INTRODUCTION
WHY SUN YAT-SEN MATTERS
LITERATURE REVIEW
METHODOLOGY
PENTAPARTITE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE
China’s Most Eminent Bookworm Jurist?
Establishing a Pentapartite Constitution?
A Tricameral Legislative System?
Could the Control Yuan Cease to Exist?
Could the Examination Yuan Be Independent?
Conclusion
PREJUDICE AGAINST REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
Separation of Political Powers and Governing Powers
The National Assembly as an Institution of Direct Democracy
The Powers of Initiative and Referendum in Practice
Sun Yat-Sen and Democratic Centralism
Conclusion
SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM IN CHINA
Political Messiah of China
Political Tutelage and the Constitutional Single Party System
Political Messianism: The Nationalist Government, 1925-1949
Blood Rewardism: The Communist Government since 1949
Mein Kampf: The Nationalist Government in Taiwan, 1949-1990
Conclusion
CONCLUSION
‘Chinese characteristics’ has become a term commonly used to explain why China is different from the rest of the world. However, it has raised the question of whether China really is so different. In the field of constitutionalism, Sun Yat-Sen was the first Chinese politician who embraced Chinese characteristics and constructed the world’s first theory of democracy with ‘Chinese characteristics’ in the early twentieth century. His theory thus enlightens us on the question of whether China really is so different.
Sun Yat-Sen’s theory of democracy consists of three notable ‘Chinese characteristics’ – the pentapartite separation of powers system, direct democracy with an institutional arrangement of representation, and the constitutional single party system. However, all of these ‘Chinese characteristics’ are rooted in Sun Yat-Sen’s misunderstanding of ‘Western’ democracy. It is even more troubling that the incompetent amendments made by Sun Yat-Sen, who was a physician, not only failed to democratise China, but also produced a permanent dictatorship in China. In addition, his allegation that China is different from the rest of the world is not substantiated by logic – any amendment which is based upon a misunderstanding of the original concept is logically false, regardless of who is the originator of the amendment.
‘Chinese characteristics’ has already become a term that is commonly used in various fields; however, its definition and connotation remain ambiguous. In the field of law, Nie Jian-Qiang argued profoundly that ‘the meaning of “Marxism or socialism with Chinese characteristics” is only up to the CCP to make an official interpretation’1 – that is, the so-called ‘Chinese characteristics’ in the field of constitutionalism may be constructed artificially for political purposes. Hence, the term ‘Chinese characteristics’ has always been applied to explain why China is different, although without the support of specific reasons: It has even been the subject of a sarcastic epithet, ‘the Tiger Balm ointment (Wan-Jin-You)’, which means ‘all-purpose use’2 in the Chinese language.
Based on the literature regarding Chinese constitutionalism, it is clear that Sun Yat-Sen was the first politician who attempted to construct a theory of democracy with ‘Chinese characteristics’. His Democratic National Socialism3 and pentapartite constitution provide diverse reasons as to why China is different, as well as why the ‘European and American’ democracies are incompetent. In other words, it is not an exaggeration to ‘honour’ him as the ‘forerunner of the Chinese characteristics’ in the field of constitutionalism, although he was a Nationalist rather than a Communist.
Sun Yat-Sen was confident that his pentapartite system could remedy the defects of the classical tripartite separation of powers.4 He argued that the power of impeachment5 must be separated from the legislative power in order to prevent the legislature from engaging in tyranny by parliament;6 in addition, the power of the civil service examination should be independent for the sake of fair personnel selection.7 However, Sun Yat-Sen confused the separation of powers with the division of government, and his pentapartite system accordingly comprises only one power of government with five departments. Moreover, the power of impeachment and the civil service examination are not sufficiently proportional to be independent powers of government in practice, and the balance of power between five powers is much more complicated than that between three powers.
