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63 Seiten, Note: 2,0
List of Abbreviations
1.1 Problem Description
1.3 Scope of Work
2 Startups - Financing and Information Asymmetry
2.1 Definition and Characteristics of Startups
2.2 Startup Financing
2.2.1 Occasions for Financing on the Basis of the Life Cycle Model
2.2.2 Traditional Forms of Financing for Startups
220.127.116.11 Financial Bootstrapping
18.104.22.168 Business Angels
22.214.171.124 Venture Capital
126.96.36.199 Bank Financing
188.8.131.52 Issues regarding Startup Financing
2.3 Information Asymmetry
3 Crowdfunding as a Source of Financing
3.1 Historical Background and Evolution
3.2.1 Definition and Basics
3.2.2 Main Actors
3.2.3 Forms of Crowdfunding
3.2.4 Procedure of a Campaign
3.3 Determinants of Success
4 Startup Financing and Crowdfunding in Europe
4.1 Market Overview
4.1.1 Facts and Figures
4.1.2 Legal Framework
4.1.3 Relevant Platforms
4.2 Example Campaign: Panono
5 Crowdfunding vs. Traditional Forms of Financing
5.1 Equity Crowdfunding vs. Business Angels vs. Venture Capitalists
5.2 Lending-based Crowdfunding for Business vs. Bank Financing
5.3 Reward-based Crowdfunding vs. Financial Bootstrapping
6.1 Target achievement
Law and Jurisdiction Index
illustration not visible in this excerpt
The major role of corporate finance is to ensure liquidity in every stage of a venture’s life cycle. Accordingly, entrepreneurs must determine the best possible financial structures and obtain appropriate financial resources for their enterprises.1 However, diverse obstacles inhibit access to financial resources: Commercial banks usually require collaterals to back loans; venture capitalists (VCs) may demand a proof of concept and business angel (BA) investments mainly result from referrals and rela- tions.2 Startups in particular rely on the support of external financiers, but usually do not possess collateral, proof concept or adequate historical financial data.3 Therefore, startup entrepreneurs frequently draw on personal savings or financial resources from family and friends. Hence, personal savings and financial support from family and friends are the most common sources of financing of startups.4 Although finan- cial bootstrapping may be adequate for the first steps of development and business formation, startups are typically confronted with the so-called “funding gap”. This term describes the gap between the entrepreneur’s resources and the financial invest- ment needed to bring an idea to an industrial level.5 Therefore, to drive innovative ideas further, investors have to close this funding gap by infusing innovative ventures with ample financial resources. Because business angels (BAs) and VCs are not viable investment options for every startup, the startup market needs more accessi- ble and alternative forms of financing. Over the last 5 years, the market for online alternative finance in Europe grew rapidly. Transaction volume in 2014 amounted to approx. €3bn, an increase of 144% from 2013.6 One of the most relevant character- istics of the online alternative finance market is that it links business models with technological platforms.7 Thusly, it affords startups with innovative ideas a digital space to present their business models to a marketplace of potential investors.
Crowdfunding represents a major share of the European online alternative finance market and has raised €2.485bn, almost 84% of the total volume in 2014.8 Crowd- funding describes the phenomenon where people - known as “the crowd” - have the possibility to provide financial contributions online, via crowdfunding platforms, di- rectly to projects or ventures they wish to support.9 Supporters then receive a certain form of compensation given their level of contribution. This compensation can be a symbolic, physical or even a financial reward and depends on the type of Crowd- funding a startup selects.
Due to the rapid growth of the online alternative finance market, this paper questions whether startups in Europe currently can leverage Crowdfunding alongside to traditional forms of financing. Furthermore, it is important for startups to know the different opportunities and risks in the environment of Crowdfunding. Moreover, the regulations of the European Crowdfunding market and the effort of launching a Crowdfunding campaign are critical components to realizing success.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether Crowdfunding is a realistic form of financing for startups in Europe. Therefore, theoretical principals of startup financing, as well as Crowdfunding and its different dimensions, have to be scrutinized further. Moreover, a general overview of the European startup and Crowdfunding market has to be provided. This paper focuses on commercial startups located in the member states of the European Union.
This paper begins with an introduction of the theoretical principles of startup financing. After a brief definition of startups, the occasions for obtaining financing are pointed out in the context of the life cycle model of a venture. In this regard, traditional forms of startup financing and the related issues are analysed. A more detailed look is also taken on the issue of information asymmetry.
