Bachelorarbeit, 2017
46 Seiten, Note: 1,0
1 Introduction
2 Theory
2.1 Ultimatum Game by Güth et al. 1982
2.1.1 Definition
2.1.2 The Framework of the Game
2.1.3 Predicted Subject Behavior
2.2 The Strategy Method
3 A Collection of Ultimatum Game Experiments
3.1 Experimental Results of Thirty Years of Research
3.2 Contradicting Material Opportunism
3.3 Subjects’ Reasoning in the Game
3.4 Subjects’ Motives for Contradicting Material Opportunism
4 The Impact of Social Distance on Subjects’ Behavior in Ultimatum Games
4.1 The Concept of Social Distance
4.1.1 The Term
4.1.2 Social Distance along Dimensions
4.2 Social Distance in the Ultimatum Game
4.2.1 A Procedure for Inducing Social Distance in Experimental Games
4.2.2 The Influence of Social Distance on Subjects’ Behavior
5 The Impact of Communication on Subjects’ Behavior in Ultimatum Games
5.1 The Concept of Communication
5.1.1 The Term
5.1.2 Decreased Social Distance Between Communicators
5.2 Communication in the Ultimatum Game
5.2.1 The Nature of Conversation between Subjects
5.2.2 The Impact of Pre-Play Communication on Subjects’ Behavior
6 Results and Discussion
6.1 Results
6.2 Discussion
6.2.1 Incentives Elicited by Social Distance Variations and Communication
6.2.2 Methodological Issues
7 Conclusion
This thesis examines the influence of social factors, specifically social distance and communication, on player behavior in Ultimatum Game experiments. It investigates whether the common assumptions of material opportunism and pure rationality in economic game theory can be reconciled with empirical evidence that highlights social, motivational, and emotional complexities in human decision-making.
3.2 Contradicting Material Opportunism
The results of the first Ultimatum game already showed that the responder does not consistently go for the alternative which generates the highest payoff (Güth et al., 1982, p. 374). That a responder rejects offers and a proposer offers more than the minimum, clearly demonstrates that the players are not maximizing their own earnings under any circumstances (Camerer, 2003, p. 11). Subjects’ behavior in Ultimatum game experiments diverges systematically from predictions and counters the concept of material opportunism (Güth & Kocher, 2014, p. 397). In addition, the structure of behavioral results also contradicts the rationality condition of game theory and economic theory in general (Güth & Tietz, 1990, p. 446). Camerer (2003) highlighted that this fact does not refute game theory in itself (p. 46), even though it is not of great support in explaining bargaining behavior (Güth et al., 1982, p. 385). According to experimental results, the game-theoretic solution introduced in section 2.1.3 seems to be socially quite intolerable (Güth & Tietz, 1990, p. 417).
In a broader sense, however, subjects do not inevitably disregard rationality. Indeed, there can be many aspects they take into account (Güth & Kocher, 2014, p. 397). Subjects are capable of strategic thinking. They adhere to the strategic concepts of game theory but in their personal format by balancing their own wishes according to their strategic principles (Camerer, 2003, p. 11).
1 Introduction: Introduces the Ultimatum Game as a primary tool in experimental economics and outlines the thesis's focus on the role of social distance and communication in bargaining.
2 Theory: Defines the core concepts of the Ultimatum Game, the subgame perfect equilibrium, and the Strategy Method used to elicit responder strategies.
3 A Collection of Ultimatum Game Experiments: Reviews thirty years of experimental data, addressing why players frequently deviate from material opportunism through fairness concerns and strategic reasoning.
4 The Impact of Social Distance on Subjects’ Behavior in Ultimatum Games: Analyzes how perceived emotional proximity and identifiability affect bargaining outcomes, utilizing social-discounting procedures.
5 The Impact of Communication on Subjects’ Behavior in Ultimatum Games: Explores how various forms of pre-play communication reduce social distance and alter the strategic landscape for proposers and responders.
6 Results and Discussion: Synthesizes empirical findings, highlighting that while communication often promotes generosity, its effects on responder thresholds are nuanced and dependent on content.
7 Conclusion: Summarizes the thesis findings and reflects on the necessity of integrating social realism into economic experiments to better model field-like negotiation settings.
Ultimatum Game, Social Distance, Communication, Material Opportunism, Fairness, Rationality, Strategy Method, Altruism, Reciprocity, Inequity Aversion, Bargaining, Behavioral Economics, Anonymity, Identifiability, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
This work explores how social factors like social distance and communication influence players' decision-making processes in Ultimatum Game experiments, challenging traditional economic models of pure self-interest.
The research centers on the interplay between strategic behavior and social motives, specifically looking at how identifiability, emotional proximity, and various communication protocols (strategic vs. social) impact bargaining.
The study seeks to answer: How does social distance and communication influence subjects’ behavior in the Ultimatum game?
The thesis conducts a selective review and meta-analysis of empirical experimental studies, specifically comparing laboratory outcomes derived from the standard Ultimatum Game and the Strategy Method.
The text covers the historical and theoretical background of the Ultimatum Game, the definition and impact of social distance, the role of face-to-face and pre-play communication, and the synthesis of results regarding proposer and responder behavior.
Key terms include Ultimatum Game, Social Distance, Communication, Fairness, Inequity Aversion, and Behavioral Economics.
The evidence suggests that as social distance decreases, proposers tend to make more generous offers, partly due to increased feelings of responsibility or a desire to avoid appearing selfish.
Not necessarily. While communication generally encourages more generous offers, responders’ acceptance thresholds often remain stable or even increase in settings where strategic, game-related communication is allowed.
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