foreign Policy
1.2. State of Research on Turkish Foreign Policy
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Complex Interdependence
2.2. Complex Interdependence and Turkish Foreign Policy
3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN CLOSE UP
3.1. Turkish Foreign Policy during and after the Cold War
3.2. Reassessment of Turkish Foreign Policy
3.2.1. Reassessment of Turkish Foreign Policy-Making in the Middle East
4. IN THE AFTERMATH OF TURKEY’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY
4.1. Consequences of this new approach in Turkish Foreign Policy
4.2. Perceptions about Turkey in the Middle East
4.3. Turkey as a Model for the Arab World?
6.1. Table 1: Trade Profile. Turkey 2010
6.2. Table 2: Foreign Trade by country groups 2011 & 2012
6.3. Table 3: Foreign Trade by top twenty countries 2011 & 2012 (Turkey)
6.4. Table 4: What is your opinion about the following countries? (TESEV)
AFAD : Prime Ministry’s Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate
illustration not visible in this excerpt
“We want a Middle East without tension, without crisis, with democracy, freedom of economy and a spirit of integration rather than having Chinese walls between countries. We want to have one integrated region based on political dialog, based on a common understanding of common security, multiculturalism, multi-religious character of the societies. This is our vision for the Middle East, for the Caucasus, for the Balkans. We want to achieve in next ten–[twelve] years. We hope that these objectives, this strategic belt of stability, prosperity and security will be established around Turkey” ( H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey).
These were the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister regarding Turkey’s thoughts about the Middle East during a conference in London last year. Noteworthy in this very statement, one realizes that Foreign Minister Davutoğlu expresses a certain concern and commitment towards all neighbors of Turkey. Moreover, he stresses that Turkey accepts the responsibility to restore peace and stability in surrounding regions and assures a decisive leadership. According to the latest press statement of the Prime Ministry’s Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate, “17.171 Syrian citizens” entered Turkey due to the ongoing turmoil and violent clashes between the citizens and the Syrian administration. Turkey initiated a high number of measures to meet the needs and necessities of the Syrian people and continues to seek for support from the international community in order to pressurize the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
During the recent years Turkey has put immense efforts in healing relations with its neighbors, establishing closer ties regarding various interest areas, be it economic, cultural or political issues and acting as a facilitator in its close environment. Interestingly, this kind of approach was increasingly voiced at various international occasions since the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) came to power in 2002. However, once one looks back in history, Turkey during the 1900s conducted a very different foreign policy strategy and viewed its close neighbors with suspicion and mistrust.
This study argues that there has been a reassessment in Turkish foreign policy which has helped Turkey to acquire a new role in the Middle Eastern region. In this regard, this research aims to analyze whether there has been a changeover in Turkish Foreign policy and if so, what were the consequences regarding Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. Along with that purpose, this paper will elaborate on the factors which have shaped Turkish foreign policy, primarily on economic aspirations. Furthermore, the goal of this research is to focus particularly on Turkey’s relations towards its Middle Eastern neighbors. In this context this study provides an overview about the different phases Turkish foreign policy has undergone and examines Turkey’s changing role in the Middle East. Consequently, this research will help to understand fully Turkey’s recent involvement regarding the Arab uprisings and increasing commitment to the Middle East.
This study is relevant in order to follow up Turkey’s increasing new role in the international arena. Nowadays, Turkey fills the news and headlines either in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and even in Africa. In order to understand recent discussions about Turkey one has to look behind Turkish foreign policy and in this sense, this paper provides a certain insight about former and current foreign policy goals of Turkey. Thus, to be able to see an overall picture, especially regarding the developments tied with the Arab spring, it is relevant to enlighten Turkey’s role in her surrounding regions, particularly in the Middle East.
As mentioned earlier, Turkey recently has managed to catch the attention of the international community, especially through its foreign policy engagement. Thus, many scholars have conducted researches about Turkey’s recent foreign policy strategy with the aim to look behind the curtains.
