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Foreign commercial policy represents a major domain of European integration and an exclusive policy competence for the European Union. The strategy, focus and practical approach of this EU trade policy has been continuously adapted to the new circumstances in an ever more globalised world economy. Thus, the EU uses its foreign trade policy not just for mere economic ends but also as a tool to strengthen its global political influence.
Having been a champion of multilateral trade negotiations in the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) throughout the 1990s, the has EU changed this strategic orientation by the mid-2000s shifting its trade policy focus from a multilateral to a bilateral strategy and initiated preferential free trade agreements (FTA) with countries and regions all over the world. Among them, the one with the largest size was the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States of America, launched in 2013.
Given the huge importance of the EU as a player in global trade, it seems relevant to examine from a political scientific perspective what have been the main reasons, drivers and motivations behind this enormous policy shift. I argue that external factors, domestic interests and institutional dynamics have collectively contributed to the reorientation of EU trade policy from multi- to bilateralism.
I will test this hypothesis by means of three theoretical approaches: neorealism as a systemic theory, liberalism as a theory with a domestic focus and institutionalism to examine the role of the most important EU institution in trade policy, the European Commission.
In order to get a more profound analysis of the main actors and motivations as driving forces of EU trade policy, I will furthermore use a case study on the, both in ambition and size, unrivalled bilateral Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as it, due to its sheer economic and political impact on the both partners involved but also on the rest of the world, provides best significant insights of processes on all three levels of analysis of this paper.
The key finding of this paper is that indeed all three level of analysis - systemic, domestic and institutional - have each a valuable explanatory power elucidating why the EU has embraced a gradually more bilateral approach in its trade policy. Yet, they cannot be seen separately from each other but mutually influence each other. In a nutshell, the global power shift for the benefit of emerging powers and to the detriment of Europe in combination with strong economic interest groups within the EU seeking for market access all over the world as well as self-interests, norms and processes within the European Commission have altogether contributed to the change of course in EU trade policy towards bilateralism.
European Union Bilateralism
Multilateralism Neorealism Liberalism
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
List of Abbreviations
1 The bilateral shift in EU trade policy, TTIP and its scientific relevance
1.1 Research topic, relevance and methodology
1.2 EU trade strategy: from bilateralism to multilateralism and back
1.3 TTIP: the climax of EU trade bilateralism?
2 Neorealism - a structural approach to international relations with states as unitary actors
2.1 Terms, assumptions and key actors of neorealism
2.2 A neorealist approach to the bilateral shift of EU trade policy
2.3 A neorealist explanation of TTIP
3 Commercial Liberalism - Economic interests and preferences as the main driver of international politics
3.1 Terms, assumptions and key actors of liberalism
3.2 A liberal approach to the bilateral shift of EU trade policy
3.3 A liberal explanation of TTIP
4 Institutionalism - Institutions as key actors with self-interest and ‘path- dependency’
4.1 Terms, assumptions and key actors of Institutionalism
4.2 An institutionalist approach to the bilateral shift of EU trade policy
4.3 An institutionalist explanation of TTIP
5.1 Theoretical Conclusions
5.2 Empirical Conclusions
5.3 Broader theoretical implications and policy recommendations
illustration not visible in this excerpt
Commercial policy has been an important element of European external action since the end of the establishment of the European Economic Community in the 1950ies.1 Trade policy therefore also represents a major domain of European integration, some call it its “raison d ’ê tre”, after the Second World War and is today one of the rare political fields where the European Union exerts treaty-based exclusive competence.2 The way EU trade policy is shaped has oscillated significantly during the last decades but in an ever more globalised and interconnected world economy where Europe seeks to play a key role, it has become a vital question that will partly define Europe’s future place in the world.3
During the 2000s, the EU “diametrically” changed its strategic orientation by shifting its trade policy from a multilateral focus in the framework of the so-called Doha Round embedded in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to a bilateral focus by initiating preferential free trade agreements (FTA) with countries and regional blocks all over the world.4
Given the huge importance of the EU as both a “power in trade” but also a “power through trade”, it seems relevant to examine from a political scientific perspective what have been the main reasons, drivers and motivations behind this enormous policy shift.5 I argue that external factors (the power shift in the international system of states away from previously dominant ‘Western’6 powers to emerging countries, especially China), domestic interests (in particular expected welfare gains of economic interest groups in the EU) and institutional dynamics (the EU Commission as the most important institution of European trade policy) have collectively contributed to the reorientation of EU trade policy from multi- to bilateralism.