Like the pentapartite system, Sun Yat-Sen’s theory for applying direct democracy is rooted in his misunderstanding of democracy.8 He said that people should be given the four powers of suffrage, recall, initiative and referendum9 in order to directly control the government;10 however, the said four powers must be exercised by the people’s representatives in a national assembly – surprisingly, Sun Yat-Sen’s so-called ‘direct democracy’ could only be exercised indirectly. In addition to this contradiction, Sun Yat-Sen’s National Assembly did not function as a parliament or a congress in accordance with his original design. In a nutshell, Sun Yat-Sen constructed a legal-constitutional system that embraced a political show hand – the winner takes all the governing powers until the next election with no watchdogs.
It is even more problematic that Sun Yat-Sen not only introduced the concept of a one-party state11 into China, he also constructed an enhanced version of the single party system in person.12 Although his single party system was deemed to be only a temporary method during the period of political tutelage,13 this temporary system later became permanent – the Chinese Communists still operate their single party system accordingly.
In a nutshell, Sun Yat-Sen’s ‘teachings … in founding the Republic of China’14 comprise the pentapartite system, a paradoxical scheme for direct democracy based on his prejudice against representative democracy, and the single party system. These are the three most notable ‘Chinese characteristics’ in the realm of constitutionalism which this thesis will explore.
When we examine the literature regarding the Chinese constitutions before the Nationalists and the Communists came to the helm,15 there is no space for Sun Yat-Sen’s theory at all. The Chinese constitutions and draft constitutions during that period were structurally similar to the modern Western constitutions – at least, we cannot find any notable ‘Chinese characteristic’16 that is alleged to be more suitable for China. However, Sun Yat-Sen’s theory became part of the constitutions of both the later governments of China, and it is reasonable to say that his theory is the first constitutionalism with ‘Chinese characteristics’. This is the reason that Sun Yat-Sen really matters.
Sun Yat-Sen was the most influential Chinese politician in the initial stage of the 20th century. He was one of the founding fathers of the Republic of China and the Nationalist Party;17 above all, China’s fall into communist hands began with his questionable diplomatic policy in 1923 – to ally with the Soviet Union, absorbing the Communist Party of China and permitting the Communists to accede to the Nationalist Party.18 Sun Yat-Sen has been deliberately apotheosised for these historical reasons, but the genuine motive for the Nationalists’ and the Communists’ creation of this ‘Sun Yat-Sen Cult’ is political. Today, he is addressed as the sole Pater Patriae of the Republic of China by the Nationalists,19 and the Communists regard him20 as the forerunner of the Chinese democratic revolution.21
It is no exaggeration to say that Sun Yat-Sen’s political thought is often ‘unsystematic and self-contradictory’;22 he merely pieced together contemporary political thinking from different schools into his theory. He clearly stated that there is no difference between his socialism and the Prussian national socialism,23 thus criticising Karl Marx accordingly;24 however, he was very interested in the Russian New Economic Policy25 and drafted the International Development of China in correspondence to Lenin in 1920.26 He admired the American democracy and constitutionalism,27 but organised his Nationalist Party as a Leninist party.28 In other words, if we look at him from a modern perspective, it is not excessive to conclude that he was an autocrat29 who promoted democracy in his later years.30 He was China’s Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin all in one; thus, both the Nationalists and the Communists could benefit from the cult of Sun Yat-Sen.