Chapter 3 deals with Crowdfunding as a source of financing. After an overview of the evolution of Crowdfunding, this concept is examined in greater detail. Specifically, the definition and basics of Crowdfunding, the main actors and the different forms of Crowdfunding are presented. Next, this chapter deals with a typical process of establishing and running a Crowdfunding campaign. The end of this chapter deals with the determinants of success of a Crowdfunding campaign.
In Chapter 4, the European startup and Crowdfunding markets are evaluated. Be- sides facts on these markets, this chapter also deals with insights into the European legal framework in the field of Crowdfunding. Moreover, relevant platforms in Europe are presented. The chapter ends with a practical example of a Crowdfunding cam- paign in Europe.
In Chapter 5, traditional forms of financing are compared to the relevant types of Crowdfunding in Europe. After equity-based Crowdfunding is compared to BAs and VCs, lending-based Crowdfunding is compared to bank financing. The end of the chapter deals with the comparison of reward-based Crowdfunding to financial boot- strapping.
In the last chapter, the investigative results are summarized and the achievement of the objective is evaluated. The paper concludes with a prospect of the development of Crowdfunding in Europe.
A startup is a young, non-established venture implementing an innovative business concept, mostly operating in branches like electronic business, communication tech- nology or life science. Startups are typically characterized by a small amount of start- ing capital and therefore often rely on financing through third parties such as BAs or VCs.10 Moreover, startups can be defined by the age or matureness of a venture. Generally, a distinction is made between startups and established companies.11 Due to the fact that startups operate in different businesses with diverse products, cus- tomers and extraneous influences, there are different approaches regarding the age or point in time when a startup establishes itself as a business. A biotechnology startup for example needs more time to establish its business than a service startup does. Fallgatter notes that established companies are at minimum 8 to 12 years old ventures.12 However, startups are often defined as ventures that are less than 8 to 12 years old, dependent on the actual business sector they are operating in. Brachtendorf ignores the assumption that a young venture is defined in terms of years of business. He adopts the approach that a firm is in its adolescence, until the venture is able to sustainably finance itself through operating cash flows.13 Accord- ingly, a non-established venture has to operate about 8 to 12 years and additionally has to achieve a certain level of financial independence, until it makes the transition to an established venture. Another important characteristic of a startup is its dispro- portionate growth rate. Ventures can, for example grow in the field of employees, locations, products or revenue. The average sales growth rate of a young venture amounts to 30% p.a. in its first year of business.14 This growth contrasts with estab- lished companies like DAX 30 companies, which register considerably smaller growth. The average revenue growth of DAX 30 corporations amounted to 8% in 2012 compared to sales in 2011.15 Apart from absolute sales figures, a venture’s growth rate can also be attributed to the branch’s growth rate. A disproportionate growth rate is given, if the venture’s growth rate divided by the branch’s growth rate is significant higher than one.16 Startups are not only defined by their respective age or growth rate, however. For example, the probability of insolvency for startups is noticeably higher compared to established ventures. Firms with an age of 1 to 5 years have a probability of insolvency of nearly 40%, whereas the probability that ventures with an age of 11 to 15 years become insolvent is roughly 25%.17 Also, Brüderl, Preisendörfer and Ziegler determined that 37% of young ventures fail in their first five years after incorporation.18
Every venture undergoes a certain life cycle and different stages of development of its business. The opportunities for securing startup financing are closely connected to the life cycle model of ventures. This life cycle model is structured in two main stages: Early stage and later stage.19 The early stage is subdivided into seed, startup and first stage. Ventures in seed stage are mainly working on the development of a prototype and elaborating a business concept.20 Also market research is an integral part of the seed stage and is used to estimate a venture’s potential success.21 There- fore, startups require financial resources. The amount of financing needed in the seed stage depends on the type and complexity of a venture’s product. Software startups e.g. developing an app with on-site information scientists need less seed financing than startups producing high-end smartphones. Startups in the seed stage are usually funded through financial bootstrapping, BAs, venture capital (VC), gov- ernmental assistance programs, commercial banks or even through creative meth- ods like barter or trade credits.22 Directly after the seed stage, the startup stage be- gins.23 Ventures in this stage have a sophisticated product in production lane status and finally convert their business idea into an operating entity. Therefore, they need monetary amounts e.g. for equipment, inventory and business formation.24 The first stage represents the last sub-section of the early stage. This stage is characterized