Is Europe a Purely Civilian Power? Europe and the Nuclear Weapons of France and the United Kingdom

Table of Contents

Abstract

Introduction
The conceptualisation of Europe as a civilian power

Arms control and Non-Proliferation
The Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Disarmament
The EU's efforts through the IAEA

European Holders of Nuclear Weapons: France and the UK
France's Nuclear Weapons
The United Kingdom's Nuclear Weapons
Franco-British Nuclear Cooperation

Common Foreign and Security policy and the discourse on European ‘dissuasion concertée'

The legality of nuclear weapons under international law

Conclusion

Bibliography

List of Tables

Table 1. Contribution Agreements between the EC and the IAEA on Nuclear Security

Table 2. French nuclear forces, January

Table 3. French nuclear forces, January

Table 4. French nuclear forces, January

Table 5. British nuclear forces, January

Table 6. British nuclear forces, January

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Abstract

This work aims to combine the discourse on civilian power Europe and the discourse on the two EU member states: namely, France and the UK possessing nuclear forces, and determine whether the EU is indeed a civilian power and if so, how do (merely national) nuclear weapons fit into a civilian power collective identity of the EU?

Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation, Civilian Power

Introduction

Since the 1970s, many scholars and politicians have been characterising the European Community back then and the European Union nowadays as a civilian power. The European Union has been exerting efforts and money to support other nations, spread human rights and democracy and convince the so-called ‘failed states' to stop developing weapons of mass destruction and eventually achieve disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand and despite those efforts, the European union still itself has member states hosting weapons of mass destruction on their soil and two of those countries: namely, France and the United Kingdom, own nuclear forces and have been proliferating WMD. Many scholars discussed the notion of civilian power Europe and also the French and British weapons of mass destruction, yet, there is very few discussing civilian power Europe having member states with national nuclear weapons. This work seeks to address the question: Is the EU merely a civilian power? If true, what is the relation between the progressive framing of Europe as a Civilian power, particularly over its efforts in non-proliferation areas, and the continuance of (national) nuclear deterrence in Europe?

The question will be addressed again in the concluding section of this work, and will be excluded from the analysis below, the article will proceed as follows: the next section is an analysis on the discourse on the notion of civilian power Europe, how scholars interpret it, to what extent does it receive support from scholars and whether it is the only conceptualisation of the EU by politicians and scholars. This is a key information to answer the first part of the research question; whether the EU is a civilian power and if yes then is it just a civilian power? Following, the first chapter discusses arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; a brief historical background about the efforts against proliferation, an analysis on the non-proliferation policies and how the EU is devoting attention and efforts in the fight against proliferation. The second chapter is devoted for France's and the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons; facts about their nuclear arsenals and their nuclear cooperation. The third chapter is about the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the proposals on European nuclear deterrence and how this affects the framing of EU as a civilian power. The final chapter discusses the legality of nuclear weapons in the international law according to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996. Finally, in the conclusion, the analyses and discussions in the main parts are deployed to answer the research question addressed at the beginning of this research.

The conceptualisation of Europe as a civilian power

In the early 1970s and after the détente in relations between the two super powers: namely, the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) , a new notion of non-military power came about in Europe. In 1972, Duchêne started a new type of power concepts by referring to the European Community (EC) as a civilian power. This approach, although Duchêne never explained it in details became a popular concept among policy makers and scholars and is still discussed and used until our present days.

We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security. (Prodi 2000:7)

The European Community at the time had a massive economic power and no collective military forces (Pacheco Pardo 2012). Duchêne's concept of civilian power Europe, albeit was mentioned briefly, vaguely, and not so often by Duchêne himself, has inspired many politicians and scholars along many years. However, the question that arises here: How did the supporters and those who mentioned the concept of civilian power Europe interpreted the concept? Duchêne never developed his idea of civilian power or explained what he meant by it, hence, this left an open door for different interpretations (Orbie 2006). One of the inspired academics by Duchêne's civilian power approach is Hanns W. Maull. Maull created three characterisations to describe and clarify how a civilian power should look like, namely:

a) [T]he acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on non­military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management. (Maull 1990/91:92-3)

When taking a look on the wider realm of the discourse about what kind of power the EU is, one would clearly notice that it is a heated discourse and that many scholars decline the conceptualisation of EU as a civilian power and describe it, inter alia, as a normative power or a typical great power. For instance, Manners (2002) described Maull's three features as ‘the centrality of economic power'. He challenged the conceptualising of Europe as a civilian power and military power, and instead argued that the EU is a normative power. Bull (1982) on the other hand criticised the approach of Europe being a civilian power and described it as ineffective and that it lacks self-sufficiency for depending on others, in his opinion, Europe does not provide for its security from its own resources but instead depends on the United States to maintain a balance in its member-states' powers. Bull suggested that Europe needs to become a self-sufficient military power.

I will stop myself here, keep only on the surface and not talk in depth about other possibilities to characterise the power of the EU, the purpose of mentioning this is to point out, that characterising the EU as a civilian power is not a consensus among scholars.

The civilian power Europe approach was first found at time when Europe was still a merely economic entity and did not have yet any foreign nor security activities as a supranational entity. In spite of the vagueness, this approach to describe the EU was surrounded by support and applause; there is a wide belief among scholars and politicians that it is a granted fact about the European Union's both internal and external policies. It is believed that the European Union relies on rather civilian means than military means to pursue common good and spread solidarity and civilisation.

The reason why there are other possibilities to define the EU's power is the difference between those kinds of powers. Pacheco Pardo (2012) and Smith (2005) found that it is not only the means used but also the ultimate ends the power has, that could differentiate between powers.

A good example to characterise these goals is what Karen Smith (2005) called ‘milieu goals' which implies common good, and ‘possession goals' which means the use of military means to achieve self-interest goals. A power should normally have the milieu goals to be civilian. However, Smith disagrees on this, regardless of what means are being used and whether actor cooperate to achieve them, and at the end, they always achieve possession goals.

Most observers seem to agree that there is a difference between civilian means and military means: civilian is non-military, and includes economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments. (Smith 2005:64)

However, is this correct in reality? Assuming that the EU is a civilian power does the EU really only rely on civilian means as defined by Smith? How about all the peace keeping missions? All peacekeeping forces the EU sends to other countries to solve conflicts and civilise ‘failed states'. There is indeed a fine line between military and civilian means and ends. At any point those peace keeping forces could turn into military fighting forces out of necessity, and this implies who it is a fine line between being a civilian power and a normal/ military power.