After lunch we all went by car to visit the Tomb of Sun Yat Sen at the Purple Mountain. This is a huge undertaking. A first class motor road leads to it, the model road for new China complete with traffic police and road signals […] some centripetal ideal, and find it in a hero-worship for Sun Yat Sen, just as Russia attempts to use the apotheosis of Lenin.31
Engineering is probably commonly viewed as a science by all mankind; however, for the Chinese people, political science (e.g., law and politics) is not commonly viewed as a science. The evidence is clear: the Chinese are aware of the danger of bridges built by unqualified engineers, but the ‘architect’ of Chinese constitutionalism was not required to have a degree of law or politics. Rather, it was reserved for political apotheoses, such as the Nationalist ‘Sun Yat-Sen Cult’:32
The Nationalist Government, in order to rebuild the Republic of China on the basis of [Sun Yat-Sen’s] Democratic National Socialism [San Min Chu I] and the Pentapartite Constitution […] in pursuance of the Late Will of our late Premier [of the Nationalist Party, Sun Yat-Sen,] has called the National Convention at the national capital. The said National Convention does hereby enact and ordain the following Basic Law of the Political Tutelage Period of the Republic of China.33
Neither Gandhi (UCL and Inner Temple) nor Nehru (Inns of Court and Inner Temple) attempted to construct legal-constitutional theories for India; however, Sun Yat-Sen, a physician who held a degree in neither law nor political science,34 was eager to become China’s Montesquieu. In contrast to the English barristers Nehru, Patel and Ambedkar, who introduced the British parliamentary system and the American federal scheme into India,35 Hong Kong physician Sun Yat-Sen modified the tripartite separation of powers to include two additional ‘Chinese characteristics’ and asserted that this unprecedented pentapartite system was ‘the most complete and the finest in the world’:36
[T]he three governmental powers in the West have been imperfectly applied and the three coordinate powers of ancient China led to many abuses. If we now want to combine the best from China and the best from other countries and guard against all kinds of abuse in the future, we must take the three Western governmental powers – the executive, legislative, and judicial – add to them the old Chinese powers of examination and censorship and make a finished wall, a quintuple-power government.
Such a government will be the most complete and the finest in the world, and a state with such a government will indeed be of the people, by the people, and for the people.37
When we examine the literature on the pentapartite separation of powers, there is no doubt that Sun Yat-Sen completely misunderstood the meaning of the separation of powers. According to Julia Hargrove, the separation of powers ‘means that each of the three branches has different powers and responsibilities’ to ‘prevent any one leader or branch of government from taking over the whole power of government’,38 and ‘the idea of checks and balances works with separation of powers … so that each branch can help check or prevent the other two from gaining all the power in the government’.39 However, Sun Yat-Sen misrepresented the checks and balances as the cause of an inept government; as a result, the five branches of government under his pentapartite system were designed to cooperate with each other, and none of them were accountable to any of the others.40 In other words, Sun Yat-Sen confused the separation of powers41 with the division of government, leading him to promote only one power of government with five departments. He was completely unaware of the danger of this creation.
Another of Sun Yat-Sen’s political concepts, the separation of rights and powers,42 further indicates that his pentapartite system consisted of only one power of government with five departments. Sun Yat-Sen categorised the executive, legislative, judicial, civil service examination and censoring powers as the ‘five governing powers of the government’.43 He asserted that those five governing powers could be fully controlled unless and until the Chinese people could exercise the ‘four political powers of the people’, i.e., ‘the suffrage, the recall, the initiative and the referendum’.44 However, such categorisation reveals his misinterpretation of representative democracy45 because he defined the legislative power as a ‘governing power’.46 In other words, the legislative organ47 designed by Sun Yat-Sen was neither a parliament nor a congress, but rather, a legislative bureau – it was yet another organ created by Sun Yat-Sen called the ‘National Assembly’, which was supposed to exercise the ‘four political powers of the people’48 and play the role of the Chinese parliament or congress. However, it lacked legislative power. Further, what is even more problematic is that it is unclear which state organ could have been identified as the Chinese parliament or congress in accordance with Sun Yat-Sen’s theory – the Legislative Yuan was surely not designed to represent the people, and the National Assembly could only exercise the ‘four political powers’, which do not include the legislative power. Realistically, if a legislative bureau could be controlled through the ‘four political powers’, why could not a representative democracy be controlled in the same way? Vice versa, if both the legislative bureau and the parliament or congress could not be controlled in any case, which state organ could more reliably exercise the legislative power?