by the start of production and subsequently the market launch.25 The first stage is comprised of production, distribution and recruitment and is the stage with the high- est demand on capital.26 VCs often participate in this stage and provide a venture with monetary amounts and know how in terms of corporate strategy and manage- ment.27 The second main stage of the life cycle model is represented by the later stage. This stage is subdivided into the expansion and divesting stage. Ventures in the expansion stage need financial resources for growth. Investments in the fields of recruitment, expansion of production or extension of distribution channels are com- mon in this stage. Furthermore, startups in this phase - generating revenues and positive cash flows - are able to reduce the VC amount and therefore claim e.g. bank loans. Also, private equity in this stage is a common way of financing a startup. VCs, on the other hand, try to prepare their exit in this stage.28 The last stage, the divesting stage, is characterized by transactions such as an IPO or trade sale.29 VCs and pri- vate equity operators especially strive for an IPO, where they sell their stake to the public, aiming to generate high profits.30 Also, during this last step, divesting is an opportunity for financing. Auditing, consulting and controlling costs are high for startups in this stage of a venture’s life cycle. Firms with revenue of less than $100m pay nearly $12m on average to go public.31 Startups often need financial support from third parties including BAs and VCs to successfully start and continue operating their business. Regardless of whether a startup is situated in the seed or divesting stage, financing is an essential factor for fast growth and affects the further develop- ment of a venture. The next chapter deals with four selected traditional forms of startup financing in greater detail.
Financial bootstrapping (following “bootstrapping”) is defined as “minimizing the need for financial capital and finding unique ways of financing a new venture”32. It is the possibility to develop a young firm with limited resources.33 Winborg and Landström define six different methods of bootstrapping.34 The first method of bootstrapping is the so-called “owner financing method”. This method describes all bootstrapping ac- tions that are directly linked with a startup’s manager. The manager, for example uses his personal credit card for corporate expenses or even insists on withholding his salary to help finance the startup. Relatives and friends who provide loans to a venture, or work for a non-market salary for the startup, are elements which belong to the owner financing method. The second method of bootstrapping is defined as the “minimization of accounts receivable”. Managers of young ventures try, for ex- ample, to speed up their invoicing or to cease business with delinquent customers. As a result, this method increases a venture’s liquidity. The third method of boot- strapping is represented by the approach of “joint utilization”. This approach is based on sharing with and borrowing resources from other firms. Managers of bootstrap- ping startups borrow equipment from other companies, or they co-own equipment or even coordinate e.g. material purchases to minimize capital requirements. The fourth method of bootstrapping is known as “delaying payments”. This method includes for example, postponing payments to suppliers or the approach of leasing equipment instead of buying it. The penultimate method of bootstrapping, as defined by Winborg and Landström, is the “minimizing of capital invested in stock”. This minimization can be achieved by searching for the best conditions possible or by even permitting the supplier to finance the resources invested in stock e.g. by both parties having a con- signment stock agreement. The sixth and last method of financial bootstrapping is defined as “subsidy finance”. A startup meeting certain criteria to obtain public sub- sidies can be partly financed by means of these subsidies.
BAs are individuals, often with an entrepreneurial background, who invest capital in startups and early stage ventures.35 The capital may be in form of debt, convertible debt or equity and is usually provided in the early stages of a venture’s life cycle. BAs aim to optimize the venture in the fields of revenue, profit and market position, until the startup is able to receive money from other sources of financing e.g. bank loans.36 To bridge the funding gap between financing through savings, family and friends and VCs, BAs usually provide loans between $100,000 and $250,000.37 Although BAs invest in high-growth and high-risk ventures, they are not seeking exorbitant returns, but rather are realistic and down-to-earth regarding returns.38 Nevertheless, BAs generate returns between 20 and 30 percent on average, for a holding period of approximately five years.39 Angel investors are individuals with expertise and expe- rience in business, and often assume management positions in the firm they invest money in.40 Therefore, firms financed by BAs are characterized by better perfor- mance, higher survival and employment rates, and enhanced exit potential.41 BAs usually invest in ventures with an estimated valuation between $20m and $30m. This is exactly the part of the market where buyers are mainly active. Consequently, BAs have a high probability to exit their investment prospectively.42 Contact between BAs and startup founders frequently occur by way of referrals e.g. friends, family mem- bers or business contacts.43
