Learning, Relearning, and Unlearning. The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, 1898-1940

Table of Contents

Introduction: The Special Problems of Counterinsurgency

1. Why Do Military Organizations Develop Doctrine, Anyway?

Types of Doctrine

Literature Review

Methodology

2. Remembering, Relearning, and Unlearning

The Army and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1898-1940

Historical Background

Wars in the Philippines

The Army at Home

3. Learning, Relearning, and Formalizing

The Marine Corps and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1898-1940

Historical Background

Wars in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua

Reaching Comprehensive Formal Counterinsurgency Doctrine

4. Putting the Cases Together

Conclusion: Preparing for the Next War(s)?

Research Objectives and Themes

This thesis investigates why, between 1898 and 1940, the United States Marine Corps developed comprehensive formal doctrine for counterinsurgency, while the U.S. Army — despite having similar operational experiences — failed to do so. The research seeks to identify the organizational factors, perceptions of mission, and institutional pressures that account for these divergent approaches to codifying lessons learned in warfare.

• Comparison of organizational learning patterns in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.
• Distinction between formal and informal, comprehensive and limited military doctrine.
• The impact of institutional mission identity on doctrinal development.
• Evaluation of existing bureaucratic change models in military contexts.
• Historical analysis of counterinsurgency efforts from the Philippine-American War through the Latin American interventions.

Excerpt from the Book

Summary of Chapters

Introduction: The Special Problems of Counterinsurgency: Outlines the fundamental challenge of counterinsurgency as a political struggle for support of the people and introduces the thesis puzzle regarding the divergent doctrinal responses of the Army and Marine Corps.

1. Why Do Military Organizations Develop Doctrine, Anyway?: Establishes definitions for doctrine and presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses regarding bureaucratic change and doctrinal evolution that will be tested.

2. Remembering, Relearning, and Unlearning: Analyzes the U.S. Army's experience from 1898 to 1940, demonstrating how it prioritized conventional warfare and ultimately failed to institutionalize counterinsurgency lessons despite significant practical experience.

3. Learning, Relearning, and Formalizing: Examines the Marine Corps' path to institutionalizing counterinsurgency doctrine through the development of the Small Wars Manual, driven by its mission identity as an expeditionary force.

4. Putting the Cases Together: Compares the two organizational outcomes against the initial hypotheses to explain why mission perception and internal consensus are the primary drivers of formal doctrinal development.

Conclusion: Preparing for the Next War(s)?: Synthesizes the findings, offering implications for how military organizations can better institutionalize lessons learned from counterinsurgency operations to avoid the costs of repeated relearning.

Keywords

Counterinsurgency, Military Doctrine, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, Bureaucratic Change, Small Wars, Organizational Culture, Formal Doctrine, Informal Doctrine, Expeditionary Warfare, Institutional Learning, Philippine-American War, Latin American Interventions, Military Innovation, Warfare Tactics.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the core subject of this thesis?

The thesis focuses on the history of counterinsurgency doctrine development within the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps between 1898 and 1940, investigating why the two organizations reacted differently to their shared experiences.

What are the central themes explored in the work?

The key themes include the distinction between formal and informal doctrine, organizational identity and mission perception, the bureaucratic costs of doctrine development, and the institutionalization of lessons learned in unconventional warfare.

What is the primary research question?

The study asks why the Marine Corps chose to develop comprehensive formal doctrine for counterinsurgency during the 1898-1940 period, while the Army, despite similar operational requirements, largely neglected to do so.

Which methodology is employed in this research?

The author uses a narrative panel analysis of comparative history, examining the development of both organizations over time to control for the variables of national culture and political system while contrasting their doctrinal outcomes.

What topics does the main body cover?

The main body provides detailed historical case studies of both services, analyzing their operational challenges in the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and how these specific conflicts influenced their internal documentation and manuals.

Which keywords best characterize this study?

Key terms include counterinsurgency, military doctrine, organizational culture, expeditionary warfare, and bureaucratic learning.

How does the Marine Corps' mission identity influence their doctrine?

The research argues that because the Marine Corps identified itself as an expeditionary and small-wars-focused force, it was more incentivized to institutionalize lessons from counterinsurgency into comprehensive formal manuals.

Why did the U.S. Army prioritize conventional warfare over counterinsurgency?

The Army viewed itself as a peer competitor to European-style powers and considered counterinsurgency operations to be distracting "police missions" that did not fit their vision for a modernized, large-scale conventional fighting force.