Only as the people are given great and the various checks upon the government will they not be afraid of the government becoming all-powerful and uncontrollable. The people can then at any time command the government to move or to stop […] with such an administrative power on the part of the government and such political power on the part of the people, we will be able to realise the ideal of the American scholar – an all-powerful government seeking the welfare of the people – and to blaze the way for the building of a new world.49
According to Sun Yat-Sen, the ‘four political powers’ were the crucial variables for the people to be able to control their government;50 however, his argument is unpersuasive to constitutional jurists worldwide: How could a government be fully controlled by suffrage, recall, initiative and referendum instead of the legislative power? In Liu Ch’ing-Jei’s defence of the establishment of the National Assembly in the 1950s, he argued that it would be either difficult or impossible to exercise the powers of initiative and referendum without the National Assembly because China is so populous.51 Such opinion implies the massive methodological difficulty in exercising those two powers without an organ in China; in addition, it also exposes the illogic of Sun Yat-Sen’s theory, because he suggested the replacement of one form of representative democracy with another. Moreover, a simple question should be asked: Which option has a better chance of fully controlling the government – representatives who act only as legislators, or representatives who are responsible for controlling our legislators?
This thesis has no intention of declaring that the current model of representative democracy is the final answer of the political system52 for all mankind, but this does not mean we should turn the clock back. We do accept that democracy is not yet perfect, but autocracy can never be the resolution for an imperfect democracy. However, Sun Yat-Sen constructed a profound but paradoxical theory by which he attempted to democratise China by means of enlightened despotism,53 i.e., political tutelage.
In 1920, Sun asserted:
[w]e must know that the emperor of [our] Republic is [our] people; but, [our] people have been enslaved for five thousand years [and] once they become emperors, [they] definitely do not know how to carry this out. So, we, the [Nationalist] revolutionists, should instruct them. […] We now have no other option but to use some compulsory approaches, forcing them to be [their own] masters by asking them to practice. This is exactly what I mean by ‘political tutelage’.54
According to the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction drafted by Sun Yat-Sen in 1924, there should be three stages in the Nationalist revolution. The first stage was the rule of the Nationalist military junta, which was responsible for the eradication of the Chinese warlords55 in preparation for the second stage, the period of political tutelage.56 In the second stage, China was to be ‘baby-sat’ by the Nationalist’s ‘enlightened despotism’ because the Chinese people needed to learn how to self-govern their counties.57 After local autonomy in China was completed, the Nationalist Government was to call the Constituent National Assembly and begin to establish a formal constitution.58 Finally, the Constitution was to be implemented, and the Nationalist Government would accordingly cease to exist.59
If Sun Yat-Sen’s political tutelage scheme is viewed in a positive way, there is no doubt that he acknowledged the fact that ‘building a democracy is far more difficult than founding a republic’.60 He even disagreed with Rousseau in holding that civil rights can only be obtained rather than given.61 But his method for democratisation, namely the concept of political tutelage, implies a latent political danger. If the concept is applied abusively, a new type of autocracy will emerge which is based precisely upon Sun Yat-Sen’s theory – that is, the constitutional single party system.
During the Period of Political Tutelage, the National Congress of the Nationalist Party of China shall exercise the governing powers on behalf of the National Assembly.
The said powers shall be exercised by the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party of China during the prorogation of the National Congress of the Nationalist Party of China.62
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought […] the Chinese people [...] will continue to adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist road […]63
This thesis thus defines a constitutional single party system as a political system that consists of an absolutely dominant political party to which domination is deliberately given by the constitutional law. Thus, there is no space for party alternation, unless and until the aforementioned constitutional law is abolished. Sun Yat-Sen tried to create a shortcut for Chinese democratisation, but his political tutelage scheme required the creation of absolute power first. A look back at the history of modern China seems to confirm the wisdom of Lord Acton’s words:
I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men, with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption it is the other way against holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority.64 – Lord Acton (1887)
China needs democratisation, but this does not mean that China should follow any single Western model for political democracy.65
The methodology of this thesis is inspired by the above quotation, as this thesis stands firmly against ‘Chinese characteristics’ in the field of constitutional jurisprudence. The fundamental basis of ‘Chinese characteristics’ is that China is different, and thus, ‘any single Western model for political democracy’66 is inapplicable, and alternatives must be proposed. Hence, this thesis applies legal doctrinal analysis to examine whether or not Sun Yat-Sen’s proposals were capable of achieving the political goals he sought. In other words, if the ‘proposals with Chinese characteristics’ failed to achieve the goals, and if, in reality, there is no difference between the ‘Western approaches’ and the ‘Eastern methods’, why then should not the Chinese people choose a system based on precedent?