On the one hand, there is an ongoing debate about Turkey cutting down its ties with the West and intensively moving towards the East. Soner Çağaptay, a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues that the AKP is “guided by an Islamist worldview”; therefore, he concludes, maintaining relations with the West becomes difficult for Turkey (Çağaptay 2009). According to him, the Turkish government has slowed down the reform process which is mandatory for Turkey, if it wants to be accepted as a full member by the European Union. Josef Joffe, editor of the German newspaper DIE ZEIT, claims that Turkey’s strategic orientation to the Middle East started back in 2002, when the AKP under Tayyip Erdoğan, according to Joffe an Islamic Justice Party, came to power. He states that this trend accelerated, when the AKP won an absolute majority during the 2007- elections (Joffe 2010). In this context, there are studies which elaborate on whether and how AKP’s political party-program and a new emerged elite contributed to Turkish foreign policy. Some scholars also consider “the Davutoğlu era” as a reason for a transformation in Turkish foreign policy and claim that “[Foreign Minister] Davutoğlu is the intellectual architect of Turkey’s new foreign policy” (Aras 2009: 139).
On the other hand, many scholars define the “‘shift of axis’ argument” in Turkish foreign policy as “a rather crude characterization” (Öniş 2011: 48). Ziya Öniş, professor at the Koç University in Istanbul, argues that Turkey has not changed its foreign policy direction from the West. Although, the relation between Turkey and the European Union currently seems to be at a low point, one should not jump into conclusions and proclaim that the Turkish government has abolished her interests in the European Union, since Turkey is aware of the EU’s importance in many areas. “Turkey is already deeply integrated into the EU in the economic, political and cultural realms and the integration process is an-ongoing process” (Öniş 2011: 48). Mensur Akgün, director of the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul, states in Le Monde diplomatique, that “Turkey is in transition” because of “changing dynamics of international politics rather than any animosity to the West” (Akgün 2010). According to Akgün, Turkey deals with its past and that includes also conflicts with its neighboring countries (Akgün 2010).
Certainly, all these perspectives provide a different access to Turkish foreign policy. However, so far literature has paid little attention to economic factors as a driving force in Turkish foreign policy. Mustafa Kutlay divides the ongoing debate about Turkish foreign policy into two categories, namely “security-based explanations” and “identity-based explanations” (Kutlay 2011: 68). Nevertheless, Kutlay suggests that besides identity or security issues, both “economic dynamics” and “the transformation of Turkish financial and industrial capital” should also be taken into consideration (Kutlay 2011: 69)
Kutlay sees similarities between the complex interdependence approach, developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, and Turkish foreign policy. He argues that “Turkey seems to be following the functionalist framework so as to exploit economic opportunities and interdependence in further institutionalizing its relations with neighboring countries by downgrading military power in favor of economic interactions” (Kutlay 2011: 71). In other words, the three main characteristics of complex interdependence, namely “multiple channels of communications, an absence of hierarchy among the issues (the rejection of high politics vs. low politics dichotomy), and the diminished role for military power” are somehow noticeable in Turkish foreign policy (Kutlay 2011: 71). Kadri Kaan Renda also argues that foreign policy making in Turkey “resemble[s] the characteristic features of complex interdependence”; in addition, Renda supposes that Turkey’s redefined foreign policy strategy enables to establish strong ties with neighboring countries and “create complex interdependence between Turkey and its neighborhood” (Renda 2011: 90).
As a result, security or identity-based approaches do not seem sufficient enough to understand the current developments in Turkish foreign politics. Therefore, this study aims to analyze Turkey’s latest foreign policy-strategy with focusing on various factors, and particularly on economic factors. In this sense, this study is subdivided into five sections. After this introduction, a theoretical approach will follow. At first glance, this research will introduce the concept of complex interdependence, developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in more detail to present the groundwork of the applied theoretical framework. This paper claims that Turkey’s recent foreign policy resembles the characteristic features of complex interdependence, especially Turkey’s relations with her neighboring countries. Therefore, the next chapter will explain similarities between the Turkish case and the concept of complex interdependence by elaborating on the three key characteristics, namely absence of hierarchy among issues, increasing use of multiple channels of interaction between states and declining primacy of military force. Subsequently, the third chapter will provide a close up of Turkish foreign policy activities during the Cold War and Post-Cold War years till recent events. The fourth chapter will put Turkey’s foreign policy activism into a broader context and discuss the consequences of the new approach along with the implications of the Arab uprisings on Turkey. In conclusion, a summary containing the main facts will be presented.