Arms control and Non-Proliferation

The EU has an important role in the international realm side by side with international organisations against the proliferation of WMD. The most known tool the EU has against the proliferation of WMD is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its policies, before the establishment of the NPT; a Treaty among Rome Treaties between the European Community member-states on establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was the foundation of EU's efforts against proliferation in 1957.

EURATOM purpose was to assure that the member-states would use nuclear only for peaceful ends. This treaty's non-proliferation aspect was effective with all member-states except for France who insisted on developing nuclear weapons. EURATOM owns all fissile materials within the borders of EC due to a ‘gentleman's agreement' that concludes that the Commission must be informed about all movements of materials inside, into and from the EC. The EURATOM also established an agency responsible for proper supply of fissile materials for supplying European civilian nuclear energy industries, the agency is the authority to review and approve supply contracts and costs. (Müller 1996)

By virtue of French nuclear weapons, EURATOM's purpose was not the confirmation of peaceful use but to make sure that the fissile materials were used for the purposes they were declared to be used for, which implies that states with nuclear weapons had the chance to change declared purposes from civilian to military (Müller 1996).

The second European organisation to pave the path for NPT policies in the EU and before it in the EC is the European Political Cooperation (EPC), it was established in 1970 but was only an intergovernmental organisation without any legal foundation due to the member-states' rejection of transferring their sovereignty to the EEC regulation in regard to all commodities related to national security. Unlike the EURATOM, the EPC was not only concerned with non-proliferation within the EC but in the whole world. In 1981, the EPC established a working group on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Müller 1996). The EPC was also behind the adoption of a common document on non-proliferation at the Dublin summit in 1990 (Grand 2000). EPC has also working groups on chemical and biological weapons, missile proliferation and UN disarmament matters. The occurrence of the Single European Act (SEA) brought about a change in the EPC capacity, representatives from the Commission were to participate in EPC meetings and the European Council became the supreme decision-making entity. The Commission established a Directorate-Genera l responsible for CFSP issues which includes non-proliferation matters. The Maastricht Treaty brought the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and identified the EPC as the cornerstone of CFSP and the non­proliferation of WMD as a prior issue for CFSP. (Müller 1996)

After France joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991, the European Community started being more active in the field of non­proliferation. After the adoption of a common document on non­proliferation at the Dublin summit in 1990 and Luxemburg summit in 1991, the EC identified arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament as priorities for the CFSP. In 1992, the twelve EU member-states proposed a joint initiative to the IAEA in strengthening of safeguards. Under the CFSP, two Council committees are handling the non-proliferation issues: namely, the Committee on Non-Proliferation (CONOP) and the Committee on Nuclear Affairs (CONUC) with national experts and representatives of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. In 1995, EU initiated a campaign for an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Portela 2003)

In 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy and a Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD. These strategies aim to support multilateral arms control regimes and enforce non-proliferation of WMD through different tools and if necessary, also military means (Jasper and Portela 2010).

Despite all the efforts the EU has made and is still making to fight against the proliferation of WMD, there are some factors that would undermine EU's effectiveness. At many occasions especially on disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD, EU member-states did not talk in one voice. Twenty-two members of the EU are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Two of them: France and the UK hold nuclear forces and another four members: namely, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands host NATO nuclear weapons on their soil, this could cause in changing the attitude of some EU members towards non­proliferation according to the state's relation to the NATO (Portela 2003).

The Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed by Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1968 and came into force in 1970 (Nuclear Threat Initiative NTI). In 1991, all EU member-states of the EU have already joined the NPT, since then the EU plays a major role in non-proliferation and has issued its own European policies and strategies against the proliferation of WMD. The Treaty now includes 190 members and has three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use. The NTI summarised the obligations of NPT members as following:

Obligations:

- Nuclear weapon states (NWS) are not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to manufacture or otherwise acquire them.
- NNWS are not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from any transferor, and not to manufacture or acquire them.
- NNWS must place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.
- All Parties are obligated to facilitate and participate in the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- All Parties must pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. (Nuclear Threat Initiative NTI, n.d.)

The parties of the Treaty meet every 5 years to review the progress of the Treaty in a so-called NPT Review Conference (RevCon). In the 2010 Review Conference, Cabactulan, president by acclamation, released a draft final document, the draft had two parts: the first is a review the progress of implementing the three pillars of the treaty and the second was recommendations for the action plan. The NWS said that the disarmament measures in the draft were too ambitious. Although the adoption of the Final Document was by consensus, the parties did not make progress on key issues. (Kile 2011b)

The next Review conference will be held in 2015, for each RevCon there is a Preparatory Committee that meets yearly, the third and last Preparatory Committee for the 2015 RevCon opened from 28 April - 9 May 2014. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee according to Decision I paragraph four in the 1995 RevCon Final Document:

4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.

The 2014 Preparatory Committee devoted the first four meetings for procedural matters and general discussions about the RevCon, then one meeting about civil society presentations, followed by one session on each one of three clusters the Preparatory Committee already agreed on in the first session. The Preparatory Committee included specific matters like disarmament, the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and peaceful use of nuclear energy. (Rauf 2014)

The three clusters are:

- Cluster 1: implementation of the provision of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security; as well as security assurances;
- Cluster 2: implementation of the provision of the Treaty relating to Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear- weapon-free zones; and
- Cluster 3: implementation of the provision of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; as well as (e) other provisions of the Treaty. (Rauf 2014) When it comes to the NPT, EU member-states have different positions, especially on the issue of disarmament and nuclear energy. Having divergent members, the EU's positions towards the disarmament are split between France and the United Kingdom, the two NWS, who are committed to the disarmament pillar in the NPT but only gradually, and neutral, pro-disarmament states like Austria, Ireland and Sweden, who support immediate disarmament. On the pillar of nuclear energy, EU member-states also do the split; the positions of EU states towards nuclear energy are lost between pro-nuclear energy states like France and anti-nuclear energy states like Austria. This division between EU member-states puts whatever EU decides commonly under the criticism of being ‘too universal'. In NPT negotiations, the EU also faces the problem of its member­states seeking their own national interests and goals and not a joint collective European interest. (Dee 2012)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Disarmament

Article VI in the NPT obliges NWS to reduce and eventually remove their nuclear weapons:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. (Non-Proliferation Treaty Text) in the 2000 Review Conference in the Final Document, the Parties of the Treaty including the NWS agreed upon 13 concrete steps or the also known as 13 practical steps towards disarmament. Section 15 in the Final Document of the 2000 RevCon starts by stating that the conference agrees on systematically implement article VI of the NPT and paragraph 3¹ and 4 (c)² of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.