I will test this hypothesis by means of three theoretical approaches, two of them originated in the research field of International Relations (neorealism and liberalism), another one deriving from theories of European Integration (historical institutionalism).
I will use neorealism because it seeks to explain the external behaviour of states as a mere consequence of the distribution of power in the international system, thus being exclusively external factors which determine foreign action of states.7 In sharp contrast to the neorealist ‘systemic’ approach stands the liberal point of view that regards state interests not as defined from the outside but rather from the inside, in other words domestic interests are the crucial drivers behind every external action of a state, including the affirmation or negation of trade cooperation.8 Therefore, the liberal perspective is indispensable in order to test the hypothesis stated above. Furthermore, both external, hence neorealist, and domestic, hence liberal, factors are two key approaches of International Political Economy and therefore useful tools in the analysis of international trade policy.9
Even though some scholars argue that constructivism and post- positivism have arisen to be very significant theories in today’s International Relations, I will not take these into consideration because the critical, post-positivist assumption of constructivism of a reality that is defined by nothing but common ideas and perceptions is in my view, opposed to neorealism and liberalism, not “substantial” enough to sufficiently answer the research question on EU trade policy of this paper which I will base on empirically reproducible findings.10 Nevertheless, some normative elements will be treated when I will analyse the ‘institutional culture’ of the European Commission and its impact on the EU trade policy in the context of my third theoretical approach, institutionalism.
As the first two theories just presented cover two key elements of my hypothesis, I will thirdly use, mainly ‘historical’, institutionalism because it offers a method for deriving analytical insights, allowing to focus on different aspects of trade policy and bringing together wide-reaching decisions and every day policy-making; it is therefore a “method of analysing the multifaceted nature of EU governance”.11 I will not include two other major theories of European integration because one of them, intergovernmentalism, strongly insists on the assumption that it is actually only the member states deciding about European policies, however the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is a an exclusive competence of the EU and falls therefore, as shown above, to the largest extent under the responsibility of the EU Commission.12 The second integration theory, neofunctionalism, for the purpose of this thesis, deals too much with EU policies in the context of the EU integration and too little with policy processes within the EU and the drivers behind it, as does institutionalism, which is why I consider it as not appropriate for the research topic presented above.13
Methodologically, I will furthermore use the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as a single case study in order to fathom out better what different motivations are at the root of the general EU trade strategy shift towards bilateralism. This planned EU-US free trade agreement appears to be an appropriate case for two main reasons. Firstly, it is one of the largest trade agreement ever negotiated with a huge expected impact upon the future of world trade which lets it seems likely that systemic, domestic and institutional factors have contributed their share to the initiation of TTIP.14 Secondly, TTIP can be seen, due to its sheer size and probable impact on the global trade system, as the peak in a series of new bilateral trade agreements initiated by the EU since the mid-2000s.15 This is less the case for other EU trade agreements as for instance the one with Canada (‘CETA’) or with South Korea which each represent a much smaller business area than the United States and can therefore be considered to have less repercussions on systemic, domestic and institutional actors and factors.16
In the following I will give a descriptive overview about EU trade policy and EU trade strategies in the last (about) 20 years (1.2) as well as the background and a short history of TTIP (1.3). Then I will introduce each of the three theories at the beginning of each chapter (2.1, 3.1, 4.1) by presenting their key assumptions and what are the crucial actors from their respective theoretical perspective. Subsequently, I will apply all of these theories both for the general EU trade policy (2.2, 3.2, 4.2) and for the case study on TTIP (2.3, 3.3, 4.3). In my conclusion, I will finally elaborate on the theoretical key findings of this thesis (5.1), to what extent the empirical findings of this thesis can give an answer to the initial research question for the main drivers and motivations for the EU trade strategy shift from multi- to bilateralism (5.2) before completing with theoretical and practical-empirical policy implications of these findings (5.3).
