Bachelorarbeit, 2008
53 Seiten, Note: 1,9
1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Definition
1.2 Research Objectives
1.3 Course of Investigation
2 Setting the Family Business Framework
2.1 Definitions of Family Business
2.1.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Dimension
2.1.2 Family and Firm Dimension
2.2 Theories for Governing Family Enterprises
3 Setting the Performance Framework
3.1 Determining Performance according to Theory
3.1.1 Owner-Manager Conflict
3.1.2 Majority-Minority Conflict
3.2 Definition of Performance
3.3 Agency Conflicts in Family Enterprises
4 Setting the Financial Framework
4.1 Theories of Capital Structure, Investments and Finance
4.2 Investing Capital
4.3 Funding Capital
4.3.1 Empirical Evidence for Financing of Family Enterprises
4.3.2 Modern Financing Instruments and Family Enterprises
4.4 Managing Capital
4.4.1 Financial Management Techniques
4.4.2 Risk Management
5 Summary and Conclusion
This thesis investigates whether the unique governance structures of family enterprises, when examined through the lens of Agency Theory, contribute to competitive advantages from a financial perspective, specifically focusing on capital funding, investment, and management strategies.
3.3 Agency Conflicts in Family Enterprises
It has become clear that three questions need to be answered in order to assess the influence of agency conflicts on family performance.
Firstly, the owner-manager and the majority-minority conflict have to be looked upon separately. Secondly, it needs to be examined what the theories described imply for the family business performance and what they suggest for the strength and direction of each conflict. Finally, the result for conflict I has to be compared to the result of conflict II and an overall conclusion has to be drawn about the empirically observable influence of agency conflicts on family businesses performance.
The two conflicts exhibit different levels of influence on firm performance. Family enterprises tend to be affected more by a majority-minority conflict and less by an owner-manager conflict. Ownership and control often fall together in family enterprises. The goals of the manager and the owner are thus identical which reduces monitoring and other contracting costs to a very low level in the case of agency conflict I.
1 Introduction: This chapter defines the research problem, objectives, and the scope of the study regarding the performance of family enterprises compared to their non-family counterparts.
2 Setting the Family Business Framework: This chapter reviews definitions of family businesses and identifies key governance theories, providing a foundation for understanding the family-enterprise system.
3 Setting the Performance Framework: This chapter establishes how performance is determined by theory and explores how agency conflicts specifically impact family firms.
4 Setting the Financial Framework: This chapter examines capital structure, investing strategies, funding sources, and management techniques from a financial perspective within family businesses.
5 Summary and Conclusion: This chapter synthesizes the research findings and concludes that while family enterprises may benefit from lower agency costs at the investment level, they often lag behind in modern capital management practices.
Family Enterprises, Agency Theory, Performance, Capital Structure, Financial Management, Investment Strategy, Funding, Ownership, Governance, Shareholder Value, Risk Management, Competitive Advantage, SMEs, Patient Capital, Profitability
The thesis explores the financial performance and competitive advantages of family enterprises compared to non-family firms by applying Agency Theory to their governance and financial strategies.
The work covers definitions of family businesses, performance frameworks, capital structure theories, investment behavior, funding sources, and financial management practices.
The study seeks to determine whether activities in funding, investing, and managing capital in family enterprises can explain their observed competitive advantages and performance superiority.
The thesis utilizes a literature-based theoretical analysis, combining Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, and empirical findings to examine the financial perspective of family firms.
The main part analyzes the "family enterprise premium puzzle," modern versus traditional financing instruments, and capital management techniques like risk assessment and financial planning.
Key terms include Agency Theory, family enterprise performance, capital structure, shareholder value, and patient capital.
In family firms, the unity of ownership and control often reduces owner-manager (Agency Conflict I) costs, although potential majority-minority (Agency Conflict II) conflicts may remain significant.
Resistance often stems from the desire to retain family control, a lack of familiarity with modern financial terms, and potential "cultural clashes" between family owners and external investors.
Family firms often prioritize long-term entrepreneurial legacy over short-term capital market evaluation, allowing them to engage in investment projects that others might avoid.
It refers to the pooled financial resources of the family, which provides a competitive advantage by protecting the enterprise from economic downturns and funding new ventures.
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