Section fifteen in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference contains the paragraph on the 13 practical steps. The first step stresses the urgency of signatures and ratifications without any postponement nor conditions to achieve an early entry of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The second step suggests putting a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions that is delaying the entry of that Treaty into force. The third step stresses the importance of negotiations in the RevCon on disarmament and a “non- discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. The fourth step stresses the necessity of establishing a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament³ with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament; it also calls the Conference on Disarmament to urgently agree on a programme that includes the establishment of such a body. The fifth step suggest the “irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.” the sixth step implies that the NWS must unequivocally undertake the total elimination of their nuclear weapons and hence leading to nuclear disarmament, which they are already have committed themselves to under Article VI.. the seventh step is the early entry into force and implementation of START II⁴ and the conclusion of START III^{5 6} while strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty[6] (ABM Treaty) as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. The eighth step is to complete and implement the Trilateral Initiative between USA, Russia and the IAEA. The ninth step is for the NWS to take steps towards disarmament by promoting international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all. NWS shall reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally, increase their transparency, implement agreements to achieve Article VI, voluntarily build measures to support progress on nuclear disarmament, reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons by unilateral initiatives, take measures towards reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, creating a diminishing role for the nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons can ever be used to facilitate the process of their total elimination, engage in the process leading to the definite elimination of their nuclear weapons. The tenth step is for the NWS to take arrangements to place fissile material they have designated as no longer required for military purpose under the IAEA and other relevant international verifications and for the NWS to dispose such materials for peaceful purposes to ensure that the materials are permanently outside of military programmes. The eleventh step is to reaffirm that the ultimate objective of the efforts of the states in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under international control. The twelfth step is handing regular reports, within the NPT review process, by all parties of the NPT on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. The last step is to continue developing the verification capabilities to provide assurance on compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for maintaining a nuclear-free world. (2000 RevCon of NPT Final Document, Volume I, Part I, 2000: 14-15)

The EU's efforts through the IAEA

The IAEA was established in 1957 to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and prevent the use of nuclear for weapons. The EU and especially the European Commission plays a great role in supporting, financing and cooperating with the IAEA, the European Commission and the IAEA are strategic partners in the Technical Cooperation Programme (TC) especially in the area of nuclear safety. IAEA signed its first Contribution Agreement with the European Commission in 2005, and since then it has been signing several agreements under inter alia the EU TACIS⁷ programme, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, the Instrument for Pre­Accession Assistance, and the Instrument for Stability (IAEA official website 2014). These Contribution Agreements or the so-called ‘Joint Actions' aim to provide financial support from the EU's Common Foreign and Security Budget to IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification (IAEA 2013).

Table 1. (IAEA 2013: 4) illustrates the Contribution Agreements on nuclear security between the European Commission and the IAEA from 2005 to 2013:

Table 1. Contribution Agreements between the EC and the IAEA on Nuclear Security

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

European Holders of Nuclear Weapons: France and the UK

The European Union includes both, states that have nuclear weapons (i.e. France and the UK), and states who are not in favour of having nuclear weapons (e.g. Ireland and Sweden), among its member-states. There are no clear signs of France and the United Kingdome willingness to abandon their weapons of mass destruction. In spite of the adoption of an EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons remain today the primary element in France and UK's defence policies. In the 1990s, France proposed the integration of both its own and British nuclear weapons to serve as a joint European deterrent. This proposal was then turned down by other EU member-states, yet it did not stop at this point for later on the French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed the idea of European nuclear deterrence again despite the fact that his proposal did not receive much attention. This affects the reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and might pave the way for future Franco-British proposals for a joint European nuclear force, especially that the EU created a military dimension within its European Council and by that transformed from a merely civilian structure. (Jasper and Portela 2010)

France's Nuclear Weapons

In the 1950s, the French parliament agreed on a five-year nuclear programme. Primarily headed towards the Soviet Union, France's nuclear heads were established as a defence tool for France without its need to depend on allies. Another motive for France to establish nuclear weapons is its humiliation in the Second World War In this case; French nuclear weapons are a symbol of power and greatness. By the end of the cold war, France eliminated its ground-based missiles. (Jasper and Portela 2010)

Although French nuclear weapons were intentionally made to serve France's national defence, in 2006, the French President Jacque Chirac changed this French image and pointed out, in an interview from which he distanced himself from afterwards, that French nuclear weapons should be deployed to deter against terrorism and emerging situations where smaller powers are involved. On the other hand, the later French President Nicolas Sarkozy had a double-faced stance towards weapons of mass destruction, he supported the involvement and obligation of France to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but at the same time praised the main and fundamental role of French nuclear weapons in France's defence and security. (Jasper and Portela 2010)

In a speech on the occasion of the presentation of the Submarine Service Ballistic Missile ‘Le Terrible' in 2008 President Sarkozy said:

Our nuclear deterrence protects us from any aggression against our vital interests emanating from a State - wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take. Our vital interests, of course, include the elements that constitute our identity and our existence as a nation-State, as well as the free exercise of our sovereignty. My responsibility, as Head of State, is to assess their limit at all times, for in a changing world they cannot remain static. All those who would threaten our vital interests would expose themselves to severe retaliation by France resulting in damages unacceptable to them, out of proportion with their objectives. Their centres of political, economic and military power would be targeted on a priority basis.