By publishing “Power and Interdependence” Keohane and Nyes’ main purpose was to question the realist approach and its predominant role in international politics. As for Keohane and Nye the realist framework puts forward an “extreme set of conditions or ideal type”; however, their study aims to provide a completely different, so to say, a contrary perspective, namely the concept of “complex interdependence” as this approach “comes closer to reality than [..] realism [does]” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 20). According to Keohane and Nye, “dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces” whereas “Interdependence” is specified as “mutual dependence” and signifies “situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 7). The causes of these “reciprocal effects” are “flows of money, goods, people, and messages across international boundaries”, in short “international transactions” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 7). As described before, Keohane and Nye define interdependence as mutual dependence; nonetheless, they clearly indicate that the term interdependence should not be restricted to “mutual benefit” since this attitude is not far-reaching and so could not explain cooperation among “industrialized countries and less developed countries” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 8). In short, the concept of complex interdependence considers that cooperation is tied with expenses since such a relation includes limitations. In addition, one may not be able to predict the outcome, which is affected by the principles of the individuals and the course of the association in the first place. In the end, it is not self-evident, that complex interdependence will automatically lead to “mutual benefit” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 8).
In order to fully explain “the role of power in interdependence” Keohane and Nye differentiate between “two dimensions, sensitivity and vulnerability” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 10). With sensitivity the authors refer to ”degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework”; that means in detail the state’s “liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies altered to try to change the situation” while vulnerability covers an “actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 11).
In comparison to the realist framework, the complex interdependence concept presents us a completely different portrait of world politics. Three significant attributes have to be mentioned in this context, namely “multiple channels”, “absence of hierarchy among issues” and the “minor role of military force” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 21-23). First, Keohane and Nye argue that “multiple channels of contact among advanced industrial countries” have been devopled (Keohane/Nye 2001: 22). These channels of communication enable interaction among very different groups, such as between statesmen and business assocciations, non-governmental or transnational organizations and may be considered “as interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 21-22). The idea of interstate relations can also be found in the realists literature; however, the latter ones describe channels which emerge, when one challenges the realist presumptions about the states acting “coherently” and being the “only units” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 21). The second characteristic, absence of hierarchy among issues, refers to the minor role of military concerns in the political discourse compared to the past. Nowadays, states have to cope with many questions related to specific areas of interests and several local groups. Consequently, there is no exact ranking among these issues available. Especially, the foreign policy agenda covers a wide range of topics since the borderline between domestic and foreign policy is disappearing (Keohane/Nye 2001: 21). Lastly, Keohane and Nye explain the third characteristic aspect of complex interdependence, namely the declining role of the military force since applying violence involves costs. The authors argue that states do not experience fear or threat anymore, like they used to, particularly developed states. In addition, the relation between the states is characterized by “mutual influence” where violent means may be insignificant and insufficient during negotiations regarding economical or ecological issues (Keohane/Nye 2001: 24). In short, although military force seems to be a secret weapon during negotiations, applying violence may lead to a deterioration of relationships towards other partner states seeing that other mutual agreements regarding different policy areas could be affected (Keohane/Nye 2001: 25). Whereas realism attributes military security questions a higher priority, the complex interdependence concept emphasizes that states pursue different goals respectively depending on the various agenda topics. In this regard, “transgovernmental politics” hamper the process of goal determination (Keohane/Nye 2001: 32).