The trade strategy of the EU (respectively its predecessor, the ‘European Communities’) originally had a rather clear focus on bilateral agreements and relations with mainly states which are former European colonies, mostly in Africa and the Caribbean, as well as with those countries in its close neighbourhood.17 This bilateral concentration of EU trade policy was however more and more ousted by a multilateral direction in the framework of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), followed by several multilateral negotiation rounds, and even more with the Repositioning the Transatlantic Relationship for a Changing World, Washington DC, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014, pp. ix-xi. establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 after the Uruguay Round.18
When the former WTO director Pascal Lamy became EU Commissioner for trade, the EU’s stance in favour of multilateralism became even more assertive, peaking in a general EU “de facto moratorium” of new bilateral trade agreements in 1999 in order to strengthen global multilateral efforts for trade liberalisation and not jeopardizing them with alternative bilateral negotiations.19 Subsequently, in 2001 a new round of multilateral trade talks in the framework of the WTO was launched in Qatar, the so-called Doha Development Agenda (DDA or ‘Doha Round’).20
However, those negotiations turned out to be extremely difficult mainly due to hardened positions between industrialised ‘Northern’ countries and developing ‘Southern’ countries.21 As a matter of fact, the latter behaved much more assertive and self-confident than in prior trade liberalisation rounds and defended their positions (mainly against agricultural subsidies in the ‘North’) against the industrial countries to an extent which eventually resulted in a mere stalemate during the DDA talks in Cancun in 2003 and an official suspension of the talks by the then WTO director Pascal Lamy in July 2006.22
With the multilateral Doha Round blocked, more and more countries initiated alternative bilateral agreements, leaving the EU as a lone voice in the wilderness still claiming that multilateralism was the best way for future trade liberalisation.23
Yet, in a global environment that turned its back more and more on multilateralism, the EU eventually decided to drop its moratorium on new bilateral trade deals and issued a new trade strategy in October 2006, under the direction of the new EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson, named ‘Global Europe’ which explicitly mentioned the EU’s “main trade interests” and clearly stated that the EU “should continue to factor other issues and the wider role of trade policy in EU external relations into bilateral trade developments”.24 This new paradigm was overall confirmed in another trade strategy called ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs’, published in 2010 underlining that the “agenda of an ambitious new generation of bilateral trade agreements […] is the right course for Europe to follow and it has started to bring results”.25
Even though both documents also emphasised that multilateral trade talks would still be the best option for further liberalisation of commerce, some scholars argued that the change of strategy in EU trade was nothing but “diametrically opposite to the EU’s previous trade strategy with focus on multilateral agreements and not economic interests”.26
As a practical consequence of this ‘diametrical’ shift, the EU initiated more and more bilateral trade talks with a gradually growing number of countries and regions, already in 2007 with India, South Korea and ASEAN.27 Yet, in 2013 the EU started bilateral negotiations for an even more ambitious trade deal - the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the United States of America.28
In fact, the idea of a transatlantic free trade agreement did not come out of the blue but had already been discussed in the mid-1990ies.29 The project failed back then however, among others due to the strong European commitment to multilateralism which should not be hampered by a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and the US working in opposite direction.30
Nevertheless, in the context of both the global turn towards more bilateralism in trade and the EU ‘diametrical’ shift in favour of bilateral trade negotiations, the concept of an EU-US free trade agreement gained momentum anew. In 2007, a
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) was established consisting of “officials from external trade, regulatory, commercial and scientific agencies in the EU and the United States”.31 On top of that, in the context of a EU-US summit in Washington in 2011 the TEC got the task to form a High Level Working Group (HLWG), “designed to identify and assess options for strengthening the transatlantic trade and investment relationship”.32 The latter proposed its results in February 2013, recommending the initiation of TTIP, especially underling the tremendous economic and welfare gains this project could possibly create.33 The TTIP negotiations were launched in February 2013 and the first round was held in July 2013.34