In France's 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security key findings, nuclear had a significant attention. The seventh key finding pointed out that nuclear deterrence is essential for national security:

7. Nuclear deterrence remains an essential concept of national security. It is the ultimate guarantee of the security and independence of France. The sole purpose of the nuclear deterrent is to prevent any State-originating aggression against the vital interests of the nation today against France, it is imperative to retain the capability to preserve the freedom of action of our nation if our vital interests are threatened with blackmail.. However, France has taken the initiative in the area of nuclear disarmament and shall continue to do so. France is particularly active in the fight against the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as the delivery missiles. the credibility of the deterrent is based on the ability to provide the President , with an autonomous and sufficiently wide and diversified range of assets and options Even though there may not be any direct threat of aggression. (Présidence de la République, 2008: 2)

The 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security also recalled the continuing of the main principals defined by General De Gaulle and the first among them is the complete independence of French nuclear forces. The thirteenth key finding in this white paper indicated that even though European member­states including France can no longer have their national control on some of their technologies, France must keep its sovereignty in some areas especially nuclear deterrence, ballistic missiles, SSNs, and cyber-security for maintaining France's strategic and political autonomy. The new security parameters in the 2008 White Paper included that the “possibility of sudden strategic upsets” could cause in breaking the “nuclear taboo". The third strategic function among five others for France to achieve its overall national security in the 2008 White Paper is nuclear deterrence:

The nuclear forces will have two clearly separate and complementary components, including the support environment enabling their independent and secure operations. France will continue to sustain these capabilities over time. As a consequence : - the nuclear ballistic submarine fleet will be equipped from 2010 onwards with the M51 intercontinental ballistic missile, deployed on our new-generation SSBNs; - the airborne component will be equipped from 2009 onwards with the ASMP A cruise missile, deployed on Mirage 2000 NK3 and Rafale aircraft, stationed in France and carrier-based. The number of nuclear-capable land­based aircraft will be reduced from 60 to 40; - the simulation programme, based notably on the corresponding facilities in the field of lasers (LMJ), X-ray analysis and supercalculators (sic) will ensure the reliability of our nuclear warheads; - the preservation of our national missile and submarine competencies, and the improvement on a 2025 horizon, of the range and accuracy of our missiles; - the overall modernisation of the support environment for our nuclear capabilities, notably in terms of communications. (Présidence de la République, 2008: 10-11)

On the contrary, France proposed in the same White Paper a nuclear disarmament action plan, which concluded the following points:

- The universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China and the US signed the Treaty in 1996, but have not yet ratified it. - The commitment of all nuclear powers to dismantle the nuclear test sites in a transparent manner, open to the international community. France has dismantled its facility at Mururoa ; the test sites of other nuclear powers have not been shut down. - The immediate opening of the negotiations for a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). - An immediate moratorium on the production of fissile materials. France has ceased the production of such materials. - The adoption of transparency measures by the five nuclear powers recognized by the NPT. - The opening of negotiations for a treaty banning all short and intermediary ground-to-ground missiles. - The adherence of all States to the The (sic) Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, along with the commitment to implement it. (Présidence de la République, 2008: 11)

in the chapter on Industrial and technological priorities for 2025 in the 2008 French White Paper, nuclear systems, which concluded designing, developing and producing nuclear weapons was one of the priorities. Another priority is naval systems including retaining a national design and production capability for nuclear-powered submarines. In addition, Aeronautics systems and the development of a fighter aircraft programme and carry out the necessary adaptation of its systems for its nuclear mission was a priority for 2025, and the final priority is missile systems:

Missiles in general and cruise missiles in particular, are critical components of our intervention capability. France will ensure the continued existence of European capabilities in this sector, based on Franco-British cooperation, with the proviso that core national competencies will be maintained, in particular all those pertaining to the airborne nuclear component. (Présidence de la République, 2008: 13)

Coming to the latest French White Paper on Defence and Security 2013, one can notice no big change in the stance of the current French President François Hollande. In his preface in the 2013, White Paper Hollande said: “We must guarantee the protection of French citizens, including against cyber-related threats, preserve the credibility of our nuclear deterrence” (Hollande, 2013:7). In the second chapter of this White Paper 'The foundations of the strategy for defence and national security', the first pillar of France's strategy for defence and national security is Preserving France's independence and sovereignty and according to the White Paper, Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of France's sovereignty. In this White Paper, the main strategic functions indentified in the 2008 White Paper remain valid, and among them of course the nuclear deterrence:

Nuclear deterrence protects France from any State-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin and in whatever form. It rules out any threat of blackmail that might paralyse its freedom of decision and action. (2013: 67)

Under the same section, the 2013 White Paper concluded the French commitment to its duties towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a promoter for the reduction and limitation of upgrading nuclear weapons throughout the world, and that France sets an example for other nuclear-weapons-states by dismantling its nuclear testing sites in the Pacific.

The French nuclear discourse is reflected into two concepts: ' l'arme de la paix (weapon of peace)' and ' dissuasion du faible au fort (deterrence of the strong by the weak)' (Jasper and Portela 2010). The first understanding l'arme de la paix makes the greatly destroying effect of nuclear weapons look very little and positive by suggesting that nuclear weapons are beneficial and will result in peace. The second understanding dissuasion du faible au fort suggests that the nature of French nuclear weapons is defensive, what is meant by ‘the weak' is that small vulnerable France has only this one way (nuclear weapons) to defend itself against the Soviet Union. (Jasper and Portela 2010)

According to the 2009 SIPRI Yearbook, France's nuclear forces consisted of nearly 300 warheads distributed on four SSBNs and 84 aircraft. Table 2. (Kile et al., 2009: 362) illustrates the French nuclear forces in January 2009:

Table 2. French nuclear forces, January 2009

Table 8.5. French nuclear forces, January' 2009

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

ASMP = Air—Sol Moyenne Portée (medium-range air to surface missile); ASMP-A = ASMP- Améliorée (improved ASMP).

a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight profile and weapon loading.
b The range of the M45 is listed as only 4000 km in a 2001 report from the National Defence Commission of the French National Assembly.
c The warhead stockpile will be reduced to fewer than 300 warheads in near future. France does not have a reserve but may have a small inventory of spare warheads.

In Table 3. (Kile et al., 2011a: 338) from SIPRI Yearbook 2011, one can notice the changes emerging between 2009-2011 (see information under Table 3):

Table 3. French nuclear forces, January 2011

Table 7.5. French nuclear forces, January’ 2011

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

( ) = uncertain figure; kt = kiloton; TNA = Tête Nucléaire Aéroportée (Airborne Nuclear War­head); TNO = Tête Nucléaire Océanique (Oceanic Nuclear Warhead).

a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight profile and weapon loading.
b A small number of the previous-generation Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (ASMP, medium­range air-to-surface) missiles may remain in sendee until completely replaced by the ASMP-A in 2011.
c France transitioned to a posture of 4 SSBNs in the mid-1990s, which meant having enough SLBMs to equip 3 operational SSBNs, with the fourth SSBN being overhauled.
d The range of the M45 is listed as only 4000 km in a 2001 report from the French National Assembly’s National Defence Commission.
e The missile upgrade started with the Le Vigilant submarine does not affect its warheads, which will be fitted back to the new M51.1 missiles.
f France does not have a reserve but may’ have a small inventory of spare warheads for a total stockpile of c. 300 warheads.

