Masterarbeit, 2012
73 Seiten, Note: Distinction (75)
1. Introduction
2. Germany and the use of force
2.1. From ‘checkbook diplomacy’ to the intervention in Kosovo
2.2. Increasing contributions and persistent skepticism
2.3. Germany and the use of force in 2011
3. The crisis in Libya and the German response: from early leader to abstention
3.1. Initial German leadership: February 15th to February 26th 2011
3.2. From leader to skeptic: February 26th to March 15th
3.3. Negotiating Resolution 1973 and the German decision to abstain: March 15th to March 17th
4. Explaining non-participation and abstention
4.1. The decision against military participation
4.1.1. A traditional German skepticism towards the use of force and Afghanistan
4.1.2. Uncertainty over military risks of a military intervention and doubts concerning French and British motives
4.1.3. The American change and the shift to “all necessary measures”
4.1.4. The ‘power of parliamentary reservation’
4.1.5. Guido Westerwelle and the FDP
4.1.6. The upcoming elections
4.1.7. No significant role for the Responsibility to Protect
4.2. The abstention
4.2.1. Time and timing contributing to the abstention
4.2.2. Was it possible to vote “yes” and not participate militarily?
4.2.3. A coalition compromise?
5. Domestic reactions and international consequences
5.1. The debate in Germany
5.1.1. Reactions in the press and public
5.1.2. The Foreign Minister and his talking points
5.1.3. Reactions in the Bundestag
5.2. International consequences
5.2.1. The German role on the Security Council
5.2.2. Germany in NATO: reinforcing doubts about ‘pooling and sharing’ and German reliability
6. Conclusion
This dissertation examines the factors that led the German government to abstain from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 in March 2011, thereby refraining from participation in the subsequent NATO-led military intervention in Libya. It aims to clarify whether this decision signaled a strategic shift in German foreign policy or was a reactive choice shaped by specific situational constraints and internal political pressures.
4.1.2. Uncertainty over military risks of a military intervention and doubts concerning French and British motives
Starting from a traditionally skeptic position towards the use of force and a suspicion of the motives of its European allies to call for an intervention, it would not have taken much to make the German government worry about the viability and usefulness of using force to protect civilians from the Gaddafi government in Libya. In interviews with the author, German decision makers repeatedly highlighted these concerns and related doubts on the French and British motives for an intervention as the most important factors for the decision not to participate and, ultimately, for the abstention.
German policy makers both in the Government and in the Bundestag were suspicious of the French and British motives to push for an intervention. As shown in Chapter 3, politicians and diplomats in the Chancellery and the Foreign Office were irritated by the speed and fervor with which Nicolas Sarkozy changed course, called for a no-fly zone and recognized the NTC. Especially the Chancellor was annoyed at the French President's actions that were neither coordinated nor previously announced to the German government. The policy makers suspected that Sarkozy was primarily motivated by a desire to impress voters with his activist attitude and to make up for his former close relationships with Arab dictators as the French presidential election approached. UK Prime Minister David Cameron, some Germans believed, was concerned to not be seen by his voters as less assertive than his French counterpart.
German policy makers doubted whether a no-fly zone or similar military engagement from the air could be successful in protecting civilians and feared it would instead lead to Western entanglement in a Libyan civil war. Officials highlighted a lack of reliable information – including from the German intelligence services – on who exactly the rebels were that would be supported from the air and what aims they were pursuing. The policy makers were afraid that killings would continue under the Western watch from the air and ultimately, the initial military involvement would lead to the interveners having to send ground troops into a protracted civil war – something that no government wanted, including the French and the British.
1. Introduction: Outlines the research context regarding Germany's controversial abstention on Resolution 1973 and defines the paper's aim to identify the underlying drivers of this decision.
2. Germany and the use of force: Provides a historical overview of Germany's evolving approach to military force, from 'checkbook diplomacy' to the debates surrounding Kosovo and Afghanistan.
3. The crisis in Libya and the German response: from early leader to abstention: Details the chronological events from February to March 2011, tracking the shift in German diplomacy as the intervention moved toward a mandate for broader military action.
4. Explaining non-participation and abstention: Analyzes the specific domestic, strategic, and individual political factors that influenced the government's decision to withhold participation.
5. Domestic reactions and international consequences: Examines the intense internal political debate within Germany and explores the subsequent impact of the abstention on Germany's standing among its NATO and EU allies.
6. Conclusion: Summarizes findings, arguing that the abstention was a result of path-dependent skepticism, specific crisis dynamics, and internal political pressures rather than a permanent strategic realignment.
Libya intervention, UN Security Council Resolution 1973, German foreign policy, NATO, Responsibility to Protect, Guido Westerwelle, military restraint, parliamentary reservation, multilateralism, German domestic politics, transatlantic relations, coalition policy, civil war, interventionism, German abstention
The work focuses on the German government's decision to abstain from the UN Security Council vote on the military intervention in Libya in March 2011 and its subsequent refusal to participate in the NATO mission.
It covers the evolution of post-Cold War German military policy, the specific diplomatic chronology of the 2011 Libya crisis, and the internal institutional and political constraints governing German foreign policy.
The research asks why Germany chose to abstain from the resolution and whether this signaled a strategic redirection of German foreign policy or was a decision necessitated by temporary internal and situational factors.
The author employs a comprehensive, qualitative study approach, primarily utilizing 23 expert interviews with politicians, diplomats, and think-tank experts, combined with an extensive analysis of primary sources and parliamentary records.
The main body examines the historical background of German military skepticism, the rapid shift in American and international expectations, and the specific domestic tensions within the German coalition government during the decision-making process.
The paper is characterized by terms such as German foreign policy, military restraint, NATO, transatlantic relations, Libya intervention, and the 'power of parliamentary reservation'.
The study concludes that the Responsibility to Protect played only a minor role in the actual decision-making process in Berlin, which was dominated more by concerns over military risks and domestic political considerations.
The author argues that while the decision reinforced pre-existing doubts among allies regarding German reliability in integrated military structures, the government actively worked to mitigate this damage through other contributions, such as in Afghanistan.
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