Keohane and Nye point out that “asymmetrical interdependence in particular groups of issues” as well as “international organizations and transnational actors and flows” clearly provide power capabilities to states, which possess a “less vulnerable” position (Keohane/Nye 2001: 27). “States will approach economic interdependence in terms of power as well as its effects on citizens’ welfare, although welfare considerations will limit their attempts to maximize power” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 27). According to Keohane and Nye, the concept of complex interdependence leaves room for the discussion about “high politics” like military security questions versus “low politics” which refers to other issue areas (Keohane/Nye 2001: 28). Various areas of interests have emerged and are mentioned in the international political debate; therefore, the agenda setting process in the complex interdependence framework differs significantly from the realist approach since one can not draw a clear border between foreign and domestic politics. Moreover, non-state actors have gained a significant position in policy-making (Keohane/Nye 2001: 29). “National interests will be defined differently on different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units”; that is why, national interest is influenced by various external factors which hinder the work of high-level statesmen from creating a consistent policy strategy (Keohane/Nye 2001: 30). Within the political discussion international organizations took up a more active role that is coupled with various functions. They create new opportunities for dialogue between different negotiation partners like politicians, governmental or nongovernmental actors, so generally between groups, who normally would not sit together at a round table. Moreover, they raise up questions related to various areas. Therefore, the political agenda consists of a diversity of issues. In addition, it should be noted that international organizations provide less powerful states assistance in conducting “linkage strategies” (Keohane/Nye 2001: 31).
Eventually, there are many approaches to Turkish foreign policy ranging from identity or security focused explanations. However, in the following this paper will elaborate on whether there are any similarities between complex interdependence and contemporary Turkish foreign policy. The purpose of this section is to adapt these characteristics on the Turkish case and provide a useful framework to follow up the developments in Turkish foreign policy.
Turkish foreign policy recently gained a lot of recognition around the globe. Turkey is mentioned during political plenary sessions whether it is in Europe, in the Middle East and the Caucasus, in Central Asia or in the Balkans. It seems that Turkey is actively engaged on international level compared with the past.
As mentioned earlier, Keohane and Nye argue that “multiple channels of communication” have emerged and created room for interaction among different groups, be it between statesmen and business groups or nongovernmental and transnational organizations. (Keohane/Nye 2001: 22).
Mustafa Kutlay refers in his work to characteristics of complex interdependence and adapts these on the case of Turkey, because he sees similar developments. Kutlay agrees that “multiple dialogue channels” enable “bilateral relations between parties”, which discuss a wide range of issues than just security concerns and in the Turkish case in particular economy plays a far more important role (Kutlay 2011: 80). “The increasing intensity of commercial relations between Anatolian businessmen and Middle Eastern markets has created spill-over effects and facilitated the establishing of new dialogue and cooperation mechanisms” (Kutlay 2011: 80). This development is particularly evident when one observes the relationship between Turkey and Syria, where Turkish entrepreneurs from Anatolia urged their government to develop and implement agreements with Syria to promote business relations and in the end “free trade and visa-free travel agreements” were put into force (Kutlay 2011: 80). Renda, also states that more communication channels have emerged in Turkey and by saying that he particularly refers to Turkey’s efforts in establishing closer ties with her neighbors. According to Renda, various platforms have been set up to facilitate communication “between state institutions of Turkey and their counterparts in other states”; in this regard, “high level strategic cooperation councils held between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Russia” can be interpreted as a multiplication of communication channels in Turkish foreign policy (Renda 2011: 99).
As a second characteristic of complex interdependence Keohane and Nye have pointed out, that there is no given hierarchy among issues anymore (Spindler 2007: 207). Renda argues that there is a similar development in Turkish foreign policy visible. Turkey perceived it as a difficult challenge to rise as a regional player since serious conflicts within Turkey, such as the PKK issue, shook the country and dominated the political agenda. Once the European Council announced Turkey’s candidacy for membership in the European Union in Helsinki in 1999, a new page was opened. Turkey was given a set of tasks to complete, in order to join the European Union as a full member. While the Turkish government initiated the reform process to meet Europe’s requirements, Turkey has undergone a significant changeover. One of the most important developments was the emergence of new actors in Turkish politics besides the traditional ones. One has to point out, while new actors started to raise their voice, others had to lower theirs. In the case of Turkey, military has lost its superior position and power in Turkish policy making since “the Europeanization process in the post-Helsinki era has belatedly transformed the civil-military relations in accordance with socio-political dynamics of the post-Cold War” (Renda 2011: 95). Consequently, this development offered new ways of political engagement for nearly everyone. While in the past “national interest” was determined only by an “exclusive circle of foreign policy elites within the states”; non-state actors found access to the foreign policy making process such as “a new class of businessman”, who began approaching to Turkey’s close neighbors mostly because of commercial interests, which then may evolve to closer relationships (Renda 2011: 96).