A tangible change in the number of French nuclear warheads occurred (see Table 4.) in 2013, France replaced its M45 missile with a M51.1 SLBM. The two submarines Le Terrible and Le Vigilant are armed with 16 M51.1 SLBMs. The third SSBN Le Triomphant is prepared to be fully operational and the development of the four French submarines is designed to carry the TNO Oceanic Nuclear Warhead that is expected to replace the M51.1 after 2015 (Schell and Kristensen 2013).

Table 4. (Schell and Kristensen, 2013: 304) illustrates the changes occurred on the French nuclear forces in January 2013:

Table 4. French nuclear forces, January 2013

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

( ) = uncertain figure; kt = kiloton; TNA = Tête Nucléaire Aéroportée; TNO = Tête Nucléaire Océanique.

a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight profile and weapon loading.
b France transitioned to a posture of 4 SSBNs in the mid-1990s, which meant having enough SLBMs to equip 3 operational SSBNs, with the 4th SSBN being overhauled.
c The range of the M45 is listed as only 4000 km in a 2001 report from the French National Assembly’s National Defence Commission.
d The missile upgrade started with the Le Vigilant submarine does not affect its warheads, which will be fitted back to the new M51.1 missiles.
e France does not have a reserve but may have a small inventory of spare warheads for a total stockpile of c. 300 warheads.

The United Kingdom's Nuclear Weapons

The British nuclear programme dates back to 1947, when the administration of PM Clement Attlee launched a secret British weapons Programme (Jasper and Portela 2010). In 1952, the United Kingdom tested its first nuclear explosion at an island off the coast of Australia. The United Kingdom completely integrated its nuclear forces into NATO to obstruct any war initiation by the Soviet Union. The reason for the United Kingdom to launch a nuclear programme was the Cold War and the Soviet Union, after the end of the Cold War, this motive has been replaced by several threats to the British national security. For UK, the maintenance of nuclear forces is not only to serve the national security but also the international community. The UK perceives itself as a ‘reliable' and ‘responsible' great power that is necessary for maintaining international peace and stability. (Jasper and Portela 2010)

In the case of British nuclear weapons, we find a similarity to French stance towards their WMD. Whereas Britain continuously expresses its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and even eventually disarmament, it still supports maintaining at least a ‘minimum' of nuclear deterrence. The British Prime Minister Blair claimed reducing British nuclear forces, nevertheless failed to achieve the realisation of this step:

We believe that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an essential part of our insurance against the uncertainties and risks of the future. We have therefore decided to maintain our deterrent system beyond the life of the Vanguards with a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines. We will also extend the life of the Trident D5 missile. (Blair 2006: 5)

His successor PM Gordon Brown had the same ambiguous strategy, he expressed that UK will support disarmament but also claimed that keeping British nuclear forces is 'non-negotiable' (Jasper and Portela 2010).

Gordon Brown told the General Assembly the UK was proposing a "grand global bargain" as a way to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce stockpiles However Number 10 said keeping the UK's nuclear missiles was "non-negotiable". (BBC News 2009)

4.67 On defence, in 2006 we decided to maintain our independent nuclear deterrent because, while we are strongly committed to multilateral nuclear disarmament and to the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we cannot rule out a threat to the United Kingdom involving nuclear weapons re-emerging over the next 50 years. (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 2008: 44)

In the 2010 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, the importance of fighting proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was mentioned often but only in the direction of preventing states like Iran and other Non-state entities like terrorism groups from proliferation nuclear weapons “Our aim is to deter direct threats, including through our membership of NATO and, ultimately, our independent nuclear deterrent.” (The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 2010:30)

The United Kingdom also continues modernising its nuclear forces. In 2012, the British Ministry of Defence published a paper on the United Kingdom's future nuclear deterrent The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2012 Update to Parliament. In this paper, the Ministry of Defence expressed that even though there is no nation with the ability to threaten the ‘independence or integrity' of the United Kingdom, still Britain could not dismiss the possibility of a ‘re-emerging' of a ‘major nuclear threat' despite the British efforts to counter proliferation of WMD. The paper also talked about the 2011 ‘Initial Gate', a milestone for a successor deterrent submarine programme for five years with £3 billion assessment phase prior to the ‘Main Gate', the main investment decision is to be taken in 2016.

The five main principles of UK nuclear deterrence policy according to the Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Minister of Defence (2012), consist of:

- preventing attack - the UK's nuclear weapons are not designed for military use during conflict but instead to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests that cannot be countered by other means
- the UK will retain only the minimum amount of destructive power required to achieve our deterrence objectives - this is known as 'minimum deterrence'
- we deliberately maintain some ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We do not want to simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities (for example, we do not define what we consider to be our vital interests), hence, we will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons
- the UK's nuclear deterrent supports collective security through NATO for the Euro-Atlantic area
- an independent centre of nuclear decision-making enhances the overall deterrent effect of allied nuclear forces: separately controlled but mutually supporting nuclear forces create an enhanced overall deterrent effect; the UK deterrent is operationally independent, and the UK does not require US or NATO authorisation to use its deterrent - UK nuclear weapons remain under political control at all times; only the Prime Minister can authorise the firing of UK nuclear weapons. (Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, 2012)

The United Kingdom possesses a sea-based nuclear deterrent. Its nuclear forces include 'Vanguard class Trident II submarine- launched ballistic missiles and associated warheads' with their support infrastructure. The UK's nuclear arsenal consists of c. 160 operational warheads available for use by a fleet of four Trident SSBNs based in Scotland. In 2010, UK committed to retain a submarine-based nuclear deterrent for the indefinite future and the Ministry of Defence started in 2013 planning to replace the four Vanguard class SSBNs with new modified submarines. (Kile and Kristensen 2013)

In 2009, UK has 48 deployed submarine ballistic missiles with 185 warheads in stockpile (see Table 5.) among which less than 160 warheads are operationally available (Kile and Kristensen 2009).

