Masterarbeit, 2005
108 Seiten, Note: 2,3
1 Introduction
2 Corruption Theory
2.1 DEFINITION AND NATURE
2.2 SCOPE AND FORMS OF CORRUPTION
2.3 IS CORRUPTION MEASURABLE?
2.4 CAUSES
2.5 COSTS
2.6 IS CORRUPTION ALWAYS BAD?
3 Anti-Corruption Programmes
3.1 REQUIREMENTS
3.2 TYPES
3.3 COMBATING CORRUPTION IN BULGARIA
3.3.1 EXTENT OF CORRUPTION
3.3.2 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CAUSES
3.3.3 REFORM PROGRAMMES
3.3.4 PLAYERS AND INVOLVEMENT
3.3.5 OBSTACLES, WEAKNESSES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
3.4 COMBATING CORRUPTION IN ROMANIA
3.4.1 EXTENT OF CORRUPTION
3.4.2 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CAUSES
3.4.3 REFORM PROGRAMMES
3.4.4 PLAYERS AND INVOLVEMENT
3.4.5 Obstacles, Weaknesses and Future Challenges
3.5 COMBATING CORRUPTION IN TURKEY
3.5.1 EXTENT OF CORRUPTION
3.5.2 COUNTRY SPECIFIC CAUSES
3.5.3 REFORM PROGRAMMES
3.5.4 PLAYERS AND INVOLVEMENT
3.5.5 OBSTACLES, WEAKNESSES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
4 Can Turkey learn from Bulgaria and Romania?
4.1 THE QUESTION OF COMPARABILITY
4.1.1 IS THE SITUATION COMPARABLE?
4.1.2 ARE THE PROGRAMMES COMPARABLE?
4.2 DIFFERENCES AND LEARNING EFFECTS
4.3 WHAT IS THE BEST STRATEGY FOR REFORM PROGRAMMES IN TURKEY?
5 Conclusion
The main question of this thesis is whether Turkey can learn from the anti-corruption efforts of Bulgaria and Romania, given that all three are in the process of EU accession. The research analyzes whether the situational and programmatic contexts of these countries are comparable enough to derive lessons that could inform a suitable anti-corruption strategy for Turkey.
2.1 DEFINITION AND NATURE
Corruption is commonly defined as the use (or abuse) of public office for private gain. By defining the notion closer, we find that it is an illegal action between at least one public employee and at least one non-public player. An important pre-condition is that the official holds a high position which gives him discretionary power and thus a monopoly in economic terms. A corrupt transaction can be regarded as a trade which occurs voluntarily or by using force and is agreed by the at least two involved players. The transaction bears high risks for both players.
A monetary or similar gain from this illegal behavior has to be weighed with certain factors like the moral/psychological fear of getting caught, losing the position or job, etc. Corruption is often reduced to bribery, but this ignores theft of public resources. These resources can be diminished, for instance, by a public official who unrightfully claims that he is sick or by a minister’s use of state owned airplanes for reaching his holiday domicile. The number of potential players in this trade is limited due to moral market entry barriers, which construes a subjective criterion in order to initiate a trade. Furthermore, the public official has to possess a tradable asset as an objective criterion and the counterpart has to be equipped with sufficient return. The clandestine process and the relatively low number of potential players results in huge costs in order to find an appropriate counterpart if it is a single transaction. The involved parties are furthermore deterred by controls inside the organization which leads to a principal-agent problem. Corruption markets tend towards bilateral monopolies due to the fear of being discovered.
1 Introduction: Introduces the study's timeframe (mid-90s to 2005) and the core objective of assessing whether Turkey can learn from the anti-corruption experiences of Bulgaria and Romania.
2 Corruption Theory: Establishes the theoretical framework, defining corruption, its forms (bribery, embezzlement, etc.), causes, and economic costs, while questioning whether corruption can ever be beneficial.
3 Anti-Corruption Programmes: Provides an overview of anti-corruption requirements and types, followed by detailed, separate analyses of the corruption landscape and reform efforts in Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.
4 Can Turkey learn from Bulgaria and Romania?: Examines the comparability of the three countries' situations and programs, identifies differences and learning effects, and proposes a strategic approach for Turkey.
5 Conclusion: Summarizes the findings, affirming that Turkey can indeed learn from its counterparts, particularly regarding the need for an overall, long-term, and sustained anti-corruption strategy.
Corruption, Anti-Corruption, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, EU Accession, Public Sector, Reform Programmes, Bribery, Embezzlement, Political Commitment, Civil Society, Transparency, Institution Building, Governance
The core question is whether Turkey can draw lessons from the anti-corruption efforts of Bulgaria and Romania to improve its own strategies, assuming that a general comparability between the three nations can be established.
The work covers the theory of corruption, specific national anti-corruption programs, the influence of EU and NATO accession processes, and the comparative analysis of political, economic, and institutional factors in the three countries.
The methodology is primarily based on a programmatic comparison. This involves analyzing national perspectives—including the extent of corruption, causes, key players, and specific obstacles—to gain a comprehensive picture before addressing the overall research question in a final synthesis.
The study argues that Turkey currently lacks a cohesive, long-term anti-corruption strategy, relying instead on piecemeal legislative reforms. It suggests adopting a more holistic approach, similar to the "omnibus" strategies seen in Bulgaria and Romania, involving political consensus and independent oversight bodies.
Corruption is defined as the use, or abuse, of public office for private gain, characterized as an illegal transaction between at least one public employee and at least one non-public player, typically involving the abuse of discretionary power.
It is the argument that bribery can potentially act as an efficient tool to bypass burdensome regulations and ineffective legal codes in countries with poor regulatory environments, though the author notes that this view is contested and often leads to further corruption.
Parliamentary immunity is identified as a major obstacle to "frying big fishes," as it protects high-level officials and ministers from prosecution, thereby undermining the credibility of the government's anti-corruption claims and allowing alleged corrupt acts to remain uninvestigated.
The EU acts as a primary driving force through its accession requirements. By assessing progress in regular reports, it sets benchmarks and demands transparency and institutional reforms, which significantly accelerate the implementation of anti-corruption measures in candidate countries.
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