Masterarbeit, 2006
71 Seiten, Note: B+
I. INTRODUCTION
II. NEW ZEALAND’S APPROACH TO THE CODIFICATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. The New Zealand Corporate Market
B. Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines
C. NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code
D. Attracting International Investments
III. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 2002 – PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE STRCT RULE-BASED APPROACH
A. Introduction
B. Historical Context
C. Causes of the Market Failure
1. Introduction
2. Agency Costs
3. Bubble Atmosphere
4. Gatekeeper Failure
D. Brief Account of Regulations
1. Introduction
2. Scope of Application
3. Regulations
a. Internal Monitoring
b. Gatekeeper Regulation
c. Regulation of Insider Misconduct
4. Increase in Financial Disclosure
5. Fraud Liability
E. Evaluation of SOX
1. Introduction
2. Effectiveness of Regulations
a. Independent Directors
b. Whistleblowers
c. Gatekeeper Regulations
d. Increased Disclosure
e. Increased Liability
3. Higher Costs
a. Agency Costs
b. The Effect of Stricter Liability
c. Information Costs
4. Conclusion
IV. WHY COMPLY-OR-EXPLAIN – REASONS BEHIND THE SPATE OF INCORPORATIONS
A. Introduction
B. Reasons for Substantive Regulation
C. Advantages of Self-Regulation
1. The Theory of Free Markets
2. Free Markets in the Common Law World
3. Evaluation of the Principle-Based Approach in the light of the Free-Market Theory
a. Flexibility
b. Investor Education
c. Considering New Zealand Circumstances
d. Comply-or-Explain in New Zealand
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work evaluates whether New Zealand should adopt a rigid, rule-based corporate governance regime similar to the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), or if it should maintain its current voluntary, principle-based approach to foster long-term market health and investor confidence.
C. Causes of the Market Failure
According to Ribstein there are three reasons for the 2001/02 market failures. He describes them as agency costs, a “bubble atmosphere”, and a gatekeeper failure. This subsection explains these terms and their severe effect on the US securities market which made Enron and WorldCom inevitable.
The separation of ownership and control leads to so-called “agency costs”. Corporate managers function as agents of the shareholders who own the company. The main benefit of having non-owner managers is that passive owners are able to invest in diversified portfolios, leaving the risk of failure to the specific agent. These agents have, as Ribstein observes, “incentives to use their control [over the company] to benefit themselves rather than the owners”. Costs arising from supervising management and protecting owners as well as residual losses caused thereby are called “agency costs”. Since ownership is highly dispersed in most securities markets, the monitoring process is particularly impractical in listed public companies raising agency costs substantially. These costs are exacerbated by the “free-rider” mentality of minor shareholders who are either unwilling or unable to invest money and time in monitoring management. The Enron as well as the WorldCom case show indubitably the dilemma that may arise when owners put too much trust in their agents and lose their natural scepticism.
I. INTRODUCTION: This chapter highlights the significance of the stock market and the necessity of corporate governance rules to protect shareholder interests in the wake of major scandals like Enron.
II. NEW ZEALAND’S APPROACH TO THE CODIFICATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: This section portrays the current voluntary, principle-based corporate governance regime in New Zealand and emphasizes the need for regulations that match its specific, small-scale economic environment.
III. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 2002 – PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE STRCT RULE-BASED APPROACH: This part provides a deep critique of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, examining its historical context, regulatory provisions, and its failure to prevent accounting scandals due to its rigid nature.
IV. WHY COMPLY-OR-EXPLAIN – REASONS BEHIND THE SPATE OF INCORPORATIONS: This chapter argues for the advantages of a principle-based "comply-or-explain" approach, highlighting the inherent flexibility and market-responsiveness of such a system compared to statutory rules.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS: The final chapter summarizes the findings, arguing that New Zealand should refrain from adopting US-style mandatory rules and instead strengthen its principle-based framework with a mandatory enforcement tool.
Corporate Governance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX, New Zealand, Comply-or-Explain, Principle-based, Market Failure, Agency Costs, Gatekeeper Failure, Investor Confidence, Self-regulation, Securities Market, Financial Disclosure, Auditing, Free Market Theory
The paper examines whether New Zealand should implement a mandatory, rule-based corporate governance regime (modeled after the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act) or continue with its voluntary, principle-based system.
The key themes include the comparison of regulatory philosophies, the impact of market failures like Enron on global policy, the economic burden of compliance on small companies, and the role of market self-correction.
The objective is to determine if adopting SOX-like regulations would actually enhance market integrity in New Zealand or if it would be counter-productive, given the unique structure of the New Zealand economy.
The author performs a comparative legal and economic analysis, reviewing existing academic literature, corporate governance codes, and historical case studies of financial market failures.
The main body covers the theoretical frameworks of corporate governance, an evaluation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's effectiveness in the U.S., and the practical arguments for or against "comply-or-explain" enforcement mechanisms.
The core keywords include Corporate Governance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Comply-or-Explain, Agency Costs, Gatekeeper Failure, and New Zealand Market.
The author argues that gatekeepers (like auditors and lawyers) failed due to conflicting loyalties and a lack of independence in a highly competitive market, compounded by a "bubble atmosphere" of unrealistic optimism.
The author concludes that SOX imposes excessive costs on smaller companies, promotes conservative/risk-averse behavior that stifles innovation, and fails to be truly preventive, making it an unsuitable solution for New Zealand's unique market conditions.
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