Table 5. (Kile and Kristensen, 2009: 360) illustrates British nuclear forces in January 2009:

Table 5. British nuclear forces, January 2009

Table 8.4. British nuclear forces, Januar)’ 2009

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

A significant change in the British nuclear forces occurred in 2010 (see Table 6.), the number of deployed submarine missiles increased and thus an increase in the number of warheads in stockpile occurred as well. Table 6. (Kile et al., 2010: 350) illustrates the emerging changes in British nuclear forces in 2010:

Table 6. British nuclear forces, January 2010

Table 8.4. British nuclear forces, January 2010

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Franco-British Nuclear Cooperation

Franco-British nuclear cooperation emerged in 1990 when France and UK decided to form a nuclear forum to exchange information on nuclear issues for the sake of creating a degree of 'commonality'. Another approach of Franco-British nuclear cooperation was 'collaboration over procurement', UK sought to replace its WE-177 gravity bomb and had two candidates to purchase the missile from, there was the American candidate, whom the United Kingdom had a long-standing cooperation with and the French candidate. The timing of this replacement occurred after the collapse of communism and buying from the French candidate appealed as a good first step for a future nuclear policy in western Europe. Another reason that made the French choice more appealing is the American-Soviet collaboration and the possibility of arms control gesture, which could threaten both British and French nuclear arsenals. In April 1990, the French and the British defence secretaries met to discuss collaboration in general including nuclear collaboration. (Croft 1996)

In 1993, a Franco-British summit announced that the Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine between the two nations would be made permanent (Croft 1996).

The French-British collaboration did not end at this point and is still continuing, in 2010 France and the United Kingdom signed what is known as The Lancaster House Treaties. The two treaties on defence and security cooperation were signed by PM David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy on November 2nd, 2010 and entered into force in September 2011. In the opening of the second treaty, the importance of nuclear deterrence of both France and UK as a “core element of their national and Allied defence strategies” was highlighted. The determination of both states to maintain a minimum of credible nuclear forces and their consideration of their nuclear deterrence as a contribute to Europe's security. In the opening they also reassured their commitment to the NPT and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and expressed their mutual interest in cooperation in industrial, technological and scientific fields for the sake of keeping their independent nuclear forces safe and reliable. (The Secretary of State for foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 2012)

The first article of this treaty concerns cooperation and exchanging classified information in the areas: “a) safety and security of nuclear weapons; b) stockpile certification; c) counter nuclear or radiological terrorism.” (2010:3-4), article 9 of this treaty concluded that the provisions of the treaty would not affect the rights and obligations of France and the UK toward any other nuclear agreement they are a part of.

On this occasion and in a press conference given by Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy following the UK-France Summit, PM Cameron commented: “[Y]ou can really see the joint French and British interest. We both have independent nuclear deterrents that we both believe are very important as our ultimate guarantor of security - it's the ultimate insurance policy.” (Cameron 2010), President Sarkozy said in the same press conference:

[L]et's address the nuclear issues. First, David Cameron and I have to see beyond the democratic scope of our present governments liberal or conservative or whatever, you have to think in the long term otherwise how could you be a visionary? If General de Gaulle had acted otherwise, we wouldn't have had the nuclear programme we have had in France. So we have to think out of the box and rely on common sense.

The current French President François Hollande agrees with his predecessor Sarkozy, according to The Guardian, already when he was still a candidate, Hollande sent his defence spokesman to London to reassure that the France-British cooperation will continue. “Jean-Yves Le Drian says the presidential frontrunner François Hollande is keen to cement ties and ensure that France and Britain - Europe's leading military powers - ‘speak from the same sheet' on defence.” (Willsher 2012).

Common Foreign and Security policy and the discourse on European ‘dissuasion concertée'

The idea of a European Foreign policy was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the first mentioning of a Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP was in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty increased the use of QMV, combined the position of the ‘High Representative of the CFSP' and the ‘External Affairs commissioner' into the position of a ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' and made this position the authority over the CFSP missions.

Within the CFSP, the European Council emerged joint European efforts against the proliferation of WMD. Yet despite the progress in the CFSP and the creation of Non-Proliferation policies, a very little attention has been paid to the European (still only national) French and British nuclear forces (Jasper and Portela 2010). In the 1990s, France offered to integrate French and British nuclear forces into a joint European nuclear arsenal. The first initiate was by President François Mitterrand when he suggested that collaboration of French nuclear forces and a common European defence should be considered (Jasper and Portela 2010). This proposal have gotten little attention at the time but it didn't end back in 1992 and was proposed again by following French leaders.

In 1995, President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Alain Juppé re-mentioned ‘dissuasion concertée' a term that translates into ‘concerted deterrence' and was first used by Deputy Defence Minister Jacques Mellick in 1992. However, the latter proposal faced opponents and advocates among the French themselves and was turned down by other EU member-states (Jasper and Portela 2010). The proposal was meant to suggest that interested EU member-states who would like to be a part of an integrated European nuclear force with the aim of eventually EU becoming a “strategically autonomous actor” by interdependency of security which would bind member-states together and cause in more integration. (Jasper and Portela 2010)

Some proponent scholars to the notion of dissuasion concertée developed possibilities to help implementing the proposal, the most common proposal was to establish “institutionalised consultations mechanisms on nuclear strategy” that would end up by creating a “single European deterrent” (Jasper and Portela 2010). There are also opponents and challenges the notion of dissuasion concertée faced, firstly the resistance of member-states that advocate disarmament like Ireland and Sweden and the concern of NATO members that the adoption of dissuasion concertée would underestimate the transatlantic security link, the third challenge facing dissuasion concertée is whether it is legal to adopt it, and more importantly how creating a European nuclear deterrent would contradict with the NPT (Jasper and Portela 2010).

Despite these challenges, and the rejection of a European dissuasion concertée, French leaders continued on proposing a common deterrence to those European partners who wish to do so, the most recent proposal was made by President Nicolas Sarkozy, who suggested to open a dialogue with European states that wish to take a part in a dialogue about deterrence as a contribution to the European common security (Jasper and Portela 2010). He talked about the role French nuclear forces already play as a deterrence in his speech in the Presentation of SSBM “Le Terrible” in 2008:

Our deterrence also takes into account changes in the world, in our alliances and in European construction. Together with the United Kingdom, we have taken a major decision: it is our assessment that there can be no situation in which the vital interests of either of our two nations could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.. As for Europe, it is a fact: by their very existence, French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe's security. Any aggressor who might consider challenging it must be mindful of this.

Sarkozy also suggested in his speech that French national security is tied to that of France's European partners and allies and that they have a common destiny that depends on the European Union:

Never in history has our national security been so intimately tied to that of our allies and our European partners. Our common destiny lies with the European Union and beyond that, with all nations that share our values: peace, freedom, fraternity, the defence of the equal and irreducible dignity of human beings regardless of colour, creed and origin.