Given the sheer economic weight of the EU and the US, TTIP is much more than just another bilateral free trade agreement. It combines the two largest economies in the world, together making up for almost 50% of global Gross Domestic Product and one third of world trade.35 Subsequently, both the EU and the US “are recognized trade powers”.36 They are also by far the most important senders and receivers of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with the US investing three times more in Europe than on the fast growing Asian continent, in turn the European FDI “in the USA are about eight times EU investments in India and China combined”.37
In light of these numbers, it is evident to what large extent a successful and comprehensive agreement on trade and investment liberalisation between these two largest economies in the world would have an impact on the rest of the world and very likely the future of global trade. Therefore, some observers categorise TTIP not just simply as a bilateral trade agreement but rather as a “mega-regional” one, being “unique” in its size.38
Considering the magnitude of TTIP, a scientific examination of what have been the main drivers and motivations behind the launch of this ‘mega-regional’ trade agreement from both a theoretical and empirical angle seems therefore necessary in order to understand the profound reasons for this political decision. This again will also allow to draw conclusions on the motivations behind the overall bilateral focus of EU trade policy since the mid-2000s.
The first theoretical framework that will be used is neorealism, which is also known as ‘structural realism’. It has this name affix because one of its main assumptions is that states behave in a certain manner due to external constraints posed by the structure of the international system.39 In other words, the structure of the international system defines, instead of individuals or the internal political system (e.g. democratic or not) and domestic factors (as for example social or economic) of an individual state, how states act in order to secure their security; this is the focus of neorealist analyses.40
In neorealism, states are the by far most important (yet not the only) actors in the international system.41 Waltz emphasises that states are unitary actors (‘units’) which is to say that from a neorealist point of view, the internal political processes of a state are not crucial for their foreign policy since the latter is determined by the structure of the international system (“systemic effects”).42 What motivates states in their external behaviour are security for the state and its citizens, the will to survive as an entity and the denial of cooperation.43 Furthermore, states are rational actors, which is to say that the balance of ends and means plays a crucial role in their political action.44
The international system is, according to Waltz, strongly marked by an anarchy between the states as on this interstate-level there is no such thing as a superordinate power which has the legitimacy and the authority to enforce law and order as it is the case inside with a national state hierarchy.45 This anarchy in the international system results in a mere struggle for survival among all states because “anarchy is associated with the occurrence of violence”, hence violent conflicts could come up at any time.46 Another consequence of this assumed anarchy is that the international system is a so-called “self-help system” where each state tries to ensure its survival against the other states entirely on his own or via alliances.47 The core principle for states in a neorealist is therefore, put bluntly with Waltz: “take care of yourself”.48
Even though the interior of the states does not play a play in neo-realism, Waltz admits that they differ tremendously, first and foremost, in their so-called capabilities, which are the most important indicators for the power of a state within the international system.49 This distribution of capabilities therefore determines the shape of the international structure, hence if one state is more powerful than the others in military, political or economic terms.50
Additionally, worldwide security can be secured in the best way by a global power balance as it decreases the likelihood of expansionist aggressions and war because every state has to fear a counter attack of other states (which are equally or similarly strong).51
This is why as soon as imbalances come up via a change of the distribution of capabilities and power, those need to be equalized, either through unilateral action or in cooperation wither others, in order to avoid a superiority of one state which imperils the security of other states.52 This again demonstrates to what extent the structure of the international system is an imperative to the behaviour of states.
Also Gilpin argues, more from an International Political Economy view, that states must be vigilant to “changes in power relations”, “shifts in the international balance of power” and “actual or potential threats” and what these imply “for their own national interests” since they might pose a possible peril to the states’ political and economic autonomy.53 This in turn brings up the question to what extent neorealism considers economic and commercial policy as a tool so ensure the security and survival of states.
