Learning, Relearning, and Unlearning. The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, 1898-1940

Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)

• Introduction: The Special Problems of Counterinsurgency
• Why Do Military Organizations Develop Doctrine, Anyway?
• Types of Doctrine
• Literature Review
• Methodology
• Remembering, Relearning, and Unlearning
• The Army and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1898-1940
• Historical Background
• Wars in the Philippines
• The Army at Home
• Learning, Relearning, and Formalizing
• The Marine Corps and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1898-1940
• Historical Background
• Wars in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
• Reaching Comprehensive Formal Counterinsurgency Doctrine
• Putting the Cases Together

Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)

This thesis examines the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps from 1898 to 1940. It investigates how these organizations learned from their experiences in a series of counterinsurgencies, focusing on the differences in their approaches to doctrinal development.

• The challenges of counterinsurgency warfare and the unique problems it presents for conventional military forces.
• The evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine within the Army and Marine Corps.
• The factors that influenced the development of formal counterinsurgency doctrine, particularly in the Marine Corps.
• The contrasting approaches to doctrinal development between the Army and Marine Corps.
• The significance of these developments for understanding the history of counterinsurgency warfare and its impact on military organizations.

Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)

• Introduction: The Special Problems of Counterinsurgency: This chapter introduces the concept of counterinsurgency warfare, highlighting its unique challenges and the difficulties faced by conventional military forces in adapting to its demands. It also provides a brief overview of the thesis's scope and methodology.
• Why Do Military Organizations Develop Doctrine, Anyway?: This chapter explores the nature and purpose of military doctrine, examining different types of doctrine and the factors that influence its development. It also discusses the literature review and methodological approaches used in the thesis.
• Remembering, Relearning, and Unlearning: This chapter focuses on the Army's experiences with counterinsurgency from 1898 to 1940, examining its historical background, its involvement in the Philippine-American War, and its efforts to adapt to the challenges of counterinsurgency warfare.
• Learning, Relearning, and Formalizing: This chapter examines the Marine Corps' experiences with counterinsurgency during the same period, focusing on its historical background, its involvement in conflicts in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and its eventual development of a comprehensive formal counterinsurgency doctrine.
• Putting the Cases Together: This chapter compares and contrasts the experiences of the Army and Marine Corps, analyzing the factors that led to the Marine Corps' development of formal doctrine while the Army remained largely focused on conventional warfare.

Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)

Counterinsurgency, military doctrine, US Army, US Marine Corps, Philippine-American War, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Small Wars Operations, Small Wars Manual, conventional warfare, revolutionary warfare, insurgency, guerrilla warfare.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the focus of this thesis?

The thesis examines why the US Army and US Marine Corps developed strikingly different counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrines between 1898 and 1940.

How does the thesis define revolutionary warfare?

It is defined as the seizure of political power by the use of armed force, where the struggle for the support of the people is central.

Which conflicts are analyzed for the Marine Corps?

The research focuses on the "Small Wars" in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, which led to the creation of the Small Wars Manual.

Why did the Army struggle with COIN doctrine?

The Army remained largely focused on conventional warfare, often "unlearning" or ignoring lessons from irregular conflicts like the Philippine-American War.

What is the significance of the Small Wars Manual?

It represents the formalization of comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine by the Marine Corps, balancing military force with political operations.