By rendering French nuclear weapons an essential constituent of the defence posture of ‘civilian power Europe', Sarkozy grants these weapons additional moral justification and legitimacy as ‘weapons of the good'. (Jasper and Portela 2010: 161)

Nothing changed in this regard between 1995 and 2008, the proposal contradicts completely with and undermines the objective of the Common Foreign and Security policy to preserve the NPT (Jasper and Portela 2010). Another reason why this proposal is inadvisable is the irrelevance of nuclear deterrence to address EU's security threats:

the European Security Strategy unequivocally identified five threats to the security of the EU: failed states, terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, organized crime and regional conflicts outside the EU. None of these threats can be satisfactorily addressed with nuclear weapons. (Jasper and Portela 2010: 163)

On this matter wrote Burkard Schmitt in his article ‘Europäische Integration und Atomwaffen' 1998 in German and translates into ‘European Integration and Nuclear Weapons', that “even if the idea of a common defence policy seems to be only possible in the very far future, the EU and the WEU [which is now transferred into the CFSP] cannot permanently ignore that two of their members are and want to stay nuclear powers. In addition, a European defence identity remains incomplete without including the nuclear component.”⁸ he wrote that a concerted deterrence could be eventually achieved but this would take a very long transition from the intergovernmental cooperation process and would only be possible with a supranational Europe with one decision maker, he also added at the end of his article, that a European deterrent only has a chance if the European people accepted it and that the longer they taboo the nuclear issue, the harder it gets to address the issue for the public. (Schmitt 1998)

The legality of nuclear weapons under international law

in 1993, the World Health Organization (WHO) requested the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on the ‘Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict'.

"In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution." (Nakajima 1993: 2)

The ICJ turned down the request by WHO (I. C. J. 1996a) because the issue is beyond WHO's legal capacity.

It has been contended that the question before the Court is an essentially political one, and also that it goes beyond the scope of the WHO's proper activities, which would ‘in limine' have deprived the Organization itself of any competence to seise the Court of it. (I.C.J. 1996a: 10-11)

In 1994, the United Nations General assembly adopted resolution 49/75K. “Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons" and transmitted a request for an advisory opinion to the ICJ in December 1994 (The Secretary-General of the UN 1994: 2).

On July 8th, 1996, the International Court of justice delivered its advisory opinion on the General Assembly of the United Nations' request ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'. The Court was composed of 15 judges. (I.C.J. 1996b). For my topic, the votes of the French judge Gilbert Guillaume, German judge Carl­August Fleischhauer, the Hungarian judge Géza Herczegh, the Italian judge Luigi Ferrari Bravo and the British judge Rosalyn Higgins, are considered important.

The Court's opinion on threatening to use nuclear force was according to Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter relating to the threat or use of force, which implies, if it is illegal to threaten to use force if the use of force mentioned in the threat is illegal itself. On the legality of nuclear weapons, the Court was not able to find an opinio juris on this matter due to the division of the international community on this matter but it pointed out that a great part of the international community supports prohibition of using nuclear forces. On the legality of nuclear weapons by humanitarian law, the Court found that nuclear weapons are being developed and renewed and that the humanitarian laws do not apply to these developed weapons because the weapons advocated by the proceedings. (I.C.J. 1996b)

Both judge Herczegh and judge Ferrari Bravo appended declarations to the advisory opinion, judge Guillaume and judge Fleischhauer appended separate opinions and judge Higgins appended dissenting opinions (I.C.J. 1996b). Judge Herczegh voted in favour of the advisory opinion especially paragraph 105 section E regarding the legality of the threat of using nuclear weapons. Judge Guillaume expressed his opinion that nuclear forces like any other forces should be only used in case of self-defence and that he doubts the applicability of International Humanitarian Law with the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons he claimed that the International law cannot deny a state the right to resort to nuclear weapons in cases where only nuclear weapons ensure its survival. Judge Higgins found that the Court did not apply the rules of humanitarian law transparently. (I.C.J. 1996b)

The seven passed votes:

I. The Court agreed on the request for an advisory opinion: 19. In view of what is stated above, the Court concludes that it has the authority to deliver an opinion on the question posed by the General Assembly, and that there exist no "compelling reasons" which would lead the Court to exercise its discretion not to do so. (I.C.J. 1996b: 238).
II. The Court decided “A. Unanimously, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”. (I.C.J. 1996b: 266);
III. B. By eleven votes to three, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such. (I.C.J. 1996b: 266);
IV. C. Unanimously, A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter⁹ and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51¹⁰, is unlawful. (I.C.J. 1996b: 266);
V. D. Unanimously, A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons. (I.C.J. 1996b: 266);
VI. E. By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However.. the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence. (I.C.J. 1996b: 266);
VII. “F. Unanimously, There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”. (I.C.J. 1996b: 267).

Conclusion

The European Union is a unique, one of a kind entity, it combines economic cooperation and political collaboration, civil norms and rights and great potentials for being a great power, it is both supranational and intergovernmental at the same time, it was even described as Hermaphrodite, an entity in-between. Thus, by looking at all the opinions on what kind of power the EU is, one notices that there is no harm in accepting all these opinions although they at some point contradict with each other, for all we know, the EU combines several sides that can contradict with each other, it is a supranational-intergovernmental entity, that contains smaller supranational entities.

At the beginning of the European Community, it was merely an economic cooperation in a period after and during major wars in Europe. Member-states had a specific vision of what they wanted the EU's power to be, the area of foreign defence and security was still only in the national hands and the EU played no role in it. Today the EU has changed, it is becoming more and more supranational, it transformed into a major actor in international affairs and depending on the situation the EU is dealing with, the EU has, in my opinion, a cluster of powers at its service to use, since the 1970 the EC/EU has been developed, new areas has been added to its capabilities and it is not anymore only a civilian power. The EU has now military troops under its control, these military troops though have been until today only used for civilising reasons like promoting human rights and democracy, but this is only because the EU always prefers resorting to civilian tools to solve conflicts and obstacles.

This work has shown that the EU is among other things a civilian power, the EU exerts efforts and money through its own policies and institutions as well as other international organisations to promote civilisation, democracy and human rights. This does not mean that EU or its member-states jeopardise their own security and resources to do so, it is only logic that the EU benefits as well, yet, this does not make the EU any less of a civilian power than it is.