Despite the fact that neo-realism is linked with a focus on ‘high-politics’ (hence the question of war and peace) and less on ‘low politics’ (e.g. economic and trade issues), economic questions have always played a decisive role in the international struggle for survival and security.54 Neorealists also underline that a mere military strength does not ensure political influence and that for example economically strong countries are not per se also military powers.55 Instead, the combination of their various capabilities (including economic strength) is the key to success, hence to ensure the survival in the international anarchic system.56
Carr has elaborated the “illusory character of the popular distinction between economic and military power” and that “power is an element of all political action, is one and indivisible.”57 Military and economic means are thus “used for the same ends” as well as “both integral parts of political power; and in the long run one is helpless without the other.”58 That means for the research topic of this thesis that also from a neorealist perspective economic and commercial policies can be used in order to secure the security and mere survival of states.
Gilpin agrees with this approach underlining that “international economic and security affairs” are “intimately joined” and their relationship is “reciprocal”.59 He argues that the more wealthy a country becomes the more important it is in the international political system, thus shifting power to fast growing economies.60 Subsequently, this change in the “international balance of power causes states to redefine their national interests and foreign policies” with sometimes severe impact on the functioning of the international economy.61 According to Gilpin, states constantly try to shape the rules and system of the world economy so it becomes favourable to their interests, which can be done both unilaterally or by forming alliances with other states.62
Yet, as mentioned above, neorealism postulates that states are unwilling to cooperate. This is because of the inherent fear that the partner could either gain relatively more from the partnership, because of the possibility of being betrayed by the cooperation partner, or the simple concern to become too dependent on other actors which has raised criticism that neorealism cannot explain sufficiently international cooperation.63 In our case, it is particularly important to actually understand from a theoretical point of view why the EU (respectively the member states forming this Union) are interested in trade agreements in general and in TTIP in particular. In fact, neorealism sees cooperation between self-interested states as possible under three conditions.
First of all, also from a neorealist view cooperation is also an option “among egoists under conditions of strategic interdependence” and “if they expect to continue to interact with each other for the indefinite future”.64 In other words, a clear strategic advantage and the perspective of being intertwined for the foreseeable future motivates states from a neorealist point of view to cooperate closely.
Another precondition to form an alliance is a common interest among partner states, which is mostly the “fear of other states”.65 One example Waltz gives is the integration of Western European states after the Second World War which, according to him, happened out of fear of a Soviet invasion underlining his standpoint that for the maintenance of an alliance the external factors are crucial and not those within the states.66
Lastly, the behaviour of states depends very much on the actions and level power of other states, subsequently if a group of states risks losing power relatively to others, states will either go for strengthening their capabilities on their own or, and this is important for the theoretical ground of international cooperation, try to grow stronger in an alliance.67 As outlined above, this can also mean economic alliances, like bilateral preferential trade deals.
I have shown that from a neorealist point of view, states are the rationally acting key players in an anarchic, international system and the structure of this system defines their actions. As soon as there comes up a power shift within the system, due to a redistribution of capabilities among states, states fearing a relative loss of power try to rebalance this development by either unilateral or common action. Economic and commercial policy can be one means to this end. A cooperation between states is possible if all participants see a strategic advantage in the alliance, consider cooperating also in the future, are linked by a common interest (mostly fear of other states) and try to react to the actions of other states.
In the following, I will therefore analyse to what extent structural power shifts in the international system, thus changing distribution of capabilities among states and actions of other states, have resulted in a bilateral shift of EU trade strategy and to the initiation of TTIP.
From a neorealist point of view, the question arises if there have been structural shifts in the international political system, hence the distribution of capabilities and power among states, and to what extent those have contributed to the change of EU trade policy strategy to a bilateral focus. Also, from a neorealist perspective one needs to examine in how far external factors such as the actions of other states have enticed the EU (in a neorealist sense as the mere sum of its member states) to reconsider its multilateral trade focus. The shift in distribution of capabilities and other states’ action combined, I will evaluate to what extent the EU has regarded these as a threat that triggers a necessary European counter-reaction.