VCs are usually investment firms that operate in sectors with both high risk and a high probability of return.44 These investment firms can also be described as a mix- ture of investment funds, VC organizations and business consultancies.45 u- ally invest for a period of 3 to 5 years and mostly expect an experienced management team with a proven track record and business concept.46 Therefore, VC is mainly used to finance expansion and growth.47 In most cases, VCs administer pool capital from limited partners and invest about $500,000 to $10,000,000 per company, ex- pecting a return of 20 to 25%.48 Compared to angel investors, VCs do not invest their own money, but money from third parties. Therefore, VCs can at most lose their job or damage their reputation if an investment fails. Moreover, when VCs administer funds from third parties, they are often confronted with pressure to show returns to limited partners. Accordingly, this pressure is certainly transferred to the startup en- trepreneurs.49 In order to compensate possible unsound investments, VC organisa- tions often diversify their risk portfolios and invest in many different businesses.50 The quota of startups VCs select to invest in amounts to 3 to 5 percent.51
Besides BAs, VCs or financial bootstrapping, traditional financing through banks still represents an important source of funds for startups. Bank financing belongs to ex- ternal finance, or more precisely, credit financing. Credit financing is divided up into short-term (less than 1 year), medium-term (1 to 4 years) and long-term (more than 4 years) loans.52 One of the most important short-term forms of credit financing is represented by a credit line. By using the financial instrument of a credit line, com- panies are able to cover their current account to a certain determined maximal level, without providing any assets as collateral (sometimes accounts receivable or inven- tories are used to secure a short-term loan).53 In exchange, banks charge a contrac- tually defined amount of interest for utilization of the credit line. Credit lines are usu- ally contracted for a medium-term period. Nevertheless, they are characterized as a short-term financing instrument, because credit lines should enable a startup to com- pensate short-term or seasonal fluctuations.54 Moreover, banks have the authority to not extend a credit line, or even cancel the credit line, when a firm is using it perma- nently.55 Therefore, banks often use the clean-up clause, which requires a venture to be completely out of debt for at least 30 days per year.56 Another form of bank financing is represented by medium- and long-term loans, also known as term loans. The duration of medium- and long-term loans is defined as from 1 to 10 years. Startups using this financial instrument receive a certain amount of money from the bank and have to repay this amount in equal periodic instalments that include reim- bursement plus a contractually determined interest. Term loans are, contrary to most short-term loans, backed by collateral. For example when financing equipment with a term-loan, the loan is backed by a certain machinery as collateral.57 Banks usually fund startups generating a positive cash flow; startups in the seed stage, however, mainly generate expenses, e.g. for research and business development, and are not able to generate a turnover. Consequently, banks do not provide most startups in the seed, startup or first stage with bank loans.58 Moreover, most startups do not have enough collateral in the beginning of their lifetime to back a bank loan.59
Startups need a sound base of financial resources to run their business, either for research, market launch or growth and expansion purposes. Therefore, young ven- tures often rely on external financiers, but the search for investors and other external financial resources may lead to potential problems for startups. These problems mainly have their origin in the characteristics of a startup. One of the main issues regarding startup financing is that startups are young firms, often without a proven track record and mostly without any forms of collateral.60 Accessible collateral is nec- essary for a bank to provide startups with term loans.61 Another issue relating to startup financing is the high risk involved with these ventures.62 In particular, a high risk of failure deters many external financiers from providing a young venture in their infancy with monetary amounts. A further problem becomes evident when comparing startups with established or even publicly-held companies. Due to the obligation to publicly disclose results, commercial and non-commercial investors can obtain de- tailed information about listed firms with minimal effort. However, detailed information about a startup and its core business are hardly accessible. This is often the case when it comes to restrictive founders, who do not provide information about their core business to third parties for fear that information may leak through to competitors.63 These startup entrepreneurs will face challenges finding a financier without providing sufficient information about their business concept and plans. On the other hand, external financiers may also have more information about the venture’s potential in a certain industry than the startup itself.64 An example is when investors who possess a great deal of experience in the branch the startup is operating in. These financiers may have a lot more information about the branch’s current trends or the prospective development than startup entrepreneurs themselves. This information disparity be- tween investors and entrepreneurs is also known as information asymmetry.