As a next step, this thesis applies political archival studies to examine whether Sun Yat-Sen misunderstood the ‘Western’ meanings of democracy and constitutionalism. Considering that both democracy and constitutionalism are undoubtedly ‘Western’ concepts, it is reasonable to think that the ‘Western’ meanings and definitions must be understood before amendments are made to them. This is fair and just. Any amendment with ‘Chinese characteristics’ which is based upon a misunderstanding of the original concept is logically false; we firmly believe that there is no ‘logic with Chinese characteristics’.
Finally, this thesis applies an empirical approach to examine Sun Yat-Sen’s proposals in practice, i.e., res ipsa loquitur.
The sovereign owner should depend upon the skilful expert to drive his car, and the same principle should apply in the vital affairs of the nation. The people are owners; they must be sovereign. The government [is] specialists; they must be men of ability and skill. […] If they are able men and loyal to the nation, we should be willing to give the sovereignty of the state into their hands.67
Ironically, if Sun Yat-Sen had really meant the foregoing, there would never have been a pentapartite constitution. The reason is obvious: A doctor of physics or chemistry is no more knowledgeable than the average person in the realm of constitutional jurisprudence. If we would not accept a prescription given by a jurist, would it not be equally dangerous to enact an unprecedented pentapartite system designed by a physician?
This chapter will present the pentapartite system using empirical evidence. It will begin with the doubts and dissenting opinions raised by judicial specialists. As a next step, the dilemmas that arose in the implementation of the pentapartite system will be discussed based on the political experience of Taiwan. Finally, this chapter will conclude that no empirical evidence has been found to support the position that Montesquieu’s tripartite system must be replaced by Sun Yat-Sen’s creation.
[...]
1 Nie Jian-Qiang, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: Implications of Good Governance, the Rule of Law and Legal Culture (Cameron May 2006) 93.
2 ‘Tiger Balm’ is a very popular ointment for all-purpose use in Greater China. Because the Chinese Government has applied the term ‘Chinese characteristics’ to explain why China should be different in every field, the Taiwanese people have thus made digs at the term, jeering that it is like the ‘Tiger Balm in politics’ whereby all the differences between China and the rest of the world can be explained.
3 Democratic National Socialism is a translation in accordance with the meaning. However, there are other translations, including San Min Chu I, San Min Principles and the Three Principles of the People.
4 Sun Yat-Sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (Frank W. Price tr, Institute of Pacific Relations 1927) 320-360.
5 See generally Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (Harvard University Press 1974) 1-6.
6 Sun Yat-Sen, ‘Wu Quan Xian Fa [The Pentapartite Constitution]’ in Chinese Nationalist Party (ed), Guo Fu Quan Ji [The Complete Works of the Pater Patriae], vol 1 (Central Relic Providing 1984) 2.1-2.11.
7 Ibid.
8 Sun Yat-Sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (Frank W. Price tr, Institute of Pacific Relations 1927) 280-360.
9 Ibid 354-355.
10 Ibid 280-360.
11 See Zheng Shi-Ping, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge University Press 1997) 3-22.
12 Charter of the Chinese Revolutionary Party § 5 (1914).
13 Charter of the Chinese Revolutionary Party § 4 (1914).
14 Constitution of R.O.C. pmbl. (1947).
15 E.g., Constitution of R.O.C. (1923).
16 See generally Ching Chih-Jen, Zhong Guo Li Xian Shi [The History of Chinese Constitutionalism] (Linking 1984) 175-347.