Concerning the distribution of capabilities, it is undeniable that a tremendous power shift has taken place, especially in economic terms, to the detriment of Europe.68 Emerging countries, first and foremost China but also other countries such as for example Russia, India and Brazil (together they are often referred to as the ‘BRICs’) have caught up enormously in economic terms thanks to faster growth rates than those in the EU and have therefore also increased their share in global trade.69 For instance, the EU’s share in global trade of goods feel from 18% in 2003 to 15% in 2014, whereas China increased its global share in this category from 5% in 2000 to 15% in 2014.70 “Chinas has become a ‘mega-trader’” analyses Dicken, underlining that the People’s Republic is today “the largest manufacturing producer, the largest agricultural producer, the largest exporter of merchandise and the world’s second largest importer”.71 Plus, China has arisen from a poor developing country in the 1980ies to today’s second most important economy worldwide.72 Emerging countries accounted for 15% of global trade at the time the ‘Global Europe’ strategy was issued in 2006 and this number has grown enormously ever since.73 Dicken therefore notes that the global economic developments in the last years have resulted in “an undoubted shift in the centre of gravity of the world economy”.74
Peterson agrees that “the balance of economic power in the international system has changed”.75 Emerging markets exert this newly gained economic power also in the political sphere, resulting in a “power transition” to the favour that creates “systematic pressure” upon the EU.76 For instance, in International organisations - that have been created by the West, (also with the goal to serve its interest) - emerging countries are more and more reluctant to play by the rules established by Europeans and Americans after the Second World War, as became obvious for example during the DDA conference in Cancun in 2003 when the emerging and developing countries did not simply submit to the claims of the industrialised ‘Northern’ countries because they did not see their requests (for more market access to ‘Northern’ states) fulfilled.77 This stalemate has been blocking the DDA negotiations, officially suspended in July 2006, for years and it demonstrates how much influence emerging powers have already won, seeking to further challenging the formerly dominating players Europe and the United States.78
1 S. Gstöhl, “The European Union’s Trade Policy”, Ritsumeikan International Affairs, vol. 11, 2013 p. 2.
2 European Union, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union of 13 December 2007”, Brussels, 2010, art. 3(1)(e); S. Meunier & K. Nicolaidis, “The European Union as a Trade Power”, in C. Hill & M. Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011,, p. 276.
3 R. Ahearn, “Europe’s New Trade Agenda”, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS22547, 2006, pp. 2.-3.; M. Dee & J. Mortensen, “Responding to new powers: The EU’s global trade strategy moving forward”, European Policy Brief, European Commission, December 2014, pp. 2-3.
4 R. Leal-Arcas, “The European Union and the BRIC Countries. Unilateralism, Bilateralism and Multilateralism”, in F. Laursen (ed.), The EU in the Global Political Economy, Brussels, P.I.E Peter Lang pp. 102-103.
5 Meunier & Nicolaidis, op. cit., p. 294.
6 These dominant Western powers are in my, very simplified, understanding the United States of America and Europe.
7 N. Schörnig, “Neorealismus”, in S. Schieder & M. Spindler (eds.), Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen, Opladen, Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2010, 3rd edition, p. 70.
8 A. Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, International Organization, vol. 51, no. 4, 1997, p. 513.
9 G. Siles-Brügge, “Bringing Politics Back In: Economic Interests and the Shift Toward Bilateralism in EU Trade Policy”, paper presented at the ECPR ‘Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 24-26 January 2010, p. 5.
10 J. Peterson, John, A. Riccardo & N. Tocci, “Mutlipolarity, Multilateralism and Leadership: The Retreat of the West?”, in Riccardo Alcaro, John Peterson & Ettore Greco, The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 46.; C. Ulbert, “Sozialkonstruktivismus”, in Siegried Schieder & Manuela Spindler (eds.), Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen, Opladen, Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2010, 3rd edition pp. 427-429.