Since the AKP won the elections in 2002, Turkish foreign policy took a new route, with a far wider focus on various issues. The traditional foreign political agenda, which contained and prioritized mostly security concerns, was broadened; so, new interest areas found their way into the political discourse such as economy and foreign trade, just to mention a few. In this regard, Renda sees a certain similarity between this new approach in Turkish foreign policy and complex interdependence and concludes that “the ultimate dominance of high politics over low politics was challenged” (Renda 2011: 96).
Regarding the third characteristic, Keohane and Nye mentioned the decreasing role of military and argued that military power has a rather inferior role within the complex interdependence concept; states are reluctant in applying military force in the first place, yet new policy tools with lower costs emerged (Spindler 2007: 207). In the case of Turkey, military and security have always been very important issues (Renda 2011: 95-96). However, in comparison to the “Cold War era” or the “post-Cold War” period, Turkey has pursued a different approach towards her neighbors during the last years (Öniş/Şuhnaz NOS: 1). Öniş and Şuhnaz state that “AKP’s foreign policy style is characterized by greater emphasis on the use of soft power and developing friendly relations with all neighbors” rather than an aggressive course (Öniş/Şuhnaz NOS: 3).
In sum, the complex interdependence approach, developed by Keohane and Nye, seems to provide a useful framework to explain patterns of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. After setting the theoretical framework, the next section aims to provide an overview on Turkey’s foreign policy strategy. This paper argues that there has been a reassessment in Turkish foreign policy and along with this restructuring the role of Turkey in the Middle East has changed. Consequently, this section will provide an examination of contemporary Turkish foreign policy with a special focus on Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. In the course of this analysis the complex interdependence approach will provide a certain framework according to which the results will be classified.
If we were to take a snapshot of Turkey and its environment today and compare it with Turkey during the 20th century, we would observe a completely different setting in both pictures. In the past, “Turkey was surrounded by serious ethnically-driven conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, while Turkey itself was experiencing a violent internal ethnic dispute involving its own Kurds” (Kirişci 2006: 7). Hasgüler argues that after the demise of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Turkey became the other loser of the Cold War. Turkey may not be separated/ disintegrated; however, it has lost its fundamental role and its identity in the international arena. Three sides of Turkey, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, turned into hell and Turkey was caught unprepared for this situation. Moreover, its foreign policy agenda was intense; on the top of it, Turkey entered a period of unstable governments and was dragged into a vortex of political and economic chaos. Hasgüler characterizes the relationship between America and Turkey as a classic Turkish TV-melodrama and further states against all the odds from outside, who argue that Turkey experienced stability for half a century of the Cold War, that Turkey neither was free from worries nor in a comfortable position during that time. In the face of the bipolar world after the end of the World War II, an emerging power, the Soviet Union, was claiming territorial rights; Turkey saw no choice but to enter the field of the other superpower and was obliged to set up a ‘strategic alliance’ with America (Hasgüler 2009).
Sabri Sayarı, a well-known scholar who has focused on Turkish domestic and foreign policies among other research areas, states that the demise of the Soviet Union and “the resulting superpower competition” have seriously affected both “global and regional politics” (Sayarı 2000: 169). In this sense, Renda states that during the 20th century the “increasing sensitivity of Turkey to its neighborhood forced Turkish policymakers to ‘regionalize’ their policies, whereas increasing vulnerability of Turkish society and particularly the Turkish state led to the ‘renationalization’ of its foreign and security policies” (Renda 2011: 93). Renda also points out that Turkey has failed to build up close ties with its neighbors be it cultural, political or economical ties due to her fear from being dragged into trouble. “Turkey lacked linkage strategies that might incorporate several issues into one package” (Renda 2011: 94).
