Masterarbeit, 2012
53 Seiten, Note: 1,3
1 Introduction
2 Theory of Dynamic Inconsistency
2.1 Prerequisites
2.2 The Multi-Selves Model
2.2.1 Sophisticated Consumer
2.2.2 Naïve Consumer
2.2.3 Screening of Consumer Type
2.3 Constrained Contracting: Two-part tariffs
2.4 Partial Naïveté
2.5 Application: Gym Attendance
2.6 Political Implications and Welfare Analysis
3 Credit Card Market
3.1 Introductory Remarks
3.2 Behavioral Model of Credit Consumption
3.2.1 General Setup and Assumptions
3.2.2 Complete Information
3.2.3 Incomplete Information
3.2.3.1 Unknown β
3.2.3.2 Unknown β and β
3.3 Welfare Analysis
3.3.1 Complete Information
3.3.2 Incomplete Information
3.4 Recent Legal and Empirical Developments
4 Retirement Savings
4.1 Introductory Remarks
4.1.1 Significance of Retirement Savings
4.1.2 The 401(k) plan
4.2 Behavioral Aspects of Retirement Savings Decisions
4.2.1 Model
4.2.2 Behavioral Phenomena
4.2.2.1 Self-control
4.2.2.2 Procrastination
4.2.3 SMarT Plan
4.2.3.1 Purpose of the plan
4.2.3.2 Main Features
4.2.3.3 Evidence
4.3 Recent Developments
5 Summary and Conclusion
This master's thesis investigates the phenomenon of time inconsistency in financial decision-making, exploring how individuals' non-stable preferences affect outcomes in credit card markets and retirement savings. By applying behavioral economic models, the research assesses the extent to which these inconsistencies lead to sub-optimal financial outcomes and evaluates potential policy interventions.
2.2.1 Sophisticated Consumer
The multi-selves model, which was first introduced by R.H. Strotz in 1956, is fundamentally rooted in game theory. We consider two periods. In the first one, consumers decide whether they want to sign up for a service. In period 2, the actual consumption decision is made. Unsurprisingly, the individual´s taste might change between the two periods, creating dynamic inconsistency. In this model, we assign a different player or “self” to each decision node, similar to the way we would treat an extensive-form game. Usually, game theoretic problems can be solved by finding a subgame perfect equilibrium, for example by utilizing backward induction. However, this concept implies complete information of the players about all future payouts. If we give up this assumption, we have to find different ways of solving the game.
1 Introduction: Provides an overview of the emergence of behavioral economics as a subdiscipline that integrates psychology into economic modeling to improve predictive power regarding human decision-making.
2 Theory of Dynamic Inconsistency: Develops a theoretical multi-selves framework to model inconsistent consumer preferences and examines how firms use pricing strategies to address sophisticated versus naïve consumer types.
3 Credit Card Market: Applies behavioral models to the credit card industry, analyzing how credit companies exploit consumer naïveté and discussing potential welfare-enhancing market regulations.
4 Retirement Savings: Examines retirement savings decisions, focusing on behavioral impediments like procrastination and lack of self-control, and assesses the efficacy of programs like the SMarT plan and automatic enrollment.
5 Summary and Conclusion: Synthesizes the main findings across all chapters, confirming that time-inconsistent preferences lead to suboptimal welfare and that tailored interventions can improve financial outcomes for consumers.
Time inconsistency, Behavioral economics, Multi-selves model, Sophisticated consumer, Naïve consumer, Credit card market, Retirement savings, Self-control, Procrastination, SMarT plan, Automatic enrollment, Welfare analysis, Loss aversion, Hyperbolic discounting, 401(k) plan.
The thesis explores time inconsistency in consumer financial decision-making, specifically how preferences that change over time impact choices in credit card usage and retirement savings.
The main topics include the theoretical modeling of dynamically inconsistent preferences, the exploitation of consumer naïveté by firms, and behavioral interventions to improve long-term saving outcomes.
The objective is to understand how behavioral phenomena such as lack of self-control and procrastination contribute to suboptimal financial decisions and how market or policy structures can mitigate these welfare losses.
The author uses behavioral economic models, including game-theoretic approaches and the multi-selves model, alongside a review of empirical studies to analyze consumer behavior and welfare.
The main part analyzes models of time inconsistency in credit markets and retirement savings plans, evaluates the impact of pricing schemes, and investigates the success of programs like Save More Tomorrow (SMarT).
Key terms include time inconsistency, behavioral economics, consumer naïveté, self-control, procrastination, retirement savings, and credit card market efficiency.
It is a theoretical framework used to model dynamic inconsistency by assigning a different "self" to each decision node, reflecting how a person's tastes might change between different time periods.
The SMarT plan mitigates the effects of procrastination and loss aversion by allowing employees to commit to future increases in their contribution rates that coincide with pay raises, thereby avoiding the perception of a loss in disposable income.
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