11 S. Bulmer, “New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 3, 1998, pp. 376, 382.
12 H.-J., Bieling, “Intergouvernementalismus”, in H.-J., Bieling & M. Lerch (eds.), Theorien der europ ä ischen Integration, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005, pp. 91-94.
13 D. Wolf, “Neo-Funktionalismus”, in H.-J., Bieling & M. Lerch (eds.), Theorien der europ ä ischen Integration, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005, pp. 66-74.
14 C. Damro, “Competitive Interdependence: Transatlantic Relations and Global Economic Governance”, in R. Alcaro, J. Peterson & E. Greco, The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 181, 189-191; F. De Ville & G. Silles-Brügge, „Why TTIP is a game-changer and its critics have a point”, Journal of European Public Policy, 25 November 2016, p. 2; D. Hamilton, “TTIP’s Geostrategic Implications”, in D. Hamilton (ed.), The Geopolitics of TTIP:
15 Damro, op. cit. pp. 189-191; European Commission, “Countries and Regions: United States”, 22 February 2017; European Commission, “European Commission welcomes adoption of negotiating mandates for new Free Trade Agreements with India, Korea and ASEAN”, IP/07/540, Brussels, 23 April 2017
16 European Commission, “Countries and Regions: Canada”, 28 March 2017; European Commission, “Countries and Regions: South Korea”, 22 February 2017.
17 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Global Europe: Competing in the World - A contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy”, COM(2006) 567 final, Brussels, 4 October 2006, pp. 8-9; J. Rollo, “Global Europe: Old Mercantilist Wine in New Bottles?”, 2006, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 403- 405.
18 Siles-Brügge, “Bringing Politics In”, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
19 S. Woolcock, Stephen, “European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements”, EPICE Working Paper, no. 3, 2007, p. 2.
20 European Commission, “Doha Development Agenda”, 20 April 2016
21 C. Ries, “The Strategic Significance of TTIP”, in Daniel Hamilton (ed.), The Geopolitics of TTIP: Repositioning the Transatlantic Relationship for a Changing World, Washington DC, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014, p. 3.
22 “EU and US play Doha Round ‘blame game’”, Euractiv, 28 May 2012; C. Kupchan, “Parsing TTIP’s Geopolitical Implications”, in in Daniel Hamilton (ed.), The Geopolitics of TTIP: Repositioning the Transatlantic Relationship for a Changing World, Washington DC, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014, p. 27; Ries, op. cit., p. 3
23 Dee & Mortensen, op. cit., p. 2.
24 European Commission, “Global Europe”, p. 9; P. Mandelson, European Commissioner for Trade, “Bilateral Agreements in EU trade policy” speech, London, London School of Economics, 9 October 2006.
25 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Trade, Growth and World Affairs - Trade Policy as a core component of the EU’s 2020 strategy”, COM (2010) 612 final, Brussels, 9 November 2010, p. 10.
26 European Commission, “Global Europe”, p. 8; European Commission, “Trade, Growth and World Affairs”, p. 3; Leal-Arcas, op. cit., p. 103.
27 European Commission, IP/07/540, op. cit.
28 European Commission, “Statement from United States President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso”, MEMO/13/94, Brussels, 13 February 2013.
29 Ries, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
31 European Commission, “Transatlantic Economic Council: Cooperation on Innovation and Growth”, 18 February 2015.
32 Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America, “High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth”, unknown date.
33 High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, “Final Report High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth”, 11 February 2013.
34 European Commission, “EU and US conclude first round of TTIP negotiations in Washington”, Brussels, IP/13/69, 12 July 2013.
35 Damro, op. cit., p. 182; Ries, op. cit., p. 4.
36 Damro, op. cit., p. 179.
37 T. Risse, “The Transatlantic Security Community: Erosion from Whitin?”, in R. Alcaro, J. Peterson & E. Greco, The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 29.