During the 1990s Turkish foreign policy was generally formed and decided by the Turkish military in collaboration with the Foreign Ministry. That is to say, these two decision-makers “perceived threats to Turkey’s territorial integrity and unity emanating from various quarters around Turkey, including Northern Iraq” (Kirişci 2009: 31). At that time, Turkish foreign policy generally concentrated on security issues because those were seen as the most urgent and important ones (Kirişci 2009: 31).
Having said this, one important public figure, which has put an immense effort in developing Turkey, politically and economically has to be mentioned in this context. Turgut Özal, who was elected as “the first Prime Minister in the 1980s and then President of Turkey early in the 1990s” has contributed to the development in Turkey in many ways by introducing liberal market policies and opening new markets abroad (Kirişci 2006: 11). During the Iran-Iraq War he chose to stay away from this conflict in Turkey’s neighboring countries, but at the same time continued to establish closer mercantile and economic ties (Kirişci 2006: 11). In 1986, he aimed to create “interdependency” between Turkey and the Middle East through his pipeline venture in order to yield peace in this region; more precisely this “pipeline would carry Turkish water to the Gulf countries as well as Israel” (Kirişci 2006: 11). Özal expressed his wish to be part of the European Community and applied in 1987. Consequently, Özal did not just want to collaborate with his Middle Eastern neighbors but also with the West; he was seeking for cooperation instead of isolation (Kirişci 2006: 11). When Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait and the Gulf War broke out in 1990, Turgut Özal convinced the traditional Turkish policymakers to get involved and provide assistance for the allied forces (Kirişci 2006: 11-12). However, the repercussion of the Gulf War hit Turkey very hard since PKK separatists were giving the Turkish government serious headaches. In addition, the “Kurdish issue” along with “the rise of an increasingly virulent political Islam in Turkey” made the situation for Ankara even worse (Kirişci 2006: 12). As if the challenges within Turkey’s borders were not enough, the Balkan conflict broke out. Considering the endangerments surrounding and within Turkey, the military establishment became active and regained its influential position in foreign and domestic policy making, in particular “through the National Security Council” (Kirişci 2006: 12).
 (Davutoğlu 2011)
 (AFAD 2012)
 (TODAY’S ZAMAN 2012a)
 (Kimer 2012)
 cf. (Hale/Özbudun 2010)
 cf. (Öniş 2003a)
 (The Economist 2011)
 (TODAY’S ZAMAN 2012b)
 (TRT 2012)
 (TODAY’S ZAMAN 2012c)
 “Soğuk Savaş’ın Sovyetler Birliği ile birlikte bir diğer mağlubu da Türkiye Cumhuriyeti olmuştur. Belki Türkiye dağılmamıştır ama uluslararası alanda kimliğini ve temel rolünü yitirmiştir. [...] Türkiye’nin üç yanı, Balkanlar, Orta Doğu ve Kafkaslar cehenneme dönerken, Türkiye duruma hazırlıksız yakalanmıştır. Üstelik, dış politika gündemi bu denli yoğunken, bir de istikrarsız hükümetler dönemine giren Türkiye, politik ve ekonomik kaoslar girdabına sürüklenmiştir“ (Hasgüler 2009).
 “Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: Bir Yeşilçam Melodramı“ (Hasgüler 2009).
 “Aslında dışardan bakan yazarların Türkiye için görece bir istikrar dönemi olarak tanımladıkları Soğuk Savaş’ın yarım yüzyılı Türkiye açısından hiç de öyle rahat ve mutlu geçmemiştir“ (Hasgüler 2009).
 “II. Dünya Savaşı akabinde ortaya çıkan iki kutuplu dünyanın süper güçlerinden biri olan Sovyetlerin toprak talepleri karşısında çareyi diğer süper gücün etki sahasına girmekte bulan Türkiye, ABD ile ‘stratejik ortaklık’ kurmak zorunda kalmıştır“ (Hasgüler 2009).
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