17 Cf. Radhey Shyam Chaurasia, History of Modern China (Atlantic 2004) 131-134.
18 Edwin P. Hoyt, The Rise of the Chinese Republic: From the Last Emperor to Deng Xiaoping (McGraw-Hill 1989) 59-65; Ko Shih-Ming, Zao Qi Guo Gong Guan Xi Xin Lun: Cong E Lian, Lian Gong Dao San Da Zheng Ce De Bain Zheng [The New Introduction to the KMT-CCP Relations in the Early Period: A Dialectic Analysis of the First United Front] (Student Book 2005) 223-226.
19 Resolution of the 143 Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party (promulgated on 1 April 1940).
20 The Communists have started to call him the Pater Patriae recently. For example, General Secretary Jiang Ze-Min regarded him as the Pater Patriae officially in 2001. Liu Xiao-Po, Xiang Liang Xin Shuo Huang De Min Zu [The Nation Who Lies to Their Conscience] (Jay Yo 2002) 230. However, it is very ironic because Sun Yat-Sen’s Republic of China was overturned by the Communists in 1949.
21 Audrey Wells, The Political Thought of Sun Yat-Sen: Development and Impact (Palgrave Macmillan 2001) 150.
22 Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949 (Routledge 2005) 211.
23 Ma Zhen-Du and Qi Ru-Gao, Jiang Jie Shi Yu Xi Te Le: Min Guo Shi Qi De Zhong De Guan Xi [Chiang Kai-Shek and Hitler: The Sino-German Cooperation] (Great East 1998) 5.
24 Sun Yat-Sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (Frank W. Price tr, Institute of Pacific Relations 1927) 363-407.
25 Chuang Cheng, Sun Wen Ge Ming Si Xiang Fa Zhan Shi Lun [The Development of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Thinking System] (National Institute for Compilation and Translation 2007) 227-232.
26 Michael R. Godley, ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: Sun Yat-Sen and the International Development of China’ (1987) 18 Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 109, 109.
27 Li Qing-Yu, ‘Dr. Sun Yat Sen and the U.S. Constitution’ in J. Barton Starr (ed), The United States Constitution: Its Birth, Growth, and Influence in Asia (Hong Kong University Press 1988) 193-200.
28 Zheng Yong-Nian, Globalization and State Transformation in China (Cambridge University Press 2004) 50.
29 See Tony Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring) (Brill 1991) 754.
30 Liu Xiao-Po, Xiang Liang Xin Shuo Huang De Min Zu [The Nation Who Lies to Their Conscience] (Jay Yo 2002) 233.
31 Reginald Keble Morcom, Eastward Ho!: A Private Diary of a Public Excursion, 1930-1 (s.n. 1931) 68.
32 See Philip Yuen-Sang Leung, ‘Margin as Mainstream: The Legitimation of Sun Yat-senism in Early Republican China’ in Philip Yuan-Sang Leung (ed), The Legitimation of New Orders: Case Studies in World History (Chinese University Press 2007) 159-178.
33 Basic Law of the Political Tutelage pmbl. (1931). This English translation originally published by The China Year Book 1935 is reworded by the author. H.G.W. Woodhead (ed), The China Year Book 1935 (North China Daily News & Herald 1935) 63-66.
34 See Chuang Cheng, Sun Wen Ge Ming Si Xiang Fa Zhan Shi Lun [The Development of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Thinking System] (National Institute for Compilation and Translation 2007) 139-156.
35 See generally Biswaranjan Mohanty, ‘Indian Policy and Constitution Special’ (2007) 9 Pratiyogita Darpan 1511, 1513.
36 Sun Yat-Sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (Frank W. Price tr, Institute of Pacific Relations 1927) 358.
37 Ibid 357-358.
38 Julia Hargrove, Judicial Branch of the Government (Teaching & Learning 2000) 8.
39 Ibid.
40 See Wang Wen, Zhong Hua Min Guo Xian Fa Lun [An Introduction to the Constitution of the Republic of China] (Self-Publishing 2000) 20.