38 De Ville & Silles-Brügge, op. cit., p. 2.
39 R. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond.”, in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 166.
40 N. Schörnig, op. cit., pp. 66-67, 69-70.
41 K. Waltz, Kenneth, “Theory of International Politics”, Boston (Massachusetts), McGraw Hill, 1979, p. 95,
42 Ibid., p. 102.
43 Waltz, op. cit., 1979, pp. 91, 105; Schörnig, op. cit., p. 65.
44 Schörnig, op. cit., p. 72.
45 Waltz, op. cit., 1979, pp. 102, 111.
46 Ibid., p. 102.
47 Ibid., p. 104.
48 Ibid., p. 107.
49 Waltz, op. cit., 1979, p. 101.
50 R. Gilpin, “Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order”, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 17; Waltz, op. cit., 1979, p. 101.
51 Schörnig, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
52 Schörnig, op. cit., pp. 75, 78.
53 Gilpin, op. cit., p. 19.
54 E. Carr, “The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 An Introduction to the Study of International Relations”, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1946, pp. 124-132; Schörnig, op. cit., pp. 68.
55 Waltz, op. cit., 1979, p. 130.
56 Ibid., p. 131.
57 Carr, op. cit., p. 132.
59 Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
60 Ibid., p. 23.
62 Ibid., pp. 21, 23.
63 H. Milner, “Interests, Institutions & Information“, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 6-7; Waltz, op. cit., 1979, p. 105.
64 Keohane, op. cit., 196.
65 Waltz, op. cit., 1979, p. 166.
66 K. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A response to my critics”, in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 342.
67 Waltz, op. cit., 1979, pp. 126-127.
68 M. Venhaus, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as a New Strategy to Marginalize Emerging Powers: A Divided Free Trade Order in the Making?”, in D. Cardoso et al. (eds.), The Transatlantic Colossus: Global Contributions to Broaden the Debate on the EU-US Free Trade Agreement, Berlin, Berlin Forum on Global Politics, 2013, p. 59.
69 P. Dicken, “Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy”, London, SAGE Publications, 2015, 7th edition, pp. 24, 27, 30; B. Rudloff, & M. Laurer, “The EU as global trade and investment actor - The times they are a-changin’”, Working Paper RD EU/Europe, 2017/ 01, January 2017, SWP Berlin, 2017, p. 6; Venhaus, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
70 Rudloff & Laurer, op. cit., p. 12.
71 Dicken, op. cit., p. 30.
72 M. Plummer, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the Global Context”, in D. Hamilton (ed.), The Geopolitics of TTIP: Repositioning the Transatlantic Relationship for a Changing World, Washington DC, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014, p. 98.
73 European Commission, “Global Europe”, op. cit. p. 5; Dicken, op. cit., 38-44.
74 Dicken, op. cit., p. 36.
75 J. Peterson, „Introduction: Where Things Stand and What Happens Next”, in R. Alcaro, J. Peterson & E. Greco, The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 5.
76 T. Risse, “The Transatlantic Security Community: Erosion from Whitin?”, in R. Alcaro, J. Peterson & E. Greco, The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 22.
77 L. J. Eliasson & P. Garcia-Duran, “Why TTIP is an unprecedented geopolitical game-change, but not a Polanyian moment”, Journal of European Public Policy, 28 November 2016, pp. 2-3; Dee & Mortensen, op. cit., p. 2., Venhaus op. cit., 60.; J. Howorth, “Sustained Collective Action or Beggar My Neighbour? Europe, America and the Emerging Powers”, in R. Alcaro, J. Peterson & E. Greco, The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 149.
78 R. Ahearn , op. cit., p. 3; Howorth , op. cit., p. 179; Peterson op. cit., 2, 7-8; J. Peterson, R. Alcaro & N. Tocci, “Mutlipolarity, Multilateralism and Leadership: The Retreat of the West?”, in R. Alcaro, J. Peterson & E. Greco, The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 52.