The main focus of this research was on the EU's civilising efforts against the proliferation of WMD. Yet in the development of CFSP and its priority the proliferation of nuclear weapons, one key issue remains ignored: the question of European (still national) that is French and British nuclear weapons. Although both European member-states committed themselves to the NPT and the European Security Strategy, they come to somehow give very little and shallow attention to the disarmament commitment they agreed upon in the NPT. Although French and British nuclear weapons are still only national, they still affect the influence and reliability of the EU and its civilian power impact in the area of non­proliferation. When EU talks about non-proliferation and disarmament, it is seldom interested in non-proliferation and disarmament of its member-states' nuclear arsenals but in the disarmament of the ‘others' and ‘failed states' nuclear weapons.

Under Article 42 paragraph 3 in the Treaty on European Union:

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Paragraph 7 of Article 42 in the same treaty stipulates that:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

This means that if France or the United Kingdom wishes to use their ‘means of powers' that are nuclear weapons they shall do to defend fellow European states if necessary.

France declared on many occasions that it is ready to make its nuclear arsenals no more national but European deterrent and albeit European States contested the proposal, there is still the possibility of this happening and all member-states agreed upon this in one of the Lisbon Treaties.

The EU's demand of non-EU states to comply to their obligations towards the NPT can indeed be referred to as double standard, the little progress both France and the UK have shown in the area of non-proliferation of their nuclear arsenals surely affects EU's identity in this regard, although both countries mention their commitments to the NPT and eventually to completely remove their nuclear arsenals in their White Papers on Defence, they still refer to their nuclear forces as a part of their identities and a guarantee for their securities. This surely undermines the spirit of the NPT and might eventually cause in its failure.

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¹ 3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

² (c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

³ A conference established by the International Community to negotiate multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements.

⁴ Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II: A bilateral treaty between USA and Russia on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

⁵ Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III: Purposed for the continuance of efforts in START II to reduce nuclear weapons.

⁶ A treaty between USA and USSR to eliminate the ABM systems used as defence against missile-delivered nuclear weapons.

⁷ “The TACIS programme aims to promote the transition to a market economy and reinforce democracy and the rule of law in the partner states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.” (Summaries of EU legislation)

⁸ My translation (not literal translation) from the original quote: “ Auch wenn das Ziel einer gemeinsamen Verteidigungspolitik oder gar einer gemeinsamen Verteidigung noch in weiter Ferne liegt, können EU und WEU auf Dauer nicht einfach ignorieren, daß zwei ihrer Mitglieder Nuklearmächte sind und bleiben wollen. Zudem bliebe eine europäische Verteidigungsidentität ohne Einbeziehung der nuklearen Komponente unvollständig. Natürlich kann eine gemeinsame Abschreckung mit geteilter Verfügungsgewalt allenfalls am Ende des europäischen Einigungsprozesses stehen. Nur in einem supranationalen Europa wären die Asymmetrien in den nuklearen Rollen und Verantwortlichkeiten vollständig aufgehoben.”

⁹ 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Frequently asked questions

What is the main focus of the language preview?

The preview aims to analyze the themes present in the document, focusing on the discourse on civilian power Europe, the nuclear weapons possessed by France and the UK, and the EU's efforts in non-proliferation.

What topics are included in the Table of Contents?

The table of contents includes sections on the conceptualization of Europe as a civilian power, arms control and non-proliferation, European holders of nuclear weapons (France and the UK), Common Foreign and Security Policy, legality of nuclear weapons under international law, conclusion, and bibliography.

What is the main question the introduction aims to address?

The introduction seeks to address whether the EU is merely a civilian power and, if so, what the relationship is between the framing of Europe as a civilian power and the continuance of national nuclear deterrence within Europe.

How does the preview characterize civilian power Europe?

The preview discusses the concept of civilian power Europe, exploring its origins in the 1970s and how it is interpreted by scholars and politicians. It also contrasts this concept with alternative characterizations of the EU, such as normative power or a typical great power.

What is the EU's role in arms control and non-proliferation?

The preview outlines the EU's efforts in arms control and non-proliferation, including its role in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its policies. It discusses the historical background of these efforts and the EU's commitment to fighting against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

What is EURATOM's purpose?

EURATOM's purpose was to assure that the member-states would use nuclear only for peaceful ends. This treaty's non-proliferation aspect was effective with all member-states except for France who insisted on developing nuclear weapons.

What is the CFSP?

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a framework within the European Union that addresses joint European efforts against the proliferation of WMD. It has roots in the Maastricht Treaty and has been strengthened by subsequent treaties.

What is NPT?

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament. The EU plays a major role in promoting the NPT and issuing its own European policies against the proliferation of WMD.

What factors undermine the EU's effectiveness in non-proliferation?

Factors undermining the EU's effectiveness include differing opinions of disarmament and non-proliferation. Twenty-two EU members also belong to NATO. France and the UK hold nuclear forces. Other member-states host NATO nuclear weapons which can change the non-proliferation attitude of some EU members.

What does the preview detail regarding France's nuclear weapons?

The preview discusses France's nuclear weapons, including their historical development, strategic role, and modernization efforts. It also references the 2008 and 2013 White Papers on Defence and National Security, outlining France's commitment to nuclear deterrence and disarmament.

What does the preview detail regarding the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons?

The preview discusses the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons program dating back to 1947. It mentions the Trident II submarine and the independent nature of the nuclear deterrent. Also points out the modernisation efforts and the 2010 National Security Strategy.

What is the Franco-British Nuclear Cooperation?

The preview details the Franco-British nuclear cooperation, including the Lancaster House Treaties signed in 2010. These treaties focus on defence and security cooperation, emphasizing the importance of nuclear deterrence for both countries.

What is the concept of dissuasion concertée?

Dissuasion concertée translates to 'concerted deterrence'. Proponents of the concept suggest institutionalised consultations on nuclear strategy that would lead to a single European deterrent. It has faced opponents due to resistance from disarmament advocates and concerns of NATO members.

What does the preview state regarding the legality of nuclear weapons under international law?

The preview covers the legality of nuclear weapons under international law, referencing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the matter. It notes the divided opinions within the international community regarding the prohibition of nuclear forces.

What is the main conclusion presented in the preview?

The conclusion states that the EU combines several sides that can contradict with each other. The EU resorts to civilian tools to solve conflicts and is now a civilian power.