41 See generally Eoin Carolan, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State (Oxford University Press 2009) 18-45.
42 This thesis suggests the term ‘the separation of political powers and governing powers’ for clarity, but the commonly used term, i.e. the separation of rights and powers, also makes sense. For example, voting is indeed a political right. However, it also determines the presidency, and that is a political power.
43 Sun Yat-Sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (Frank W. Price tr, Institute of Pacific Relations 1927) 354.
44 Ibid 354-355.
45 See generally Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (University of Chicago Press 2006) 17-59.
46 Wang Wen, Zhong Hua Min Guo Xian Fa Lun [An Introduction to the Constitution of the Republic of China] (Self-Publishing 2000) 17-18; Liu Ch’ing-Jei, Zhong Hua Min Guo Xian Fa Yao Yi [The Essential Thoughts of the Constitution of the Republic of China] (Self-Publishing 1987) 29-30.
47 It was called the ‘Legislative Yuan’ by Sun Yat-Sen, along with the other four ‘Yuan(s)’ – the Executive, the Judicial, the Examination and the Control Yuan(s).
48 See generally Tung Hsiang-Fei, Zhong Guo Xian Fa Yu Zheng Fu [The Constitution and Government of China] (42nd edn, Self-Publishing 2005) 170-171.
49 Sun Yat-Sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (Frank W. Price tr, Institute of Pacific Relations 1927) 359-360.
50 Ibid.
51 Liu Ch’ing-Jei, Zhong Hua Min Guo Xian Fa Yao Yi [The Essential Thoughts of the Constitution of the Republic of China] (Self-Publishing 1987) 121-122.
52 See generally Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma, Principles and Theory of Political Science, vol 1 (Atlantic 2007) 135-142.
53 Not only Sun Yat-Sen but also Liang Chi-Chao supported tutelage in China in 1906. Liang argued: ‘when a country has long been under barbaric absolutism ... with political freedom extremely restricted … the tutelage of an enlightened despotism is required’. Roger B. Jeans, Jr., Democracy and Socialism in Republican China: The Politics of Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) (Rowman & Littlefield 1997) 17.
54 Sun Yat-Sen, ‘Xun Zheng Zhi Jie Shi [The Interpretation of Political Tutelage]’ in Chinese Nationalist Party (ed), Guo Fu Quan Ji [The Complete Works of the Pater Patriae], vol 2 (Central Relic Providing 1984) 8.111 (Author’s translation).
55 Fundamentals of National Reconstruction § 6 (1924).
56 Fundamentals of National Reconstruction § 7 (1924).
57 Fundamentals of National Reconstruction § 8 (1924).
58 Fundamentals of National Reconstruction § 23 (1924).
59 Procedure Ending the Political Tutelage § 1-5 (1947).
60 Tong Te-Kong, Wan Qing Qi Shi Nian [The Final Seventy Years of the Qing Empire], vol 5 (Yuan-Liou 1998) 217-247.
61 Kuei Hong-Chen, Zhong Hua Min Guo Li Xian Li Lun Yu 1947 Nian De Xian Zheng Xuan Ze [The Constitutional Theory of the Republic of China and the Constitutional Political Choice in 1947] (Show We 2008) 196-204.
62 Basic Law of the Political Tutelage Period § 30 (1931). This English translation originally published by The China Year Book 1935 is reworded by the author. H.G.W. Woodhead (ed), The China Year Book 1935 (North China Daily News & Herald 1935) 63-66.
63 Constitution of P.R.C. pmbl. (1982).
64 John E.M. Dalberg-Acton, ‘Letters to Archbishop Mandell Creighton’, in John Neville Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence (eds), Historical Essays and Studies (Macmillan 1907) 504.
65 Zheng Yong-Nian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge University Press 1999) 65.
66 Ibid.
67 Sun Yat-Sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (Frank W. Price tr, Institute of Pacific Relations 1927) 314-315.