The influence of information asymmetry on financial transactions, especially with re- gard to young and small ventures, can be described by having a look at the general relationship between entrepreneur and financier. Jensen and Meckling call this rela- tionship “Agency Theory” and define it as a “contract under which one or more per- sons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”.65 Both parties, the principal and the agent, are defined as utility maximizers and both, having different interests, act in their own self-interest. Furthermore, Jen- sen and Meckling describe that it is generally impossible to guarantee that the agent will always make optimal decisions from the principal’s point of view, without incurring costs.66 Moreover, it is assumed that there is information asymmetry between these two parties.67 These two factors - the different interests and information asymmetry between principal and agent - lead to two major problems in the context of a principleagent relationship.68 The first problem is “Adverse Selection” and occurs when one party acts opportunistically before signing a contract (ex ante).69 The principal has three different possibilities to reduce the information asymmetry between principal and agent.70 The first is “Screening” and this strategy helps the principal receive more information about the agent. A typical form of screening is an analysis of the agent’s creditworthiness, for example. The second way to reduce information asymmetry ex ante is known as “Signalling”. This approach describes the process where the agent wants to persuade the principal as to his qualities and characteristics. A proper way to demonstrate this is through a testimonial. The third possibility to reduce infor- mation asymmetry ex ante is described by the approach of “Self Selection”. The prin- cipal presents different contracts to the agent and affords the agent the possibility to choose one of them. Depending on the agent’s selection, the principal allows a con- clusion regarding the agent’s intention. Problems regarding information asymmetry may also appear after a contract is signed up. This problem is known as “Moral Haz- ard” and occurs when one party acts opportunistically after a contract is finalized (ex post). To prevent the problems of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a principle- agent transaction, appropriate measures of costs must be taken from both parties. Costs, which arise during a principal-agent relationship, are known as “Agency Costs”.71 Agency Costs are the sum of monitoring expenditures by the principal, bonding costs by the agent and residual loss. The monitoring of costs transpire when the principal tries to influence the agent’s behaviour positively by controlling it.72 In the context of a financial transaction between a financier and a startup, an example of monitoring costs are investor requested periodical reports. The startup (agent) has to prepare presentations, figures, financial statements and additional information re- quested by the investor (principal). Costs that occur because the venture’s manage- ment spends time on the preparation of financial statements, is an example of mon- itoring costs. The second component of agency costs are bonding costs. Bonding costs are costs, which an agent expends to show the principal that he is acting in the principal’s best interest.73 The agent does so by excluding a certain behaviour cred- ibly that the principal does not tolerate.74 An example of bonding expenditures in the context of startup financing is a contract that requires the startup entrepreneur (agent) to remain with the firm for a certain period, after the financiers investment. By signing a contract, the agent shows the principal that he acts in the principal’s best interest and displays loyalty towards the investor. These bonding expenditures made by the agent are opportunity costs e.g. that the agent may decline a job offer from another firm. The last component of agency costs is the residual loss. Even when monitoring and bonding costs are incurred, there may still be a divergence between the principal’s and the agent’s interests. The costs that ensue from this divergence between the principal and the agent are known as residual losses.75
Jensen and Meckling’s theory shows that the divergence of information and interests between principal and agent leads to higher costs. The greater the divergence of information and interests in an agency relationship, the higher the expenditures for monitoring and bonding. Applying the agency theory on financing and comparing (1) a financial transaction between a financier and an established firm with (2) a trans- action of a financier and a startup, it appears that case (2) leads to higher agency costs than case (1). The reason for this that the information asymmetry in case (2) is greater than in case (1).76 Due to the high agency costs in information asymmetry, these losses are primary issues in the context of startup financing.
1 Cf. Hahn, C. (2014), p. 5.
2 Cf. Hawawini G., Viallet, C. (2011), p. 295; Holden, G., Belew, S., Elad, J., Rich, J. R. (2009), p. 109; Klonowski D. (2014), p. 139.
3 Cf. OECD (2015), p. 168; Hahn, C. (2014), p. 5ff.
4 Cf. Holden, G., Belew, S., Elad, J., Rich, J. R. (2009), p. 105.
5 Cf. OECD (2013a), p. 48.
6 Cf. http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-and-university-of-cambridge/$FILE/EY-cam- bridge-alternative-finance-report.pdf, date: 31.01.2016, p. 12.
7 Cf. http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-and-university-of-cambridge/$FILE/EY-cam- bridge-alternative-finance-report.pdf, date: 31.01.2016, p. 3.
8 Cf. http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-and-university-of-cambridge/$FILE/EY-cam- bridge-alternative-finance-report.pdf, date: 31.01.2016, pp. 13, 18, 37.
9 Cf. Sixt, E. (2014), p. 28.
10 Cf. http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Definition/start-up-unternehmen.html, date: 31.01.2016.
11 Cf. Ries, E. (2001), p. 252.
12 Cf. Fallgatter, M. (2002), p. 29.
13 Cf. Brachtendorf, G. (2004), p. 4.
14 Cf. Moog, P. (2004), p. 2.
15 Cf. http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Dax-30- Unternehmen_2012/$FILE/Dax30_Praesen- tation_2012.pdf, date: 31.01.2016, p. 2.
16 Cf. Hayn, M. (1998), p. 21.
17 Cf. Dunne, T., Roberts, M. J., Samuelson, L. (1989), p. 676.
18 Cf. Brüderl, J., Preisendörfer, R. (1992), p. 236.
19 Cf. Rudolph, B. (2006), p. 222ff.
20 Cf. Rudolph, B. (2006), p. 223.
21 Cf. Caselli, S. (2010), p. 18.
22 Cf. Caselli, S. (2010), p. 18; Leach, J. C., Melicher, R. W. (2014), p. 26ff.
23 Cf. Rudolph, B. (2006), p. 223.
24 Cf. Caselli, S. (2010), pp. 18-19.
25 Cf. Rudolph, B. (2006), p. 224; Sixt, E. (2014), p. 47.
26 Cf. Breuel, B. (1988), p. 584.
27 Cf. Rudolph, B. (2006), p. 225.
28 Cf. ibid.
29 Cf. Rudolph, B. (2006), p. 223.
30 Cf. Rudolph, B. (2006), p. 225.
31 Cf. https://www.pwc.com/us/en/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf, date:
31.01.2016, p. 8.
32 Leach, J. C., Melicher, R. W. (2014), p. 118.
33 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 130.
34 Cf. Winborg, J., Landström, H. (2001), p. 243ff.
35 Cf. Holden, G., Belew, S., Elad, J., Rich, J. R. (2009), p. 108.
36 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 137.
37 Cf. Holden, G., Belew, S., Elad, J., Rich, J. R. (2009), p. 108.
38 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 137.
39 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 138.
40 Cf. ibid.
41 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 137.
42 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 138.
43 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 139.
44 Cf. Holden, G., Belew, S., Elad, J., Rich, J. R. (2009), p. 109.
45 Cf. Breuel, B. (1988), p. 582.
46 Cf. Bloomfield, S. (2008), p.44; Holden, G., Belew, S., Elad, J., Rich, J. R. (2009), p. 109.
47 Cf. Rudolph, B. (2006), p. 225.
48 Cf. Holden, G., Belew, S., Elad, J., Rich, J. R. (2009), p. 109; Klonowski D. (2014), p. 139; Breuel, B. (1988), p. 582.
49 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 140.
50 Cf. Breuel, B. (1988), p. 582.
51 Cf. Breuel, B. (1988), p. 585.
52 Cf. Lüscher-Marty, M. (2011), chapter 3.30.
53 Cf. Reichling, P, Beinert, C., Henne, A. (2005), pp. 138-139; Hawawini G., Viallet, C. (2001), p. 294.
54 Cf. Reichling, P, Beinert, C., Henne, A. (2005), pp. 138-139.
55 Cf. Lüscher-Marty, M. (2011), chapter 4.02.
56 Cf. Hawawini G., Viallet, C. (2011), p. 294.
57 Cf. Hawawini G., Viallet, C. (2011), p. 295.
58 Cf. Klonowski D. (2014), p. 142.
59 Cf. Hahn, C. (2014), p. 5ff.
60 Cf. OECD (2015), p. 168; Hahn, C. (2014), p. 5ff.
61 Cf. Hahn, C. (2014), p. 5ff.
62 Cf. OECD (2015), p. 168.
63 Cf. Winborg, J., Landström, H. (2001), p. 237.
64 Cf. ibid.
65 Cf. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976), p. 308.
66 Cf. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976), p. 308.
67 Cf. OECD/IEA (2007), pp. 27-28.
68 Cf. OECD/IEA (2007), p. 27-28.
69 Cf. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976), p. 308.
70 Cf. Heyd, R., Beyer, M. (2011), p. 34.
71 Cf. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976), p. 308.
72 Cf. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976), pp. 308-309.
73 Cf. ibid.
74 Cf. Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon (2000), p. 55.
75 Cf. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976), pp. 308-309; Fabozzi, F. J., Drake, P. P. (2009), p. 298.
76 Cf. OECD (2006), p. 19.
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